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The New Climate Economy 
The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, and its flagship project The New Climate Economy, were set  
up to help governments, businesses and society make better-informed decisions on how to achieve economic prosperity 
and development while also addressing climate change.
This programme of work was commissioned in 2013 by the governments of seven countries: Colombia, Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, Norway, South Korea, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The Commission has operated as an independent 
body and, while benefiting from the support of the seven governments, has been given full freedom to reach its  
own conclusions.
The Commission’s programme of work has been conducted by a global partnership of eight leading research institutes: 
World Resources Institute (WRI, Managing Partner), Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), Ethiopian Development Research 
Institute (EDRI), Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations 
(ICRIER), LSE Cities, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and Tsinghua University.
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The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate
The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate has overseen the New Climate Economy project. Chaired by  
former President of Mexico Felipe Calderón, the Commission comprises former heads of government and finance 
ministers, and leaders in the fields of economics, business and finance.
Members of the Global Commission endorse the general thrust of the arguments, findings, and recommendations  
made in this report, but should not be taken as agreeing with every word or number. They serve on the Commission in  
a personal capacity. The institutions with which they are affiliated have therefore not been asked formally to endorse  
the report and should not be taken as having done so.
Felipe Calderón, Former President of Mexico (Chair)
Nicholas Stern, I G Patel Chair of Economics and 
Government, London School of Economics and Political 
Science (Co-Chair); President, British Academy
Ingrid Bonde, Chief Finance Officer and Deputy Chief 
Executive Officer, Vattenfall AB
Sharan Burrow, General Secretary, International Trade 
Union Confederation
Chen Yuan, Vice-Chair, National Committee of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference; 
former Chairman, China Development Bank
Helen Clark, Administrator, United Nations Development 
Program; former Prime Minister of New Zealand
Luísa Diogo, Former Prime Minister of Mozambique
Dan L. Doctoroff, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Bloomberg LP
S. Gopalakrishan, Executive Vice-Chairman,  
INFOSYS; President, Confederation of Indian Industry
Angel Gurría, Secretary-General, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development
Chad Holliday, Chairman, Bank of America
Paul Polman, Chief Executive Officer, Unilever; Chair, 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development
Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Managing Director and Chief 
Operating Officer, World Bank; former Finance Minister 
of Indonesia
Caio Koch-Weser, Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; 
Chair, Supervisory Board of the European  
Climate Foundation
Ricardo Lagos, Former President of Chile
Michel M. Liès, Chief Executive Officer, Swiss Re
Trevor Manuel, Former Finance Minister of  
South Africa
Takehiko Nakao, President, Asian Development Bank
Eduardo Paes, Mayor of Rio de Janeiro; Chair, C40 Cities 
Climate Leadership Group
Annise Parker, Mayor of Houston, Texas
Nemat Shafik, Deputy Governor, Bank of England; former 
Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund 
(until June 2014)
Jens Stoltenberg, United Nations Secretary-General’s 
Special Envoy on Climate Change; former Prime Minister 
of Norway
Maria van der Hoeven, Executive Director, International 
Energy Agency
Zhu Levin, President and Chief Executive Officer, China 
International Capital Corporation 
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The Economics Advisory Panel
The project was advised by a panel of distinguished economists, leaders in their respective disciplines. While the 
Economics Advisory Panel (EAP) has provided valuable guidance that has influenced the work of the Commission, 
they were not asked to formally endorse the report and should not be taken as having done so. Their wide-ranging 
contributions are described in “Theories and perspectives on growth and change: Guidance from the Economics Advisory 
Panel to the report of the Commission” by Nicholas Stern, published as part of this report.
Nicholas Stern (Chair), I G Patel Chair of Economics and 
Government, London School of Economics and Political 
Science; President, British Academy
Philippe Aghion, Robert C Waggoner Professor of 
Economics, Harvard University
Isher Judge Ahluwalia, Chairperson, Indian Council for 
Research on International Economic Relations
Kaushik Basu, Senior Vice President and Chief 
Economist, World Bank
Ottmar Edenhofer, Professor of the Economics of 
Climate Change, Technical University of Berlin
Fan Gang, Director of the National Economic Research 
Institute, China
Ross Garnaut, Distinguished Professor of Economics, 
Australian National University 
Benno Ndulu, Governor, Central Bank of Tanzania
Daniel Kahneman, Professor of Psychology and Public 
Affairs Emeritus, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton 
University, and Nobel Laureate
Ian Parry, Principal Environmental Fiscal Policy Expert, 
International Monetary Fund 
Carlota Perez, Professor of Technology and Socio-
Economic Development, Tallinn University of Technology; 
and Centennial Professor, London School of Economics 
and Political Science
Torsten Persson, Professor of Economics, Institute of 
International Economic Studies, Stockholm University
Dani Rodrik, Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social 
Science, Institute for Advanced Study
Michael Spence, Professor of Economics, New York 
University, and Nobel Laureate
Rintaro Tamaki, Deputy Secretary General, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development
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All over the world, people want to achieve better lives for 
themselves and for their children. Governments want to 
secure economic growth, improve living standards, create 
jobs and reduce poverty. Businesses want to expand and 
become more profitable. 
Today we also know that the world must deal with the 
challenge of climate change. 
Can these aspirations all be met at the same time? Is it 
possible to tackle long-term climate change while also, 
now, promoting economic growth and development?  
Or must we choose between our future security and  
our current living standards? 
It was to provide an objective, independent examination 
of these questions that the Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate was established in 2013 by a group 
of seven countries. 
Our report is addressed to economic decision-makers 
across the world in both public and private sectors. Its 
core conclusion is that, by shaping the major processes of 
structural and technological change now occurring in the 
global economy, we can create lasting economic growth 
while also tackling the immense risks of climate change.
We are extremely grateful to the governments of 
Colombia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom for their vision 
and support. They have given us freedom in conducting 
our work, and the findings and recommendations in this 
report are entirely independent of them.
The Commission is made up of 24 former heads  
of government and finance ministers, and leaders  
of businesses, cities, international organisations, and 
research institutions. Their wealth of experience gives 
confidence that our research has been grounded in 
reality, and that the recommendations of this report 
can be implemented. The Commission has been advised 
by a panel of 15 distinguished economists, all of them 
world leaders in their respective economic disciplines.
Their diverse perspectives on the economics of growth, 
development and structural transformation, public policy, 
risk and economic history have guided the project’s 
intellectual approach.
The research programme has been conducted by  
a dedicated team, supported by a partnership of  
economic and policy research institutions from five 
continents. The work has drawn on extensive engagement 
with economic decision-makers in governments, states, 
cities, communities, companies, trade unions, international 
organisations and financial institutions throughout the 
world. Over 100 organisations have actively contributed 
to the work of the Commission through research  
papers, data, team members, feedback, advice and 
support. This report therefore reflects the insights and 
experience of many institutions and experts. We are 
grateful to all of them. 
The issues dealt with in this report could not be more 
important. Almost every country today faces difficult 
economic problems. Climate change is an unprecedented 
challenge that confronts the world as a whole. The 
10-point Global Action Plan we propose in this report can 
help catalyse action to achieve both better growth and  
a better climate. It proposes practical measures which  
can be taken not just by national governments, but by 
cities and regional authorities, businesses, communities 
and international organisations. The Commission and 
the New Climate Economy project remain committed to 
engaging further with all those interested in these issues. 
The need is urgent, for decisions made today and over 
the next few years will determine the future course of 
both economic growth and climate change. World leaders 
will come together in 2015 to decide on new goals for 
sustainable development and to achieve a new climate 
agreement. At home they will continue to make vital 
economic decisions. As they do so, we hope they will 
consider seriously the research and recommendations 
presented in this report. 
Preface
FELIPE CALDERÓN 
Chair of the  
Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate
JEREMY OPPENHEIM
Global Programme  
Director of the New Climate 
Economy project
NICHOLAS  STERN
Co-Chair of the Global 
Commission and Chair of the 
Economics Advisory Panel
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The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate  
was set up to examine whether it is possible to achieve 
lasting economic growth while also tackling the risks of 
climate change. 
Its report seeks to inform economic decision-makers 
in both public and private sectors, many of whom 
recognise the serious risks caused by climate change, 
but also need to tackle more immediate concerns such 
as jobs, competitiveness and poverty. The report brings 
together evidence and analysis, learning from the practical 
experience of countries, cities and businesses across  
the world.
The report’s conclusion is that countries at all levels 
of income now have the opportunity to build lasting 
economic growth at the same time as reducing the 
immense risks of climate change. This is made possible 
by structural and technological changes unfolding in the 
global economy and opportunities for greater economic 
efficiency. The capital for the necessary investments is 
available, and the potential for innovation is vast. What 
is needed is strong political leadership and credible, 
consistent policies.
The next 15 years will be critical, as the global economy 
undergoes a deep structural transformation. It will not  
be “business as usual”. The global economy will grow by 
more than half, a billion more people will come to live in 
cities, and rapid technological advance will continue to 
change businesses and lives. Around US$90 trillion is likely 
to be invested in infrastructure in the world’s urban, land 
use and energy systems. How these changes are managed 
will shape future patterns of growth, productivity and 
living standards. 
The next 15 years of investment will also determine the 
future of the world’s climate system. Climate change 
caused by past greenhouse gas emissions is already 
having serious economic consequences, especially in more 
exposed areas of the world. Without stronger action in 
the next 10-15 years, which leads global emissions to peak 
and then fall, it is near certain that global average warming 
will exceed 2°C, the level the international community has 
agreed not to cross. On current trends, warming could 
exceed 4°C by the end of the century, with extreme and 
potentially irreversible impacts. By building up greenhouse 
gas concentrations and locking in the stock of high-carbon 
assets, delay in reducing emissions makes it progressively 
more expensive to shift towards a low-carbon economy. 
Future economic growth does not have to copy the 
high-carbon, unevenly distributed model of the past. 
There is now huge potential to invest in greater efficiency, 
structural transformation and technological change in 
three key systems of the economy:
• Cities are engines of economic growth. They generate 
around 80% of global economic output, and around 
70% of global energy use and energy-related GHG 
emissions. How the world’s largest and fastest-
growing cities develop will be critical to the future 
path of the global economy and climate. But much 
urban growth today is unplanned and unstructured, 
with significant economic, social and environmental 
costs. As pioneering cities across the world are 
demonstrating, more compact and connected urban 
development, built around mass public transport, 
can create cities that are economically dynamic 
and healthier, and that have lower emissions. Such 
an approach to urbanisation could reduce urban 
infrastructure capital requirements by more than 
US$3 trillion over the next 15 years. 
• Land use productivity will determine whether the 
world can feed a population projected to grow to 
over eight billion by 2030, while sustaining natural 
environments. Food production can be increased, 
forests protected and land use emissions cut by 
raising crop and livestock productivity, using new 
technologies and comprehensive approaches to soil 
and water management. Restoring just 12% of the 
world’s degraded agricultural land could feed 200 
million people by 2030, while also strengthening 
climate resilience and reducing emissions. Slowing 
down and ultimately halting deforestation can be 
achieved if strong international support is combined 
with strong domestic commitment to forest 
protection and rural income development. 
• Energy systems power growth in all economies. We 
are on the cusp of a clean energy future. Coal is riskier 
and more expensive than it used to be, with growing 
import dependence and rising air pollution. Rapidly 
falling costs, particularly of wind and solar power, 
could lead renewable and other low-carbon energy 
sources to account for more than half of all new 
electricity generation over the next 15 years.  
Greater investment in energy efficiency – in 
businesses, buildings and transport – has huge 
potential to cut and manage demand. In developing 
countries, decentralised renewables can help provide 
electricity for the more than one billion people 
without access. 
Across all these systems, three “drivers of change” need to 
be harnessed to overcome market, policy and institutional 
barriers to low-carbon growth: 
• Raising resource efficiency is at the heart of both 
growth and emissions reduction. In many economies, 
both market and policy failures distort the efficient 
allocation of resources while simultaneously 
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increasing emissions. While subsidies for clean 
energy amount to around US$100 billion, subsidies 
to polluting fossil fuels are now estimated at around 
US$600 billion per year. Phasing out fossil fuel 
subsidies can improve growth and release resources 
that can be reallocated to benefit people on low 
incomes. A strong and predictable price on carbon 
will drive higher energy productivity and provide 
new fiscal revenues, which can be used to cut other 
taxes. Well-designed regulations, such as higher 
performance standards for appliances and vehicles, 
are also needed. 
• Investment in infrastructure underpins modern 
economic growth. Low-carbon forms of infrastructure 
are essential to reduce current emissions trajectories. 
Yet many economies today are failing to mobilise 
sufficient finance to meet their infrastructure 
needs. This is not due to a shortage of capital in the 
global economy. It results, in many countries, from 
a lack of public financing capacity and the market 
perception that investments are high-risk. Financial 
innovations, including green bonds, risk-sharing 
instruments and products which align the risk profile 
of low-carbon assets with the needs of investors, can 
reduce financing costs, potentially by up to 20% for 
low-carbon electricity. National and international 
development banks should be strengthened  
and expanded.
• Stimulating innovation in technologies, business 
models and social practices can drive both growth  
and emissions reduction. Advances in digitisation,  
new materials, life sciences and production 
processes have the potential to transform markets 
and dramatically cut resource consumption. But 
technology will not automatically advance in a low-
carbon direction. It requires clear policy signals, 
including the reduction of market and regulatory 
barriers to new technologies and business models, 
and well-targeted public expenditure. To help create 
the next wave of resource-efficient, low-carbon 
technologies, public research and development (R&D) 
investment in the energy sector should triple to well 
over US$100 billion a year by the mid-2020s. 
Well-designed policies in these fields can make growth 
and climate objectives mutually reinforcing in both 
the short and medium term. In the long term, if climate 
change is not tackled, growth itself will be at risk.
Consistent, credible, long-term policy signals are crucial. 
By shaping market expectations, such policy encourages 
greater investment, lowering the costs of the transition 
to a low-carbon economy. By contrast, policy uncertainty 
in many countries has raised the cost of capital, damaging 
investment, jobs and growth. In the long run, there is a 
significant risk that high-carbon investments may get 
devalued or “stranded” as action to reduce greenhouse  
gas emissions is strengthened. The quality of growth 
matters, as well as its rate.  
Many low-carbon policies deliver multiple other benefits, 
including greater energy security, less traffic congestion, 
improved quality of life, stronger resilience to climate 
change and environmental protection. Many can help 
reduce poverty. In the 15 countries with the highest 
greenhouse gas emissions, the damage to health from 
poor air quality, largely associated with the burning of 
fossil fuels, is valued at an average of over 4% of GDP. 
Many countries are now recognising the costs of a  
high-carbon model of development. 
Managed well, the additional investments in 
infrastructure needed to make the transition to a  
low-carbon economy will be modest. The infrastructure 
requirements for a high-carbon economy, across 
transport, energy, water systems and cities, are  
estimated at around US$90 trillion, or an average of  
US$6 trillion per year over the next 15 years. By 
combining renewable energy with reduced fossil fuel 
investment, more compact cities, and more efficiently 
managed energy demand, low-carbon infrastructure will 
increase investment requirements by only an estimated 
US$270 billion a year. These higher capital costs could 
potentially be fully offset by lower operating costs, for 
example from reduced expenditure on fuel. Investing in a 
low-carbon economy is a cost-effective form of insurance 
against climate risk. 
The report proposes a 10-point Global Action Plan of key 
recommendations. This asks decision-makers to:
1. Accelerate low-carbon transformation by 
integrating climate into core economic decision-
making processes. This is needed at all levels of 
government and business, through systematic 
changes to policy and project assessment tools, 
performance indicators, risk models and reporting 
requirements. 
2. Enter into a strong, lasting and equitable 
international climate agreement, to increase the 
confidence needed for domestic policy reform, 
provide the support needed by developing countries, 
and send a strong market signal to investors. 
3. Phase out subsidies for fossil fuels and agricultural 
inputs, and incentives for urban sprawl, to drive more 
efficient use of resources and release public funds for 
other uses, including programmes to benefit those on 
low incomes.
4. Introduce strong, predictable carbon prices as part 
of good fiscal reform and good business practice, 
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sending strong signals across the economy.
5. Substantially reduce capital costs for low-carbon 
infrastructure investments, expanding access to 
institutional capital and lowering its costs for low-
carbon assets.
6. Scale up innovation in key low-carbon and climate-
resilient technologies, tripling public investment 
in clean energy R&D and removing barriers to 
entrepreneurship and creativity.
7. Make connected and compact cities the preferred 
form of urban development, by encouraging better-
managed urban growth and prioritising investments in 
efficient and safe mass transit systems.
8. Stop deforestation of natural forests by 2030, by 
strengthening the incentives for long-term investment 
and forest protection, and increasing international 
funding to around US$5 billion per year, progressively 
linked to performance.
9. Restore at least 500 million hectares of lost or 
degraded forests and agricultural lands by 2030, 
strengthening rural incomes and food security. 
10. Accelerate the shift away from polluting coal-fired 
power generation, phasing out new unabated coal 
plants in developed economies immediately and in 
middle-income countries by 2025.
The first six recommendations provide the conditions 
necessary for a strong and credible framework to foster 
low-carbon and climate-resilient investment and growth.  
The last four point to vital opportunities for change which 
can drive future growth and lower climate risk in cities, 
land use and energy systems. 
Implementation of the policies and investments 
proposed in this report could deliver at least half of 
the reductions in emissions needed by 2030 to lower 
the risk of dangerous climate change. With strong and 
broad implementation, rapid learning and sharing of best 
practice, this number could potentially rise to 90%.  
All the measures would deliver multiple economic and 
social benefits, even before considering their benefits 
to climate. Further action will also be required. Some of 
this, such as the development of carbon capture, use and 
storage technologies, will have net costs to be borne solely 
for the purpose of reducing climate risk. Beyond 2030 net 
global emissions will need to fall further towards near  
zero or below in the second half of the century. But the 
costs will be much lower and the opportunities for growth 
much greater if the foundations of a low-carbon economy 
are laid now. 
A strong and equitable international agreement 
is essential to support ambitious domestic action. 
Developed countries will need to show leadership through 
their own strong emissions reductions, and by mobilising 
financial and technological support for developing 
countries. At the same time, developing countries already 
account for around two-thirds of annual greenhouse gas 
emissions. Global reductions on the scale required  
will therefore not be possible unless all countries play  
their part.
The shift towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient 
path of growth and development will not be easy, and 
governments will need to commit to a just transition. 
Not all climate policies are win-win, and some trade-offs 
are inevitable, particularly in the short term. Although 
many jobs will be created, and there will be larger 
markets and profits for many businesses, some jobs will 
also be lost, particularly in high-carbon sectors. The 
human and economic costs of the transition should be 
managed through support for displaced workers, affected 
communities and low-income households. Strong political 
leadership and the active participation of civil society  
will be needed, along with far-sighted, enlightened 
business decisions. 
The wealth of evidence presented by the report shows 
that there is now huge scope for action which can 
both enhance growth and reduce climate risk. Leading 
businesses, cities and countries are showing how this can 
be done. The world’s economic leaders face a remarkable 
opportunity to set the world on the path to sustainable 
prosperity. The prize is immense, and the moment of 
decision is now. We can achieve both better growth  
and a better climate. 
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Theories and Perspectives on Growth and Change: Guidance from the 
Economics Advisory Panel for the Report of the Commission
The core argument of this report, entitled, “Better 
Growth, Better Climate”, is that by investing in and 
building “better growth” we can make great strides 
towards managing the immense risks of climate change, 
and thus build a “better climate”. In other words, fostering 
strong and sustainable growth in living standards can and 
should come together with a fundamental reduction in 
climate risk. That progress relative to these two objectives 
can support each other so well is, in large measure, 
because over the next two decades we have a remarkable 
coincidence of two vital transitions in world history. 
The first is in the structure of the world’s economy and 
society. This will embody: a rapidly shifting balance in the 
source of economic activity from developed to developing 
countries; great moves of population into cities; rapid 
growth of population; significant changes in the ways we 
generate and use energy; movement out of agriculture in 
to (mainly) services; and still further pressure on forests, 
land and water. The second is a decisive two decades for a 
transition to a low-carbon economy which will determine 
whether or not we can avoid the immense risks of climate 
change. The first transition will happen come what may. 
The second is a fundamental choice of our generation. 
The central argument of this report, and the key insight 
that has shaped the analysis, is that if we manage the first 
transition well, we will have made great strides towards 
success in the second. If the first goes badly, the second 
will be much more difficult. We are at a fork in the road. 
We have been brought to this point by a remarkable 
period in the economic history of the world. The last three 
decades have seen two decades of strong growth, driven 
in large measure by the emerging market economies, 
followed by the greatest financial and economic crisis in 
almost a century in the rich countries. In these decades, 
the international division of economic activity has been 
transformed. In 1985, the rich countries with 1 billion out 
of a world population of then 5 billion, had around two-
thirds of the world’s output (PPP, current international $), 
whereas now they have less than half. The shares of global 
carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions have followed a similar 
track. In 1985, rich countries accounted for more than 
half of annual global CO
2
 emissions, whereas now they 
emit around a third. Whilst poverty in all its dimensions 
remains deeply troubling across the world, this period has 
seen life expectancy rise steeply and hundreds of millions 
have been lifted out of poverty. Demand for resources 
has risen sharply. Technological change in information and 
communications, in materials, and in biotechnology has 
been extraordinary.
The financial and economic crises in rich countries have 
contributed to faltering world growth. China, the most 
powerful driver of growth in the last three decades, is 
recognising that its growth will slow. At the same time 
China’s policy-makers also recognise that the pattern and 
structure of their growth should change to become more 
sustainable. Developing and emerging countries continue 
to see economic growth and its role in overcoming 
poverty as central to their development ambitions. The 
last quarter of a century has also brought a deepening 
understanding of the challenges of climate change, with 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
founded in 1988, and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992.
The great economic questions of the coming years will 
be whether the world can continue the story of growth 
and poverty reduction, manage the further structural 
transformations which are in train, and tackle the immense 
and growing potential risks of climate change. Thus the 
report is about the next fundamental transformation of 
the world economy which follows from and is shaped by 
the great transformations of the preceding quarter of 
a century. At the heart of this next transformation, and 
where we will make our key choices, are our cities, energy 
systems and land use. 
The rapid changes of the last three decades were part of 
long-term trends of economic history, but the acceleration 
was remarkable. Change in the next few decades will no 
doubt be different and there will be many surprises. But 
we can be fairly confident of the following: cities will grow 
rapidly and older cities will require reform and renewal; 
energy systems will be created as many countries pass 
through stages of development when energy demand will 
grow strongly and richer countries will refurbish their 
systems; and many of the battles to save and enhance 
forests and ecosystems will be resolved in the face of 
strong pressures from growth of population and demand 
for materials, food and water. Our decisions, for better or 
worse, implicit or explicit, considered or haphazard, will 
shape our cities, energy systems and land use for decades 
or centuries. 
These next few decades are critical for climate change 
because, as a result of rapid hydrocarbon powered growth 
and the destruction of forests, we have already reached 
atmospheric concentrations of 400 parts per million (ppm) 
of CO
2
 or around 450ppm of CO
2
 equivalent (taking 
account of other greenhouse gases). If the world stays 
substantially above those levels for a long time it will be 
difficult or impossible to have a reasonable (say 50-50) 
chance of holding global average surface temperature 
to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This is the level above 
which, in the words of the UNFCCC, climate change 
becomes dangerous, partly because the risk of tipping 
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points and destabilising feedbacks increases strongly. 
We currently appear to be on a course which could take 
the world to 4°C or more, temperatures not seen for 
tens of millions of years. The consequences in terms of 
catastrophic events, desertification, flooding, sea-level 
rise and so on could cause hundreds of millions of people, 
perhaps billions, to move, likely resulting in extended and 
severe conflict. 
Delay is dangerous because the principal greenhouse 
gas, CO
2
, is so long-lived and concentrations are very 
difficult to reduce. Furthermore, much of the relevant 
infrastructure and capital is long-lasting and, in a period 
of rapidly growing energy demand, we risk “locking-in” 
high-carbon equipment and structures. That the “window 
for action” is closing has been emphasised strongly by 
a number of international institutions including the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World Bank.  
The coinciding of these two transitions is both a challenge 
and an opportunity. The report shows that putting the 
response to these two challenges together offers a real 
chance of success on both. And in so doing it demonstrates 
that we have an extraordinary opportunity for growth, 
poverty-reduction, and a much more attractive and 
sustainable way of consuming, producing and living. That 
opportunity comes not just from the coinciding of the two 
transformations, but also from the very rapid advances 
in technology that we have seen in recent decades. For 
example, the extraordinary advances in information 
and communications technology (ICT) have enormous 
potential for resource efficiency and fostering further 
innovation. Furthermore, experience with various policies, 
such as carbon pricing, has taught us many lessons. We 
understand better, from both successes and failures, how 
to manage the kind of change experienced over the last 
few decades. And we can be confident that the technical 
advances we have seen, and that are on the way, will 
generate great further opportunities. 
Failure to foster growth and poverty reduction, and to 
manage structural change will prevent the coherent 
global action necessary to manage climate change. 
Failure to manage climate change will undermine and 
potentially reverse the development achievements and 
poverty reduction of the last few decades. If we fail on 
one, we fail on the other. Will we behave in a way to seize 
opportunities for growth, and growth that is sustainable? I 
hope that the report will help steer us towards a  
positive answer.
It is this overall understanding and definition of the 
challenges of the next two or three decades, based on the 
analyses and lessons of economics and economic history, 
particularly of the last two or three decades, that have 
shaped the guidance given by the Economics Advisory 
Panel (EAP), which has advised the Commission. The 
EAP has not written the report, but its distinguished 
and independent economists have provided counsel 
and guidance, and have brought an extraordinary range 
of insight, talent and perspectives to it. Furthermore, 
the range of experience in different kinds of economics 
within the EAP and its international make-up reflect the 
character and structure of the economic challenges. 
Many of its members have participated at a senior level in 
making or guiding economic policy. They understand the 
realities of practical politics. They have provided challenge, 
rigour and a constructive spirit in offering their advice. 
In what follows there are a number of references to their 
academic contributions. A bibliography of some of their 
relevant writings is provided as an appendix to the report. 
I am very grateful, as chair of the EAP and co-chair of the 
Commission, for the guidance they have given. I must 
emphasise, however, that whilst I have consulted with 
them and been guided by them, the views expressed in this 
note are my own.
Why another report now? Please excuse me if I start 
from the Stern Review published in October 2006. 
Technical progress has moved much more strongly than 
was expected at that time. There is more experience 
with climate policies. The world has struggled with a 
great recession. Meanwhile, the science looks still more 
worrying. Emissions have continued to rise, still more 
strongly than expected at that time, and some effects are 
coming through more rapidly than anticipated. The politics 
on emissions looks more worrying; in many countries the 
political will to act is weak. This report goes beyond the 
Stern Review in its central focus on both structural  
change and on how growth and climate action can be 
mutually supportive.
There are also important changes in the subject of 
economics. Many are probing more deeply into the 
determinants of development and growth, with great 
emphasis on innovation, learning and institutions. The 
“Schumpeterian” story is rising still further in the attention 
of economists, for example through the work of Aghion 
(an EAP member). There have been important advances 
too in behavioural economics, particularly associated with 
the work of Kahneman (an EAP member), which guide 
us on how decisions are understood and made, and how 
responses to change take place. 
There have also been many helpful reports over recent 
years. The IEA, through its World Energy Outlooks, 
has examined energy systems and how they might 
develop, with a strong focus on the detail of economic 
and energy structures around the world and the energy 
investments that are necessary to reduce emissions on 
the scale required. They are the major source of much 
data and analysis on investment in energy infrastructure. 
The World Bank 2012 report Turn Down the Heat: 
Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided provides 
a comprehensive review of climate impacts at such 
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temperatures, which have not been seen on the planet 
for millions of years. Angel Gurria of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has brought to centre stage the need for zero-emission 
energy in the second half of this century and established 
the OECD as a leading institution for research on the 
economics of climate change. And the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has produced valuable research on 
energy taxation and subsidies and associated externalities 
and market failures. While this report is different in its 
emphasis on rapid structural change across the world 
economy, particularly in cities, energy and land use, it 
builds on the valuable earlier work of these institutions. 
And it draws on a whole range of perspectives and 
research from economics and other disciplines. 
With the challenges defined in this way, it is clear that 
both standard growth models and the usual shorter term 
macroeconomic models of output and unemployment 
simply do not carry the features and analytical foundations 
which allow a satisfactory analysis of the key questions 
for the report. Standard growth models, often focused 
on the longer run, have offered real insights into how 
savings and investment, population growth and technical 
progress can combine to generate growth. Shorter-term 
macroeconomic models have been of help in guiding the 
management of demand, unemployment and inflation. 
But neither of them is designed to inform the analysis of 
radical structural change.
The transformations that will shape the coming decades 
are already under way. We cannot defer or “push out” the 
necessary transformational investments and innovation 
to some vague medium or longer term, to be examined 
and decided later, an argument also emphasised strongly, 
for example, in the work of Edenhofer (an EAP member), 
the IEA and many others. The structural transformations 
under way and the actions necessary on climate change 
involve major investments. Such investments will drive 
the transformations. They will boost growth and bring 
other valuable returns, for example to air quality and 
energy security. But transformations and major new 
investments can involve dislocations. Moving early and 
strongly towards the world I am describing is not an easy 
win-win. But a central conclusion of the report is that 
credible and coherent action now has great potential and 
attractiveness for growth, poverty reduction, ways of 
living, and sustainability — surely much greater potential 
than something that attempts minimal change whilst 
sending mixed signals to investors and trying to stick with 
current patterns.
This report takes a major step in the direction of bringing 
together economic analyses and perspectives that fit 
the analytical tasks at hand. In so doing it charts an 
attractive and wise way forward. It is not a rigid plan, but 
a path of growth and discovery which promises a strong 
and sustainable future of continued development and 
poverty reduction. It is focussed exactly on identifying 
and analysing key areas which are core to the processes 
of transformation and decision-making, i.e. cities, energy 
systems and land use, and key drivers of change, i.e. 
resource efficiency, infrastructure and innovation. 
The nature of the problem and the need for deep and 
broad approaches to growth, poverty reduction and 
structural transformations has motivated the analytical 
guidance given by the EAP. On growth and structural 
change, the guidance of the EAP and the work of 
the report team have been much influenced by the 
Schumpeterian perspectives on medium- to long-term 
technological transformations. Such transformations are 
precisely what are at issue here. As Freeman, Perez (an 
EAP member) and others have shown, periods of major 
technological transformation are usually accompanied by 
innovation, investment and growth over a few decades. 
This Schumpeterian tradition is complemented by, and 
interwoven with, models of learning and endogenous 
growth in the tradition of Arrow, Aghion (an EAP member) 
and others (see Aghion et al. 2014). The report is also 
informed by the Kuznets and Chenery analyses of the 
relationship between growth and sectoral change which 
in recent times have been deepened and taken forward 
by Rodrik and Spence (both EAP members). These are 
complemented again by advances in economic geography 
(see work by Krugman, Venables and others) and analyses 
of cities, often building on the pioneering work of Jane 
Jacobs. In India, for example, Ahluwalia (an EAP member), 
has led applied work on growth of cities and necessary 
infrastructure investment. Fan Gang, Garnaut and Stern 
(EAP members) have examined how urbanisation and 
sectoral change are transforming the Chinese economy. 
Ndulu (also EAP member) has provided guidance on 
transformation in Africa. 
Modern public economics is at the heart of the 
Commission’s work on policy. Much of this body of 
theory proceeds by analysing both market failures and 
government failures. It is firmly based in the tradition 
of Meade, Samuelson, Arrow, etc. (and earlier Dupuit, 
Wicksell, Marshall and Pigou). 
Emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) represent a 
market failure as the emitter does not bear the costs of 
the damage and disruption from their activities. In the 
Stern Review, I suggested that emissions of GHGs may be 
the largest market failure the world has seen: all people 
are involved in the cause, all will experience the impacts, 
and those impacts are potentially immense. In this sense 
carbon pricing, which corrects for the externality and thus 
promotes the sound functioning of markets, is the most 
urgent policy to get in place today. It involves a relatively 
simple application of widely accepted tax principles and 
can be applied in a number of ways, including through 
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an explicit tax or cap-and-trade scheme, or by adjusting 
existing fuel taxes to reflect their carbon content. 
Market failures extend beyond the fundamental one of 
GHG emissions, to more dynamic failures such as the 
public spillover of ideas in research and development 
(R&D), networks, capital markets and information, as 
well as co-benefits of ecosystems, efficiency, health 
and so on. At the same time, governments who must 
shape the environment for investment and innovation 
can over-reach themselves or be influenced by vested 
interests. The presence of these more dynamic market 
failures potentially amplifies the size and duration of the 
consequences of government failure, making the issue of 
accountability of institutions all the more important. The 
analytical challenge here is to bring out and examine the 
dynamics associated with these perspectives. We need to 
combine the economics of Pigou with that of Schumpeter. 
Strong carbon prices, and strong investment in and 
policies towards R&D and innovation are likely to be very 
powerful in driving the necessary change. A number of 
members of the EAP have been strongly involved in the 
literature on modern public economics and its dynamics 
(Aghion, Rodrik, Spence, Stern, for example). 
Policies for flexibility help manage processes of resource 
allocation arising from evolving patterns of demand, 
the advance of technology and the emergence of new 
competitors. Examples of such policies include trade 
openness, supportive labour market policies (including 
income support where necessary), investment in skills 
and education, support for R&D and innovation, flexible 
housing markets, competition policy, and product market 
regulation. All these can help promote movement of 
resources and manage dislocation, particularly in its 
effects on poorer people.
Credibility of policy will be just as important as its nature. 
Institutional structures, such as development banks, 
mechanics of collaboration and transparent long-term 
policy bodies can play a key role. Modern approaches to 
institutional economics can be very helpful here (a number 
of EAP members have emphasised this perspective). More 
broadly, the advice of the EAP has also recognised the 
vital role of institutions (social, economic, governmental, 
international, financial, and so on) in influencing how 
transformations can occur, and indeed their timing, 
structure and success (see, for example, the work of 
Besley and Persson, Acemoglu and others, including EAP 
members Aghion, Rodrik, Persson, Spence). If market 
failures themselves arise from or reflect problems in 
property rights, transaction costs, information and trust, 
then, in addition to standard government interventions 
(subject to issues around government failure), one can 
also think about the way in which institutional structures 
have been, and can be, created within and between 
communities, to help overcome problems of both 
government and market failure, and facilitate creativity 
and change. The insights of Ronald Coase and Elinor 
Ostrom would be a key starting point.
The whole report is essentially about risk management, 
on an immense scale, in structural transformation, in 
growth and poverty reduction, and in climate change. 
The EAP has not suggested a formal or narrow approach 
here. The economic theorist’s work-horse of expected 
utility theory, whilst helpful for some simple frameworks 
of decision-making, is not well-structured for the scale of 
risks, international action and difficulties of perception 
involved here. What is necessary is a broader approach, 
in the sense of an understanding of change, uncertainties 
involved, and strategies for managing and reducing risk. 
Such perspectives and analyses point to an examination 
of policy options according to what they could deliver 
in terms of a range of outcomes with their many risks 
and dimensions. That is how wise decision-making can 
be informed and guided. It provides a way to look at and 
assess advantages and disadvantages, pros and cons, and 
costs and benefits, with their associated uncertainties. 
It is an approach which can be called structured 
consequentialism in the sense that it provides a structured 
framework for decisions in terms of careful evaluation and 
assessment of possible consequences. It is transparent. 
But it does not proceed by attempting to summarise the 
entire consequences for the world into one model for 
net benefits and one optimal policy or one number for 
expected utility. In this context this latter approach is 
cavalier and often lacking in transparency and honesty as 
to what is behind the “results”. 
Our climate will change given past and future emissions. 
Adaptation to these changes is an important example of 
risk management and flexibility. Robust infrastructure 
will be of great importance to adaptation and flexibility in 
general. This report has focused primarily on the fostering 
of a low-carbon economy, and as such adaptation has not 
been at centre stage. We should not, however, take that 
as a statement that it is unimportant. Far from it, given the 
changes on the way it will be crucial. And it is important to 
recognise that mitigation, adaptation and development are 
intimately interwoven, in agriculture, buildings, transport, 
and infrastructure, including across the whole economy. 
Examples are in the report.
This next two to three decades constitute a crucial period 
for poverty reduction and advance in well-being across the 
full range of economic and human dimensions. The EAP 
has generally been informed and guided by a broad view of 
development, as embodied in the work of Sen and others, 
and a number of EAP members have contributed strongly 
to the literature on the meaning and measurement of 
poverty, and the processes for poverty reduction. The 
EAP has been fortunate also to have with it leading 
economists of the key international institutions associated 
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with growth and development: The World Bank (Basu), 
IMF (Parry) and OECD (Tamaki). Their experience of the 
practical, political, and conceptual issues involved, as well 
as the economics, has been of profound importance. 
Human behaviour, in the form of understanding and 
perceptions, reactions, decisions and so on, particularly 
in the context of rapid change, may not be as simple or 
systematic as portrayed in standard economic models. 
It is important to ask how decisions to follow a radically 
different path, and in real time, could emerge or be 
fostered. Here the EAP has been able to draw on the 
insights of modern behavioural economics, as led, for 
example, by Kahneman. Social movements can be powerful 
agents for change. Leadership will be at a premium. And 
sometimes when leaders get together in the face of shared 
threats they may take a more long-term view of policy than 
when narrowly driven by local politics – as, for example, 
with the building of international cooperation after the 
Second World War, which fostered a strong period of 
growth and trade in many countries. But such an outcome 
cannot be taken for granted. Much worse is possible. The 
better outcome depends on a shared understanding of 
dangers and of what can be done in the way of action. It is 
crucial to be able to see a constructive and attractive way 
forward. I hope that the report contributes to such  
an understanding. 
Cooperation and simultaneous action is critical to success 
in the challenge of fostering growth and transformation 
and managing climate change. Greenhouse gas molecules 
in the atmosphere have the same effect regardless of 
origin. This is a collective action problem. Hence the 
international make-up of the EAP, and the concern to 
understand how individuals and nations can cooperate 
and learn together, have been key aspects of its work. For 
international cooperation, institutions matter, particularly 
in the context of anticipating the actions and reactions 
of others and building mutual confidence and, where 
possible, trust. Principles of game theory and the ideas of 
cooperation of Ostrom (see above) can provide valuable 
insight here. 
The EAP took into account the challenges involved in the 
work leading to the crucial UNFCCC meeting in Paris at 
the end of 2015. These international discussions, ethically, 
economically and politically, should examine directly 
the critical question of equity. Climate change is deeply 
inequitable in both its origins and impacts. The analyses 
and recommendations of the report take collaboration and 
equity carefully into account.
Political economy inevitably pervades the whole report. 
Local, national and international policy structures and 
decisions are subject to many pressures by those who see 
themselves as potential winners or losers, particularly the 
latter. There are inevitably discussions and judgements 
at many places in the analysis about the nature of these 
forces and how they might play out. Most of the EAP 
members have worked in “real policy environments” and 
are keenly aware of the importance of these issues.
The work of the Commission has thus embodied or been 
informed by the fundamental economics of growth, 
structural transformation, economic history, economics of 
public policy, economics of risk, theories and experience 
of development and poverty reduction, international 
economics, and institutional and behavioural economics 
amongst others. These ideas, theories and perspectives 
are at the core of our approach. The subject matter 
requires breadth and depth in theory, evidence  
and perspectives.
It should be clear from the definition of the problem, and 
the theories and perspectives brought to bear, that it 
makes little sense to try to embed the analysis into one 
single model. The story is neither short-run management 
nor long-run growth around which much modelling is 
oriented. It is a story of transformation, disruption and 
radical change – stable structures are not what it is about. 
But that does not mean less theory, rather it means more, 
as I have argued. Many perspectives are involved and 
single rigid frameworks are not up to the task. 
It is unfortunate therefore that the economic models 
in the climate literature have been heavily focussed, 
too heavily in my view, on one particular approach. 
These models are usually called Integrated Assessment 
Models (or IAMs) which have the worthy aim of bringing 
together scientific models of climate change and models 
of economic growth. These have made a worthwhile, 
although modest, contribution. Nevertheless the current 
literature, in its portrayal of potential damages, misses 
out much of the scientific risk, potential catastrophes and 
tipping points. There is little there, for example, of any 
seriousness about the potential for huge loss of life that 
could come with 4°C and above, both directly, and from 
the movement of people and resulting conflict. 
In the analyses of the costs of action, such models usually 
embody a rigid economic framework of exogenous 
growth and fixed cost and production structures, thereby 
assuming away most of the challenges of investment, 
innovation and structural change which lie at the heart of 
the problem. In addition, they usually have rising marginal 
costs of action in a context where dynamic increasing 
returns may be important. Taken together, these  
defects in modelling have often led to damage from 
climate change being systematically and grossly 
underestimated and the costs of economic change  
being substantially overestimated.
These IAMs, which take the underlying structure of the 
economy over the coming decades as given, are simply 
not equipped to take on the analytical challenges of 
transformations identified here as being at the core of 
the issues. As Edenhofer has argued, it is time for a new 
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Notwithstanding the limitations of models, most model-
based estimates of the long-run costs of efficient climate 
policy (see IPCC, AR5, WGIII) are in the order of 1-4% 
of global GDP in 2030 from taking ambitious climate 
action consistent with a 50-50 chance of stabilising global 
average warming at 2°C above pre-industrial levels. These 
costs will vary by country. But, and this is a crucial point, if 
policies are weak, misguided or inconsistent, action could 
be much more expensive; policy mistakes in the process 
of fostering the transition can be very costly. Much of the 
work of the Commission has been on how to do policy well. 
This is a point that extends far beyond these models. 
It would be wrong to argue that managing the structural 
transformations will inevitably provide all the emissions 
reductions necessary for a responsible management of 
climate. The required urgency and scale of emissions 
reductions will necessitate going beyond a sound 
structural transformation, i.e. viewed as sound in the 
absence of concern over emissions. We do not want to 
pretend that emissions reductions are all win-win, or there 
is a “lunch” that is totally free. But the extra resources 
necessary for responsible management of climate provide 
a “lunch well worth paying for”, particularly when we 
include, as we should, the co-benefits of a cleaner, safer, 
more energy secure, and more bio-diverse economy along 
with the huge benefits of reduced climate risk. 
The approach of the report does not allow the precision, 
spurious in our view, which can come via the answer to 
certain questions through one single model. On the other 
hand by looking at a number of models, disaggregating, 
and bringing different perspectives, theory and ideas to 
bear, it does allow us to tackle the questions that matter. 
And it offers a perspective for an informed choice of 
strategy based on an assessment of the coming structural 
changes, the potential gains from managing them well, the 
close connections with GHG reductions, the co-benefits of 
those reductions, and the reduced risks of climate change. 
This is what broad perspectives and a marshalling of the 
lessons of economics and economic history as a whole  
can bring. 
I trust that the perspectives and theories the EAP 
has brought to bear have both guided the work of the 
Commission and are essential for an understanding of the 
processes of growth and change, which are at the heart of 
the challenges and choices at the fork in the road where 
we now stand. I am deeply grateful to the members of the 
EAP for their work and guidance. 
Nicholas Stern 
Co-Chair of the Global Commission and Chair of the 
Economics Advisory Panel.
generation of IAMs (see also Stern 2013 and Dietz and 
Stern, forthcoming, on the structures of the IAMs). There 
has indeed been some improvement. But even improved 
IAMs are likely to be very limited in their ability to capture 
the key elements of the kinds of perspectives and analyses, 
described above, which must be brought to bear. Yet it 
is these IAMs that have dominated much of the formal 
modelling of the economics of climate change, including 
estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC). And for the 
reasons described, the SCC is systematically, and probably 
substantially, underestimated in such models. To look 
across current literature on IAM models and to see where 
it stands on assessing potential damages from climate 
change and costs of action is essentially to “average” 
across work which is systematically biased.
Some models of economic growth have been used by 
Treasuries and some international institutions to assess 
the shorter-run impact of climate action on growth, e.g. 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models (these 
are sometimes embedded in IAMs). These models often 
start from the assumption of an economy where resources 
are already efficiently allocated and there are no market 
failures. Therefore there is a danger that such model 
structures assume directly that introducing climate policy 
inevitably diverts resources away from profitable activities 
and thus has an impact on short-run gross domestic 
product (GDP). But we live in an imperfect, inefficient 
and constantly changing world where there are multiple 
frictions, unemployment and other dynamics, and multiple 
unpriced benefits from climate policies such as reduced 
local air pollution, increased energy security and stronger 
biodiversity. Thus, the models often fail to capture these 
key features when simulating the GDP impact of climate 
policy on output. We must recognise that there are some 
promising attempts (including from the OECD) to improve 
these models and some progress has been made. I would 
encourage further investment in such improvements. 
No single model, however, is ever likely to be able to 
tell the full story of the dynamics of an economy with 
many sectors, many goods, where lives may be lost on a 
substantial scale, where innovation is at the core of the 
story and where there are complex imperfections. Multiple 
scenarios from multiple models will be valuable, including, 
multi-model comparison such as that undertaken by the 
Energy Modeling Forum (EMF), the Mercator Research 
Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) 
and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research 
(PIK) for the Commission. Such an approach avoids the 
risks of cherry-picking from different model results. But 
the fundamental limitations of the models remain. In multi-
model comparisons it is vital to examine the literature 
carefully for the systematic biases identified above: that 
should be a key aspect of any overall assessment in  
such exercises.
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This report seeks to understand how countries with 
different kinds of economies can meet the goals of 
stronger economic growth and development while also 
reducing the risks of dangerous climate change. 
These issues have sometimes become embroiled in 
controversy and ideological argument. The aim of the New 
Climate Economy project has been to gather and assess 
the evidence as independently and objectively as possible.  
The approach taken by the project has been to adopt 
the perspective of those who make the major economic 
decisions which affect people’s lives today: ministers 
of finance and other ministers in government, heads of 
businesses and financial institutions, leaders of states 
and provinces, city mayors, trade union and community 
leaders. These decision-makers are trying to achieve goals 
and deal with problems which appear far more immediate 
and acute than those of climate change. Yet at the same 
time it is the decisions they make which will determine the 
future course of the climate system. So the question the 
project has sought to explore is not “how can greenhouse 
gas emissions be reduced?” – others have done this 
comprehensively – but “how can economic decision-
makers achieve their principal goals while also reducing 
their impact on the climate?” The underlying assumption is 
that it will be easier for peoples and countries to make the 
necessary political decisions about tackling climate change 
if the economic benefits and opportunities, as well as the 
costs, are clearer. And it will be easier if they can see how 
the necessary climate-related actions and investments fit 
with their ambitions for growth, poverty reduction and 
structural change. 
This report presents the findings of the project’s year-
long programme of research and engagement with major 
economic decision-makers. The research has sought to 
access and bring together the best available evidence, 
drawing on important and detailed work done by many 
other institutions and researchers. They are listed in the 
Acknowledgements. This has been supplemented by 
original research conducted across a range of countries, 
much of which will be published separately as national 
reports and contributing papers. 
The report does not try to be comprehensive: its focus is 
on the areas where the relationship between economic 
growth and climate risk is largest and most pressing. There 
are many economic issues and sectors it does not discuss 
in depth. In particular it does not focus on how economies 
should adapt to the climate change that is already 
occurring. Adaptation is essential, given the climate change 
that is in train. It is interwoven with the issues of growth 
and development and a crucial part of the economic 
strategies discussed here. But it was not the focus of  
our research.  
The New Climate Economy project has constantly looked 
for practical solutions which decision-makers can adopt 
and implement in the ‘real worlds’ they inhabit. The report 
tries to reflect the imperfect conditions which firms, 
consumers and governments confront in real economies: 
never in possession of the information needed for perfect 
decisions; always needing to adjust and adapt to change; 
typically trading off between short-, medium- and long-
term priorities. A global report inevitably has to  
generalise across very different kinds of economies.  
But it seeks to recognise the different circumstances 
diverse countries face.
The approach to economic analysis taken by the report 
goes beyond a traditional static view of how economies 
work. It has been framed in a dynamic context of 
change and transformation. Guided by the advice of the 
Commission’s Economics Advisory Panel, the project  
team has drawn widely on economic history, the 
economics of public policy and of risk, theories and 
experiences of development and poverty reduction, and 
international, institutional and behavioural economics, 
amongst other approaches.  
Economic models can generate precise numbers – for 
GDP growth, jobs or emissions – but they can only ever 
offer approximations of the future. Too much is unknown 
about the course of technological and structural change, 
with the key processes difficult to capture formally. 
Too much that is of value – such as people’s health, 
the reduction of risk, the sustainability of the natural 
environment – is hard to quantify. John Maynard Keynes 
once said “it is better to be roughly right than precisely 
wrong”. The report gathers the available quantitative 
evidence. But the Commission and its Economic Advisory 
Panel would warn against the search for false precision. 
It is judgement, informed by a range of perspectives and 
evidence, that will lead to better decisions. The report is 
intended to provide resources for such judgements. 
The structure of the report is as follows. Chapter 1 sets 
out the joint challenges of economic growth, poverty 
reduction and climate change, in the context of the rapid 
structural and technological transformations through 
which the global economy is now going. It examines the 
core question of whether the actions and policies which 
can reduce greenhouse gas emissions are inevitably 
damaging to growth and other economic goals, or whether 
better economic management could deliver growth and 
less climate risk at the same time. In doing so it introduces 
the core framework of analysis underpinning the report. 
This focuses on three key drivers of change within the 
economy – resource efficiency, infrastructure investment 
and innovation – and three key economic systems where 
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both growth and emissions are strongly occurring: cities, 
land use and energy. 
Chapters 2 to 4 explore the three systems. Chapter 2: 
Cities shows how building better, more productive cities 
can boost economic prosperity. Chapter 3: Land Use 
examines measures to meet global food demand, restore 
degraded land and end deforestation. Chapter 4: Energy 
examines how increased energy demand can be met more 
sustainably through cleaner energy sources and increasing 
efficiency. Each chapter asks how it is possible to achieve 
economic goals in these areas at the same time as reducing 
climate risk, and sets out a series of conclusions, drawing 
on the evidence of what is already happening across  
the world today.
Chapters 5 to 7 then look at the wider economic drivers of 
growth, structural change and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Chapter 5: Economics of Change examines how resource 
efficiency can be increased through key areas of economic 
policy, including fiscal reform and regulatory and other 
approaches. It also discusses the vital measures needed 
to help economies and societies adjust to change. Chapter 
6: Finance looks at how the risks and capital costs of 
investing in low-carbon infrastructure can be lowered, 
particularly in the energy sector, in both developing and 
developed economies. Chapter 7: Innovation discusses the 
processes of technological and business innovation, and 
how they can be encouraged to favour the development of 
low-carbon technologies that will also drive growth across 
the economy. Again, these chapters draw on evidence 
from across the world for their analysis and to make 
recommendations for action and policy. 
Chapter 8: International Cooperation considers how 
action at national and sub-national levels to achieve 
lower-carbon and more climate-resilient growth and 
development can be enhanced through various forms of 
international cooperation. It discusses in particular how a 
strong and equitable international climate agreement can 
provide the economic framework for the transition to a 
low-carbon and climate-resilient global economy. 
The final chapter brings together the Commission’s 
principal recommendations to the international 
community of governments and economic decision-
makers in the form of a 10-point Global Action Plan.
Each chapter of the report can be read as a stand-alone 
document. Each is intended to be particularly relevant to 
decision-makers in the subjects it covers. 
In addition to the full report, the Commission has 
published a shorter Synthesis Report which summarises 
the core findings, argument and conclusions. This also 
includes the Executive Summary and summary of the 
Global Action Plan. Subsequent publications include a 
series of contributing papers and country reports for 
Brazil, China, Ethiopia, India, the Republic of Korea and the 
United States. These will provide fuller technical support 
for the work contained in the global Better Growth, Better 
Climate report.
This is a report for consultation. It is not intended as – and 
could not be – the final word on the many complex issues 
it explores. The Commission does not expect universal 
agreement with its conclusions. But the issues it examines 
are urgent and critical, and the Commission hopes it will 
stimulate both debate and action. 
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Chapter 1
Main points
• Rapid technological progress, a large rise in trade, and major structural changes have transformed the global 
economy in the last 25 years. Developing countries now account for more than two-fifths of world GDP. Poverty 
dropped at the fastest rate ever in the last decade. However, since the Great Recession of 2008–09, countries at 
all income levels have struggled to achieve fast, equitable growth in output, jobs and opportunities. Vigorous and 
deliberate reforms are needed to sustain broad-based long-term prosperity.
• The next 15 years are also critical for tackling climate risk. Global carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions from energy use 
increased by about 3% per year in the 2000s, around twice the pace of the years 1981–2000. The choices made in 
the next 15 years will either lock in a future with growing pollution and worsening climate change, or help move the 
world onto a more sustainable, low-carbon development path.
• Many of the policy and institutional reforms needed to revitalise growth and improve well-being over the next 15 
years can also reduce climate risk.  Potential “win-win” reforms in urban, land use and energy system would involve 
correcting market and government failures that now make economies less efficient than they could be. These are not 
“easy wins”, however; they will require real effort.
• Many actions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can yield multiple benefits, such as improved air quality. 
Health damage from air pollution averaged over 4% of GDP in the 15 largest CO
2
 emitters in 2010. Measures  
that reduce GHGs and air pollution together in these countries would yield health benefits of US$73 per tonne of 
CO
2
 abated.
• The climate benefits from economic measures considered in this report could be substantial: enough to achieve at 
least 50% and potentially up to 90% of the emission reductions needed to get onto a 2°C pathway. All these measures 
are compatible with goals of boosting national development, equitable growth and broadly shared improvements in 
living standards, and make economic sense even before considering future avoided climate damage.
• Countries at different stages of development will necessarily prioritise different actions. For low-income countries, 
key challenges include strengthening institutional capacity, improving agricultural productivity, and expanding 
modern energy access. Middle-income countries have greater institutional capacity and resources but face  
complex problems of structural change and urban development. The challenge facing developed countries is to 
accelerate innovation, renew infrastructure and modernize public finance in ways that strengthen growth and 
promote decarbonisation.
• Greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will make 2016–2035 about 0.9–1.3°C warmer than 1850–1900, 
on average, even if drastic action to reduce emissions is taken immediately. Thus, adaptation is essential. Financial 
flows from developed to vulnerable low-income countries need to increase sharply to meet adaptation needs. Many 
institutional reforms to facilitate adaptation will also increase the development and carbon abatement options 
available to countries.
Growth and Climate Change:  
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
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1. Introduction 
The world economy has been transformed over the last 
25 years. Computing, communications, biotechnology, 
materials science and other fields are in the midst of 
technological revolutions, greatly expanding humanity’s 
productive capacity. World output has more than doubled 
since 1990,1 accompanied by rising international flows 
of knowledge, trade and capital, as well as by enormous 
structural changes. Developing economies have grown 
in importance, their share of global GDP rising from just 
over a quarter to more than two-fifths over this period.2 
The number of people living in urban areas surged by two-
thirds, to more than half the world’s population.3 
Developing countries – the poorest and most populous 
region of the world – have been at the heart of many of 
these changes. Middle-income countries’ output has more 
than tripled since 1990, and low-income countries’ has 
more than doubled.4 Growth accelerated not only in large 
emerging economies such as China and India, but also in 
many smaller and poorer countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. In developing countries, the number of poor fell 
by nearly 500 million just in the last decade – the fastest 
pace of poverty reduction for which we have data.5 But 2.4 
billion still live on less than US$2 a day. 
There is now an opportunity to build on this experience to 
make further major gains in human well-being in the next 
10–20 years and beyond. But progress cannot be taken 
for granted. There are major risks that overshadow this 
otherwise bright prospect. 
First, in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008–09, 
countries at all income levels are struggling to restore 
or achieve fast, equitable growth in output, jobs and 
opportunities. Despite the rapid growth before the crisis, 
the world is not on track to eradicate extreme poverty 
by 2030, as envisaged in the Sustainable Development 
Goals that are now being drafted.6 Improvement in 
broader measures of human development has also 
slowed since the crisis.7 
Climate risk, meanwhile, is an increasing concern. The 
strong growth performance before the financial crisis 
was accompanied by a surge in energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.8 This development 
model, if carried forward, would generate spiralling 
emissions and, ultimately, severe climate damage that 
would undo the very gains in well-being that we seek.9 
Major recent natural disasters have inflicted significant 
economic and human costs, including Typhoon Haiyan 
in the Philippines, Hurricane Sandy in the United States, 
major droughts in China, Brazil and the Horn of Africa, 
and floods in Europe. Such extreme events are likely to 
increase in both frequency and magnitude with unchecked 
climate change. Nor are extreme events the only concern. 
Existing climate variability is already a major source of 
poverty and insecurity among the rural poor. For them 
even small increments to risk in the form of delayed rain, 
higher temperatures, slightly more intense or protracted 
drought can mean disaster.
Tackling the challenge of strong, equitable and sustainable 
growth will require huge new investments and shifts in 
resource use. Actions today and in the next 15 years will 
be critical to stabilising and then reducing emissions to try 
to meet the international target of keeping the average 
global temperature increase below 2°C.10 They will either 
lock in a future with inefficient infrastructure and systems, 
growing pollution and worsening climate change, or help 
move the world onto a more sustainable, low-carbon 
development path that strengthens resilience and begins 
to slow and reverse the accumulation of climate risk.
A critical insight of this report is that many of the policy 
and institutional reforms needed to revitalise growth and 
improve well-being over the next 15 years can also be 
critical to tackling climate risk. There are many potential 
“win-win” reforms that can simultaneously energise 
development and grapple with climate risk, but they may 
not be “easy wins”. Real-world economies are rife with 
market and government failures. Correcting these can 
generate multiple benefits that transform the cost-benefit 
calculus of reforms. For example, we illustrate the very 
large co-benefits that can arise from policies to cut GHGs 
and local air pollution. 
The report highlights three fundamental drivers of change 
that these reforms will draw upon: more efficient resource 
use, infrastructure investment, and innovation. And it 
focuses on three socio-economic systems that hold the 
key to yield multiple economic, social and environmental 
benefits: cities, land use, and energy systems. These 
systems are crucial for change in the next 10–20 years, 
because they are so important for the global economy 
and emissions, are already undergoing rapid change, and 
usually possess some institutions and policy frameworks 
that render them capable of reform and contributing to 
improved outcomes. 
The Commission estimates that at least 50% and – with 
broad and ambitious implementation –potentially up to 
90% of the actions needed to get onto a 2°C pathway 
could be compatible with goals of boosting national 
development, equitable growth and broadly shared 
improvements in living standards. 
Middle-income countries’ output 
has more than tripled since 1990, 
and low-income countries’ has 
more than doubled.
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Reforms will entail costs and trade-offs, and will often 
require governments to deal with difficult problems of 
political economy, distribution and governance. But an 
argument that tackling climate risk is simply too costly, 
whether in terms of growth, competitiveness, jobs or 
impact on the poor, can be overstated, especially when 
the multiple benefits of climate action are fully taken into 
account. Complementary social protection and adjustment 
policies can help vulnerable groups and sectors make what 
is often a difficult transition. 
There is no simple reform formula or agenda that will 
work for all countries. Each will deal with development 
and climate challenges differently, based on levels of 
economic, human and institutional development, social 
and political structures, history, geography and natural 
endowments. Countries will need creative experiments, 
to “learn by doing” and thus to find the right path for their 
own circumstances.
This introduction lays the foundation for the rest of the 
report. It begins by examining the growth and climate 
risks that could overshadow the global economy in coming 
years. It then looks at ways for countries to advance 
both economic and climate goals together, including 
“no-regrets” reforms, critical sectors and drivers of 
change, and the potential economic and GHG impact of 
reforms and actions discussed in the report. The differing 
challenges in low-, middle- and high-income countries are 
then examined. The chapter ends by showing why actions 
in the next 15 years are particularly critical. 
2. Growth risks and climate risks
The world has made tremendous gains in human well-
being over recent decades. Yet there are signs that 
countries could downshift to a weaker growth and 
poverty reduction trajectory in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession of 2008–09. Understandably, policy-makers are 
now focused on how to craft reforms to spark renewed 
growth and development – but they are also aware of 
growing climate risks. 
The current model of development carries with it a growing 
risk of locking in a high pollution path. Current economic 
and poverty reduction gains may then prove unsustainable 
in the long run, as rapidly rising GHG emissions result 
in serious climate damage. Continued, rapid economic 
progress cannot be taken for granted. There is thus an 
urgent need for sustained policy and institutional reforms 
to revitalise growth and poverty reduction, strengthen 
resilience, avert lock-in and begin to slow and ultimately 
reverse the accumulation of climate risk. 
2.1 Growth risks
The world economy may struggle to resume its strong 
performance before the Great Recession. Global annual 
growth averaged about 4% in the 2000s, before the 
crisis.11 A more volatile and uncertain landscape has 
emerged in the years since, however. World growth did 
rebound to 5% in 2010 but has steadily decelerated 
since, falling to only 2.8% in 2013.12 Forecasters 
expect a slight pickup in 2014, but there is high 
uncertainty around these projections.
Growth risks in developed countries
Developed countries were at the epicentre of the financial 
crisis and have also underperformed in the years since. 
After a modest rebound in 2010, growth in countries 
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has decelerated, falling to 1.3% in 
2013.13 The large gap between actual and potential output 
that opened up during the crisis has fallen much more 
slowly than in previous recessions. Output gaps in 2013 
remained as high as 3.5% of potential output in the United 
States and the Euro area, according to OECD estimates. 
Potential output itself has deteriorated relative to pre-
recession trends. 
Unemployment in the OECD was 7.9% in 2013, only 
slightly below a peak of 8.3% in 2010.14 Stagnating median 
incomes, high youth unemployment and rising inequality 
are a source of disquiet in many developed countries. In 
the longer run, there are concerns about the fiscal impacts 
of ageing populations, exacerbated by the steep increase 
in public sector debt as a consequence of the crisis. 
The causes of the crisis and its weak aftermath are 
intensively debated. Theories include shocks to aggregate 
demand; overly tight fiscal and monetary policies; financial 
sector risk-taking coupled with weak regulation; too much 
private debt and protracted deleveraging; and excessive 
government intervention and uncertainty caused by 
unpredictable policies. 
This report does not attempt to resolve these debates. 
However, extended cyclical downturns can cause adverse 
structural changes that reduce the economy’s long-term 
potential output. Prominent analysts are concerned that 
developed countries may fall into an extended period 
of “secular stagnation”.15 Broad programmes of policy 
and institutional reforms are needed to modernise and 
buttress public finance, enhance innovation, and boost 
growth and employment opportunities in the developed 
world today.  
Reforms will entail costs and 
trade-offs, and will often require 
governments to deal with difficult 
problems of political economy, 
distribution and governance.
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Figure 1
Countries at different stages of development
Note: GNI per capita is using the World Bank Atlas Method, in current US$. GHG emissions exclude land use, land use change and forestry 
(LULUCF). Source: The World Bank, 2014.16
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Growth risks in developing countries
Developing economies are also finding it difficult to 
regain their growth momentum in the wake of the crisis. 
Developing country growth averaged close to 7% annually 
in 2001–07, but slipped below 5% in 2013–14.17
The causes of the slowdown in developing countries are 
diverse. They include more difficult global conditions, 
including slow post-crisis growth in developed world 
imports, volatile foreign capital flows and lower prices for 
many primary commodities, as well as the need to curb 
overly expansive macroeconomic policies, and deeper 
structural and institutional impediments to growth. 
There are also some general reasons why the growth 
boom in developing countries in the 2000s could turn 
out to have been a temporary episode. Empirically, high 
growth that is sustained over several decades is extremely 
rare. China and Korea are two outstanding examples in 
this select group. It is much more common for developing 
countries to experience “spells” of both high and low 
growth lasting 10–15 years, sometimes characterised as 
“growth miracles” and “growth failures”.18
There are good theoretical reasons why high-growth 
spells in developing countries might not be sustained. 
“Catch-up” growth is a basic mechanism of economic 
development, in which poor countries grow by importing 
advanced ideas and technologies, but it does not occur 
automatically. Achieving sustained growth requires 
developing countries both to strengthen fundamentals 
such as human capital and institutions, and to foster 
structural change, which sees labour, capital and 
entrepreneurs move from traditional to new, higher-
productivity sectors. Achieving structural change is 
fraught with both government and market failures. 
Examples of the former might include a lack of key public 
infrastructure, and of the latter knowledge failures that 
lead to inadequate investment in importing foreign 
technologies. Overcoming such failures requires a 
constant, high-level engagement by government to 
experiment with reforms, learn from mistakes, and 
implement what seems to work at a given time. Such 
reform capacity may not exist, or be present only fitfully, 
according to changing political conditions.19
We thus have good reasons to think that if developing 
countries are to regain and sustain the fast growth of the 
2000s into the next decades, they will need to undertake 
intense and sustained reform over the long term. These 
reforms will both build up fundamental capabilities and 
promote structural change. 
It is important to remember the particular development 
challenges faced by middle- and low-income countries, as 
well as by countries with abundant natural resources – a 
group that cuts across income lines.
Low-income countries are marked by high poverty. 
Three-quarters of their population live on less than US$2 
a day.20 In sub-Saharan Africa extreme poverty is not only 
widespread but deep: large numbers live well below the 
absolute poverty line of US$1.25 a day. Health, education 
and other human development outcomes are weak. Low-
income countries generally have low institutional capacity, 
relatively low (though fast-increasing) urbanisation, and a 
high reliance on agriculture and other primary sectors. 
The key challenge in these countries is to overcome poor 
governance and low institutional capacity, and so spark 
rapid and widely shared economic growth and poverty 
reduction. These countries comprise 11% of the world 
population21 and are exceptionally vulnerable to climate 
change and variability.22 They are responsible for only 
2% of world primary energy consumption and 1% of 
carbon dioxide emissions from energy use.23 Changes in 
agriculture and land use could yield significant gains in 
terms of development and build climate resilience while 
curbing GHG emissions. Ensuring modern energy access 
for the poor is also a key development challenge. 
Middle-income countries comprise 70% of the world 
population and were central to the boom in developing 
country growth, globalisation and urbanisation in the 
2000s.24 They account for around half of world energy 
consumption and carbon emissions from energy use, 
proportions which are rising rapidly. These are countries 
with a large and growing middle class. Many are grappling 
with complex problems of structural change and institutional 
modernisation. They are critical players in a transition to 
a resource-efficient, low-carbon global economy. Major 
development challenges include tackling dysfunctions 
and inefficiencies in urbanisation, industrialisation and 
energy use, where there is a high potential both to improve 
productivity and abate GHG emissions. 
China and India stand out among middle-income countries 
by virtue of their size. Despite China’s tremendous 
development over the last 30 years, its political leaders 
have remarked that the country’s previous economic 
model is likely to prove “unbalanced, uncoordinated and 
unsustainable”.25 New approaches will be needed if the 
country is to avoid the “middle income trap” and reach high 
income levels in the next 15–20 years. The previous model 
entailed rapid growth in capital accumulation, exports, 
energy-intensive industry, and high levels of fossil fuel 
use (particularly coal); it also brought urban sprawl and 
severe local air pollution. A new direction will include a 
Developing economies are also 
finding it difficult to regain their 
growth momentum in the  
wake of the crisis.
28 www.newclimateeconomy.report
ST
R
A
T
E
G
IC
 C
O
N
T
E
X
T
shift towards growth driven by innovation, more efficient 
resource use, cleaner energy sources and reduced coal 
consumption, cleaner air to breathe, more compact 
and productive cities, and greater reliance on growth in 
domestic consumption and services. These structural 
changes offer notable “no-regrets” opportunities for 
decarbonisation as part of the country’s efforts to achieve 
national economic and social goals. 
In India, meanwhile, where growth has fallen below 5% 
for two consecutive years,26 a new government has a 
strong mandate to accelerate development by boosting 
infrastructure, improving the business climate and 
strengthening public service delivery. 
Countries that have abundant natural resources occur 
in all income groups. They saw a significant rise in 
revenues during the 2000s as a result of major new 
mineral discoveries and higher international commodity 
prices.27 If well managed, these resources could accelerate 
growth and poverty reduction. If not, they could generate 
dysfunctional outcomes. 
However, these countries also face particular challenges. 
First, in the absence of strong governance, natural 
resource abundance tends to foster problems such as 
corruption, social strife over rents and other effects – 
collectively labelled the “natural resource curse” – that 
lead to worse development outcomes. In practice, faster 
growth associated with mineral booms has often had only 
weak links to job creation and poverty reduction. Second, 
many of these countries are not saving enough to replace 
the depletion of their natural assets with human capital, 
through skills development, health improvements and 
new infrastructure, for example. In such cases, the total 
stock of wealth is falling, and present prosperity masks 
the likelihood of a poorer future.28 Third, if the rest of the 
world credibly commits to curbing fossil fuel use, these 
resource-rich countries face the prospect of reduced 
demand and lower prices for fossil fuels in the future. It 
is therefore crucial that they make the most of the boom 
they are enjoying today to build up their human and other 
capital and prepare for the transition that they will surely 
have to undertake in the coming decades.
2.2 Climate risks
While achieving rapid economic growth and poverty 
reduction in the run-up to the financial crisis, the world 
has also been accumulating immense climate risks. Global 
CO
2
 emissions from energy use increased by about 3% 
per year in the 2000s, around twice the pace of the years 
1981–2000.29 CO
2
 emissions from energy use are the 
largest component of global GHG emissions, accounting 
for two-thirds of total emissions in 2010.30 A growth rate 
of 3% means that emissions increase by 55% in 15 years 
and double in 25 years. 
Recent emissions trends differ strongly between 
developed and developing countries, decelerating in the 
former but accelerating in the latter. Figures 2a and 2b 
explain changes in CO
2
 emissions according to three 
drivers: real GDP, energy intensity of GDP, and carbon 
intensity of energy. (Energy intensity is the energy 
consumed per unit of real GDP. Carbon intensity of energy 
is the carbon emissions per unit of energy.)  
Figure 2a shows that in the developed world, CO
2
 
emissions began to decouple from economic growth, 
contracting by 0.3% per year in the 2000s. This decline 
partly reflects the recession and slower economic growth, 
but there were also more promising reasons. The annual 
decline in energy intensity reached nearly 2% per year. 
Carbon intensity also fell, reflecting a continued gradual 
shift towards cleaner sources in the energy supply mix.
There was, however, no such decoupling in developing 
countries, where CO
2
 emissions rose by 6.5% annually in 
the 2000s, in line with economic growth (see Figure 2b). 
Among other factors driving emission growth, the pace 
of decline in energy intensity slowed compared with the 
1990s. Most seriously, the carbon intensity of the energy 
mix in developing countries, which was flat in the 1990s, 
rose by over 1% per year in the 2000s, reflecting a greater 
reliance on coal to meet rapidly growing demand for 
electric power generation.
Importantly, these carbon emission trends in developed 
and developing countries have not evolved independently. 
They reflect growing international trade in an increasingly 
integrated global economy. The 1990s and 2000s saw a 
shift in production of energy- and carbon-intensive goods 
from developed to developing countries, accompanied 
by a sharp rise in imports of such goods by developed 
countries from developing countries.31 Key metrics for 
understanding this trend are “production emissions”, 
which refer to the carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions within a 
particular country’s borders, and “consumption emissions”, 
relating to the CO
2
 embedded in the goods consumed by 
a country, regardless of the country where this CO
2
 was 
originally emitted. 
In developing countries, the fraction of production 
emissions which were ultimately exported rose from about 
4% in 1990 to 11% in 2010.33 Conversely, in developed 
countries, consumption emissions have grown faster 
than production emissions, reflecting rising carbon-
intensive imports. High-income OECD countries saw 
Global CO2 emissions from energy 
use increased by about 3% per year 
in the 2000s, around twice the 
pace in 1981–2000.
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Figures 2a and 2b
Changes in CO
2
 emissions, by key drivers, in high-income and developing countries
Source: Brahmbhatt et al., 2014 (forthcoming).32  
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Greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change. Carbon 
dioxide (CO
2
) is the main greenhouse gas, and is emitted 
principally from the burning of fossil fuels for energy in 
the electrical power, transport, industry and residential 
sectors, and from deforestation and land use change. 
Other powerful GHGs include nitrous oxide (N
2
O) and 
methane (CH
4
), which are emitted from various agricultural 
and industrial processes and from waste. Fluorinated 
greenhouse gases such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are 
used as refrigerants and are less abundant but far more 
powerful than CO
2
.  
A broad definition of GHG concentrations includes so-
called “Kyoto” GHGs (CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O and three fluorinated 
gasses HFC, PFC and SF6) as well as “Montreal” GHGs 
(ozone-depleting substances such as chlorofluorocarbons, 
or CFCs). The concentration in the atmosphere of Kyoto 
GHGs is currently around 446 parts per million (ppm) 
of CO
2
 equivalent (CO
2
e), while including Montreal 
gases raises this to 470 ppm. Atmospheric CO
2
e 
concentrations are rising by around 3 ppm per year, and 
that rate is accelerating.34 A century of “business as usual” 
development might take us to a concentration of 1,000 ppm 
of CO
2
e. Climate models suggest that such a rise could lead 
to a median temperature increase over the next century of 
4°C or more compared with pre-industrial levels  
(see Figure 3).35
Action to reduce carbon emissions is made more urgent 
by long lag effects, both in atmospheric physics and human 
infrastructure, which mean that decisions today have their 
major impact on the climate for future generations. 
First, there is a long atmospheric time lag, because it can 
take 25–30 years for CO
2
 molecules to reach the upper 
atmosphere, and cause the “greenhouse effect” of trapping 
heat. Thus, moderating climate change in 2040–50 requires 
cuts in GHG emissions today and over the next 10 years. 
Note that CO
2
 remains in the atmosphere for several 
centuries, and so avoiding emissions in the first place is the 
only sure way to limit their impact. 
Second, GHG emissions come largely from long-lived 
assets. Once a power station, building, factory or car has 
been built, it will generate emissions at about the same rate 
through its life. This can be 40–50 years for a power station 
and even longer for some buildings (assuming constant use, 
and no “retrofitting” of new technology). This gives rise to 
the phenomenon of “lock-in”. Once capital assets are  
built, their lifetime emissions are potentially irrevocable  
for decades. 
The implications for climate action are profound. The 
infrastructure and technologies we install today will affect 
emissions both today and through this century. The next 15 
years will be decisive in influencing the future climate. That 
is because of the greenhouse gas-emitting capital stock 
which already exists, plus the US$90 trillion worth of new 
infrastructure investment expected during this period 
across the cities, land use and energy systems where 
emissions will be concentrated.37  
One way to understand the implications of lock-in for 
climate policy is through the concept of “carbon budgets”. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
calculated that for a two-thirds or better probability of 
limiting global average warming to 2°C, cumulative GHG 
emissions could not exceed 3,670 billion tonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (Gt CO
2
e).38 Around half of that (1,890 
Gt CO
2
e) had been emitted by 2011. If the capital stock 
built over the next 10 years generated emissions at the 
same rate as that built over the last 25 years, the world 
would almost certainly exceed this carbon budget. 
The IPCC’s review of recent emission projections suggests 
that if current trends continue, global emissions in 2030 
will be around 68 Gt CO
2
e, compared with around 50 Gt 
CO
2
e today, with cumulative emissions breaching the 
2°C carbon budget by a significant margin in the long 
term.39 There are several conceivable emission pathways 
consistent with a two-thirds probability of keeping 
warming below 2°C by 2100. A core 2°C scenario used in 
this report looks for a reduction in GHG emissions to 42 
Gt by 2030 – an average decline of about 1% a year, with 
further reductions thereafter, including (in line with IPCC 
scenarios) a transition to negative emissions in the second 
half of the century.40  
Such calculations show that delay in taking action makes it 
increasingly difficult to meet a 2°C target, raising climate 
risk. Delay is dangerous. Climate scientists have estimated 
how rising temperatures will affect different regions of 
the world over time, showing how warming above 2°C will 
lead to more dangerous effects.41 In general, the frequency 
of extreme weather events, such as heat waves, droughts, 
floods, hurricanes and storm surges, will increase. 
Rising and more variable temperatures and changes in 
precipitation patterns will also take a toll, particularly 
in developing countries which depend on agriculture. 
Arctic sea ice and global glacier volume will shrink further, 
while sea-level rise and ocean acidification will continue. 
Ecosystems and “biomes” (biologically productive regions) 
will move polewards as temperatures rise. 
Put in economic terms, the impact of about 2°C of 
warming could lead to global aggregated losses of 
0.2–2.0% of income, the IPCC has said, synthesising the 
results of various studies.42 Impacts and damages were 
likely to be significantly more severe in tropical regions 
and developing countries. Within developing countries, 
the poor are inevitably the most vulnerable group. 
The IPCC reports that very few studies have examined 
economic impacts beyond a 3°C increase, which would 
represent an average global temperature not experienced 
Box 1
Climate change – concentration pathways, “lock-in” and impacts
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Source: IPCC, 2014.36 
for millions of years. While such studies have arrived at a 
very wide range of damage estimates, it is well understood 
that higher temperatures in this range increase the 
likelihood of reaching “tipping points” or “thresholds” in 
natural systems, setting off powerful, self-reinforcing 
climatic impacts and irreversible changes with severe 
economic and human costs. For example, the thawing of 
permafrost could lead to a large release of methane, which 
would drive additional temperature rises, risking runaway 
and catastrophic climate change and economic damages.
Figure 3
The world is currently on track for warming of around 4°C
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net carbon imports in 2010 rise to the equivalent of 
18% of production emissions, from about 2% in 1990. 
Nevertheless, some OECD countries have managed to 
reduce both production and consumption emissions.
The comparison with financial risk
Climate risk can be usefully compared with financial risk 
before the 2008–09 financial crisis. Such comparisons 
include the steady accumulation of risk over time, the 
systemic nature of that risk, and its underlying incentives.
Before the crisis, financial risks increased as leverage and 
the use of high-risk instruments grew and spread through 
a globalised financial system. Climate risk is similarly 
cumulative, determined by the growing stock of GHGs 
in the atmosphere, rather than any one year’s emissions. 
Such accumulation of risks creates the danger of a more 
severe outcome, especially since it is hard to know how 
close the system is to a tipping point. Even if most analysts 
thought a global financial crash was unlikely, there was 
clearly a possibility that it could happen, as transpired. 
Similarly, there is a clear possibility that climate impacts 
and damages could be even greater, or come earlier, than 
scientists’ central scenarios, with very severe effects. 
The financial risks that accumulated in the pre-2008 
period were “systemic”, in that all major financial 
institutions were exposed, making the entire global 
financial system vulnerable. Climate risk is also systemic: 
it cannot be isolated in one part or region of the world 
economy. Damage from warming above 2°C will affect all 
parts of the global economy. 
Climate and pre-crisis financial risk also exhibit similar 
incentives. Financial firms and households had incentives to 
take on excessive debt and risk, because of higher near-term 
profits and utility. Regulators and governments had little 
short-term incentive to stop the excess, since the credit 
boom was evidently boosting economic growth and voter 
satisfaction. Similarly, firms emitting carbon and consumers 
enjoying the benefits of fossil fuels have every incentive to 
enjoy their low costs today. Governments with short-term 
political considerations hesitate to get in the way. 
These parallels are both disturbing and instructive. 
Climate risk is large, systemic and accumulating, just as 
financial risk was before 2008. However, climate risk 
is arguably much better understood, having been the 
subject of vast international research collaboration and 
discussion for decades. And, unlike financial risk, failing 
to act could have consequences that are irreversible. 
The Commission believes that the world’s governments, 
businesses and citizens at large possess an overwhelming 
case to act while they are still able to defuse the risks, if 
not to eliminate them. 
Managing climate risk under uncertainty
One of the factors that makes climate change such an 
unusually difficult problem is that it entails policy-making 
under large scientific and economic uncertainties. While 
there is little doubt that climate change is occurring and 
that human activity is contributing significantly, there 
remain many large scientific uncertainties about the timing 
and scale of climate changes. The IPCC exhaustively 
documents these uncertainties in its latest major report 
reviewing the physical evidence, published last year.43 As 
Box 1 notes, little is known about the scale of economic 
damages beyond a warming of 2–3°C, although the range 
of outcomes includes the possibility of very severe, long-
run damage. 
Uncertainty is not a reason for inaction given the evidence 
that climate change will inflict significant costs on 
average across the range of uncertainties. In addition, it 
is a standard assumption that decision-makers are risk-
averse, and should therefore put even greater weight on 
the loss of welfare under a less optimistic outcome. The 
rational course of action is to manage climate risks, to 
take climate action today as an insurance premium against 
the real, but difficulty to quantify, possibility of severe 
or catastrophic outcomes.
Broadly speaking, there are two strategies to manage 
climate risk: 
• Mitigation of climate risk aims to reduce the likelihood 
and extent of climate change by reducing GHG 
emissions. In risk management language, this can be 
called a self-protection strategy. The challenge facing 
the world is how to mitigate emissions substantially 
while maintaining rapid economic development and 
poverty reduction. In the remainder of this report 
we explore the potential for mitigation in terms of 
three drivers of change: improvements in efficiency 
in resource use; strategic investments especially in 
infrastructure; and, perhaps most important in the 
long run, innovation.
• Adaptation, on the other hand, is defined by the 
IPCC as “the process of adjustment to actual or 
expected climate effects”, which “seeks to moderate 
or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities” 
from climate change.44 This is sometimes referred to 
as a self-insurance strategy. There is growing interest 
in broader strategies for transformative adaptation 
that help communities increase productivity, seek 
out lower-carbon methods and strengthen resilience 
to climate change. Box 2 notes some key aspects 
of adaptation. (See also Box 4, which describes 
transformative adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa.)
In conclusion, there is an urgent need for a development 
Climate risk is large, systemic 
and accumulating, just as 
financial risk was before 2008.
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Any sensible approach to managing climate risk will 
involve some investment in adaptation, alongside 
mitigation. GHGs already in the atmosphere will 
mean that 2016–2035 will be 0.9–1.3°C warmer than 
1850–1900, on average, even if drastic action to reduce 
emissions is taken immediately.45 Adaptation to at least 
that level of climate change will therefore be essential. 
Furthermore, without mitigation, emissions and 
temperatures will continue to rise, and so will the costs 
of adaptation, as the impacts of climate change become 
increasingly harsh. Beyond a certain threshold, climate 
change would overwhelm capacity for adaptation – for 
example, extreme heat and sea-level rise. 
Adaptation is likely to be highly context-specific, but 
will in general involve complementary actions across 
all levels, from individuals to governments. Changes 
in patterns of resource allocation, investment and 
innovation will be needed to sustain and improve well-
being in response to actual and expected climate changes. 
Increased investment will be needed in such areas as 
more resilient infrastructure and water supplies; stronger 
coastal defences and flood protection; new techniques 
in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and other sectors to 
maintain output under changing weather conditions; 
improved meteorological forecasting and early warning 
systems; and better risk management, insurance, social 
protection and health services. 
Taking adaptation seriously further underlines the 
importance of efforts to strengthen institutions for  
public investment management, to ensure that public 
spending is well planned, carefully implemented and 
efficiently managed. 
Initial estimates have indicated that the costs of 
adaptation to 2°C warming might be US$70–100 billion 
Box 2
Adaptation
model, across all types of countries, that first slows and 
ultimately reverses the accumulation of climate risk, while 
continuing to yield rapid gains in human well-being.
3. Opportunities to tackle  
growth and climate challenges
3.1 Some strategic considerations 
A central insight of this report is that many of the policy 
and institutional reforms needed to revitalise growth 
and improve well-being over the next 15 years are also 
key to tackling climate risk. There is considerable scope 
for countries to press forward with reforms that both 
energise development and grapple with climate risk.  
per year from 2010 to 2050, or about 0.2% of global 
GDP in 2009, but a much more significant cost relative to 
GDP in low-income countries, which are likely to suffer 
more from climate change.46 Limitations in the evidence 
base also suggest that these estimates are incomplete.47 
Regardless, estimates of adaptation financing needs in 
vulnerable low-income countries, such as in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Small Island Developing States, far exceed 
actual flows. Improving financing for adaptation must 
be an important element in international cooperation to 
tackle climate change.
Alongside public investment, adaptation also requires 
institutional and policy reforms that facilitate adaptation 
by businesses and individuals. Rational, forward-looking 
individuals will normally undertake adaptation actions in 
their own self-interest, but such autonomous adaptation 
may be hampered by market and policy failures. For 
example, farmers in low-income countries may fail to shift 
to new, more resilient seeds and farming techniques due 
to some combination of credit market and information 
failures, and weak property rights. Solving such problems 
to promote more resilient farming methods can have 
multiple benefits by raising agricultural productivity as 
well as curbing emissions, by promoting more sustainably 
intensive farming methods. 
As these examples suggest, many of the reforms needed 
to facilitate adaptation are also likely to increase the 
development options and carbon abatement choices 
available to individuals and countries. A systematic use 
of cost-effective adaptation measures could increase 
resilience and reduce losses from climate change by up 
to two-thirds through 2030, while also making insurance 
more cost-effective for the remaining third, according  
to one study.48
Market and policy failures, multiple benefits and the  
scope for “win-win” reforms
The potential for countries to make immediate progress 
on both development and reducing climate risk rests 
partly on what the Commission sees as the substantial 
scope for what are sometimes called “win-win” or “no-
regrets” reforms.  
“Win-win” reforms arise because real-world economies 
are rife with market and policy failures. In contrast to 
the theoretical economic model of competitive general 
equilibrium, where the demanding conditions for a 
welfare optimum are satisfied, real economies are 
typically operating well below their potential to improve 
welfare. Correcting these failures can generate multiple 
benefits, including gains in economic efficiency and the 
34 www.newclimateeconomy.report
ST
R
A
T
E
G
IC
 C
O
N
T
E
X
T
environment. Such reforms still entail costs and trade-
offs. But the case for vigorous reform is substantially 
strengthened by taking proper account of the full range 
of market and coordination failures, and the potential 
multiple benefits (and costs) of correcting them.  
Box 3 lists some of the more important market and 
coordination failures that are relevant to this discussion.
This report documents numerous opportunities for 
reforms which deal with both development and climate 
risk. These reforms yield both significant near- to medium-
term net improvements in welfare, economic efficiency 
and development, as well as mitigation of GHGs. One 
important example we illustrate here is reform to reduce 
the negative environmental externalities from burning 
fossil fuels to reap multiple benefits, including both lower 
global climate risk and reduced local air pollution.
Climate change itself is, of course, the biggest of all 
global externalities. The economic case for undertaking 
some immediate action to mitigate climate change is well 
established.50 But actual action has been limited. One 
concern among policy-makers is that while the costs of 
climate interventions are incurred today, they will produce 
benefits mostly over the long term. In addition, the size 
of these benefits is uncertain. And the climate benefits 
produced as a result of actions by any individual country 
will largely accrue to other countries, in the absence of a 
global agreement. 
The benefit-cost calculus of climate action can change 
substantially when fuller account is taken of the multiple 
benefits that arise as a joint product of actions to reduce 
emissions of GHGs.51
The classic example of multiple benefits is the reduction 
in local air pollution associated with climate mitigation 
policies that reduce the use of fossil fuels.52 Fossil fuel 
burning generates not only greenhouse gases but also 
local air pollution that has an immediate harmful impact 
on the emitting country itself. The most important type 
of air pollution involves tiny particles called particulate 
matter (PM). These particles are defined according to their 
size; the smallest, PM
2.5
, which often come from burning 
fossil fuels, are the most dangerous. They increase they 
prevalence of lung cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, ischemic heart disease (from reduced blood 
supply) and stroke.53
Externalities occur when a product or activity affects 
people in ways that are not captured in its price. A 
firm burning coal as an input in manufacturing creates 
local air pollution, which damages the health of people 
nearby. This damage is not captured in the price of the 
final product, which is then over-consumed, reducing 
overall welfare. The firm’s activity also creates a global 
externality in the form of climate change, which will 
adversely affect people all over the world.
Network effects occur when the value of a product or 
activity depends upon its wider adoption. Electric cars 
are less valuable if there are only a few users, because 
it is unprofitable to create a network of charging 
stations. And without charging stations, the number of 
electric car users remains low. As a result, electric cars 
may fail to take off and achieve an alternative possible 
equilibrium with many users and a profitable charging 
network. Extension of recycling initiatives and the 
electricity grid provide other examples.
Agglomeration effects are close cousins of network 
effects, and are important in the economics of cities, 
where the value of deciding on a particular location 
depends on the number of other people deciding  
the same. 
Innovation externalities occur where an inventor is 
inadequately rewarded for the time and resources 
invested to create a superior product or process. For 
example, once developed, the innovation’s advantages 
may be relatively cheap to copy. Knowing this, the 
inventor may simply not take the trouble to innovate. 
Similarly, firms may under-invest in education and 
training, as trained workers can be “poached” by other 
companies. Network externalities and asymmetric 
information effects also hinder the creation, diffusion 
and financing of innovations. 
Imperfect information. Many imperfections in capital 
markets and financial systems, such as moral hazard, 
adverse selection and principal-agent problems, result 
from imperfect information. In addition, firms and 
consumers do not have complete information about 
available goods and services – for example, the energy 
efficiency of appliances or cars – and so may not 
recognise their economic benefit.
Behavioural aspects. Economies may also perform 
inefficiently because of the psychological features of 
economic agents, whether consumers, workers, savers, 
managers or policy-makers, reflecting various biases 
and constraints in human decision-making.49
Box 3
Anatomy of market failures – a world  
of imperfections and opportunities
There is considerable scope 
for countries to press forward 
with reforms that both energise 
development and grapple  
with climate risk.
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Figure 4
Cost of mortality from outdoor air pollution, 2010
Note: The estimate is for mortality from particulate matter (PM2.5) exposure in particular Source: Hamilton, 2014.
55 
The health damages caused by local air pollution are often 
very large. In China, PM
2.5
 pollution has been linked to 1.23 
million premature deaths in 2010 (median estimate) – or, 
put in monetary terms, damages equivalent to 9.7–13.2% 
of China’s GDP. The problem is so severe that curbing local 
air pollution has become one of the major items on the 
government’s policy agenda, driving plans to curb China’s 
coal consumption. 
In India, PM
2.5
 pollution is associated with more than 
627,000 premature deaths in 2010 (median estimate), 
equivalent to 5.5–7.5% of GDP. Figure 4 shows median 
estimates of the costs of mortality from PM
2.5
 exposure for 
the 15 largest emitters of CO
2
 from energy use.54 
It is sometimes useful to express the monetary value of 
health damages from local air pollution per tonne of CO
2
 
emitted from fossil fuel combustion. With some caveats, 
this indicator also provides an estimate of the potential 
health benefits per tonne of CO
2
 abatement. A recent 
study calculates the median value of such health benefits 
for the 15 largest CO
2
 emitters at US$73 per tonne of 
CO
2
 abated in 2010.56 Illustrating the significance of these 
numbers, they are more than double US government 
estimates for the climate benefit of reducing CO
2
 
emissions. The US Interagency Working Group on Social 
Cost of Carbon estimated this climate benefit at US$32 
per tonne of CO
2 
abatement in 2010.57 Adding the median 
US$73 benefit from reduced air pollution in the 15 largest 
emitters would triple the overall benefit from cutting 
carbon emissions. Furthermore, and importantly from 
the perspective of policy-makers, the air quality benefits 
are enjoyed in the near term; accrue locally, mostly to the 
country itself; and are more certain compared with climate 
change benefits. 
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This discussion of avoided local air pollution provides 
a specific example of the importance of accounting for 
multiple benefits when evaluating climate actions. In 
practice, it would be important to look carefully at how 
the size and time paths of the various benefits and costs 
differ across countries. Many aspects of the links between 
greenhouse gases and local air pollutants, including 
synergies and trade-offs, need to be better understood. 
From the perspective of policy-makers, an important 
complication is that there may be alternative policies 
that generate a different set of benefits. For example, a 
significant volume of local air pollution can be mitigated 
by so-called “end of pipe” methods that do not reduce 
GHG emissions, such as sulphur scrubbers fitted to 
the smokestacks of power plants. If countries pursued 
more ambitious air pollution reduction targets, however, 
then “end of pipe” methods are unlikely to be enough. 
It would still then be necessary to adopt methods 
that also reduce GHG emissions. 
One of the few model-based studies to estimate the 
scale of GHG reductions from ambitious air pollution 
policies considered an illustrative scenario in which 
countries sought to reduce premature air pollution-
related deaths in 2050 by 25% compared with 2005. 
This ambitious air pollution target also yielded large 
GHG reductions by 2050, falling by 38% in the OECD, 
61% in China and 42% in India, compared with a baseline 
without mitigation policies.58 
Fossil fuel combustion, especially from coal, is the major 
source of PM pollution in China, causing severe smog and 
haze problems in major cities. In 2013 only three Chinese 
cities met a so-called “Grade II” air quality standard 
(equivalent to less than 35 micrograms of PM per cubic 
metre). Research for the Commission suggests that 
even with the most advanced end-of-pipe technologies, 
only 50% of Chinese cities would be able to achieve the 
Grade II air quality standard by 2030. Instead, it will be 
necessary to adopt upstream methods which replace fossil 
fuels to ensure that most Chinese cities meet these air 
quality standards. Such transformational policies would 
also generate GHG reductions and help China peak its 
emissions by around 2030.59
In a full cost–benefit analysis, policy-makers could 
compare the total multiple benefits (net of costs) of a GHG 
mitigation policy against those of an air pollution reduction 
policy. An optimal policy would seek a combination of GHG 
and air pollution measures, to maximise total multiple 
benefits net of costs. One study finds that an optimal, 
combined policy achieves air quality benefits as large as 
an air pollution-only policy, while also achieving climate 
benefits larger than in a GHG-only mitigation policy.60 The 
net total benefits of the combined policy are larger than 
either of the separate policies. Clearly, this is an important 
policy theme which deserves to be explored more 
thoroughly going forward. 
Scope for reforms: some qualifications and limitations
We have used the term “win-win” to refer to the potential 
for reforms which tap multiple benefits by tackling 
numerous market and policy failures. It is important to 
describe some qualifications and limitations.
First, such reforms still entail costs and various trade-offs. 
To illustrate, consider a common example of a “win-win” 
reform, to reduce fossil fuel consumer subsidies. Such a 
reform can reduce fiscal pressures, improve economic 
efficiency, and yield multiple benefits in reduced local air 
pollution and GHG emissions. However, it also entails 
costs, including human costs and loss of output that 
occur as workers and equipment in some sectors become 
unemployed for some time, before finding employment 
in rising sectors. Costs and trade-offs exist in all cases, 
and need to be carefully examined and dealt with in 
undertaking reforms.
Second, there is the “problem of the second best”. In 
an economy with multiple imperfections, an attempt 
to correct one imperfection could reduce rather than 
increase overall welfare.61 Here there are no easy 
formulas. Each situation would need to be analysed 
carefully on its merits, and policy might need to proceed 
through step-by-step experiment and learning-by-doing to 
discover the right combination of instruments to advance 
overall welfare over the course of time.
Third, there are often deep political economy or 
institutional reasons why governments do not undertake 
reforms to eliminate a market or policy failure. 
Government failure can lead to reforms themselves 
introducing new distortions or inefficiencies that leave 
the country worse off than before. Such failures can occur, 
for example, when governments are mainly responding to 
influential special interests or rent-seekers; lack credibility 
with the public; or are mainly driven by short-term political 
objectives. As a result, the hard and poorly understood 
problem of improving governance and institutions is 
an essential element of reform strategies to tackle 
development and climate objectives. 
Some of these limitations may represent daunting 
challenges for reform. But this should not discourage a 
well-considered, bold and persistent effort to act, given 
the potential for immense gains in human welfare and 
In developing countries, an 
important concern is that attempts 
to tackle climate change will derail 
their immediate and overriding 
objective of rapid economic growth 
and poverty reduction.
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poverty reduction, and the severe climate losses that 
could accompany inaction. 
Is climate action too costly? 
There is never a good time for major change, especially 
one which involves complex political dynamics and 
deep institutional reform. To make progress, it is 
crucial to examine the many thoughtful and reasoned 
concerns about potential adverse effects of climate 
action. Here we briefly discuss some of the main 
concerns that are sometimes raised against taking 
immediate action on climate. 
The most widely held concern is that climate action is 
simply too costly. In developing countries, an important 
concern is that attempts to tackle climate change will 
derail their immediate and overriding objective of rapid 
economic growth and poverty reduction. In all countries 
there are concerns about potential effects on employment 
and competitiveness in the global economy. 
In evaluating such concerns, it is important to take into 
account the full costs and benefits of all available options. 
Sometimes a policy may appear too costly because not 
all its benefits are accounted for. The appropriate metric 
for judging an economic policy is its impact on overall 
welfare. In this report, we have tried to focus on policies 
and reforms which improve overall national welfare, 
productivity and efficiency, and which also help reduce 
climate risk. 
Often the analysis focuses only on the costs to a 
particular sector – for example, the pollution or carbon-
intensive industries in the economy – while ignoring 
broader effects on the welfare of the public at large, 
such as improvements in health from reduced local 
air pollution. A lack of environmental regulation is in 
effect a form of subsidy to highly polluting firms at 
the expense of a less healthy public, and less polluting 
firms. Environmental policy improves overall economic 
efficiency and welfare by removing the implicit subsidy for 
polluting firms, and by causing a reallocation of resources 
towards cleaner activities. 
The exclusive use of GDP as a yardstick to measure the 
welfare effects of reform can also be misleading. The 
effect on GDP might include a potential loss in measured 
output of goods and services, but not other types of 
changes in welfare, for example in improved health. Policy-
makers should supplement GDP effects with estimates 
of broader welfare gains, which can also be estimated in 
monetary terms, albeit sometimes only roughly.62
If policy-makers do want to focus solely only on GDP 
effects, however, several points are relevant. First, the 
assumptions of models used to make such estimates 
need to be carefully scrutinised. Models often start from 
the assumption of an economy where resources are 
already efficiently allocated, for the good reason that we 
do not yet know how to model the real world of multiple 
imperfections and numerous inefficiencies. The effects 
of reform are therefore judged against the assumed 
starting point of an efficient economy. Such results, while 
interesting, need to be used cautiously as a guide to policy, 
when one is judging the results of reform versus non-
reform in a highly imperfect and inefficient world. 
Second, as Chapter 5: Economics of Change discusses in 
more detail, the estimated global costs of efficient climate 
policy, such as a carbon tax, are usually rather limited, 
perhaps in the order of 1–4% of global consumption 
in 2030, with a median value of 1.7%, according to the 
IPCC’s review of recent studies.63 Such costs are fairly 
small in relation to the much larger underlying increase 
in consumption that would occur by 2030. Assuming 
consumption growth of 3% in 2015–30, a little less than 
average world GDP growth since 1980, a median 1.7% 
cost would represent a delay of about six months in 
achieving the level of consumption that would have been 
reached in 2030 without climate policies. This does not 
seem an excessive insurance premium to pay to start 
reducing the possibility of dangerous climate change. Note 
that the cost estimates discussed here do not include 
the kinds of multiple benefits discussed above, nor the 
benefits of averted climate damages. Such model-based 
cost estimates can also be significantly reduced by optimal 
recycling of revenues from a carbon tax – for example, to 
cut labour and capital taxes. 
Third, adopting a somewhat costlier option today may 
make sense in a highly uncertain world where there is a 
value in keeping options open and avoiding getting locked 
into courses that might turn out to be very expensive in 
the future. This point is especially relevant when building 
large, long-lived infrastructure such as transport networks 
or power systems. 
Fourth, the cost–benefit ratio for climate action depends 
greatly on the international context. There is a disincentive 
for governments to undertake reforms with climate 
trade-offs, because climate action creates a global public 
good. The benefits from a single country’s efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions will accrue to all countries. But 
if countries act together to reduce emissions, then the 
climate benefits for each country are much larger. Chapter 
8: International Cooperation explores approaches for 
Developing countries may  
worry that environmental 
policies will hinder their 
industrialisation. They may 
argue that it is better to “grow 
dirty and clean up later”.
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enhancing global cooperation on climate action, including 
the need for climate finance to help developing countries 
make progress. 
Will climate action lead to loss of competitiveness?
The particular focus here is the potential harm caused 
by climate action to the international competitiveness 
of a country’s industries. The concern is that higher 
costs relative to foreign competitors will cause a shift in 
pollution-intensive industries to other countries with less 
strict regulation.
Empirical studies have found this relocation effect to 
be small, where it is found at all, reflecting the fact that 
pollution abatement costs are only a small proportion of 
total costs in most industries. In addition, environmental 
regulations can induce firms to increase innovation as 
a way to offset such higher costs. Governments may 
nevertheless consider providing carefully designed 
transitional assistance to vulnerable sectors.64
Developing countries may worry that environmental 
policies will hinder their industrialisation. They may 
argue that it is better to “grow dirty and clean up 
later”. Developing countries indeed face numerous 
coordination and market failures that may hamper 
structural change and the success of tradable goods 
industries, which, even if they are polluting, might well be 
important for long-term growth and structural change. 
As noted earlier, “growing dirty” implies subsidising 
polluting industries at the expense of less polluting firms 
and the public at large, who suffer from pollution and 
ill-health. Lack of environmental regulation can then be 
a form of industrial policy to support polluting tradable 
sectors, one that is relatively easy to implement, as it 
does not make heavy demands on institutional capacity. 
Developing countries should, however, be able to reach 
a better outcome if they combine tighter environmental 
policy with more focused government interventions 
in support of structural change, backed by a sustained 
effort to strengthen institutional capacity. To encourage 
such approaches, developed countries could consider 
providing greater flexibility under international trade 
rules to accommodate well-managed industrial policy 
interventions by developing countries.65  
Will climate action hurt the poor?
Whether climate actions such as removing fossil fuel 
subsidies or a carbon tax are regressive (having a 
greater relative negative effect on the poor) depends to 
some extent on country circumstances. There is some 
evidence that they tend to be regressive in developed 
countries, but less so in developing nations, where the 
upper and middle classes may be the major consumers 
of energy.66 Regardless of this relative impact, policy-
makers are concerned about the absolute impacts 
of higher energy prices on the poor. Well-designed 
and targeted safety net measures to help vulnerable 
groups are an essential element in the political 
economy of reforms.
Will climate action cost jobs?
Linked to concerns about competitiveness are fears 
that environmental policies will significantly increase 
unemployment. Others have argued that such policies will, 
on the contrary, be a source of “green jobs”. 
A good starting point is to note that the aim and effect 
of environmental and climate policies is to induce a 
substitution between different types of production and 
consumption, away from more polluting to less polluting 
activities. There is no special reason to expect any overall 
net job gains or losses from this adjustment. While there is 
a clear finding in the research that any overall employment 
effects of environmental policies are small, there is no 
consensus whether those small effects would be positive 
or negative.67 (See Chapter 5: Economics of Change for 
further details.) 
There will, however, be changes in the numbers and types 
of jobs across and within economic sectors, and there 
could be significant adjustment issues, as workers need 
to move from declining to expanding sectors, firms and 
job types. This will require specific policies to shape a just 
transition. The amount of such “churn” or job destruction 
and job creation linked to climate mitigation is expected 
to be about 0.5% of total employment – quite small 
compared with the overall “churn” that normally occurs in 
a market economy. Job effects may be larger in economies 
with larger labour market imperfections. The recycling of 
revenues from carbon taxes or emissions trading schemes 
can mitigate job impacts. For example, studies suggest that 
recycling of carbon tax revenues to reduce labour market 
taxes could offset or more than offset all adverse impacts 
of climate action on employment.68
3.2 Enabling change through resource  
efficiency, investment and innovation 
Policy efforts to promote rapid development and tackle 
climate risk will draw upon and work through three 
fundamental mechanisms or drivers of change that affect 
every sector of the economy: efficiency of resource use; 
investment, particularly in infrastructure; and innovation.
Investment in infrastructure is a 
fundamental mechanism to expand 
the productive capacity of the 
economy.
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Note: Cities include urban transport, and land use includes forests; innovation includes economy-wide innovation.
Figure 5
Three critical economic systems and three key drivers of change
Resource efficiency
The discussion in the preceding section has stressed the 
presence of numerous market and policy failures which 
result in an inefficient allocation of resources and lower 
levels of welfare. Fossil fuel consumer subsidies are an 
important example. They result in multiple resource 
misallocations, including excessive capital and labour 
employed in pollution-intensive sectors. Within sectors, 
firms use more fossil fuel- and pollution-intensive methods 
of production. Consumers’ shopping baskets are biased 
towards fossil fuel- and pollution-intensive goods and 
services. There is too much local air pollution, damaging 
citizens’ health and productivity, and too high GHG 
emissions, storing up climate risks for the future.69  
Reforms of fossil fuel subsidies, discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5: Economics of Change, can stimulate 
improvements in efficiency of resource use in all these 
dimensions. Various instruments can improve resource 
efficiency by tackling market failure, including price-
based instruments such as carbon taxes or emission 
trading schemes, as well as regulations and standards, and 
information-based instruments, among others. 
Infrastructure investment
Infrastructure refers to the large interconnected physical 
networks – transport, communications, buildings, 
energy, water and waste management – that provide 
critical services to and raise the productivity of the 
economy as a whole. Investment in infrastructure is 
a fundamental mechanism to expand the productive 
capacity of the economy.
Recent economic research has provided much evidence 
on the high, economy-wide returns to efficiently allocated 
and well-managed infrastructure capital.70 As Chapter 6: 
Finance indicates, almost US$90 trillion infrastructure 
spending (in constant 2010 dollars) is projected to be 
needed in 2015–30 across the cities, land use and energy 
systems, especially in developing countries. Ensuring that 
this new infrastructure does not lock countries into a 
high-carbon path, but rather supports the transition to a 
low-carbon economy, is expected to have a net additional 
cost of about US$4 trillion. The latter does not include 
Innovation and technological 
progress are by far the most 
important drivers of long-term 
growth in productivity and output.
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longer-term operational savings in a low-carbon transition, 
as a result of burning less fossil fuels. 
Increased investment is a means of increasing 
consumption in the future. When the economy is 
operating at full capacity, it will, in general, demand some 
sacrifice of present consumption. But that is hardly the 
case in large parts of the world today, which are continuing 
to operate at below their potential output in the wake of 
the Great Recession. Investment is hardly constrained 
by a shortage of savings, as suggested by low long-term 
real interest rates. Yet world gross fixed investment 
relative to GDP has fallen to around 21% in the years 
since the crisis, the lowest level in 50 years, entirely 
due to a fall in developed countries, to around 19%.71 
The present macroeconomic context thus provides a 
particularly favourable opportunity for policies to foster 
stronger global growth through increased infrastructure 
investment, including in low-carbon systems.72 Chapter 
6: Finance further explores policy approaches to boosting 
infrastructure spending on low-carbon assets, in particular 
through institutional innovations to encourage private-
sector financing and engagement.
Innovation
Innovation and technological progress are by far the most 
important drivers of long-term growth in productivity and 
output.73 It is also becoming clear that innovation is likely 
to be the most important long-term driver to mitigate 
climate change, in particular by fostering new technologies 
that can supply energy that is not only clean but also 
cheap and abundant. The latter condition is critical if 
the world is to satisfy rapidly growing energy demand in 
developing countries while also abating GHG emissions 
and climate change.  
A broad definition of innovation includes not only 
cutting-edge research and development (R&D), but 
also deployment, diffusion and adoption of existing 
technologies, the latter being especially important in 
developing countries. It includes not only development 
of new products and production processes, but also 
institutional innovation and new methods of business 
organisation, marketing and distribution. Relatively simple 
innovations can have enormous impacts: the introduction 
High poverty makes Africa’s rural populations 
acutely vulnerable to climate risk. It also closes down 
opportunities for productive investment and reinforces 
land use policies that contribute to climate change. 
Low productivity is at the heart of the problem. Grain 
yields are between one-third and one-fifth of those 
in South Asia. Much of Africa’s agricultural output 
growth over the past half-century has come from land 
and labour increases. Crop-intensification, minimum 
tillage and agroforestry projects could all boost yields. 
Farmers in Malawi have doubled maize output per 
hectare through more intensive cropping. However, 
climate risk is itself a barrier to investment, one which is 
gradually ratcheting higher. Studies show that inability 
to manage risk is a major deterrent to the adoption 
of new technologies and investment in crops offering 
higher (but more variable) returns.
Transformative adaptation strategies could help change 
this picture. For example, support for social protection 
and the development of insurance can provide a 
safety net that reduces the threat of severe losses. 
Investment in infrastructure can have a similar effect by 
strengthening resilience.
African governments themselves could do much to 
reduce risk and raise productivity. On one estimate, 
Africa’s farmers typically receive around 20% of the 
value of food crops, reflecting the poor state of rural 
roads and the operation of transport cartels. Some 
10–20% of food staple production is lost through post-
harvest losses. Non-tariff barriers restrict opportunities 
for participation in regional trade. One effect is to 
decouple agriculture from fast-growing urban markets. 
Currently, intra-regional trade accounts for less than 
10–15% of the US$35 billion in food imports.
Ethiopia is exploring a more ambitious approach 
to adaptation. The 2011 Climate Resilient Green 
Economy strategy provides a single funding mechanism 
and institutional framework linking all government 
departments. The strategy combines public investment 
in infrastructure with incentives for private investment 
to mitigate climate risks and raise productivity. 
Box 4
African agriculture – a case for transforma-
tive adaptation and  
multiple gains80  
of the humble shipping container revolutionised global 
freight transport and is estimated to explain a 700% 
increase in industrialised country trade over 20 years.74
There is a large role for public policy to foster innovation. 
As Box 3 indicates, innovation is subject to its own 
specific market failures, such as knowledge spillovers, 
network externalities and asymmetric information. These 
failures mean that private incentives alone are generally 
The clustering together of 
individuals and firms in urban  
areas facilitates innovation, 
productivity increases and 
economic growth through a  
variety of agglomeration 
economies.
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inadequate to generate an optimal amount of innovation. 
Market incentives for climate-friendly innovation are 
further reduced by the failure to price externalities 
related to GHG emissions, which boost the profitability of 
polluting relative to clean technologies. The introduction 
of environmental pricing on fossil fuels would improve the 
price incentives for innovators to seek out new cleaner 
technologies, in addition to improving the efficiency of 
existing resource allocation.  
Chapter 7: Innovation discusses various public policy 
responses, including public-sector R&D, fiscal incentives, 
public procurement, intellectual property rights and other 
instruments. Innovation market failures also provide 
a rationale for policies tailored to promote innovation 
in clean technologies more specifically. That is because 
market failures affecting innovation also promote path 
dependence.75 The large existing base of research in fossil 
fuel technologies, for example, has given them a large 
“head start”, and favours further innovations on that path. 
This path dependence, or bias in favour of existing dirty 
technologies, could hinder or prevent the creation of a 
clean energy innovation complex and path that might 
otherwise generate new clean technologies that are 
ultimately even cheaper than their dirty competitors. 
3.3 Opportunities to tackle growth and  
climate challenges in three critical systems
The Commission has focused on three socio-economic 
systems that hold the key to yield multiple economic, 
social and environmental benefits: cities, land use and 
energy systems. These systems are crucial for change in 
a meaningful 10- to 20-year horizon because they are 
so important for the overall economy and emissions, 
are already undergoing rapid change, and generally 
have institutions and policy frameworks that can 
support reforms and contribute to improved outcomes. 
Other sectors such as heavy and light industry and 
services are also enormously important, of course, 
and are examined throughout the rest of the report, 
for example in the discussions of energy, innovation, 
competitiveness and restructuring.
Building more productive and cleaner cities
As Chapter 2: Cities discusses, urbanisation and economic 
development are mutually reinforcing. The clustering 
together of individuals and firms in urban areas facilitates 
innovation, productivity increases and economic growth 
through a variety of agglomeration economies. Such 
effects include spillovers and diffusion of knowledge 
between firms; increased productivity due to a wider 
variety of specialised inputs and types of labour; better 
risk-sharing; better matching of workers to firms; 
and greater feasibility of infrastructure projects with 
economies of large scale.
The geographic density of economic activity is found to be 
a powerful influence on productivity, broadly confirming 
the role of agglomeration economies, and showing that 
more compact cities can have economic development 
advantages. Employment density is found to explain 
over half of the variation in labour productivity across 
US states, for example.76 At the same time, cities are 
also drivers of energy consumption and GHG emissions, 
generating about 70% of the global total of each.77 
Crucially, more compact, more connected city forms allow 
significantly greater energy efficiency and lower emissions 
per unit of economic activity.
Unfortunately, there are few automatic guarantees 
that urban form will necessarily evolve in ways that 
maximise agglomeration economies and productivity 
while curbing GHG emissions, local air pollution and 
congestion. The dominant growth pattern in many 
urban areas is characterised by unmanaged sprawl 
and increasing car use. The fact that individuals and 
firms do not take into account the collective benefits 
of density creates a bias towards more urban sprawl. 
Other market failures also contribute, such as the 
lack of pricing for air pollution, congestion, or road 
traffic accidents (a major source of death and injury, 
particularly in developing countries78). Lack of city-level 
institutional and planning capacity tends to work in the 
same direction. Policy failures include infrastructure 
financing or urban tax models that implicitly subsidise 
sprawl, and motor fuel taxes that are too low to fully 
cover the cost of building and maintaining roads. Once 
a city starts to sprawl, it creates its own logic for further 
sprawl, by shaping household expectations about 
dwelling space and commute time; and building up a 
political economy of property developers and transport 
providers. Beside climate change, urban sprawl is one of 
the biggest examples of a market failure worldwide. 
The Commission concludes that the type of urbanisation 
that unfolds in the next 15 years will have a major bearing 
on whether the world can exploit the opportunity for 
achieving economic growth while managing climate risk. 
How urban planners shape urban form and long-lived 
infrastructure in these coming few years will largely 
determine whether the world gets locked into a traditional 
model of sprawl and conventional motorisation, with lower 
productivity and spiralling emissions, or moves onto a 
better path, with more compact, connected and liveable 
cities, greater productivity and reduced climate risk. 
In developing countries, especially, 
the traditional model of agriculture 
and land use is under pressure due 
to growing land and water scarcity, 
deforestation, over-grazing and  
soil degradation.
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Improving land use
Agriculture and land use systems will play an important 
role in dealing with development and climate risk 
challenges, as elaborated in Chapter 3: Land Use. These 
systems are central in meeting rising demand for food, 
driven by fast-rising incomes in developing countries and a 
still growing world population. They remain a major source 
of employment and income in low- and lower-middle-
income countries, where they are also highly vulnerable to 
climate change. 
In developing countries, especially, the traditional model of 
agriculture and land use is under pressure due to growing 
land and water scarcity, deforestation, over-grazing and 
soil degradation. These are also regions where agricultural 
productivity is already being affected by existing climate 
variability and will be most seriously reduced by  
climate change. 
Chapter 3: Land Use argues that there are significant 
reform opportunities that raise farmers’ incomes, 
strengthen resilience to climate change and abate GHG 
emissions. Such gains can be achieved by the application 
of modern agricultural technologies and practices that 
boost crop and livestock productivity, and that economise 
on inputs such as land, water and fertilisers. Landscape 
approaches to land and water management, which look 
beyond individual farms to improve resource use and 
protect ecosystem services, and often involve planting 
trees, can increase productivity and help stop and reverse 
land degradation. This, in turn, can reduce pressure on 
adjacent forests.79
Exploiting such opportunities will require policy reforms, 
coordination and institution-building to overcome 
market failures that hinder farmers from pursuing them 
individually. One key problem to address is weak property 
rights, which create “tragedy of the commons” problems, 
contributing to overgrazing, deforestation, overuse of 
water resources and soil degradation. Weak property 
rights, credit market failures, imperfect information and 
other market failures contribute to inadequate uptake 
of new agricultural technologies, products and logistics 
capacity, which together could improve living standards, 
reduce food losses, and create greater flexibility and 
resilience to climate variability. Government failures, 
including inadequate provision of public goods such 
as roads, human security, information and agricultural 
extension services, also contribute.
Transforming energy systems
Energy is a crucial enabler of development. World energy 
use has increased by more than 50% since 1990,81 and it is 
clear that developing-country demand for energy services 
will continue to increase as these countries industrialise 
and as hundreds of millions more people move out of 
poverty. Many of these people will be gaining access to 
electricity for the first time. Securing access to abundant 
energy services will remain a major preoccupation for 
policy-makers everywhere.82 
Important approaches for meeting energy demand 
and reducing climate risks will include boosting energy 
efficiency, and exploiting rapid changes in energy supply 
technologies, as discussed in Chapter 4: Energy. 
First, there is substantial scope to meet demand for 
energy services by increasing energy efficiency. Numerous 
low-cost ways already exist to increase energy efficiency 
in transport, power, heating, lighting, buildings and 
industry, a potential which is growing rapidly as a result 
of innovation. Uptake of these solutions is hampered by 
energy subsidies, lack of environmental pricing and market 
failures such as innovation externalities, learning-by-doing 
effects, imperfect information, credit market failures and 
principal-agent problems, as well as behavioural effects 
such as inattentiveness and myopia. 
Policy interventions such as subsidy reform, carbon 
pricing, product efficiency standards, better information 
and behavioural “nudges” can significantly boost energy 
efficiency and, in particular, prevent inefficient energy 
models being locked into long-lived infrastructure.83 Such 
interventions can also prevent lock-in of a high-carbon 
mix of fuels, in particular excessive use of coal. Section 3.1 
above has explored the large health and economic benefits 
of curbing local air pollution from fossil fuel burning. The 
most effective way to reduce these damages is through 
corrective fuel taxes. A recent study by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) finds that fuel taxes would also raise 
substantial fiscal revenues that could be used to cut other 
distorting taxes, or to raise other development spending.84  
Second, global energy supply technology is changing 
rapidly. Renewable energy has seen unexpectedly fast cost 
declines. These changes are overturning many previous 
assumptions about relative energy costs and broadening 
the set of cost-effective low-carbon energy options 
available to countries, as Chapter 4: Energy elaborates. 
Developing countries need to re-evaluate traditional 
assumptions about the inevitability of fossil fuels and 
Developing countries need 
to re-evaluate traditional 
assumptions about the 
inevitability of fossil fuels 
and coal and to study the full 
range of options that are now 
becoming realistic.
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Marginal abatement benefits curve for 2030
New Climate Economy project analysis.87 
coal and to study the full range of options that are now 
becoming realistic. Middle-income countries that want to 
absorb new technologies and become technology leaders 
should avoid locking themselves into coal-based pathways. 
Broadly speaking, high-income OECD countries have been 
the pace-setters in exploring low-carbon paths, through 
research and development, deployment, and policy and 
institutional innovation. Innovation market failures mean 
that there is a clear rationale for a strong public sector 
role to support overall energy R&D and deployment. A 
major, expanded push on fundamental energy research, 
development and innovation should be a priority in all 
developed countries, both individually and through 
international cooperation. 
3.4 Quantifying multiple benefits and  
emissions reduction potential from  
low-carbon actions
Analysis for the Commission has developed preliminary 
estimates of the value of multiple benefits likely to result 
from the reforms and investments discussed in this report. 
The analysis focuses on actions in the three key economic 
systems discussed in the preceding section: cities, land 
use and energy systems. Surveys of relevant technical 
literature were used to make monetary estimates of the 
multiple benefits per tonne of CO
2
 abated.85
The focus is on multiple benefits from the following 
actions: reduced coal use, leading to lower local air 
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Figure 7
Abatement potential of measures proposed in this report up to 2030
Source: New Climate Economy analysis.90 
pollution and improved health; rural development arising 
from better land management and the restoration of 
forests and degraded land, linked with policies reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+); reduced volatility of energy prices as a result 
of less reliance on fossil fuels; and reduced air pollution, 
avoided accidents and lower congestion due to shifts in 
transport modes, including greater use of bus rapid transit. 
The results are illustrated with a version of the Marginal 
Abatement Cost Curve (MACC) developed by McKinsey 
& Company.86 Each of the blue bars in Figure 6 shows 
the estimated incremental cost in 2030, relative to the 
high-carbon alternative, of abating an extra tonne of 
CO
2
 through a specific technique or action, and the total 
technical abatement potential it offers. The incremental 
cost estimate per tonne in 2030 is based on the difference 
in operating and annualised capital costs between the 
low- and high-carbon alternatives, net of any potential 
savings associated with the shift to low carbon. The 
original McKinsey cost curve is inverted, so that methods 
with net benefits appear above the axis and those with 
net costs below, and the value of the multiple benefits 
is included where relevant. Thus, the chart becomes a 
“marginal abatement benefits curve”. The red bars in 
Figure 6 show the additional co-benefit associated with 
STRONG CARBON PRICING AND AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE AGREEMENT WILL HELP TO DRIVE ALL LEVERS
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various abatement options, such as the health benefits 
from reduced local air pollution. 
Figure 6 shows that many abatement options have a 
positive benefit even in narrow financial terms, which 
become substantially larger and more numerous once 
multiple benefits are included. A number of options with 
net costs swing to net gains when multiple benefits are 
taken into account, for example reduced deforestation, 
recycling of new waste or offshore wind. For energy 
efficiency options, the inclusion of multiple benefits could 
as much as triple their overall benefit.  
This quantification of co-benefits is exploratory. On one 
hand, the coverage of co-benefits does not incorporate all 
possibilities, and, on the other, the proposed reforms do 
not include various potential programme and transaction 
costs. Nevertheless, this analysis clearly strengthens the 
case that countries have available a broad array of reform 
and investment options to improve the well-being of 
citizens while abating GHG emissions.
This analysis raises the question of the extent to which 
the actions discussed in this report would contribute to 
significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. As noted 
in Section 2.2, on current trends, with no climate action, 
GHG emissions could reach around 68 gigatonnes (Gt) by 
2030, from around 50 Gt CO
2
e today. While a number of 
emission pathways are consistent with limiting warming 
to below 2°C by 2100 with over 66% probability, a core 
scenario used in this report looks to reduce emissions to 
42 Gt by 2030.88 In other words, the world would have 
to cut GHG emissions by 26 Gt by 2030, compared with 
a baseline of no climate action. Further reductions would 
be needed after 2030, including negative emissions in the 
second half of the century.
Analysis for the Commission shows that the most 
significant measures and actions set out in this report 
relating to cities, land use and energy systems, plus 
specific forms of innovation in manufacturing and services, 
would yield some 14 Gt CO
2
e of emission reductions. That 
is at least 50% of the median level of emissions reductions 
needed in the core 2°C scenario. 
In the best circumstances, with early, broad and ambitious 
implementation, with rapid learning and sharing of best 
practice, these reforms and actions could achieve as 
much as 24 Gt of emissions reductions, or 90% of what 
is needed for a 2°C path.89 That, in turn, would require 
decisive policy change and leadership, combined with 
strong international cooperation, particularly to support 
developing countries’ efforts.
These actions would deliver multiple economic and social 
benefits. As a result, governments have good economic 
reasons to implement these actions even without 
accounting for their climate change benefits.
Calculations of this kind cannot be precise, which is 
why the figures come with a broad range. They depend 
on assumptions about what happens in the “base case” 
scenario, how far specific kinds of measures can be 
implemented and at what cost, the level of emissions 
they will generate, the underlying economic conditions 
(including growth rates and energy prices), and how 
rapidly technological changes may occur. They also depend 
on judgements of how the multiple economic benefits of 
these measures and actions should be valued. But with all 
these caveats, the figures do provide an indication of the 
scale of reductions potentially available. 
On their own, these measures would likely not be 
enough to achieve the full emission reductions needed 
by 2030 to put the world on a 2°C path. The additional 
low-carbon measures needed would likely have net 
economic costs. For example, buildings will have to be 
more deeply retrofitted with energy efficiency measures 
than could be justified otherwise. Coal- and gas-fired 
power stations will have to be retired early, or fitted 
with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology 
whose sole purpose is the reduction of GHGs. Industrial, 
agricultural and transport emissions will need stronger 
curbs. The likelihood that these more costly actions will 
also be required suggests that investment in research and 
development on key technologies such as CCS should be 
scaled up significantly today. 
The low-carbon transition will not end in 2030. Deeper 
reductions will be required after that, to achieve near-zero 
or even net-negative emissions in the second half of the 
century. The measures in this report would nevertheless 
begin to put in place the institutions and policies – in 
terms of urban design, land use patterns, energy systems, 
environmental pricing and technological innovation – 
that would lay the foundation and create options for the 
more ambitious low-carbon policies and actions needed 
throughout this century. 
4. Addressing growth and  
climate challenges in different 
country realities
The best approaches for dealing with development 
and climate challenges will depend on countries’ vastly 
different realities and circumstances. Differences in levels 
of economic, human and institutional development, in 
social and political structures, in history, geography and 
natural endowments, profoundly shape the development 
and climate challenges that countries face, the capacities 
they can bring to bear, and the manner, timing and 
speed with which they can make progress on tackling 
these challenges. In this section we briefly consider 
the differing realities and challenges in low-, middle- 
and high-income countries.
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4.1 Low-income countries
Low-income countries are characterised by high absolute 
poverty and low levels of human development and 
institutional capacity; limited industrial development; 
low access to energy; and a high reliance on foreign aid 
and concessional financing to support infrastructure 
investment and the public budget. As noted earlier, 
they account for negligible proportions of world energy 
consumption and GHG emissions.91 Large fractions of the 
population are typically rural and derive their livelihoods 
from agriculture. Along with geographic issues that may 
expose them to more natural hazards, socio-economic 
conditions in these countries make them particularly 
vulnerable to climate risks.92 The key challenge in these 
countries is to overcome poor governance and low 
institutional capacity, to spark rapid, widely shared and 
sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction.
Cities: Urbanisation is still in its early stages in low-income 
countries, with only 28% of the population living in cities, 
compared with 39% in lower-middle- and 60% in upper-
middle-income countries.93 Cities are growing rapidly, but 
still at an early stage of development. City authorities in 
low-income countries have a great opportunity to shape 
urban development in a desirable direction at relatively 
low cost, although they tend to lack the institutional 
capacity to use more sophisticated instruments of urban 
planning. Basic infrastructure choices can nevertheless 
fundamentally shape a city’s character and footprint even 
at this stage; for example, they can ensure that scarce 
infrastructure resources go to smart choices such as bus 
rapid transit (BRT) rather than “business-as-usual” choices 
such as urban motorways (see Table 1).
Agriculture and land use, including forests, are much 
more important for people’s livelihoods and well-being 
in low-income countries, and they are vulnerable to 
pressures of land and water scarcity, deforestation 
and soil degradation. Agricultural productivity will be 
more seriously reduced by climate change than in other 
countries, in part because of lower capabilities and 
investment in preparedness and infrastructure ranging 
from weather forecasting to irrigation. 
In most cases, agriculture, forestry and land use are 
the biggest contributors to GHG emissions in these 
economies.94 Carbon emissions related to energy are 
relatively unimportant because of limited industrial, 
power and transport development. Methane (CH
4
) 
and nitrous oxide (N
2
O) emissions related to livestock 
digestion and waste and various agricultural processes 
are far more important, as are carbon emissions related to 
deforestation, which is driven by expansion of agricultural 
lands, consumption of wood for cooking fuel and logging.
As Chapter 3: Land Use argues, there are substantial 
opportunities for low-income countries to intensify 
agriculture and to adopt “climate-smart” practices that 
can achieve “triple wins”: higher farm incomes, increased 
resilience to climate change, and reduced GHG emissions 
Resource efficiency
Investment and finance
Innovation
Reduce incentives and 
hidden subsidies for 
embryonic urban sprawl 
in smaller towns
Use smart infrastructure 
such as mass transit to 
guide early-stage city 
development. Improve 
tax administration 
and public investment 
management
Reform tax and other policy 
distortions
Strengthen rural credit 
and risk markets. Boost 
investment in rural 
infrastructure, including water 
management and agricultural 
logistics, together with forest 
protection
Strengthen property rights 
and extension services to 
speed diffusion of modern 
farming technology and 
practices
Reform fossil fuel subsidies, 
with well-designed safety 
nets to protect the poor. 
Strengthen power sector 
management
Boost concessional finance and 
domestic tax capacity to support 
rapid expansion of grid and 
distributed electricity capacity
Support diffusion of distributed 
solar and other cost-effective 
new low-carbon technologies
Cities Land use Energy
Table 1 
Addressing growth and climate challenges in low-income countries
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(including greater carbon storage in soil, plants and 
trees).95 From a policy perspective, this requires not a 
single technological solution, but rather a broad range of 
reforms and investments to promote better soil and water 
management, more efficient use of inputs, and the use of 
agroforestry techniques and other practices, and, more 
generally, to promote widespread diffusion and adoption 
of modern agronomic knowledge. 
Reforms should improve incentives for farmers to 
adopt new technologies and practices, and tackle supply 
constraints that arise because of inadequate rural public 
goods and infrastructure. Reforms should strengthen 
farmers’ property rights; boost rural credit and risk 
markets to increase adoption of new technologies by 
poor farmers; and increase rural extension services 
to provide better information and technical support. 
Public investments in rural transport and logistics 
infrastructure can vastly strengthen incentives by 
linking farmers to international markets and supply 
chains. The specific mix of reforms and investments will 
depend on the circumstances of the country. Ethiopia, 
for example, has adopted an “Agricultural Development 
Led Industrialisation Strategy”. The country has also 
initiated a Climate Resilient Green Economy strategy, with 
measures to boost yields, improve soil management, curb 
agricultural GHG emissions and curb deforestation. 
Energy: Ensuring modern energy access is a major 
development challenge in low-income countries. About 
1.3 billion people or 26% of the population in developing 
countries still lack access to electricity. The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) defines modern energy access as “a 
household having reliable and affordable access to clean 
cooking facilities, a first connection to electricity and then 
an increasing level of electricity consumption over time”.96 
The thresholds for electricity access in this definition are 
low: 250 kilowatt-hours per year for rural households and 
500 kWh/year for urban households; for comparison, the 
average US household uses about 11,000 kWh/year.97 
Rapid expansion of public and private investment in power-
generating capacity is key to improving energy access. Such 
scaled-up finance will come both from international sources 
– for example, concessional lending from development 
banks, and strengthened domestic taxation and financial 
capacity. Support for cost-effective, low-carbon energy 
sources will be an important part of long-term, external, 
concessional financing. Nevertheless, given the overriding 
priority for rapid growth and poverty reduction in these 
economies, there will undoubtedly be trade-offs between 
low-carbon and fossil fuel options. Given the relatively small 
size of low-income economies, a push to achieve minimum 
energy access levels in these countries would have a 
negligible impact on global CO
2
 emissions. 
In addition to efforts to scale up power generating 
capacity, demand-side, efficiency measures and 
opportunities will also play an important part in helping to 
satisfy energy needs in low-income countries – aided, for 
example, by reforms of fossil fuel subsidies. 
Drivers of change: In addition to reforms in these three 
key systems – cities, land use and energy – it is also 
important to pursue broad, economy-wide reforms 
that can enhance or stimulate resource efficiency, 
infrastructure investment and innovation.
Regarding innovation, the rapid spread of mobile phones 
shows the potential for low-income countries to achieve 
widespread adoption and diffusion of appropriately 
adapted and priced new technologies. A similar rapid 
diffusion of appropriate new technologies should be 
encouraged in agriculture, energy, the digital economy 
and financial services, among others. Governments in 
low-income countries can facilitate rapid and continuous 
absorption of new technology by maintaining low 
barriers to foreign trade and investment, including 
through “South–South” interactions with middle-income 
countries which may have invested in adapting high-
income technologies to developing country conditions. 
A business-friendly investment climate encourages local 
entrepreneurs to take on the risks of adapting imported 
technologies. Strengthening education broadly increases 
the capacity of the population to absorb new technologies. 
Financial support and technical assistance from foreign 
partners are also important.
Regarding investment, a key priority in low-income 
countries is building and strengthening the basic 
institutions of public financial management, such 
as tax administration, budgetary management and 
execution, accounting and auditing. There is an urgent 
need to improve public investment management 
capacity, given that there is little point in mobilising 
resources if new investments have poor returns 
because of mismanagement. External finance from 
multilateral development banks and other development 
partners for major infrastructure projects needs to be 
substantially expanded. This will also help encourage 
private capital flows. 
4.2 Middle-income countries
Middle-income countries account for about 70% of 
the world population98 and are at the heart of global 
development and climate challenges. Poverty is less 
widespread than in low-income countries, but still 
substantial, with 38% overall living on less than US$2 a 
day. Rapid growth and poverty reduction thus remain 
central development objectives, implying rapidly rising 
demand for energy services and, with it, continued GHG 
emissions growth. 
Growth itself, however, is creating new pressures 
in middle-income countries. Industrialisation and 
urbanisation are generating substantial local air 
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Table 2 
Addressing growth and climate challenges in middle-income countries
pollution, congestion and other stresses. Expanding 
middle-class populations are becoming more vocal 
in demanding solutions to these problems. But these 
countries also have institutional advantages that 
differentiate them from low-income countries: more 
effective governance, more educated populations, more 
diverse economies and greater private-sector capacity, 
on average. Thus, they have a growing capacity to 
tackle complex and institutionally challenging economic 
and environmental reforms. 
Cities: Middle-income countries are at the heart of a 
global urbanisation trend. The decisions that these cities 
make today about their size, shape, density, land use and 
infrastructure will effectively lock in – for better or worse 
– the potential pathways for economic prosperity, and 
emissions for decades and even centuries to come. For 
example, some 70–80% of the built infrastructure that 
India will have in 2050 is not yet built.99 Already many 
middle-income countries are suffering the unintended 
costs of a “business-as-usual” model of urbanisation, at 
the heart of which are urban sprawl and conventional 
motorisation. These costs include lost productivity and 
innovation as a result of squandered agglomeration 
economies, as well as excessively costly transport 
infrastructure, air pollution and traffic congestion.
With their greater institutional strength, middle-income 
countries can adopt a variety of more sophisticated 
urban planning instruments. Strong city-level governance 
with financial autonomy, control, transparency and 
accountability is an important pre-requisite. Strong 
metropolitan authorities can deliver strategic 
infrastructure such as mass transit systems, for example, 
and can impose motor fuel taxes or congestion charges to 
help price the pollution and congestion damages caused by 
private vehicle use (see Table 2).
Agriculture and land use: Lower-middle-income 
countries, in particular, share many agricultural and land 
use characteristics with low-income countries. Around 
70% of the population of India, for example, is still based 
in rural areas, with 50% relying on agriculture for their 
livelihoods.100 As a result, these economies share the same 
problems of land and water scarcity and soil degradation 
as low-income countries. Many of the reforms to achieve 
so-called “triple wins” remain relevant here. 
Given their greater institutional capacity, education 
levels and resources, however, middle-income countries 
also have the opportunity to undertake more ambitious 
initiatives – for example, to strengthen domestic 
agricultural innovation. Brazil’s Agricultural Research 
Corporation (Embrapa)101 has shown how a strong 
research and development (R&D) capability can boost 
the adaptation of foreign farm technologies to local 
conditions, for improving crop and livestock yields and 
Resource efficiency
Investment and finance
Innovation
Tax congestion and air 
pollution damage from 
auto use. Eliminate 
incentives for urban 
sprawl
Secure major 
infrastructure savings by 
re-orienting spending to 
promote compact urban 
forms
Develop strong, 
city-level governance 
to guide urban 
development
Reduce subsidies that waste 
fertiliser, water and power; 
increase spending on key 
public goods
Strengthen rural credit 
and risk markets; boost 
investment in rural 
infrastructure and logistics
Strengthen domestic 
agricultural R&D, in 
particular to adapt modern 
agricultural technologies to 
local conditions
Reform fossil fuel subsidies; 
increase fuel taxes to reflect 
local pollution damages. 
Recycle tax revenues to boost 
development
Develop medium-term plans 
to peak coal consumption and 
boost investment in lower-carbon 
energy portfolios
Boost domestic R&D to facilitate 
integration of low-carbon 
energy technologies; strengthen 
efficiency standards
Cities Land use Energy
Industrialisation and 
urbanisation are generating 
substantial local air pollution, 
congestion and other stresses.
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making better use of degraded lands. Sometimes the 
greater resources of middle-income countries are also put 
to wasteful uses, such as in agricultural input subsidies 
that cause excessive use of fertilisers, irrigation and 
electricity. Countries like China and India can improve 
resource productivity in agriculture by cutting input 
subsidies and using these savings to strengthen rural 
public goods including transport and other services.
Energy: Middle-income countries have been the driving 
force behind the sharp acceleration in global energy 
consumption and energy-related CO
2
 emissions in the 
2000s.102 This acceleration has been driven by rapid 
economic growth and a greater share of coal in the fuel 
mix of these countries. 
There are many self-interested reasons for middle-
income countries to shift their energy strategies towards 
a greater focus on energy efficiency and low-carbon 
sources. Such a shift can avoid large health and economic 
damages from local air pollution and congestion, and 
growing energy insecurity as a result of rising net imports 
of coal and other fossil fuels. In China, air pollution has 
become so severe that the National Action Plan on Air 
Pollution in September 2013 banned construction of new 
conventional coal-fired power plants in major economic 
areas such as Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei (JingJinJi), the Yangtze 
River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, requiring them to 
sharply reduce coal consumption by 2017.103 
The most efficient way to implement such reform is to 
eliminate fossil fuel subsidies and end the under-taxation 
of fossil fuels, to reflect local air pollution and other local 
damages, and recycle the resulting taxation revenues for 
poverty reduction and development. Recent estimates 
suggest that such corrective fuel taxes would generate 
revenues in the range of 6–8% of GDP in China and India, and 
cut pollution-related deaths in these countries by 50–70%.104
Institutional reforms and regulatory measures can 
also improve the adoption of energy efficiency. India’s 
power transmission and distribution losses are around 
20% of production, compared with 5–7% in the United 
States.105 More ambitious standards to promote the 
uptake of existing low-cost energy-efficient products and 
technologies could reduce such losses and associated 
energy-related carbon emissions dramatically. 
Countries can learn from one another. For example, the 
emergency measures to slash coal consumption in China 
could have significant economic adjustment costs. Other 
middle-income countries could take steps to prevent their 
economies becoming as coal-intensive in the first place, 
drawing on available policies and emerging low-carbon 
energy technologies.
Drivers of change: Middle-income countries have a much 
greater capacity to undertake innovation, compared with 
low-income countries, both in absorbing and adapting 
frontier technologies from abroad, and undertaking 
innovation themselves. This capacity can help middle-
income countries adopt a more proactive approach 
to promote innovation and efficiency in key sectors 
such as electricity and energy, transport, buildings, 
manufacturing, agriculture, and the digital economy. 
The Republic of Korea provides a model example of 
a middle-income economy which was able to make a 
transition to high-income status through an unwavering 
focus on strengthening domestic human capital 
and technological capability.106
Middle-income countries can also access a deeper 
pool of resources to pursue development and climate 
challenges, as a result of their greater institutional 
capacity. They have more sophisticated systems of 
public finance, deeper domestic capital markets and 
engage more extensively in international private capital 
markets. Such institutional capacity is important to 
reshape domestic public finance, using environmental 
taxes to reduce labour and capital taxes and boost 
productive investment. 
4.3 High-income countries
Developed economies are still struggling in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession. Five years after the 
crisis, unemployment and output gaps remain high. 
Medium- to longer-term problems loom, including the 
impact of ageing populations on public finances and 
growth, as well as problems of rising income inequality 
and climate change. 
The challenge facing developed countries is to modernise 
public finance, enhance innovation and boost growth 
and employment in ways that accelerate progress on 
decarbonisation. The OECD argues that policies will 
need to focus on four key areas in the decades ahead: 
accelerating global integration; making institutions more 
resilient to shocks; curbing emissions; and exploiting a 
knowledge economy, which will be the main driver of 
global growth.107
Cities: In developed countries, the strategic focus is the 
re-densification and revitalisation of existing urban cores, 
alongside a shift from industry to services and innovation 
The challenge facing developed 
countries is to modernise public 
finance, enhance innovation and 
boost growth and employment in 
ways that accelerate progress  
on decarbonisation.
50 www.newclimateeconomy.report
ST
R
A
T
E
G
IC
 C
O
N
T
E
X
T
in megacities and mid-sized cities. London, Brussels and 
Tokyo are examples of cities that are reversing urban 
sprawl and re-densifying. Strong, well-established city 
governments are important to drive adoption of more 
sophisticated high-tech infrastructure and energy-
efficient buildings, and to use more sophisticated spatial 
planning and regulation instruments such as urban 
growth boundaries and maximum density standards. 
Sophisticated multimodal metropolitan transport 
authorities can be established, like “Transport for 
London”,108 which can drive productivity of the whole 
transport system through both pricing (e.g. congestion 
charging) and capacity allocation mechanisms (e.g. bus 
lanes, downtown parking capacity). 
Agriculture and land use: Developed economies are at 
the forefront of agronomic research and development 
and innovation. Further public support should be 
provided for fundamental research and development, 
under a general high-income country strategy for 
economic revitalisation through increased innovation. 
Support should also be increased for multinational 
institutions and partnerships, such as the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR),109 
among others, that specifically focus on agricultural 
innovation and dissemination targeted at developing 
countries. Forestry and land use in developed countries 
are now a net sink for CO
2
 emissions, and this trend 
can be enhanced. The Republic of Korea provides an 
outstanding example of a country that has dramatically 
increased its forests, increasing from about one-third to 
two-thirds of its land area since the mid-1950s.110
Energy: High-income countries are the pace-setters 
in developing paths to a low-carbon future, both in 
research, development and innovation, and in policy and 
institutional innovation, including efforts at international 
coordination. A resolute push to introduce carbon pricing 
will yield multiple benefits, in terms of reduced local air 
pollution, as well as generate significant revenues that 
can play an important role in facilitating pro-growth fiscal 
reforms. A major push on fundamental energy research 
and development and innovation should also be a priority 
in developed countries both individually and through 
international cooperation. Institutional experimentation 
and learning from trial and error will also be crucial, 
especially around power system reform where more 
distributed generation technologies challenge traditional 
utility business models. Some developed countries are 
facing significant fiscal and other problems related to 
support for and integration of renewables. Careful 
study of lessons from these experiences and redesign 
of institutions as appropriate will be an important 
contribution in developed countries.
5. Conclusion: Why now?
Decision-makers will never have all the information they 
would want to make perfect decisions about the future. 
However, they do have three vital pieces of information 
that can guide their choices now.
First, the world is only halfway through its urbanisation 
journey. The next 15 years will hugely increase the 
footprint of urban infrastructure and shape the 
consumption patterns of about 1 billion new urban 
dwellers.111 Choices over the pattern of urban 
development and associated energy and transport 
systems will shape how future societies function. These 
choices will also disproportionately affect the speed with 
which nations move from low- to middle-income status 
and from middle- to high-income status. The expected 
infrastructure investment of about US$90 trillion per year 
in cities, buildings, energy and transport systems over the 
next 15 years provides an unparalleled opportunity to 
build the world we want.
Second, deferring decisions for another decade will 
mean locking into high-carbon infrastructure. This 
will significantly increase the probability that future 
generations will have to contend with global warming of 
4°C or more. Without immediate action, we will soon be 
committed to a minimum of 2°C warming, with adaptation 
costs likely to increase non-linearly beyond that point. 
Third, many “no-regrets” opportunities exist to improve 
economic growth and climate risk performance together. 
Our economy is not operating at the “efficient frontier”. 
Tackling multiple market failures and policy distortions will 
create both more growth and less climate risk, through 
integrated reform. Driving productivity in land use, by 
bringing degraded land back into production, meets the 
goals of increased rural incomes, greater food security 
and better climate risk management. The same is true 
for driving energy efficiency, cutting wasteful resource 
subsidies and tackling urban air pollution. Many of these 
opportunities are available with today’s technologies, 
but need policies to encourage investment in better 
management systems and business models. We are just 
at the start of an innovation journey where advances 
in digitisation, energy technologies and biological and 
materials sciences can create new industries and reinvent 
old ones, generating new jobs while reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
There is also a crucial role for international cooperation 
on climate action. While this chapter and report stress 
opportunities for self-interested national action, it is 
well understood that – given the nature of the climate 
problem – countries working cooperatively will have 
incentives to accomplish a good deal more than the sum of 
uncooperative national actions. 
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As Chapter 8: International Cooperation argues, future 
cooperation will benefit from an approach that promotes 
development while helping countries to steadily move 
away from carbon dependence onto low-carbon 
trajectories. Such an approach would focus on agreed 
common norms and standards, and developing institutions 
that promote investment, trade, technology and expertise 
to support decarbonisation, both from richer to poorer 
countries, and among developed and developing 
countries. The Commission recognises that international 
cooperation is required not only for a transition to a low-
carbon economy that is dynamically efficient, but also for 
one that is just.
Building the new climate economy will not be an easy 
journey. It is certainly not the “path of least resistance”, 
and will require constant adjustment of policies, economic 
structures and institutions. But it is our opportunity to 
choose and shape a better economy, where equitable 
growth and a safer climate are not in opposition. This 
report also highlights actions that create flexibility and 
increase countries’ options in an uncertain future through 
2030 and beyond. The Commission is well aware that the 
transition to an economy which delivers better growth 
and climate performance is a 30- to 50-year journey. It 
is also a journey on which path dependencies mean that 
steps taken over the next 5–15 years may prove to be 
disproportionately important.
As finance ministries, central banks and the world’s 
leading companies know, good growth and good risk 
management go together. Growth that takes no account 
of climate risk is unlikely to be sustainable for investors 
who know that their future assets could be adversely 
affected. Climate risk reduction that comes at the 
expense of growth or that hurts poor households will 
never be politically sustainable. The trick, and central 
purpose of this report, is to learn how to put the two sides 
of the equation together. 
Table 3 
Addressing growth and climate challenges in high-income countries
Resource efficiency
Investment and finance
Innovation
Congestion pricing and 
other fiscal reforms to 
remove subsidies for 
urban sprawl
Infrastructure and 
systems investments to 
promote densification 
and revitalisation of 
urban cores
Institutional innovation 
to strengthen city 
governance, including 
through greater 
digitisation. Multimodal 
transport authorities to 
promote mass transit. 
Deregulation to support 
new asset-sharing 
business models
Reform inefficient 
bioenergy policies; eliminate 
remaining input subsidies
Scale market-based 
instruments for green 
infrastructure and 
ecosystem services
Boost funding for 
international agricultural 
R&D, advanced bioenergy, 
and diffusion to developing 
countries
Modernise public finance 
systems, drawing on carbon 
pricing to facilitate pro-
growth tax reform.
Develop short- and medium-term 
plans to peak coal consumption 
and boost investment in low-
carbon energy; drive regulatory 
reform especially in the power 
sector
Boost fundamental energy R&D 
including “game changers”; 
create market-pull mechanisms; 
strengthen public-private risk-
sharing partnerships (e.g. for 
CCS) including IPR models
Cities Land use Energy
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Chapter 2
CITIES
Main points
• Building better, more productive cities can boost economic prosperity and help tackle climate change. On current 
trends, fewer than 500 cities in three key groups – Emerging Cities, Global Megacities, and Mature Cities – will 
account for over 60% of global income growth and half of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions growth between 
now and 2030. Action in these cities, particularly Emerging Cities, will have disproportionate benefits for the global 
economy and climate. 
• Growth today typically involves poorly managed, unstructured urbanisation whose economic, social and  
environmental costs outweigh the benefits. Urban sprawl costs the US economy alone an estimated US$400  
billion per year. 
• A shift to more compact urban growth, connected infrastructure, and coordinated governance could boost long-term 
urban productivity and yield environmental and social benefits. Such an approach has the potential to reduce urban 
infrastructure capital requirements by more than US$3 trillion over the next 15 years. New analysis suggests that 
the world’s 724 largest cities could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by up to 1.5 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO
2
e) annually by 2030, primarily through transformative change in transport systems.
• All cities can improve resource productivity in the short term through cost-effective investments in building energy 
efficiency, waste management, transit and other measures. However, these benefits will typically be overtaken by 
economic and population growth within seven years without a broader, structural shift in the model of  
urban development.
• We are already seeing many cities shifting towards better-managed urban growth, particularly in transport. Over 
160 cities have implemented bus rapid transit systems. China’s urban rail networks will total 3,000 km in length in 
2015. Nearly 700 cities have implemented bike-sharing schemes, and a range of smarter transport systems, such as 
car-sharing, have taken off in numerous cities.
• Scaling and accelerating the shift to compact, connected, coordinated growth will require countries to put urban 
areas at the heart of their economic development strategies, and consider greater fiscal autonomy for cities. Only 
4% of the 500 largest cities in developing countries are deemed creditworthy in international financial markets. The 
international community should redirect and scale up multilateral development bank financing for smarter urban 
infrastructure, and help cities build creditworthiness. 
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1. Introduction
Cities are engines of national and global growth. Urban 
areas account for half the world’s population, but generate 
around 80% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP).1 
They are also associated with around 70% of global energy 
consumption and energy-related greenhouse  
gas emissions.2
The world is now experiencing a new, different type of 
urbanisation. By 2030, around 60% of the global population 
will live in urban areas. Cities and urban areas3 will house 
nearly all of the world’s net population growth over the next 
two decades: 1.4 million people are being added to urban 
areas each week, roughly the population of Stockholm.4 
By 2050, the urban population will increase by at least 2.5 
billion, reaching two-thirds of the global population.5 This 
urban transition is being driven by cities in the developing 
world, where 90% of urban growth is projected to take 
place.6 In 2030, China’s cities will be home to close to 1 
billion people or 70% of the population.7
The stakes for growth, quality of life and carbon emissions 
could not be higher. The structures we build now, including 
roads and buildings, could last for a century or more, 
setting the trajectory for greenhouse gas emissions at a 
critical time for reining these in. 
City administrations are often acutely influential, with 
sharper local powers than national policy-makers.8 But 
climate risk is rarely near the top of their priority list.  
They face other pressing issues: public safety, delivery 
of basic services, housing, chronic traffic congestion, 
municipal budgets. 
Planning for more compact, better-connected cities 
with strong mass transit systems will help policy-makers 
tackle these pressing challenges. Such cities are more 
productive, socially inclusive, resilient, cleaner, quieter 
and safer. They also have lower carbon emissions, showing 
that the goals of economic growth and climate change 
can work together. The lessons are being learned. South 
American cities such as Curitiba and Bogota are flagships 
for the benefits of bus rapid transit systems. But these are 
not typical. In the last 10 years, population densities in 
Chinese cities have declined on average by 25%,  
for example.9 
This chapter begins by charting the growing contribution 
of cities both to the world economy and carbon 
emissions. Next, it reviews the most common form of 
urban expansion across countries today, and examines an 
alternative growth pathway, giving special attention to 
urban form, transport, and initiatives which boost short- 
to medium-term resource productivity. Next, it discusses 
the kinds of urban policy frameworks needed to scale up 
that alternative pathway, through planning policy, pricing 
instruments, fiscal and finance mechanisms, governance, 
and legal powers. It concludes with recommendations. 
While the chapter is targeted at a wide readership, 
it is particularly pertinent for countries which have a 
significant portfolio of rapidly growing cities. Several 
other chapters also address urban issues, including 
Chapter 4: Energy (particularly urban air pollution); 
Chapter 5: Economics of Change (how mass transit 
systems can help reduce the distributional effects of fuel 
taxes and carbon pricing); Chapter 6: Finance (unlocking 
funding for smarter infrastructure); and Chapter 7: 
Innovation (improving energy efficiency in buildings). 
 
2. Cities, global growth and  
carbon emissions 
Cities are engines of national and global growth, 
accounting for around 80% of global economic output.11 
Some 150 of the world’s largest metropolitan economies 
produce 41% of global GDP with only 14% of the  
global population.12
Most successful high-income countries have 
economically dynamic cities at the heart of their 
regional and national economies, from Tokyo in 
Japan to London in the United Kingdom. Cities are 
also rapidly transforming the economic landscape of 
emerging markets. Already the 90 largest Chinese cities 
account for over US$6 trillion – the size of the national 
economies of Germany and France combined.13 And 
cities in India generate two-thirds of GDP, 90% of tax 
revenues, and the majority of jobs, with just a third of the 
country’s population.14 
Cities are also key drivers of global energy demand and 
greenhouse gas emissions, accounting for around 70% 
of both, according to the International Energy Agency 
(IEA).15 Urban emissions from emerging economy cities 
are already converging with those of developed cities.16 
Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, for example, have per 
capita emissions comparable to those of large European 
and some North American cities.17 
Research for the Commission used a database of the 
world’s largest cities to identify three groups that are 
particularly important in terms of impacts on the global 
economy and climate out to 2030. The three groups 
The structures we build now, 
including roads and buildings, 
could last for a century or 
more, setting the trajectory for 
greenhouse gas emissions at a 
critical time for reining these in.
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Figure 1Figure 1
Atlanta and Barcelona have similar populations and wealth levels but very different  
carbon productivities
were defined based on their population, income level 
and growth. The analysis shows these 468 cities will 
account for over 60% of global income growth between 
2012 and 2030, under business-as-usual economic 
growth assumptions. They will account for nearly half of 
all growth in energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. 
In 2030, they will account for 60% of global GDP and 
around 45% of global energy-related emissions.18 
The groups are classified as Emerging Cities, Global 
Megacities, and Mature Cities, defined below.19
• Emerging Cities are 291 rapidly expanding middle-
income, mid-sized cities in China, India and other 
emerging economies, with populations of 1–10 
million, and per capita incomes of US$2,000-20,000. 
These cities are likely to account for over a quarter 
of global income growth and over a third of energy-
related emissions growth over the next two decades. 
Given the rapid change expected in these cities 
over the next few decades, action by this group 
represents the most significant short- to medium-
term global opportunity for avoiding lock-in to long-
lived, high-carbon urban infrastructure.20  
• Global Megacities are 33 major cultural centres 
with populations above 10 million and per capita 
incomes over US$2,000, including capital cities such 
as London, Beijing and Tokyo. This comparatively small 
number of cities will account for approximately 15% 
of global income growth and over a tenth of emissions 
growth out to 2030, with considerable diversity in the 
pace of economic and demographic change between 
them. Some of these cities are already exhibiting 
signs of relative decoupling of economic growth 
from emissions growth.21 This presents an important 
opportunity to explore how these cities can continue 
to attract talent and capital while managing growth  
in emissions. 
Source: Bertraud and Richardson, 2004.10
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• Mature Cities are 144 prosperous, established, 
mid-sized cities in high-income countries with per 
capita incomes above US$20,000, such as Stuttgart, 
Stockholm and Hiroshima. These cities – which often 
form part of a regional economic network – will drive 
close to 20% of income growth out to 2030 and have 
the highest per capita emissions of any city group, 
averaging 12 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO
2
e) per capita in 2030. Growth in emissions is 
expected to be relatively modest, and a number of 
cities within this category show signs of decoupling of 
economic growth from emissions growth. 
In addition, a less-noticed story of urbanisation is 
unfolding in Small Urban Areas. Over a quarter of global 
income growth and around a sixth of GHG emissions 
growth will take place in small cities, towns, peripheral 
industrial zones, and other urban areas of less than half a 
million people. This is where much of the urbanisation will 
take place in Least Developed Countries. 
Given the significant lock-in risks associated with urban 
infrastructure investments, the choices all these groups 
of cities make now about their future model of urban 
expansion will play an important role in determining the 
Figure 2Figure 2
Emerging Cities will play a significant role in growth of the global economy and carbon  
emissions to 2030 
Note: Energy assumptions are consistent with the IEA’s Current Policies scenario. GDP figures are based on 2012 prices and exchange rates. 
Small urban areas are a highly diverse segment covering cities in both developed and developing countries. Estimates for this segment, 
especially for per capita emissions, are subject to significant levels of uncertainty and should be treated as indicative.
Source: Analysis by LSE Cities and Oxford Economics; data from the Oxford Economics Global 750 Cities database. Small Urban Areas 
include 26 cities in the Oxford Economics database with populations under 500,000 and those areas classified as urban in the UN World 
Urbanization Prospects database. 
global economic and emissions pathway for decades and 
even centuries to come. This is particularly the case for 
rapidly growing Emerging Cities and Small Urban Areas 
(see Figure 2). The stakes could not be higher. 
3. The rising costs of unmanaged, 
unstructured global urban 
expansion 
In much of the world, urban growth is now characterised 
by poorly managed, unstructured expansion and 
conventional motorisation. Business-as-usual 
development may see the number of privately owned 
vehicles increase from 1 billion today to 2 billion in 2030.22 
Meanwhile, the area of urbanised land could triple globally 
from 2000 to 2030.23 This is equivalent to adding an area 
bigger than Manhattan every day. 
China illustrates this trend. Over the last 10 years, 
population densities in Chinese cities have declined 
on average by 25%, and are now lower relative to 
benchmarks in advanced countries.24 Despite some signs 
of the inverse trend in Beijing over the last decade, the 
continuation of such a model of urban expansion would 
BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
C
IT
IE
S
63
require developing an area equivalent to the Netherlands 
over the next decade, and a tripling of urban land in China 
by 2030.25 
Although this sprawled pattern of urban development has 
real and perceived benefits,26 the Commission’s analysis 
shows that on balance, the future costs will significantly 
outweigh the benefits.27 Already today, this growth model 
is starting to break down. In China, Prime Minister Li 
Keqiang described the smog in Chinese cities as a warning 
“against the model of inefficient and blind development”, 
with the rush to develop spreading into rural areas and 
leaving municipal governments with mounting debt.28 
In other emerging markets, informal settlements are 
growing as urbanisation increases, with the provision 
of infrastructure and services unable to keep pace with 
population growth.29
The challenges also apply to developed countries. In the 
United States, sprawling urban areas were hit hard by 
a speculative real estate market and high energy prices 
in the run-up to the financial crisis. Sprawling suburbs 
such as Victorville, outside Los Angeles, proved unviable 
when fuel prices rose from $2 early in the decade to $4 in 
2008.30 The significant increase in transport costs reduced 
the demand for housing, contributing to over 70% of new 
homes for sale being in foreclosure by July 2009.31 In 
Europe, urban economies characterised by a pre-crisis real 
estate boom, for example in Spain, are still struggling to 
recover from the downturn. 
The business-as-usual pattern of urbanisation is imposing 
a range of significant economic and social costs.  
These include:
1. Greater required investment, leading to a funding 
gap and the failure of many cities to deliver basic 
urban infrastructure and services: The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the IEA estimate that around US$50 trillion 
is required for investment in transport, building 
energy efficiency, telecommunications, and water 
and waste infrastructure over the next 15 years.32 
The Boston Consulting Group, meanwhile, calculates 
an infrastructure investment shortfall of over US$1 
trillion per year33, a significant share of which is due 
to the additional investment required for roads and 
traffic management in sprawling cities. Urban sprawl 
significantly reduces the resources available for 
investment in basic urban infrastructure and services, 
as well as public transport. In India, the gap in urban 
infrastructure investment is estimated at US$827 
billion over the next 20 years,34 with two-thirds of  
this required for urban roads and traffic support.  
New analysis for the Commission shows urban 
sprawl in the United States adds costs of around 
US$400 billion per year, mostly as a result of greater 
infrastructure, public service delivery and transport 
costs (see Box 1). 35
2. Growing financial and welfare costs related to traffic 
congestion: Congestion is already imposing costs 
as high as 3.4% of GDP in Buenos Aires and 2.6% in 
Mexico City.36 Even in the higher-density European 
Union, congestion costs average 1% of GDP.37
3. Escalating economic and social costs due to 
air pollution: Urban air pollution is projected to 
become the top environmental cause of premature 
mortality by 2050.38 In Beijing, the total social costs 
of motorised transport, including air pollution and 
congestion, are estimated at 7.5–15% of GDP.39 
Analysis for this report, covering 311 cities and close 
to a billion people, shows that the business-as-usual 
pattern of urban development is responsible for 86% 
of these cities exceeding World Health Organization 
(WHO) air quality guidelines for outdoor air pollution. 
By tipping air pollution above safer thresholds, this 
pattern of development has therefore contributed to 
an estimated 730,000 premature deaths, a significant 
proportion of which are related to motorised 
transport.40 Other studies show that pollution-related 
health costs reach as high as 5% of GDP in some 
cities in developing countries, over 90% of which 
can be attributed to vehicle emissions.41 The OECD 
estimates that the social costs of road transport 
in OECD countries, China and India combined are 
US$3.5 trillion per year, including the value of health 
impacts and lives lost.42
4. Lock-in of inefficiently high levels of energy 
consumption: A study of 50 cities worldwide 
estimates that almost 60% of growth in expected 
energy consumption is directly related to urban 
sprawl, surpassing the impact of GDP and population 
growth.43 This leaves many cities vulnerable to 
volatility in energy prices. 
5. Increasing social exclusion: The combined effects 
of urban sprawl and motorisation are linked to the 
growth of both slums and gated communities, which 
are creating socially divided cities.44
6. A wide range of other economic and social costs: 
These include costs related to road safety, divided 
communities, low levels of physical activity (with 
significant health implications), reduced ecosystem 
In Beijing, the total social 
costs of motorised transport, 
including air pollution and 
congestion, are estimated at 
7.5-15% of GDP.
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Urban sprawl, defined here as the uncontrolled and 
excessive spatial expansion of cities, is one of the world’s 
most significant – and least well documented – market 
failures, leading to inefficient use of land, capital and  
other resources. 
As noted above, new analysis for this project puts the 
external costs of sprawl at about US$400 billion per year 
in the United States alone. Around 45% of those costs are 
due to the increased cost of providing public services such 
as water and waste; one-fifth is due to increased capital 
investment needs for infrastructure such as roads, and the 
rest is due to the costs of increased congestion, accidents 
and pollution not borne directly by private individuals. The 
total costs amount to about 2.6% of US GDP at current 
prices. If the United States followed an alternative growth 
pattern without urban sprawl, the savings could cover the 
country’s entire funding gap in infrastructure investment. 
Such cost estimates indicate the potential savings from 
pursuing smarter growth policies based on more compact, 
mixed, multi-modal, infill development. This is a lower 
bound estimate, as it excludes over US$323 billion in 
higher personal/household transport costs, climate 
change impacts, the impacts on agricultural productivity 
and ecosystems, and social costs related to the creation 
of more divided communities and degradation of urban 
centres – which can, for example, increase crime. Although 
the costs of urban sprawl may be lower in absolute value 
in developing countries, due to lower wages and property 
values, they are likely to be similar in magnitude as a 
proportion of the national economy. 
Despite a range of real and perceived benefits of more 
sprawled development to private individuals and 
developers, such as larger house sizes and some cost 
efficiencies in house-building, a review of the evidence 
for the Commission report suggests inefficient sprawled 
development at least doubles land used per housing unit, 
services and risks to food security. Urban road 
accidents in developing-country cities alone can 
cost as much as 2% of GDP.45 And Chinese urban 
expansion is already adversely affecting food 
security due to the impacts on land use.46 
In addition to these economic and social costs, a 
business-as-usual pattern of urban expansion will lead 
to a significant increase in global carbon emissions. 
First, urban infrastructure uses materials, including 
concrete and steel, which have significant embedded 
emissions as a result of their carbon-intensive 
manufacture. These materials are heavily used in the 
early phases of urbanization in particular. If developing 
countries expand their infrastructure to current 
average global levels, the production of infrastructure 
increases the costs of providing utilities and public services 
by 10–30% and sometimes more, and increases the costs 
associated with travel by 20–50%.48 These costs can be 
higher in fast-growing low- and middle-income countries, 
where sprawled patterns can double or triple many costs 
due to the increased costs of importing construction 
equipment, for instance. 
Sprawl also tends to be unfair, since lower-income 
people, who rely more on walking, cycling and public 
transport, are less likely to benefit from the additional 
road infrastructure, for example, but still pick up the bill 
in higher utility and public service costs. Although there is 
some evidence to suggest that sprawl can increase housing 
affordability, this is typically more than offset by the 
increase in transportation and public service/infrastructure 
costs (e.g. water, waste and sewage).49 
A degree of urban expansion is inevitable, particularly in 
Emerging Cities, driven by a range of factors, including 
income and population growth, the falling costs of 
private vehicle travel, and reductions in the value of rural 
land as economies undergo structural transformation. 
However, urban expansion often goes far beyond what is 
economically efficient. 
At the heart of sprawl are a range of interlocking market 
failures, such as the failure to account for the higher costs 
of providing public infrastructure in sprawling cities; the 
failure to price the significant and rising costs of traffic 
congestion, vehicle-related accidents, carbon emissions 
and air pollution; and the failure to take into account the 
public infrastructure costs generated by more dispersed 
developments. Excessive spatial growth is also driven by 
a range of governance failures, strong vested interests, 
and weak revenue bases (which encourage the sale of land 
for new development). Chapter 5: Economics of Change 
provides detailed analysis of markets failure in the pricing 
of energy and carbon emissions. 
materials alone would generate around 470 billion tonnes 
of CO
2 
emissions by 2050,50 much of this in sprawled 
cities. The continued expansion of infrastructure could 
produce cumulative emissions of 2,986-7,402 billion 
tonnes of CO
2 
over the remainder of this century.51 
Second, poorly managed urban development could lock  
in higher operational emissions for decades and  
centuries to come. The IEA estimates, for example,  
that under business-as-usual patterns of urbanisation,  
carbon emissions from urban transport will almost double 
by 2050.52 
 
Box 1
The global cost of urban sprawl 47
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India is on the brink of an urban revolution. Over the last 
two decades India’s urban population increased from 
217 million to 377 million, and this is expected to reach 
600 million, or 40% of the population, by 2031. The 
current pattern of urbanisation is largely taking place 
on the fringe of cities, much of it unplanned and outside 
the purview of city codes and byelaws, and is already 
imposing high costs. Unprecedented growth is leaving 
municipal governments with critical infrastructure 
shortages and service gaps. 
Urban pollution caused 620,000 premature deaths in 
2010, up more than sixfold from 2001, and a recent 
survey of 148 Indian cities by the Indian Central 
Pollution Control Board found onlty two cities with 
passable air quality. Recent estimates show that the 
cost of environmental degradation, largely driven by 
sprawling cities, is enormous, reducing India’s GDP by 
5.7%, or about US$80 billion annually. Some 44% of 
India’s rapidly growing carbon emissions have urban 
origins, emanating from transport, industry, buildings 
and waste. This highlights the potential benefit of a new 
model of urban development.
4. A new wave of urban 
productivity
Cities can follow a different growth pathway to unlock a 
new wave of urban productivity. This alternative approach 
should be based on boosting resource productivity, to 
improve the efficiency of energy use and resilience to 
energy price volatility. And it would involve a broader shift 
to more compact, connected and coordinated  
urban growth. 
4.1   Boosting resource productivity 
Even under a business-as-usual pattern of urbanisation, 
all groups of cities have significant short- to medium-term 
opportunities to save energy and reduce inefficiencies 
associated with unstructured, poorly managed 
urbanisation. New analysis reviewed by the Commission 
shows significant economic opportunities in the next 5–10 
years for all cities to improve resource efficiency, generate 
wider economic benefits, and reduce carbon emissions. 
Potential measures include smarter buildings and 
transport, efficient waste management, and investments 
at the district level. These are outlined in further detail  
in Box 3. 
These relatively accessible, “no-regrets” options could 
play a critical role in helping cities overcome some of the 
key barriers to change, and so avoid becoming locked into 
higher-cost, higher-carbon development trajectories.
They could help secure commitment to creating cleaner 
cities, and could build capacities, stimulate investment, 
build momentum for change, and create opportunities for 
learning. All of these could be critically important benefits, 
as many cities, and particularly those in the developing 
world, may not yet have the technical, financial and 
institutional capacities needed for fundamental  
shifts to more energy-efficient and low-carbon 
development paths.59 
However, it is also clear that the economic and climate 
benefits of measures to boost urban resource productivity 
can be quickly overwhelmed by continued economic and 
population growth under business-as-usual patterns, 
unless they are accompanied by broader structural shifts 
in urban form and public transport infrastructure. That 
was a key finding of the five city studies described in Box 
3, and is especially the case in rapidly growing, Emerging 
Cities. The study calculated that it took only a few years 
for energy consumption and carbon emissions to reach 
business-as-usual levels (dubbed energy or emissions 
“TREBLE points”),60 after exploiting all cost-effective 
energy efficiency and carbon reduction options. For 
example, GHG emissions returned to levels expected 
without the green technology investments in less than 
seven years in Kolkata, Lima, Palembang, and Johor Bahru, 
as a result of economic and population growth.  
These findings highlight the importance of combining 
investments in efficiency with deeper structural changes 
in urban form and transport infrastructure. Another 
priority is to decarbonise the energy supply – a topic 
discussed in depth in Chapter 4: Energy. While sector- or 
district-level investments that boost resource productivity 
can help improve urban efficiency and build capacity for 
further change, they are not sufficient to ensure long-term 
resource efficiency, sustained emission reductions, and 
wider social and economic benefits. Cities operate like 
networks. Fixing one node at a time, on a patchwork basis, 
can create strong positive local effects at the node, but 
it does not systematically boost productivity across the 
whole urban network. A more coordinated approach  
is essential.
4.2 Compact, connected, coordinated  
urban development 
To unlock a new wave of sustained, long-term urban 
productivity improvements, cities will need to shift to 
compact, connected and coordinated urban development, 
termed the “3C” model of urban development. This 
alternative model is briefly defined. 
• Compact urban growth refers to managed expansion 
which encourages higher-density, contiguous 
Box 2 
The rising costs of unmanaged, 
unstructured urban expansion  
in India 53
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A synthesis of studies examining the economic case for 
investment in low-carbon development strategies in 
five cities – Leeds, UK; Kolkata, India; Lima, Peru; Johor 
Bahru, Malaysia, and Palembang, Indonesia – identifies 
numerous opportunities for cost-effective investments, 
for more efficient vehicles, transport systems and 
buildings, and for small-scale renewables.54 The review 
shows that savings in the range of 13–26% in energy use 
and GHG emissions are possible relative to business-as-
usual trends in the next 10 years through investments, 
with payback periods of less than five years, assessed on 
commercial terms. 
In the buildings sector, opportunities include improved 
building design practices; insulation; more efficient 
heating/cooling, lighting technologies and appliances, 
and the adoption of small-scale renewables. For 
residential buildings in the Leeds City Region, it was 
calculated that £1.1 billion (US$1.7 billion) could be 
profitably invested in domestic energy efficiency 
measures, generating annual savings of £400 million 
(US$626 million), paying back the investment in less 
than three years and reducing total emissions from the 
domestic sector by 16% relative to business-as-usual 
trends. These investments could also achieve multiple 
other benefits, including reduced fuel poverty and 
improved public health.
In the transport sector, the studies emphasise the 
potential for cost-effective investments in more efficient 
vehicles, cleaner fuels and a range of public transport 
initiatives. In the Lima-Callao region, for example, it was 
projected that cost-effective investments could reduce 
transport-related GHG emissions by 26% by 2025 
relative to business as usual. An investment of PEN7.4 
billion (US$2.8 billion) would generate annual energy 
savings of PEN2.9 billion (US$1.1 billion) – meaning a 
payback in 2.6 years. These investments would also have 
other benefits – particularly relating to urban air quality 
and public health.
In the waste sector, the studies found that cities could 
make significant cost-effective investments in waste-
related GHG emissions through measures such as 
improved recycling, landfill gas capture and enhanced 
composting of waste. In Kolkata, for example, waste-
related greenhouse gas emissions could be cut by 41% by 
2025, relative to business as usual, through investments 
of INR13.1 billion (US$224 million) that would generate 
annual savings of INR1.1 billion (US$18.8 million), 
paying back the investment in 11.8 years. Again, these 
investments could achieve multiple other benefits.
These findings are supported by other studies  
and assessments: 
• The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) found that recent developments in technology 
and know-how made it possible to build or retrofit 
very low- and zero-energy buildings, often at little 
marginal investment cost.55 Efficiency measures 
typically paid back well within the building’s lifetime, 
and generated significant energy savings in both new 
(50–90% savings) and existing buildings (50–75%). 
The IPCC found that well-designed building codes 
and appliance standards were the most cost-effective 
ways to unlock these benefits, although numerous 
market and non-market barriers often hinder  
market uptake.
• Siemens identified 30 market-ready low-carbon 
technologies such as light-emitting diode (LED) street 
lighting, new building technologies and electric buses. 
Adopting these across 30 of the world’s megacities 
could create more than 2 million jobs,56 and avoid 3 
billion tonnes of cumulative GHG emissions and 3 
million tonnes of local air pollution between 2014 and 
2025, with an investment value of US$2.5 trillion.57 
• McKinsey & Company examined the economic 
benefits of developing new green technology 
districts in the United States, China and the Middle 
East.58 Technologies included efficient building 
design and lighting, energy-efficient street lighting, 
efficient waste management, rooftop solar power, 
and combined heat and power. McKinsey estimated 
annual operating savings of US$7–21 million, or 
US$250–1,200 per resident, for incremental capital 
costs of US$35–70 million per square kilometre. The 
investment could break even after three to five years, 
and generate an internal rate of return of 18–30%. The 
green technologies could reduce annual energy costs 
by 24–36% and reduce GHG emissions by 28–49%. 
Extending the same technologies (analysed here for 
greenfield development) to brownfield sites would 
have higher costs associated with remediation, but 
likely still drive net savings.
Box 3
Economic returns from boosting resource productivity
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development, with functionally and socially mixed 
neighbourhoods, and walkable, human-scale local 
urban environments.61 Denser development is 
complemented by public green spaces to maintain 
liveability.62 In rapidly expanding cities, compact 
urban development is achieved through planned 
accommodation of population expansion and 
anticipation of infrastructure needs. Compact urban 
growth can also be achieved through redevelopment 
of brownfield sites.63
• Connected infrastructure refers to investment in 
innovative urban infrastructure and technology, with 
a focus on smarter transport systems to connect 
and capture the economic benefits of more compact 
urban forms. These transport systems would connect 
mixed-use, employment, housing and commercial 
clusters. They include bus rapid transit (BRT), bicycle 
“superhighways”, car- and bicycle-sharing, smarter 
traffic information systems, and electric vehicles with 
charging point networks using renewable energy 
sources. Transport systems can be complemented 
by smarter urban utilities to deliver more connected, 
resource-efficient public services such as efficient 
energy, waste and water systems, street lighting 
technology, and smart grids. Smarter, more efficient 
buildings (both via retrofits and new builds) complete 
the fabric of the urban system. 
• Coordinated governance refers to effective and 
accountable institutions to support coordinated 
planning and implementation across the public and 
private sectors and civil society, particularly for 
land use change and transport. The existence of 
organisations dedicated to coordinating policies 
within entire urban agglomerations, for example, has 
especially positive effects, ranging from lower levels  
of particulate matter air pollution to a reduction in 
urban sprawl.64
4.3 The benefits of compact, connected, 
coordinated urban pathways 
Encouraging more compact, connected and coordinated 
cities is ultimately about harnessing cities’ growth 
potential by reinforcing a central function, facilitating 
access to people, goods and services, and ideas. 
Throughout history, cities have been dynamic centres of 
economic specialisation and cultural expression.  
By enabling density – the concentration of people and 
economic activities in a small geographic space – these 
economic and social interactions create a vibrant 
market and fertile environment for innovation in ideas, 
technologies and processes, spurring innovation  
and productivity.65 
More compact urban growth can significantly reduce 
the cost of providing services and infrastructure, and 
the rate of development of new land. It also significantly 
increases the viability of public transport and other urban 
infrastructure, by attracting more intensive use, and 
creates a deeper labour market that can achieve faster 
and better job matches. Moreover, the components of 
this system are self-reinforcing, generating a virtuous 
circle: more compact urban centres concentrate urban 
innovation and job creation, helping to attract talent 
and capital for investment in smarter infrastructure and 
technology, and widening the skilled labour pool. 
In the medium to long term, the economic and social 
benefits of a large-scale shift to a compact, connected and 
coordinated urban pathway include: 
1. Unleashing productivity and growth through 
agglomeration effects: Firms and workers in dense 
urban agglomerations are more productive. The 
World Bank estimates that in China, for example, a 
compact urban development pathway would lead to 
higher economic growth, greater productivity, and 
a larger share of the high-value services sector by 
2030.66 There are also productivity benefits from 
policy coordination. Empirical evidence suggests 
that productivity is lower in cities with a high degree 
of administrative fragmentation, a cost that is 
almost halved by the presence of a well-functioning 
governance body.67
2. Improving the efficiency of capital deployment and 
closing the infrastructure gap: New analysis for the 
Commission suggests that the United States could 
save $200 billion per year if it pursued smarter, 
more compact growth policies, primarily due to 
savings in the cost of providing public services and 
capital investments such as roads.68 According to the 
World Bank, China could save up to US$1.4 trillion 
in infrastructure spending up to 2030 if it pursued 
a more compact, transit-oriented urban model – 
equivalent to around 15% of China’s GDP in 2013.69 
Analysis for the Commission suggests that more 
compact, connected urban development could reduce 
global urban infrastructure requirements by  
more than US$3 trillion over the next 15 years 
(2015–2030).70
More compact, connected urban 
development could reduce 
global urban infrastructure 
requirements by more than 
US$3 trillion over the next 15 
years (2015–2030).
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3. Delivering substantial cost savings in the transport 
sector: Estimates for the United States suggest that 
transit-oriented urban development could reduce 
per capita car use by 50%, reducing household 
expenditures by 20%.71 In 1995, transport costs 
in transit-oriented Singapore were US$10 billion 
less than in car-oriented Houston, a city of similar 
population size and wealth.72 At significantly lower 
fuel prices, sprawling Houston spends about 14% of 
its GDP on transport, compared with 4% in relatively 
compact Copenhagen and about 7% typically in many 
Western European cities.73 In New York, density-
related transport cost savings amount to about 
US$19 billion per year.74 
4. Delivering a wide range of benefits related to public-
transport, walking and cycling infrastructure: These 
benefits include greater access to jobs and low-cost 
transport, reduced congestion, improved public health 
and safety, and greater energy security75 – all of 
which are particularly valuable to low-income urban 
residents. Regarding health, substantial benefits arise 
from improved air quality and physical activity. A 
study of Ho Chi Minh City, for example, found that a 
compact urban model would reduce transport-sector 
fine particulate matter (PM2.5) emissions by 44%, as 
With the rising incidence of climate-related hazards 
impacting urban areas, it is crucial that cities invest in 
enhancing their resilience to ensure they can withstand 
the shocks of future extreme events, minimise the 
damages, and recover quickly. A great deal is at stake: 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012 caused about US$19 billion  
in damages in New York City alone, left almost 2  
million people without power, and flooded nearly  
90,000 buildings.80 
Coastal cities are at particularly great risk. The OECD 
analysed the climate risks faced by the 136 port cities 
globally with more than a million residents in 2005, and 
found they had about US$3 trillion worth of assets at 
risk in 2005, or about 5% of global GDP that year; by the 
2070s, that is expected to rise to US$35 trillion, or 9% 
of projected global GDP.81 The most exposed cities as of 
2005, the study found, were Mumbai and Kolkata in India; 
Guangzhou and Shanghai in China; Miami, Greater New 
York and New Orleans in the US; Ho Chi Minh City in 
Vietnam; Osaka-Kobe in Japan; and Alexandria in Egypt. 
Sound urban management can reduce vulnerability to 
climate hazards – for example, through better planning 
to restrict development in the most exposed locations.82 
Transport systems, utilities (e.g. energy, water) and 
buildings also need to be made more resilient, and basic 
infrastructure such as sewers needs to be well maintained. 
Some measures can enhance resilience, reduce emissions, 
and boost jobs and growth at the same time. For 
example, investment in green space and efficient waste 
management bolsters climate resilience, absorbs carbon, 
and enhances the attractiveness of cities to global talent 
and capital.
While the benefits of economic density have to be 
balanced against the potential risks of increased exposure 
to shocks such as climate hazards, there is evidence that 
more compact, connected and coordinated cities can also 
be more resilient: 
• They are more energy- and resource-efficient, 
providing resilience to resource price shocks. 
• They may be more able to raise finance for investing in 
climate-resilient infrastructure and public services. 
• They provide economies of scale in the provision of 
risk control measures. 
• Dense, well-functioning urban centres can draw 
residents in from areas exposed to climate hazards. 
• Strong, coordinated land management can prevent 
settlement in hazardous areas.
Box 4 
Urban resilience: compact, connected and coordinated cities
well as indirect PM emissions by 16% as a result of 
reduced electricity use.76 
In addition to the economic and social benefits, more 
compact, connected and coordinated urban development 
will also have significant climate benefits, by lowering 
GHG emissions from transport, buildings and other 
operations. New analysis for this report using a global 
database of city-level carbon emissions estimates that 
adoption of more compact, connected development 
models by the world’s largest 724 cities could reduce 
global GHG emissions by 800 million to 1.5 billion tonnes 
of CO
2
e per year by 2030. Those savings are achieved 
primarily through transformative changes in transport, 
reducing personal vehicle use in favour of mass transit.77 
Another analysis for the Commission found that compact, 
transit-oriented cities could reduce annual GHG emissions 
by about 0.6 billion tonnes of CO
2
e in 2030, rising to 
1.8 billion tonnes CO
2
e by 2050.78 The savings would 
be achieved through reductions in personal vehicle use 
(shifting to public transport) and smaller housing units 
with lower energy demand. Further research is needed, 
however, to fully assess the potential impact on emissions 
of these and other compact, transit-oriented urban 
development strategies.
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Measures to improve compactness and connectivity  
at the city level can also significantly improve the 
effectiveness of national policies to reduce carbon 
emissions. A recent study of Paris, for example, found that 
the presence of dense public transport infrastructure 
significantly increases residents’ willingness to pay carbon 
or fuel taxes.79
4.4 Different cities, different choices
The concept of supporting more compact, connected  
and coordinated urban development is relevant to all 
types of cities, but the strategies for achieving this will 
vary significantly. 
In Emerging Cities and many Small Urban Areas, there will 
inevitably be some urban expansion. There is thus a unique 
opportunity to managing urban growth so it includes 
compact city features and smarter urban infrastructure 
from the start.83 Emerging Cities can become real leaders 
in driving forward a compact, connected development 
model, given that much of their infrastructure is yet to be 
built, and essential aspects of urban form have yet to  
be locked in. 
In Global Megacities, there is a growing imperative to 
retain and enhance attractiveness for talent and capital. 
This can be achieved through vibrant urban cores and 
world-class transit systems. Transit-oriented development 
EMERGING CITIES GLOBAL MEGACITIES MATURE CITIES
Compact
Coordinated
Connected
Design in compact city 
features from the start, 
including integration 
of industrial and 
residential areas   
e.g Chenggong (China) 
Introduce surface-based 
public transport based on 
Bus and BRT systems and  
rapid rail where appropriate 
e.g. Bogota (Colombia) 
Build capacity for 
integrated land use and 
transport planning 
e.g. Curitiba (Brazil) 
Re-densification through 
regeneration of existing city 
cores and multiple hubs, 
brownfield re-development, 
and urban retrofitting 
e.g Beijing (China)   
Further expand existing 
public transport systems and 
increase share of public and 
non-motorised travel
e.g Mumbai (India) 
   
Integrated land use and 
transport planning,  
including accessing 
international finance for 
smarter infrastructure, 
road pricing and land value 
capture mechanisms 
e.g. London (United 
Kingdom) 
 
   
Re-densification through 
regeneration of existing city 
cores and supporting hubs, 
brownfield re-development, 
and urban retrofitting  
e.g. Hamburg (Germany)  
Major opportunities for 
introducing cycling and 
non-motorised travel
e.g. Amsterdam 
(Netherlands) 
 
Integrated land use 
and transport planning, 
including use of regulations 
e.g. Barcelona (Spain) 
 
 
Different cities, different choices 
Table 1
at the periphery can complement the redevelopment of 
city centres, neighbourhoods and former industrial land. 
Road space and parking areas can also be reallocated to 
achieve a greater mix of alternative transport and non-
transport uses. Many Global Megacities have a central 
core with multiple hubs, with opportunities for a two-track 
strategy to revitalise and improve connectivity within and 
between the urban core and multiple hubs. 
Mature Cities may already be locked into substantial sprawl, 
as is the case in Sydney and Johannesburg. Concentrating 
new development in denser urban blocks can enable compact 
city pockets supported by mass transit, to create more 
efficient and connected urban networks, and diversification 
of their economies. This can be complemented by the 
regeneration and revitalisation of brownfield sites in urban 
cores. Existing development can also be retrofitted, and 
connectivity between the urban core and supporting hubs 
can be improved. As with many megacities, this type of 
strategy will become ever more important as many Mature 
Cities look to retain and enhance their attractiveness for 
talent and capital in increasingly globalised labour and capital 
markets  (see Box 7). 
In summary, every city has a unique economy, 
demographic and geography, so the strategy for achieving 
more compact, connected and coordinated urban 
development must be flexible and responsive to diverse 
demands: one size does not fit all. 
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Few sectors are as inefficient as road transport. Roads can 
cover more than 20% of a city’s surface, but operate at 
capacity only 5% of the time. Cars are in use only about 4% 
of the time, and much of that time is spent stuck in traffic 
or searching for parking.88 Despite this, there remains a 
global trend towards increasing motorisation, with the 
number of privately owned motorcars potentially doubling 
from 1 billion today to 2 billion by 2030.89 
However, new and alternative patterns of urban transport 
are emerging in cities around the world, driven largely by 
innovative use of existing technologies, which could start 
to reverse this trend.
Figure 3 below shows the explosion in new forms of urban 
mobility, as more and more cities adopt these solutions to 
enhance their efficiency, competitiveness, social equity 
and quality of life. BRT is a notable phenomenon, which 
redistributes road space in favour of buses through 
dedicated bus lanes, pre-boarding ticketing and custom-
designed stations. But there has also been an explosion in 
other areas such as car- and bike-sharing and the use of 
car-free zones. 
In 2000, five cities had bike-sharing schemes, with only 
4,000 bikes between them.90 There are now bike-sharing 
schemes in 678 cities in both developed and developing 
countries, with 700,000 bikes.91 Some 186 municipalities 
around the world were building, planning or actively 
studying bike-sharing as of the end of 2013. The number of 
car-sharing members in North America has increased from 
16,000 in 2002 to 1 million in January 2013.92 
While the number of electric vehicles (EV) introduced in 
cities has been slower than anticipated, EV sales increased 
from 45,000 cars in 2011 to nearly 200,000 in 2012, and 
more than 400,000 EVs were registered in cities worldwide 
at the beginning of 2014. This is likely to rise markedly with 
further technological improvements, helping to reduce local 
air pollution and noise in cities. Digitisation, information and 
communications technology (ICT), and use of “big data” are 
also opening up possibilities for improving public transport 
efficiency and reducing the need for travel. Chapter 7: 
Innovation discusses these issues. 
There are several reasons for this diversification of urban 
mobility, including increased congestion and the costs of 
maintaining a car, which are shifting new generations of 
urban dwellers to alternative transport options. A study 
of 23,000 respondents in 19 countries found that younger 
urban dwellers (the so-called Generation Y) are more likely 
to live in areas where amenities are within walking distance; 
to relocate to reduce their daily commuting time; and to use 
car-share or car-pool technologies.93
Urban transport in the next decades is thus likely to be 
marked by greater use of public options; smarter, cleaner 
vehicles, and digitally enabled car-sharing. However, it 
is unlikely that in the foreseeable future, technological 
innovation will change the co-dependence of compact 
urban form and public transport in enhancing productivity 
and accessibility in cities.
Box 5
Innovation: a potential tipping point in urban transport? 87
4.5 New urban development models in action 
The Commission found remarkable consensus amongst 
urban development practitioners and prominent 
international organisations such as the World Bank, 
the OECD, the United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme (UN-Habitat), and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) supporting the 
development of more compact, connected and 
coordinated cities. There is strong evidence that such 
cities are more productive, socially inclusive, resilient, 
cleaner, quieter, safer and lower-carbon.
There is less consensus on whether it is possible to 
develop cities in ways which arrest what some see as an 
inevitable expansion of existing patterns of urbanisation. 
Case study evidence suggests, however, that we are 
already seeing tipping points towards more compact, 
connected and coordinated urban pathways. The 
development of more compact urban forms and re-
densification is an emerging trend in some leading, better 
planned cities, and in other cities as well. 
Over the last decade, re-densification has been taking 
place in a range of Global Megacities and Mature Cities,84 
including London, Brussels, Tokyo, Hamburg and Nagoya. 
These cities have moved back towards more concentrated 
forms partly as a result of land use regulations and 
investment in public transport. Beijing is going against 
the trend of sprawling cities in China: population density 
in Beijing’s core increased by 50% between 2000 and 
2010.85 The Sacramento region in California demonstrates 
how an urban area can swiftly reverse a trend towards 
urban sprawl, through land use and transport planning. 
Two years after a growth management plan was 
implemented, two-thirds of the housing growth in the 
region was achieved through infill in attached or small-lot 
detached housing, resulting in a significant rise in density 
for the region.86 
The world is also seeing the seeds of a revolution in 
urban connectivity, through smarter urban infrastructure 
and new technology, particularly in transport, with the 
potential for transformative effects (see Box 5).  
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BRT is transforming cities in many developing countries, 
increasing productivity and land value, while reducing 
traffic congestion, carbon emissions and air pollution. 
More than 160 cities have implemented BRT systems, 
which can carry large numbers of passengers per day at 
less than 15% of the cost of a metro.95
Bogota has been a trailblazer in BRT. The city is a globally 
recognised leader in transit-oriented urban planning 
and transport innovation, with strong leadership from 
successive city administrations and the embrace of 
integrated planning. Its headline project has been the 
TransMilenio BRT system, which has been replicated 
in several other cities, including Guangzhou (China) 
and Ahmedabad (India).96 The BRT carries 2.1 million 
passengers per day and operates at a profit.97 The city 
has complemented the BRT with a citywide network of 
bicycle paths that connect residents to public transport, 
community spaces and parks. Further innovations in the 
pipeline include the piloting of electric and hybrid buses, 
and an electric taxi fleet. 
There are other signs of change around the world. In 
China, urban rail networks will total 3,000 km in length in 
2015 and double that by 2020.98 Bicycle infrastructure 
is also being upgraded in many cities, including citywide 
upgrades in Copenhagen, cycle superhighways in London, 
and hundreds of bike-sharing schemes that showcase the 
Figure 3 
A range of smart transport systems have taken off in numerous cities worldwide since 2000
Source: Embarq, 201394
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Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics, has said that 
technological innovation in America and urbanisation in 
China will be the “two keys” to human development in the 
21st century. 
China’s urbanisation represents the biggest and fastest 
social movement in human history, with nearly 500 
million people moving into cities in the past 30 years.104 
However, the dominant, business-as-usual model of 
rapid urbanisation has given rise to a growing range of 
economic, social and environmental costs. Urban forms 
developed over the past 10 to 15 years are starting to lock 
in dependency on private cars, resulting in more carbon-
intensive, polluting and congested development. Urban 
sprawl has reduced productivity gains from agglomeration 
and specialisation and has led to much higher levels of 
capital accumulation than is necessary to sustain growth. 
Research from 261 Chinese cities in 2004, for example, 
suggested that labour productivity would rise by 8.8% if 
employment density doubled.105 
China’s leaders recognise that building better cities will 
help China to keep growing strongly for years to come.106 
Going in the wrong direction with cities will undermine 
growth, increase social inequality, and accelerate global 
climate change. Traffic congestion and air pollution are 
the top complaints by China’s citizens. As a result, China is 
undergoing a potentially radical policy shift. In December 
2013, for the first time in China’s history, the Central 
Government held a national urbanisation conference, 
attended by President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li, 
which emphasised the need to shift towards more compact 
and mixed-use land development patterns to contain urban 
sprawl, maximise resource efficiency and curtail  
the negative externalities of pollution, congestion and  
CO
2
 emissions. 
China’s New National Urbanisation Plan for 2014-2020 
– overseen by the prime minister and published in March 
2014 – places urban policy at the heart of Chinese decision-
making and signals a strong shift towards an alternative 
urban pathway, highlighting the need to address urban 
sprawl, congestion and worsening pollution. This shift in 
direction is embedded in a new joint report by the World 
Bank and the Development Research Center of China’s 
State Council recommending that China curbs rapid urban 
sprawl, with a focus on reforms to urban planning, urban 
finance and municipal governance.107
benefits of cycling for local economies, the environment 
and individual health. A range of smarter transport 
systems, such as car-sharing and electric vehicles, have 
also taken off in cities worldwide.99
The coordination of land use and transport planning is also 
improving in some countries and cities, with strengthened 
urban institutions. More than two-thirds of OECD cities 
now have a municipal body to coordinate programmes 
of public investment in urban infrastructure. These 
cities tend to be denser, have higher GDP per capita, and 
attract more skilled people.100 Cities such as London are 
providing strong, replicable models for coordinating public 
transport investment. Transport for London, for example, 
is a single agency that oversees all urban transport modes, 
including non-motorised transport, public transport and 
road traffic, with the authority to take decisions across 
local administrative boundaries.101 India and South Africa 
have also developed plans to help coordinate land use and 
transport decisions between the local, regional  
and national levels.
City policies supporting a shift towards compact, 
connected and coordinated pathways are being  
adopted in a growing number of developed countries, 
including France, Japan, the Czech Republic and Austria. 
Among emerging economies, China is shifting towards 
a similar pathway to boost urban productivity and  
reduce the escalating costs of urbanisation. China 
has established a programme of 100 low-carbon 
demonstration cities embedded in all major departmental 
plans. Cities such as Chenggong district in Kunming typify 
radical shifts towards higher-density, mixed-use, transit-
oriented development.102
A broad range of cities are demonstrating that more 
compact, connected and coordinated urban pathways 
can strengthen the economy and deliver multiple  
other benefits:108 
• Emerging Cities are demonstrating the economic, 
social, and broader benefits of investing in more 
compact, connected urban pathways. Sustained 
investment by Curitiba in its BRT system, bike paths, 
pedestrian ways and zoning policies has resulted 
in the city having one of the lowest accident rates 
in Brazil. Per capita GHG emissions are also 25% 
lower than the Brazilian urban average; gasoline 
consumption is 30% lower than the national average; 
and citizens spend only 10% of their income on 
transport, one of the lowest rates in the country. 
Curitiba has achieved this while seeing a threefold 
increase in population since the 1960s.109 It is now 
one of the most affluent cities in Brazil, and its 
experience has been replicated in other cities, such  
as Bogota. 
Box 6 
China’s urban revolution 103
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• Global Megacities are demonstrating how to remain 
competitive through more compact, connected 
and coordinated urban development. London, for 
example, remains one of the world’s most dynamic 
cities, yet since 2000, population growth in London 
has been concentrated within a 10 km radius of the 
city centre, and 53% of all newly constructed floor 
area between 2004 and 2011 was within 500 metres 
of a rail or underground station.110 Car ownership in 
London decreased 6% from 1995 to 2011, while the 
city’s economy grew around 40%.111 And the city has 
reduced air pollution to close to WHO guidelines, 
with a particular emphasis on reducing emissions 
from private vehicles through policy measures such as 
congestion charges and low-emissions zones.112 More 
broadly, the members of C40, a global network of 
megacities committed to reducing GHG emissions, are 
collectively taking more than 8,000 actions, primarily 
in their economic self-interest. A significant share of 
these investments could be transformational, with a 
rising number of megacities reporting implementation 
of BRT systems, for example.113 
Even cities with significant lock-in to sprawled 
development patterns can start to forge alternative urban 
pathways. A striking example is Houston, one of the most 
sprawling, low-density, car-dependent cities in the United 
States, and the largest US city to lack zoning policies to 
manage private development. By 2035, if present trends 
continue, Houstonians are forecast to be spending 145% 
more time in their cars than they do today. 
City leaders are making ambitious attempts to overcome 
the legacy of sprawl through urban renewal and sustained 
investment in transport systems. One programme, for 
example, offers developers up to $15,000 per unit for 
building multi-family housing in and around the city’s core. 
Houston also launched a light rail system in 2004, and will 
be adding three new lines in 2014. Plans are in progress  
for a BRT line. 
In addition, a third of Houston’s bus fleet is now hybrid 
buses, and the city has created an online hybrid and electric 
car-sharing programme for municipal vehicles, enabling a 
34% reduction in the municipal car fleet; more than half of 
its light-duty vehicles are hybrid or electric. Bike-sharing 
and car-sharing programmes are now up and running. 
The city and the private sector have also committed more 
than $200 million to a signature new Bayou Greenways 
initiative, adding 150 miles of new hiking and biking trails. 
These initiatives mark a potential shift towards planning 
Houston’s future in a way that values improved transport 
connectivity as a viable alternative development model. 
(In addition, the city is converting traffic lights at 2,450 
intersections to LEDs, as well as 165,000 streetlights.)
The case for action has been a simple economic one: 
Houston’s leaders recognise that their firms are struggling 
to draw talent from leading US universities, because 
prospective employees want a city with an attractive, 
vibrant urban core and strong multi-modal transport 
networks. Recent survey evidence from the Rice 
University’s Kinder Institute for Urban Research already 
suggests that more than half the residents of Harris 
County, of which Houston is part, would prefer to live in  
an area with mixed-use development, including homes, 
shops, and restaurants as opposed to single-family 
residential areas. 
“At some point, it’s not enough to keep grabbing the 
suburbs and roping them in,” Houston Mayor Annise 
Parker has said, recognising the need for change. “You’ve 
got to make the system as a whole function, and you do 
things to bring people back to the inner core.”
Houston’s leaders have had to demonstrate leadership to 
make these investments and reforms. Stephen Klineberg of 
the Kinder Institute says: “The great Catch-22 for Houston 
is we want density, but you can’t have density with a car 
and there’s no density to support light rail. You build light 
rail on the faith that if you build it, they will come.”
Box 7.
Houston: Overcoming sprawl through urban renewal and connectivity 117
• Mature Cities such as Stockholm, Copenhagen, 
Portland, Hong Kong, Hanover and Singapore have 
all shown, through efficient land use and sustained 
investments in public transport, that it is possible 
to grow prosperous economies while dramatically 
reducing externalities such as GHG emissions and air 
pollution. For example, Stockholm reduced emissions 
by 35% from 1993 to 2010, but grew its economy by 
41%, one of the highest growth rates in Europe.114 The 
city is now considering new measures, such as making 
the Stockholm Royal Seaport fossil fuel-free by 2030, 
to drive further economic and carbon benefits. Since 
1990, Copenhagen has reduced its carbon emissions 
by more than 40%, while experiencing real growth 
of around 50%.115 All of these cities consistently rate 
high in rankings of the world’s most competitive cities. 
5. Scaling and accelerating change 
If the global economy is to capture the productivity 
benefits of more compact, connected and coordinated 
cities, analysis for the Commission suggests that policy-
makers should prioritise four mutually reinforcing areas: 
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• Build effective and accountable institutions to 
support the implementation and delivery of 
coordinated programmes and investment, particularly 
in relation to land use change and transport. 
The importance of these issues to each city will differ. 
Cities will need to structure a mutually reinforcing 
package of reforms and investments suited to their 
own political, economic and social contexts, and their 
capacity for implementation. Moreover, the balance 
of responsibility between actions at the city, regional 
and national level will depend on the level of autonomy 
provided to urban areas. 
The most significant opportunities for shifting the course 
of urbanisation are likely to be in fast-growing, mid-
• Strengthen the role of strategic planning and land use 
regulation at the national and city level, to provide the 
framework for more efficient and effective planning of 
land use, transport and urban infrastructure. 
• Reform subsidies and introduce pricing to reflect 
the full costs associated with unstructured urban 
expansion, including inappropriate pricing of land,  
new development, carbon emissions and  
conventional motorisation.118
• Unlock financing for smarter, more resilient urban 
infrastructure and technology, to allow cities to 
redirect and invest capital in infrastructure which 
dramatically improves connectivity.119 
Figure 4 
Some cities have shown that compact and connected urban pathways can go hand in hand with 
economic growth: Stockholm, Copenhagen, Hong Kong
SOURCE: Rode, Floater et al. 2013; Floater, Rode et al. 2013, 
2014.116
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sized Emerging Cities and in Small Urban Areas, where 
administrative and technical capacities can be limited 
or weak. These cities can start by identifying relatively 
accessible, economically attractive options in the short- to 
medium term to boost resource productivity and build 
commitment and capacities for change. They can combine 
this with planning an adequate public transport network 
and basic public services. However, capacity constraints 
should not prevent cities from being ambitious and 
focusing on more challenging interventions. Consultations 
for this report have demonstrated that policy-makers are 
considering ambitious reforms even in some of the most 
capacity-constrained environments. Moreover, capacity 
is often best built through action-based learning in the 
process of policy implementation. 
5.1  Strategic planning and regulatory reform 
Spatial and infrastructure planning needs to be 
significantly strengthened at both the national and 
city levels.120 According to the World Bank, only about 
20% of the world’s 150 largest cities have even the 
basic analytics needed for low-carbon planning.121 A 
significant number of the world’s most rapidly urbanising 
countries do not have national plans for managing urban 
expansion to achieve economic, social and environmental 
objectives. Traditional approaches to planning in 
countries such as India are proving ineffective at 
influencing the sheer scale and shape of urbanisation and 
Source: Adapted from Atkins, 2014126
Table 2
Traditional vs. new citywide planning systems
• Little integration with transport planning 
• Lack of thought for relationships with wider 
city region
• Little attention paid to wider, social, 
environmental or economic factors associated 
with land use
• Strict division of land uses with little mixed use
• Low development densities to restrict 
pressure on existing infrastructure
• Focus on neighbourhood-scale physical 
development rather than city-level  
spatial planning
• High degree of integration of land use, transport 
policy, and infrastructure investment with wider 
economic, social, and environmental objectives
• Plan grounded in robust analysis of functional 
relationship with wider region 
• Plan fully costed and responsibilities for delivery 
clearly stated 
• Plans recognise that mixed use is part of a wider 
strategy for efficient land use, but not prescriptive 
on exact mix of uses
• Flexibility built in to neighbourhood-level 
objectives, with high frequency of review
Traditional approaches to planning New approaches to planning
infrastructure. Land use planning at the national and city 
levels is often conducted as separate exercises, leading to 
urban sprawl, social marginalisation and high demand for 
conventional motorisation (see Table 2). 
Reforms to national- and city-level planning systems 
need to go hand-in-hand with regulatory reform. Such 
reform will include shifting from maximum to minimum 
density standards, and minimum to maximum parking 
requirements. It will also include introducing mixed-use 
regulation and density bonuses for developers in order 
to support compact city development with a hierarchy 
of higher-density, mixed-use clusters around public 
transport nodes. For example, Denmark’s Planning Act 
on the “Station Proximity Principle” requires new offices  
over 1,500 m2 to be located within 600 metres of a rail 
station, reinforcing Copenhagen’s efficient, compact  
urban form.122 
Careful introduction of urban growth boundaries (or 
selective protection of non-urban land) can foster 
urban compaction and incentivise the development 
of brownfield over greenfield land, while avoiding 
house cost inflation.123 Here it is important to identify 
where there is scope for expansion and plan ahead for 
essential infrastructure, rather than simply try to contain 
sprawl, which can lead to unintended outcomes such as 
“leapfrog sprawl”.124 Complementary measures to boost 
development density, reduce parking requirements and 
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promote more mixed-use development can offset the 
inflationary impact of growth boundaries on housing 
affordability, by reducing unit land costs and land 
requirements.125
5.2 Subsidy reform and new  
pricing mechanisms
Subsidy reforms and new pricing mechanisms can help 
reduce and reverse the perverse incentives supporting 
unstructured urban expansion and conventional 
motorisation. This would not only reduce negative 
externalities, but also strengthen the fiscal revenue base 
at the national and city levels, and provide revenue to 
reinvest in sustainable urban infrastructure. Nations and 
cities can develop different strategies according to their 
unique political, institutional, and cultural landscapes. 
Three types of instruments are of particular importance: 
fuel subsidies, congestion charges and land  
development taxes.127 
Fuel subsidies and other pricing policies drive urban 
sprawl in many countries, directly against other national 
policy goals, such as addressing air pollution and 
congestion and promoting responsible macroeconomic 
policy management.128 The under-pricing of transport 
fuels and motorised travel has locked-in inflated levels 
of automobile use in many urban areas. For example, 
commuters in the Netherlands are able to reduce their 
taxable income by up to €0.19 per kilometre of commute, 
resulting in 25% more commuting trips and 16% more 
car trips.129 Research from US cities shows that a 10% 
increase in fuel prices leads to a 10% decrease in urban 
fringe developments with high commute times.130 
Congestion charges and parking fees can steer commuters 
to public transport if viable options exist, and cities 
typically have the power to introduce such measures. 
Stockholm’s congestion tax reduced traffic delays by a 
third, decreased traffic demand by more than a fifth,131 
and generated a net budget surplus of US$90 million per 
year.132 A study in Paris showed that congestion charges 
would reduce the radius of the metro area by 34% and 
average travel distance by 15%.133 Charging for on- and 
off-street parking based on market prices also reduce 
parking demand and release space for higher-value usage. 
Land and development taxes are usually under the control 
of city authorities, and their greater use has recently been 
suggested by influential bodies such as the OECD and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Property taxes are 
typically the largest source of revenue for many cities, but 
often favour greenfield over infill development. Variants 
of property taxes include land taxes or split-rate taxes. 
These are underused and could be scaled up to promote 
compact urban form by levying a higher tax rate on the 
value of urban land, and a lower or zero rate on the value 
of buildings and other improvements. Such alternative 
taxes can increase the capital-to-land ratio – i.e. the 
intensity of development, with efficiency and equity 
benefits.134 This type of taxation has been successfully 
used in countries such as Singapore, Japan and Korea, 
and parts of the United States, South Africa and Canada. 
Perverse incentives which favour single-family homes 
over multi-household developments should also be 
reconsidered. Development taxes can help to control 
urban sprawl at relatively low economic cost, and are the 
most direct way to price the externalities associated with 
new development beyond city boundaries.135 
5.3 Finance mechanisms 
An overwhelming body of evidence suggests that cities 
need greater access to financing for smarter urban 
infrastructure and new technology. A lack of financing can 
be the most significant hurdle of all. 
As a first principle, national, regional and city-level funding 
needs to be redirected away from business-as-usual urban 
infrastructure development, such as road-building. This 
would significantly reduce the investment gap and release 
funds for mass transit infrastructure, and is particularly 
important for countries with more limited budgets. China, 
for example, invested nearly US$200 billion in highway 
construction nationwide in 2012, with over US$1 trillion 
to accelerate the construction of urban public facilities 
during its 12th Five-Year Plan from 2011 to 2015.136 
India’s main urban development fund – the Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) – is 
skewed towards the construction of bridges and flyovers 
to support conventional motorisation.137 Redirecting 
investment can be particularly effective for urban 
transport infrastructure.138 Bogota’s BRT system was 
partially financed by redirecting funds away from urban 
highway programmes. 
Other steps for increasing city financing include greater 
budgetary control, enhanced creditworthiness, the use of 
land value capture, municipal bonds, reform of multilateral 
funding, and support for project preparation.139 These are 
discussed in turn below. 
A narrow revenue base induces many cities to convert 
Only 4% of the 500 largest 
cities in developing countries 
are deemed creditworthy 
in international financial 
markets, rising to 20% in  
local markets.
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publicly owned agricultural land to urban land for revenue 
generation. Providing cities with greater fiscal autonomy 
– backed up by appropriate fiduciary safeguards – would 
help them to leverage the significant co-financing often 
required for large-scale urban infrastructure investment, 
such as mass transit systems, rather than simply 
converting land to pay for basic public services. 
Enhancing creditworthiness is one way to boost city 
finances. An inability to source financing for large-scale 
urban infrastructure projects is closely related to poor 
credit ratings. According to the World Bank, only 4% of 
the 500 largest cities in developing countries are deemed 
creditworthy in international financial markets, rising 
to 20% in local markets. Investing US$1 in raising the 
creditworthiness of cities can leverage more than US$100 
in private-sector financing for smart infrastructure.140 
The World Bank’s City Creditworthiness Initiative is 
demonstrating how cities can improve their credit ratings 
through an array of measures, such as increasing locally 
generated sources of revenue, better debt management, 
and developing multi-year capital investment plans. 
Such higher creditworthiness can unlock financing 
for low-carbon, climate-resilient infrastructure. Lima 
provides a good example of a city working with a range 
of international institutions, including the Public Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), to gain a credit 
rating. This helped to unlock funding for its BRT project. 
In another example, Kampala in the space of one year 
managed to boost its locally generated revenue by 86%. 
With borrowing limits pegged to own revenue, this has 
almost doubled what the city can borrow for large-scale 
urban infrastructure. 
Greater use of land value capture can also help finance 
large-scale urban infrastructure, while also driving 
more compact urban forms. Land value capture involves 
financing the construction of new transit infrastructure 
with the profits generated by the increase in land value 
stimulated by the presence of that infrastructure. For 
example, in Hong Kong, the government’s “Rail plus 
Property” model captures the uplift in property values 
along new transit routes, ensuring efficient urban form 
while delivering US$940 million in profits in 2009 for the 
76% government-owned MTR Corporation.141 Saõ Paulo 
has raised over US$1.2 billion in six years using related 
instruments, and Curitiba is funding the conversion 
of a highway into a BRT corridor, complemented by 
higher-density, mixed-use spaces and green areas – an 
investment of US$600 million.142 Variations of land value 
capture include development impact fees, tax incremental 
financing, public land leasing and development right sales, 
land readjustment programmes, connection  
fees, joint developments, and cost/benefit-sharing.  
Cities such as Houston have created special Tax  
Increment Reinvestment Zones to help finance the  
cost of urban infrastructure.144 
Cities can use municipal bonds to finance a group 
of infrastructure projects, whose collective assets 
underwrite the bond. Such bonds allow cities to attract 
large institutional investors which typically prefer not 
to invest in small, individual projects. For example, 
Johannesburg recently issued a US$136 million green 
bond to finance a diverse range of investments, from 
hybrid buses to biogas energy and rooftop solar water 
heaters. The bond was 1.5 times oversubscribed and 
will earn investors a return of 185 basis points above 
sovereign bonds.
The global climate-related bond market is currently 
estimated at US$503 billion.145 Municipal bonds are 
a small share of this, less than US$2 billion, indicating 
significant potential for scaling up. Models such as the 
Qualified Energy Conservation Bond (QECB) used in 
the United States to allow local governments to borrow 
money to fund energy conservation projects could also 
be translated into other sectors to fund projects which 
generate economic returns and carbon savings. With 
public infrastructure investment falling in many countries, 
attracting private capital into smarter infrastructure is 
even more urgent. Institutional investors in the OECD 
alone have more than US$70 trillion in assets under 
management but face significant investment barriers 
related to the complexity of investments and transactions 
costs associated with smaller infrastructure projects.146 
To overcome these barriers, cities can set up exchanges or 
dedicated vehicles to match infrastructure projects with 
financial backers. For example, the mayor of Chicago set 
up the Chicago Infrastructure Trust in April 2012 to invest 
in transformative infrastructure projects. Smaller cities 
could set up pooled financing mechanisms between cities 
to aggregate the packaging, standardising, marketing  
and selling of urban infrastructure investments for  
the private sector.147 
Existing multilateral development bank (MDB) funding 
in middle- and low-income countries could go further to 
support the development of more compact, connected 
and coordinated cities. The eight largest MDBs have 
committed to investing US$175 billion over the next 
Johannesburg recently issued 
a US$136 million green bond 
to finance a diverse range 
of investments, from hybrid 
buses to biogas energy and 
rooftop solar water heaters. 
www.newclimateeconomy.report
C
IT
IE
S
78
decade for more sustainable transport. However, 
according to the MDBs’ self-reported breakdown, 
only about 25% of current MDB financing for 
transport supports sustainable transport.148 Less than 
a fifth of projects reported in 2012 focused on urban 
transport projects, except for road and urban highway 
construction.149 This suggests that, for the foreseeable 
future, MDB financing will continue to provide incentives 
for business-as-usual urban growth rather than compact 
urban growth and connected infrastructure. Institutions 
such as the World Bank have established a set of tools 
to assess the carbon impacts of investment decisions. 
However, MDBs provide support to cities on a sector-
by-sector basis rather than via holistic packages aligned 
to a strategic approach to managing urban growth. MDB 
funding could be reformed to ensure a more strategic, 
coordinated approach. Greater consideration should also 
be given to improving cities’ access to MDB financing, in 
partnership with national governments. 
Finally, cities need support to prepare infrastructure 
projects and financing deals, especially rapidly expanding 
mid-sized cities in emerging and developing countries. 
Many cities have good ideas and plans for smarter urban 
infrastructure, but often lack the necessary expertise 
to prepare and package these into bankable projects 
that can attract private-sector capital. While dedicated 
financing vehicles designed for this purpose can help 
(see municipal bonds above), international support is 
also valuable. For example, the Cities Development 
Initiative for Asia (CDIA)150 provides assistance to 
mid-sized Asian cities to bridge the gap between 
their development plans and implementation. More 
than US$5 billion in large-scale urban infrastructure 
investments are under development due to CDIA’s 
catalytic input, delivered at a cost of around 0.25% of the 
investments under preparation.151 
5.4 Building effective and  
accountable institutions
Cities need to build effective and accountable 
institutions, to achieve the collective decision-making 
and integrated policy interventions required for efficient 
urban infrastructure development and spatial planning. 
While many megacities have the skills and resources to 
implement the shift towards a new urban development 
model, many other cities lack such capacity. 
Institutional strengthening is particularly important in 
small and mid-sized cities in developing countries.152  
To underpin the institutions required to plan and finance 
a more compact and connected development model,  
five elements of urban governance should be given  
greater prominence:153 
1. Integrated transport and land use authorities:  
Many urban agglomerations include multiple 
administrative levels, which can prove challenging 
to coordinate. To integrate policy programmes at 
the metropolitan level (“horizontal governance”), 
many countries have set up sector-specific, 
metropolitan-level agencies,154 such as Transport 
for London, discussed earlier. Another option is to 
set up integrated multi-modal transport and land 
use authorities. Curitiba pioneered this approach 
through the Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento 
Urbano de Curitiba (IPPUC), which aimed to 
integrate all elements of urban growth.155 The IPPUC 
prioritised mixed-use development and dedicated 
high-capacity bus lanes, the backbone of the city’s 
successful BRT system. Key factors in IPPUC’s 
success included an ability to leverage dedicated 
funding sources and a long-term vision which was 
followed by a succession of civic leaders.156 
2. Institutional structures for coordinating land use 
and transport planning:  Fragmented governance 
and a lack of coordination between national and local 
policy frameworks for urban planning and transport 
are common in many countries. Coordination between 
city departments and between city, regional, and 
national policy frameworks (“vertical” governance) 
is fundamental to effective strategic land use and 
transport planning. India, for example, has recently 
developed a National Urban Transport Policy, 
integrating transport and land use planning as a single 
strategic goal. The central government covers half 
the costs of preparing integrated transport and land 
use plans.157 South Africa has used national legislation 
to create an Integrated Development Plan that 
coordinates national, provincial and local  
government policy. 
3. Information communication technology (ICT) and 
e-governance systems:  More advanced ICT systems 
can improve urban planning, revenue-raising, and 
transparency and accountability in government 
practices. Poor transparency and accountability have 
historically contributed to the unplanned conversion 
of undeveloped land into industrial or residential  
use in many cities, exacerbating sprawl.158 Cities  
can now make use of new ICT and e-governance 
systems to improve urban planning, and protect a 
revenue base for infrastructure investments. On the 
“demand side”, these systems can empower citizens  
to provide feedback on the quality of municipal service 
The next 10 to 20 years will 
be pivotal in the world’s 
urbanisation journey
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delivery and boost citizen participation in shaping land 
use planning processes. City governments in India,  
for example, are starting to use geographic 
information system (GIS) mapping to develop spatial 
planning strategies and to ensure more effective 
revenue collection. 
4. Development of sound municipal accounts and 
data: A crucial step in unlocking financing for 
urban infrastructure and new technology is to 
develop a coherent, consistent and integrated set 
of macroeconomic accounts, based on common 
standards similar to the Standard National Accounting 
system.159 This helps private-sector financiers to 
assess creditworthiness and municipalities to identify 
and track performance improvements. If they face 
significant deficiencies in city-level economic, social 
and environmental performance data, cities can use 
ICT and social media to build effective metrics at 
low cost, and even use real-time data to monitor and 
improve the efficiency of service delivery. City-level 
GHG emissions data are particularly inconsistent, of 
poor quality and with no common baseline.160  
The Global Protocol for Community Scale GHG 
Emissions (GPC), an initiative to move towards a 
standard for city-level GHG accounting developed 
by ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability), the 
World Resources Institute and C40, and supported by 
the World Bank, UN-Habitat and UNEP, is helping to 
address this problem.161 
5. Building capacity to scale public-private 
partnerships: Many city authorities do not have 
sufficient capacity or skills to identify and structure 
the right kinds of public-private partnerships required 
to plan, design, finance and deliver large-scale urban 
infrastructure. New models of engagement with the 
private sector can help cities to build that capacity. 
Examples include the 2030 Districts model in the US 
and Canada, and those spearheaded by the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development 
through its Urban Infrastructure Initiative (UII). The 
2030 Districts are urban public-private partnerships 
that bring together property owners, municipal 
governments and community stakeholders to ensure 
significant district energy, water and transportation 
emissions reductions and resiliency upgrades. There 
are six established Districts in major US cities (Seattle, 
Denver, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, San Antonio and 
Cleveland), with 12 additional Districts in various 
advanced stages of development. The UII initiative 
brought together 14 world-leading companies in 
partnership with ICLEI and the Urban Land Institute 
to support 12 developed- and developing-world 
cities with new urban solutions. In Yixing (China), for 
example, UII recommended approaches for tackling 
urban sprawl, and the development of a citywide tram 
network is now being fast-tracked. 
The next 10 to 20 years will be pivotal in the world’s 
urbanisation journey. Building better, more productive 
cities could make all the difference for middle-income 
countries looking to become high-income, and for low-
income countries looking to graduate to middle-income. 
Building better, more productive cities will also be crucial 
for the global climate. The measures identified in this 
chapter can support significant improvements in the 
economic and climate performance of cities and sow 
the seeds for unleashing a new wave of long-term urban 
productivity improvements by encouraging more compact, 
connected and coordinated urban development.
6. Recommendations 
A strategic approach to managing urban 
growth at the national level
Countries need to prioritise better planned urban 
development and increased urban productivity as key 
drivers of growth and climate goals. This is especially the 
case for countries with rapidly urbanising populations. 
Current institutional arrangements often result in urban 
development being driven by other national priorities. 
Here, coordination and cooperation between national and 
regional governments and city leaders is essential. The 
Commission urges countries to: 
• Develop national urbanisation strategies in 
conjunction with city governments, with cross-
departmental representation and assigned budgets, 
overseen by the centre of government and/or 
Ministry of Finance.
• Provide greater fiscal autonomy for cities, 
potentially linked to economic, social and 
environmental performance benchmarks.
• Consider setting up a special-purpose  
financing vehicle at the national level to support 
cities to become more compact, connected  
and coordinated, with appropriate  
private-sector participation. 
• Redirect existing infrastructure funding towards 
more compact, connected and coordinated urban 
infrastructure development, including existing 
national urban infrastructure funds and other 
relevant funding vehicles. 
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 The role of the international community
The international community also has a key role to play in 
fostering better-managed urban growth. The Commission 
urges the international community to:
• Develop a Global Urban Productivity Initiative 
to promote and assist in the development of best 
practices in boosting urban productivity and  
support countries’ and cities’ own efforts. The 
initiative should: 
• Build on the existing work of the OECD,  
UN-HABITAT, the World Bank, Regional 
Development Banks, and city networks such as 
the C40 and ICLEI;
• Involve rapidly urbanising countries and mayors of 
leading cities; 
• Include a global leadership group of CEOs of 
leading businesses already helping cities to plan, 
finance and deliver smarter urban infrastructure 
and integrated technology solutions.
This initiative should review institutional options 
for systematic collection of city-level data; develop 
urbanisation scenarios and best practice guidance; 
create an international standard for integrated 
municipal accounting, and provide targeted capacity-
building. It should also give priority to educating the 
next generation of urban planners and designers – 
as well as economists in key ministries – about the 
benefits of compact, connected and coordinated 
urban development. 
• Set up a global city creditworthiness facility to help 
cities develop strategies to improve their “own 
source” revenues and, where sovereign governments 
allow it, increase their access to private capital 
markets. This should build on and scale-up the existing 
programme of the World Bank, and assist cities in 
both developing and developed countries.  
• Effective immediately, ensure that the multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) work with client and 
donor countries to redirect overseas development 
assistance and concessional finance away 
from investments which lock in unstructured, 
unconnected urban expansion. Investment should 
support integrated citywide urban strategies and 
investment in smarter infrastructure and new 
technology. Greater consideration should also be 
given to redirecting overall MDB funding to account 
for the growing importance of cities in economic 
development in rapidly urbanising countries, as well 
as the scaling-up of support to help cities prepare and 
package urban infrastructure investments. 
Stronger policies and institutions to drive 
compact, connected and coordinated  
urban development 
Building better, more productive cities is a long-term 
journey. It requires persistence in several key areas to 
shift away from business-as-usual urban expansion, 
with countries, regions and cities working together. In 
addition to short-term measures and investments to boost 
resource productivity in sectors as diverse as buildings, 
transport and efficient waste management, priority areas 
for structural transformation include:
• Strengthen strategic planning at the city, regional 
and national levels, with a focus on improved 
land use and integrated multi-modal transport 
infrastructure. These efforts should be supported by 
regulatory reform to promote higher-density, mixed-
use, infill development, and new measures such as 
efficient parking practices. 
• Reform fuel subsidies and introduce new pricing 
mechanisms such as road user charges to reduce 
and eventually eliminate incentives to fossil-fuelled 
vehicle use. Also consider charges on land conversion 
and dispersed development, and measures that place 
a higher price on land than on buildings such as land 
taxes and development taxes. These reforms can 
raise revenue to invest in public transport and transit-
oriented development. 
• Introduce new mechanisms to finance upfront 
investments in smarter urban infrastructure and 
new technology. These may include greater use of 
land value capture mechanisms, municipal bonds, and 
the creation of dedicated national, regional, or city-
level investment platforms to prepare and package 
investments to attract private-sector capital. 
• Build more effective and accountable city-level 
institutions. Key measures include: (i) setting up 
integrated transport and land use authorities to  
plan urban growth and scale public transport,  
cycling, walking and spatially efficient use of low-
carbon vehicles; (ii) working with the private sector  
to plan, finance and deliver smarter infrastructure  
and integrated technology solutions; and  
(iii) making enhanced use of ICT and  
e-government practices.
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Chapter 3
LAND USE
Main points
• Rapid population growth, urbanisation, rising incomes, and resource constraints are putting enormous pressure 
on agriculture and forests, which are crucial to food security and livelihoods. Agriculture and land use change also 
account for 24% of global greenhouse gas emissions. These factors, together with attractive opportunities to boost 
investment in well-managed land use systems, make agriculture a top-priority sector for both economic and climate 
policy, particularly in developing countries. 
• Agricultural productivity needs to sharply increase to keep up with food demand. The Green Revolution boosted 
grain yields through widely applicable technological improvements, but many of the measures needed today are 
location-specific, addressing issues such as drought, pests, and salt resistance. Public funding of R&D needs to 
increase substantially; reducing input subsidies (mainly for fertiliser and water) would free up funds while reducing 
waste and negative environmental impacts. 
• Policy interventions are needed to enable and encourage smallholders to adopt new technologies and practices 
under more uncertain conditions. Measures to consider include targeted climate change adaptation finance, 
agricultural insurance schemes, and more secure property rights. Landscape-level (vs. farm-level) approaches are 
needed to maintain ecosystem services and overcome market failures. 
• Demand-side measures are also needed to reduce pressure on agricultural systems. On a caloric basis, a quarter 
of the world’s food is now lost or wasted between farm and fork. For example, food waste reduction measures in 
developed countries could save US$200 billion per year by 2030, and reduce emissions by at least 0.3 Gt of CO
2
e. 
Policy-makers should also work to reduce demand for food crops for biofuels and promote a shift in diets, away from 
red meat especially. 
• Special measures are necessary to prevent further deforestation and degradation of (mainly tropical) forests, 
especially when promoting increased agricultural productivity. Achieving zero net deforestation could result in 
emissions reductions of around 3 Gt CO
2
e per year in 2030. Payments for ecosystem services, such as under 
REDD+, can play a key role in this. Private-sector engagement could also play a significant role. 
• Restoring just 12% of degraded agricultural land could boost smallholders’ incomes by US$35–40 billion per year 
and feed 200 million people per year within 15 years. It can also increase resilience to weather shocks and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by nearly 2 Gt CO
2
e per year. Initiating forest restoration of at least 350 million hectares 
by 2030, meanwhile, could generate US$170 billion/year in net benefits from watershed protection, improved crop 
yields, and forest products. This would also sequester about 1–3 Gt CO
2
e/year, depending on the areas restored.
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We begin by examining the changing context for 
agriculture and forestry, including population growth, 
resource scarcity, and the need to both mitigate and adapt 
to climate change. We then review supply-side strategies 
to increase agricultural productivity, including new 
technologies and practices to increase crop yields, the role 
of input subsidies and other policy measures, sustainable 
ways to increase livestock productivity, and “landscape 
approaches” that boost crop yields while restoring and 
protecting key ecosystem services. Next, we look at 
demand-side measures to ease pressures on natural 
resources, including ways to reduce food loss and waste, 
alternate approaches to biofuels, and the role of dietary 
changes. We then examine the natural capital of forests, 
trends in deforestation, forest degradation, afforestation, 
and reforestation, and ways to scale up and accelerate 
positive change. Throughout the chapter, we draw lessons 
from success stories around the world: from Korea, to 
China, Niger, Brazil, Costa Rica and the United States. 
We end with a series of recommendations. For further 
discussion of some of these issues, see also Chapter 7: 
Innovation (biofuels) and Chapter 3: Cities (urban land 
use), as well as sections of Chapter 6: Finance and Chapter 
8: International Cooperation.
2. The changing context 
With the global population expected to grow by 1.2 billion 
by 2030, and the global middle class set to roughly double 
by 2030 from 2 billion today, pressures are increasing on 
food supplies and the underlying natural resource base.5  
Although the share of people living in extreme poverty has 
been cut in half since 1990, from 43% to 21%,6  more than 
1.2 billion people still lived on less than US$1.25 (2005$) 
in 2010, and more than 840 million went hungry regularly 
in 2012.7  Figure 1 illustrates the breadth of global food 
insecurity in 2012.
Much of the progress we have made since the period of 
catastrophic famines in Asia and Africa in the 1970s and 
earlier8  is due to extraordinary increases in agricultural 
productivity, driven by the “Green Revolution”, a 
concerted, multi-decade effort to modernise farming in 
the developing world. High-yield varieties of rice, wheat 
and maize were developed and widely distributed, and 
the use of agricultural inputs (irrigation water, fertilisers) 
sharply increased. Across Asia, average rice yields nearly 
doubled, and wheat yields nearly tripled.9  
Yet far more growth is needed. To feed a growing and 
richer population by 2050, 70% more crop calories than 
those produced in 2006 will be needed, primarily due 
to changes in the developing world, including dietary 
change.10  The developing world is where more than 
80% of the global demand growth for field crops, fibre 
and beverage crops, meat, and forest products, including 
timber, will occur over the next 15 years.11  Meeting this 
1. Introduction
Global demand for agricultural and forestry commodities – 
food, fuel, fibre, etc. – continues to surge, driven primarily 
by emerging and developing economies. This can be very 
good news for countries with abundant land and water. 
It provides considerable added potential for economic 
growth and poverty alleviation: 70% of the world’s poorest 
people live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for 
their livelihoods, mostly in the tropics.1  At the same time, 
it can be very worrisome for those who need to purchase 
their food, especially in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, 
where 40–70% of all household expenditure is on food.2  
Agricultural and natural resource commodities have risen in 
value substantially in recent years, and there is also a growing 
recognition of the importance of the ecosystem services 
that forests and agricultural land provide, such as local and 
global weather and water regulation, carbon storage, and 
biodiversity. Yet around the world, ecosystems are under 
pressure from over-exploitation of key natural resources 
such as freshwater and soil nutrients. 
Forest degradation and deforestation are particular 
concerns, especially in the humid tropics. Roughly 
a quarter of the world’s agricultural land is severely 
degraded,3  and rapid urbanisation and population growth 
are also driving people to clear more forest land for timber 
and charcoal, and then use the land for crops and pasture, 
or for larger-scale agriculture.4  Inadequate soil and 
water management is exacerbated by loss of vegetative 
cover, and leads to water and air pollution, as well as 
erosion and landslides. Key ecosystem services such as 
water cycle regulation are being compromised, and the 
natural resource base is becoming less productive. At the 
same time, climate change is already posing significant 
challenges, increasing both flood and drought risk in many 
places, and altering hydrological systems and seasonal 
weather patterns.
This chapter makes the case for strategic investment 
and policy interventions to sharply increase agricultural 
productivity, reduce pressures on the land, and protect 
and restore forests. For developing countries, especially, 
the stakes are very high: if they succeed, they can grow 
their rural economies, lift people out of poverty, and 
strengthen their position in global markets – while also 
helping reduce climate risk and protect vital ecosystem 
services. If they fail, billions of their people may be unable 
to feed themselves adequately. 
To feed a growing & richer 
population by 2050, 70% more 
crop calories will be needed than 
those produced in 2006.
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Figure 1:
The distribution of global food insecurity in 2012
new demand will create huge opportunities for businesses 
– from small local firms, to multinationals. 
 
Agriculture already plays a key role in many developing 
countries’ economies. The World Bank found that in 
countries in the $400-1,800 per capita GDP range 
(2005$), many of them in Asia, agriculture was 20% of 
GDP on average; in sub-Saharan Africa, it was 34%, and 
accounted for almost two-thirds of employment and a 
third of GDP growth in 1993–2005.12  Agricultural exports 
can provide crucial revenue to support development in 
poor countries, and they remain important even for large 
economies, from Indonesia, to Brazil, to the US. 
 
Agricultural growth could come at a steep price, however. 
The global agricultural land area (including permanent 
pastures) grew by about 10% – 477 million hectares 
(ha) – over the last 50 years,14  expanding into savannahs, 
prairies and forests. Tropical forests have been particularly 
hard-hit, losing carbon storage equivalent to 15% of 
global greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 2010.15  
Vital ecosystem services – water and air purification, 
flood protection, biodiversity, etc. – have also been 
compromised. And in some regions, there is little land 
left that is suitable for agricultural expansion. Water is a 
Source: Maplecroft’s Food Security Risk Index 2013.13  The Food Security Risk Index has been developed for governments, NGOs and busi-
nesses to use to identify countries that may be susceptible to famine and social unrest stemming from food shortages and price fluctuations. 
Maplecroft reaches its results by evaluating the availability, access to and stability of food supplies in 197 countries, as well as the nutritional 
and health status of populations.
particular concern; the United Nations projects that half 
the global population will be living in areas of high water 
stress by 2030.16  Climate change will further exacerbate 
these challenges (see Box 1). 
Agriculture, forestry and other land use are themselves 
major producers of GHG emissions, accounting for a 
quarter of total global GHGs in 2010.17  Emissions from 
agriculture include methane from livestock, nitrous 
oxide from fertiliser use, and carbon dioxide (CO
2
) from 
tractors and fertiliser production (see Figure 2). As noted 
above, agricultural expansion is also a major driver of 
land use change, in particular through deforestation. It 
is estimated that deforestation and forest degradation 
were responsible for 11% of total global GHG emissions 
net of reforestation; if reforestation and afforestation 
are excluded, the impact rises to nearly 20% global GHG 
emissions.18  Annual net deforestation was 5.2 million 
ha per year over 2000-2010.19  Between 2000 and 
2010, the world lost an average of 13 million ha of forest 
(gross) each year to deforestation, or 5.2 million ha net of 
reforestation and afforestation.20 
Agriculture, forestry and land use issues differ by 
geographic region. Farmers and forest-dependent people 
Low Risk
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Medium Risk
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High Risk
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0.0 – 2.5 No Data
Afghanistan
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in higher-income countries, for example, typically have 
access to sophisticated insurance mechanisms, good 
infrastructure, supportive government institutions, 
investments, and policies informed by data. They are a 
small part of highly diversified economies with ample 
opportunities beside farming or forestry. Adapting to 
climate change and building resilience will not always be 
easy, but they have plenty of support and resources.  
The same is true of a growing number of rural people  
in the emerging economies of Eastern Europe, Asia  
and Latin America.
In much of Africa, large parts of South Asia, and significant 
pockets elsewhere, the majority of the population are 
smallholder farmers or forest-dependent people living at 
the economic margin. In sub-Saharan Africa (excepting 
South Africa), 20% of people live on less than US$1.25 
a day and fewer than 10% have access to any form of 
insurance; in more than half of these countries, formal 
crop insurance policies are not available at all.23  Combined 
with above average climate variability and below-average 
infrastructure, these factors can make both farmers 
and governments highly risk-averse, hindering rural 
development. Short-term food security takes priority over 
investments that would bring higher and more sustainable 
growth over the longer term. Climate change exacerbates 
the problem.24 
Dealing with climate change in places with concentrations 
of rural poor will require programmatic approaches at 
scale that lower the risks for smallholder farmers and 
forest dwellers who pursue economic opportunities – for 
example, by engaging with markets instead of focusing 
only on subsistence food production. Some of these 
measures can produce “triple wins” of higher productivity, 
greater resilience, and increased carbon sequestration, as 
will be discussed later in the chapter. They require tailored 
institutions and safety nets, however, appropriate for low-
income, low-density, and low-infrastructure conditions. 
In many cases, it will be necessary to pool risks and 
financing with entities outside the local farm and forest 
systems involved, as risks are typically highly covariate 
over large distances and local resources are meagre. 
Several African countries, such as Ethiopia and Mali, have 
done a tremendous amount using their own national 
resources, but an adequate response will require 
substantial external finance. Across Africa, the need for 
agricultural adaptation finance is estimated at US$10 
billion or more per year.25  For context, bilateral aid by 
OECD members to Africa in 2012 for adaptation in all 
sectors was US$1.6 billion, and the five largest multilateral 
funds specialising in adaptation finance have disbursed 
US$40 million per year for agriculture in Africa over the 
last 10 years.26  Funding needs in the Asia and Pacific 
region for adaptation in agriculture were estimated by the 
Asian Development Bank at US$3.5 billion in 2009.27 
There are clearly compelling reasons to invest  
strategically in the agriculture and forestry sectors, 
particularly in developing countries. The sections that 
follow explore a number of opportunities to boost 
agricultural outputs. Many of these measures would 
also ease pressures on natural resources, reduce GHG 
emissions and make farming systems more resilient  
in a changing climate.
Climate change will have significant adverse effects on 
crop yields, livestock health and tree growth due to higher 
temperatures, extended heat waves, flooding, shifting 
precipitation patterns, and spreading habitats for pests 
(such as flies and mosquitos) and diseases (such as wheat 
and coffee rusts) that can follow even small increases in 
heat and humidity. Without adaptation, yields of the main 
cereals in developing countries are expected to be 10% 
lower by 2050 than they would have been without climate 
change. Water stress on cropping, already substantial  
in some areas, is likely to increase due to growing  
water scarcity. 
Both world population and average global cereals yields 
have exhibited fairly constant annual increments in 
absolute terms since 1980, which translates to a decreasing 
growth rate in percentage terms. Average annual 
percentage growth of world population and world cereals 
yields between 2010 and 2030 are projected to be about 
0.7% per year for cereals yields in the absence of climate 
Box 1:
The impacts of a changing climate on agriculture and food security21
change, and population at 0.8% per year (U.N. medium 
variant). Even without climate change, global per capita 
cereal availability at projected yield growth rates will fall 
unless agricultural land expansion grows. With growing 
non-food demands for cereals and climate change, the 
pressures on land will be much worse.
A range of macroeconomic modelling studies suggest 
that the primary impact of climate change will be on the 
poor in tropical countries, mainly through decreased local 
food supply and higher food prices. The most significant 
impacts are projected for Africa and South Asia, where 
poverty is highest, agriculture accounts for a large share 
of employment and GDP, and adaptation investment per 
capita is low. But significant parts of other regions will also 
be affected. Generally, the lower the capacity of people to 
adapt to climate shocks, the larger the negative impacts. 
Fears of such impacts can lead to excessive risk aversion, 
which can keep both people and regions locked into 
patterns of poverty and resource degradation.
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Figure 2:
Global AFOLU greenhouse gas emissions by sub-sector (2010)
Source: World Resources Institute analysis based on UNEP, 2012; FAO, 2012; EIA, 2012; IEA, 2012; and Houghton, 2008,  
with adjustments.22
3. Supply-side measures in 
agriculture
3.1 Increase crop yields
The Green Revolution has transformed agriculture around 
the world, but many farms in the developing world are still 
operating well below their economic potential. If we are to 
launch a second Green Revolution, however, it will need to 
address the extra constraints imposed by a degrading land 
base, water scarcity, and other drought- and heat-related 
issues. Often the problems will be very location-specific, 
such as increasing salinity from waterlogging or ocean 
intrusion, or particular pests or plant or animal diseases. 
Success can have major impacts on regional development 
and land use change, as shown in Box 2 for soybean 
development in the Brazilian Cerrado.
Globally and in specific regions, rapid advances in 
biological sciences are opening up great possibilities 
for developing new, more productive and resilient crop 
varieties. New technologies are making it possible to 
quickly screen huge volumes of material for desired traits 
and then to cross-breed them into seeds, revolutionising 
the business.29  Breeders have developed methods for 
mapping and labelling portions of plant DNA associated 
with useful traits such as drought tolerance or pest 
resistance. This permits identification before a plant has 
grown of those seedlings that are most promising for 
further breeding.
Innovation through large global science partnerships can 
help break major barriers to further progress in increasing 
crop yields. An example is “C4 Rice”, a multi-disciplinary, 
multi-centre partnership that hopes to transfer the 
“super charged” C4 two-cell photosynthesis of crops 
such as maize to rice, a single-cell C3 photosynthesis 
crop. If successful, the outcome will be germplasm that 
crop breeders in individual countries can use to develop 
adapted varieties that greatly boost yields and reduce 
water and fertiliser needs.30 
A key collaboration focused on tropical food crops is 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR), a US$1 billion-a-year global 
agricultural research partnership involving 15 research 
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centres. CGIAR centres were instrumental in the original 
Green Revolution. They bring together high-level scientific 
capacity, significant funding, and institutional memory 
on developing-country agriculture and natural resource 
management. This enables them to provide farmers with 
vital science and technology support.
For example, CGIAR’s International Rice Research 
Institute developed a variety of rice (known as “Scuba 
rice” or, formally, “Sub-1”) that can withstand submersion 
in water, a common situation as floods are increasing in 
rice-growing regions of South and Southeast Asia. The 
variety was introduced in India in 2008 after 10 years of 
development, and 5 million farmers in the region have  
now adopted Sub-1 varieties.31  Similar innovations could 
be invaluable in addressing other major challenges, such  
as saltwater intrusions in the great river deltas of 
Southeast Asia.32  
Improved agricultural practices are also increasing crop 
yields. For example, scientists have known for many years 
that paddy rice yields in the tropics can be increased by 
alternately wetting and drying the crop in key periods 
during the growing season.33  A formalisation of these soil, 
water and nutrient management principles was developed 
The Cerrado biome of central Brazil was traditionally 
considered unfit for large-scale agriculture due to its 
poor, acidic soils. The Brazilian agricultural innovation 
system developed soybean varieties resistant to 
aluminium and to the tropical climate in the 1960s and 
1970s. The new varieties could achieve yields two or 
three times larger than those in southern Brazil. 
Cultivation of soybeans in central Brazil soared after 
1970, leading to a roughly 40% increase in labour and 
land productivity in the region from 1970 to 1985. It 
induced shifts in land use from pasture to crops, and 
linked the region to international markets at a time 
when global demand for soybeans was growing rapidly. 
The new technologies required more skilled labour, 
requiring intensive use of fertilisers and mechanisation. 
This accounted for 30% of the increase in educational 
attainment in the region from 1970 to 1991, through 
both local knowledge transfer and in-migration. 
On the flip side, the first official Brazilian government 
survey of the state of the Cerrado using satellite imagery 
found that some 47% of the natural vegetation had been 
lost by 2008. This inevitably has serious consequences 
for loss of carbon and biodiversity from a places in the 
world that has traditionally been considered highly 
biodiverse and carbon-intense. There is no free lunch.
Box 2:
Technological change in crops leading 
regional development: soybeans in the 
Brazilian Cerrado28
in Madagascar in the early 1980s, called the System of 
Rice Intensification (SRI). Along with alternate wetting 
and drying, it includes reducing seeds used per unit area, 
reducing synthetic fertiliser input, and applying organic 
manures instead. The practice seems to have worked well 
in Madagascar, and by 2011, it was also reportedly used in 
1 million farms in Vietnam, with average yield increases of 
9–15%, and reductions in inorganic fertiliser use of 25% 
and water of 33%.34 
SRI is very labour-intensive, however, and requires precise 
knowledge and timing, as well as reliable water access on 
demand. It is also likely that SRI is only suited to specific 
locations, so the opportunities for scaling it may be 
limited.35 This and Scuba rice are examples of how the next 
Green Revolution is likely to require more location-specific 
approaches than the original Green Revolution. This 
will place even heavier demands on national agricultural 
innovation systems for varietal development, capacity-
building, and communication with farmers.
The potential economic benefits, however, are substantial. 
For example, achieving a 10% yield increase (well within 
historical experience) from a new technology or practice 
on half of all rice fields could add about US$10 billion/
year to farm incomes in current prices and yields by 2030, 
mostly on small farms and in Asia.36  Similarly, since rice 
production now accounts for an estimated 28% of all 
freshwater use by humans, a one-third savings on farm 
water use (if it were possible) on 50% of all rice area could 
free up the equivalent of 7% of total agricultural water use 
or 4–5% of global freshwater currently used for  
all purposes.37 
With some crops, such as maize and wheat, the private 
sector may play an important role in innovation, as there 
is a market for hybrid seed, and research on these crops 
may also have more global (rather than region-specific) 
applications. However the returns to deploying new 
technologies on the small farms that predominate in most 
of Africa and Asia are low, and access to credit is often 
difficult. Thus there is also a need for public support for 
scaling-up these commercially viable technologies in 
some regions or with some farms. For the major cereals, 
research programmes supported by the CGIAR are 
critical, especially as traits that will enable adaptation to 
climate change are added to those being sought. 
In 2008, governments only 
spent US$32 billion globally 
on agricultural R&D; private-
sector funding added another 
US$18 billion
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Public-sector support is also crucial, particularly for rice 
and various “orphan crops” – some starchy root crops, 
vegetables, legumes, and other crops of little global 
market value. Yet in 2008, governments only spent 
US$32 billion globally – including US$15.6 billion (2005 
PPP) in developing and emerging economies. Private-
sector funding added another US$18 billion (2005 PPP), 
primarily in developed countries, according to a global 
assessment for 2008 done in 2012.38  Investment levels 
have increased since the global food crisis of 2008; 
although there is no comprehensive estimate, trend 
growth in CGIAR funding and in a few major countries, 
such as China, public spending in 2014 is likely to be 
closer to US$20 billion.39  To put this in context, OECD 
governments provided US$259 billion in support to 
farmers in their own countries in 2012.40  Agricultural 
R&D accounts for only 3% of public R&D in advanced 
economies, much less than allocated to sectors such  
as energy (4.2%), industrial production (6.3%), and  
defence (24.9%).41  
The returns on agricultural R&D can be substantial. An 
independent meta-evaluation of CGIAR-financed food 
crop research in developing countries from 1971 to 
2007, worth US$7 billion in 1990 prices, found it had 
“significantly demonstrated and empirically attributed” 
minimum benefit-cost ratios of 2:1, and “plausible 
extrapolated” benefits of up to 17:1 overall.42  There is 
considerable scope to increase funding for agricultural 
R&D to increase productivity and resilience, whether 
through multilateral, regional or national institutions. 
Large countries can plausibly operate large fully integrated 
agricultural research systems, as do Brazil, China 
and India. Smaller countries need to find and nurture 
opportunities for regional and international collaboration. 
Innovation will remain central to solving the increasingly 
complex issues involved. And there is a continuing need for 
public support to upstream agricultural R&D of relevance 
to developing countries. CGIAR is a critical institution in 
this regard, coordinating efforts across more than three 
dozen donors, targeting priorities, avoiding needless 
duplication, and maximising synergies.43
3.2 Shift input subsidies to delivery  
of public goods
Many countries subsidise key agricultural inputs – 
irrigation water, fertiliser, etc. – in an effort to boost 
productivity, but a growing body of evidence suggests 
these subsidies can also lead to waste and environmental 
damage. Policy changes could increase the efficiency 
of agricultural production and reduce GHG emissions. 
For example, while synthetic fertilisers are critical to 
agricultural intensification, they are also subject to 
overuse, particularly when subsidised, degrading the 
resource base. In 2010, synthetic fertiliser use also 
accounted for nearly 1.3 Gt CO
2
e of emissions, and this 
figure is growing.44  
In China, a life-cycle assessment of fertiliser use in 2013 
found that nitrogenous fertiliser-related emissions, 
including the energy used to produce fertilisers, 
accounted for 7% of total GHG emissions. For every 
tonne of N-fertiliser produced and used in China, 13.5 
tonnes of CO
2
e ends up being emitted (rather than 
absorbed through crop production), compared with 9.7 
tonnes of CO
2
e in Europe. The study found that reducing 
over-application of fertilisers, combined with better 
water management, could reduce Chinese national 
GHG emissions by 2% or more, without any loss of food 
output.45  Yet in 2012, agricultural subsidies in China 
rose to US$73 billion, or 9% of agricultural output; at 
least US$18 billion of these are payments based on input 
use.46  India provided roughly US$28 billion in input 
subsidies to nitrogenous fertilisers and electricity for 
pumping agricultural water in 2010.47  Input subsidies are 
also common in industrialised countries: OECD country 
governments paid farmers US$32 billion based on input 
use in 2012.48 
Phasing out input subsidies would incentivise better, 
more targeted input use, reducing associated pollution 
and GHG emissions and saving farmers money, since 
they pay for inputs even if they are subsidised. Potential 
GHG emission reductions of 200 million tonnes of CO
2
e 
per year have been estimated from more efficient use 
of fertilisers in China alone49  and close to 100 million 
tonnes of CO
2
e per year from more efficient use of water 
in India.50  Further benefits could be achieved if funds 
now spent on these subsidies were redirected to support 
underfunded public goods such as research and extension; 
however, such support has shrunk in recent years, even as 
subsidies for private goods such as fertiliser  
have expanded.51  
The situation in sub-Saharan Africa is different, however. 
There, synthetic fertiliser use in 2013 was estimated 
at 9-10 kg/ha, compared with an average of 150 kg/ha 
in Asia.52  Only about 6% of the crop area in Africa was 
irrigated in 2011, compared with 48% in Asia.53  A number 
of countries in Africa have subsidised fertiliser in an 
attempt to increase usage, and this can help under some 
conditions, where use is limited by volatile international 
fertiliser prices, low commercial development, thin input 
markets, lack of knowledge, illiquidity, etc., and there 
are clear exit strategies.54  However, the same analysis 
In 2012, agricultural subsidies 
in China rose to US$73 billion, 
or 9% of farm output; at least 
US$18 billion were payments 
based on input use.
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also suggests that the reasons for low usage are often 
more complex than temporarily high purchase prices or 
missing financing that might be addressed by subsidies, 
and that the opportunity cost of subsidies can be large, as 
other investments might better address the underlying 
problems. 
3.3 Increase livestock productivity
Robust and growing demand for meat and milk, with 
modest price increases, create significant opportunities for 
producers who can access the relevant markets, including 
low-income rural people who raise livestock.55  Global 
meat consumption grew at 2.3% per year from 2004 to 
2013, and is projected by Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to rise by 1.6% per year 
from 2014 to 2023, in a context of continued high prices 
resulting from rapid growth in Asian demand and negative 
disease, feed and other production cost impacts on the 
supply of US beef and pork.56  Even with the rise of large-
scale livestock operations in many developing countries, 
rapidly rising domestic demand can also benefit local 
small-scale producers, who may work together with larger 
formal sector producers or processors.57  
However, the livestock sector is subject to the same 
“resource crunch” affecting crop production and forests. 
The supply of grain-fed meat and milk rose rapidly over 
in the two decades up to 2008, as global livestock prices 
were rising relative to feed costs, due primarily to rapid 
growth in Asian demand for meat and milk.58  Going 
forward for the next decade or so, livestock prices (and 
cattle prices in particular) are likely to continue to rise, 
although there is more uncertainty around future feed 
costs. 59 Livestock farming is also currently responsible for 
more than half of direct agricultural emissions (excluding 
land use change), and over 7% of total global GHGs (see 
Figure 2). Roughly four-fifths of livestock emissions are 
associated with ruminants such as cattle, water buffalo, 
sheep and goats.60  
There are four significant pathways for achieving 
economic growth from livestock production. The first 
three also have the benefit of mitigating GHG emissions. 
The fourth mitigates livestock emissions only if it is 
combined with one of the first three. 
1. Promoting more efficient beef and dairy production to 
meet growing demand for beef and milk will increase incomes 
and use fewer resources per unit of output to produce it. 
There is an important and scalable opportunity for 
increasing the productivity of cattle and dairy operations 
on large areas of pasture in Latin America, especially 
Brazil, where pasture productivity is estimated to be 
currently only at one-third of potential.61  There are also 
large variations in the efficiency of pasture use across 
farms within ecological regions of Brazil – in fact, larger 
on average than between regions.62  Treating pasture with 
lime and fertiliser, introducing improved grass, legumes, 
and leguminous shrubs, improving health care, and adding 
shade trees could boost productivity to at least half of 
potential, enabling a 50% increase in cattle exports.63  
These technologies will have considerable latitude to 
spread as beef continues to rise in price. However, it will 
also be critical to ensure that any adjacent common land 
is not illegally cleared for beef as a result of increased 
profitability.64  This pathway would also decrease GHG 
emissions per unit if pursued in conjunction with the 
second pathway.
2. There is significant scope for reducing per unit ruminant 
emissions while improving efficiency of production. 
There are already large differences across regions: a 
kilogram of beef produced in Eastern Europe generates 
14 kg of CO
2
e GHG emissions on average, compared 
with 77 kg in South Asia and 29 kg in North America.65  
Within individual regions and farming systems, it has been 
estimated that if the bottom 75% of producers in terms 
of GHGs adopted the practices of the top 25%, global 
GHGs could be lowered by 0.2–1 billion tonnes of CO
2
e, 
depending on the price of carbon.66  There are several 
existing options for improving the quality and digestibility 
of forages and fodder, reducing emissions of enteric 
methane and improving daily weight gains, so animals can 
be brought to market sooner. Technologies with the most 
potential are feed additives, forage management (including 
new introductions and rotational grazing), increased 
efficiency in the age structure of herds, and breeding. 
Adopting these measures and learning from higher 
performers is in farmers’ own financial interest, but 
effecting change will require building knowledge among 
farmers, helping them secure finance for upfront 
investment costs, and overcoming risk aversion. 
Forthcoming work by the FAO suggests that at least 150 
million tonnes CO
2
e of annual livestock emissions can 
be abated without compensating producers, and that a 
further 100 million tonnes of reductions could be induced 
by paying farmers US$20 per tonne of CO
2
e.67
3. Increased efficiency in producing pork, poultry and eggs 
would save resources and help shift relative price incentives 
to favour less GHG-intensive meats. 
Pork and poultry are less GHG-intensive than beef 
and mutton, and lower prices and higher quality could 
encourage a shift in consumer demand.68  The “Livestock 
Revolution” of the 1980s and 1990s mostly transferred 
industrial-grade pig and poultry production systems and 
genetics from the US and Europe to developing countries 
through private-sector investments; the latter were made 
profitable by rapidly rising local demand and relatively 
cheap feed grains. This also helped shift meat consumption 
in developing countries in relative terms, to a larger share 
of grain-fed poultry and pork instead of grass-fed mutton 
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and beef.69  There is scope to further reduce supply-chain 
transaction costs to increase productivity and facilitate 
market access for pork, poultry, eggs, and other lower-
GHG animal protein sources. 
Vertical integration in particular allows a measure of 
branding; confidence in the genetics of the animals, 
feeds and hygienic practices (typically supplied by 
the contracting organisation), trust-building through 
contractual relations, and enforcement. For pork, 
poultry and eggs, the usual solution is contract farming.70  
Contract farming for poultry and eggs is now pervasive 
in the US, Latin America and Asia and is being spread to 
Africa.71  Spreading this further could lead to better access 
to markets for smallholders and more efficient, lower-cost 
production. World meat production in 2013 is estimated 
at 308 million tonnes, of which 22% is bovine meat and 4% 
is ovine.72  If 50% of bovine and ovine meat consumption 
switched to poultry on a kg by kg basis by 2030, a net 
emission savings of 0.9 Gt of CO2e could be achieved.73 
4. Producers in emerging and developing economies would 
benefit from being able to sell livestock products to high-
value markets through one of the major multinational 
groups, particularly given the concentration of the global 
meat industry in recent years. 
If these multinational enterprises emphasise reducing the 
GHG emissions associated with their meat sourcing, as 
seems likely to happen, countries that wish to benefit from 
this growth pathway will also have an additional incentive 
to pursue the first three. 
A trend is emerging where developing countries can 
add value to livestock production by developing the 
sanitary and environmental credentials needed to attract 
both orders and investment from major international 
firms. Only one-tenth of meat production is traded 
internationally by weight, compared with more than one-
third of even more perishable fish.74  This is largely due to 
the sanitary (distinct from food safety) issues discussed  
in Box 3. 
Meat trade has nonetheless grown by 40% in the last 
decade,75  and pressures are building for changes in both 
technologies for disease control and regulations. At 
the same time, the global meat industry is increasingly 
concentrated: the top 10 meat-centred multinationals had 
revenues approaching US$200 billion in 2013.76  Three of 
these were also members of the Consumer Goods Forum 
(CGF), an industry association representing roughly 400 
of the world’s largest retailers, manufacturers, and service 
providers with combined annual sales of €2.5 trillion, with a 
proven interest in promoting food safety and environmental 
sustainability in their supply chains.77  Being a competitive 
supplier to this kind of firm will thus require investments 
in food safety and sustainability, many of which can be 
addressed via the other three pathways discussed above.
A major market barrier, and one that hampers the scale-
up of more efficient production techniques, is the fact 
that globalisation has led to the rapid transmission of 
animal disease across borders. For example, an Indian 
variety of foot-and-mouth disease was associated with 
more than £8 billion in public- and private-sector losses 
in the UK in 2001.78  And of the thousands of diseases 
known to affect humans, about half are thought to 
be transmissible between livestock and humans, or 
“zoonotic”. Well-known examples are avian influenza and 
SARS, but there are many others. 
Disease concerns and associated animal health barriers 
have segmented global meat markets into “disease-free 
without vaccination” and “with vaccination” categories.79  
The latter countries cannot export livestock or livestock 
products to the former countries under current 
regulations, which typically limits exports from developing 
to developed countries and even within groups of 
developed and developing countries. Globalisation of 
markets is creating new pressures to move animals and 
animal products across borders, with new concerns also 
emerging about disease transmission. Climate change 
itself will also help redraw the distribution of diseases 
as fungi, parasites, and insect vectors expand into new 
habitats.
How both the technologies and sanitary regulations 
evolve will determine who benefits from investments in 
disease surveillance and other animal health measures. 
The latter are critical to determining who can meet the 
rising demand for meat products in major markets (for 
example, the US is precluded from shipping beef to China 
as of this writing, and until July, so was Brazil).80 
This is no longer just a matter of interest to traditional 
meat exporters; Indian beef shipments nearly tripled 
between 2008 and 2013, and India is now the world’s 
second largest beef exporter, with a one-fifth global 
market share by weight. India is also the fourth largest 
exporter of eggs. How vaccines are developed for key 
diseases will be critical for determining how markets 
develop. The fact that an animal is vaccinated under 
current technology significantly lowers its potential 
market value in international trade. 
Box 3:
Animal health innovations will 
influence livestock markets in the 
coming years
3.4 Landscape approaches for ensuring 
sustainable water and land for farming  
and people
The next Green Revolution will have to address the 
consequences of the widespread and increasing 
degradation of productive landscapes for agricultural 
productivity and resilience, including the loss of key 
ecosystem services such as clean and abundant fresh 
water and air. The immediate drivers of land degradation 
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are increasing mono-cropping, pollution, nutrient mining, 
uncontrolled grazing and wood-cutting on common areas, 
inappropriate tillage, erosion from rainfall runoff, and 
misapplication of chemicals.81 
Agricultural land degradation is bound up with soil 
structure changes that can affect water retention, 
increase toxicity from salinisation and pollution, and result 
in nutrient depletion. These are very hard to measure 
accurately, but estimates are that about one-quarter of 
agricultural land globally is now severely degraded, unable 
to provide the ecosystem services it once did, including 
growing crops at reasonable levels of productivity for 
the land in question.82  In-depth case studies in China, 
Ethiopia, Mexico, Uganda, Rwanda, Chile, and Indonesia 
estimated declines in overall agricultural productivity due 
to degradation in 2003 to be 3–7%, an order of magnitude 
larger than the estimated cost of remediation.83  
The technologies discussed earlier in this section, such 
as specialised crop breeding and improved management 
practices, can help address land degradation at the farm 
level, as they directly enhance productivity and resilience. 
This “double win” can arise from a seed that promises both 
higher yields and greater drought resistance. But there 
are also practices that add organic matter to the soil and 
control water runoff, jointly improving water retention and 
soil fertility. When these practices involve net additions 
to carbon sequestration in soils and above ground in 
trees, they produce “triple wins” that include mitigation as 
well as increased productivity and resilience. This is the 
essence of “climate-smart agriculture”.84 
Collective action across a rural landscape can also 
be crucial. In many cases, the negative impacts of 
unsustainable practices on one farm can spill over, such 
as when a farmer cuts down the trees at the top of a 
slope, affecting the flow of water to farms at the bottom. 
Conversely, planting trees at the top of the slope could 
achieve “triple wins” at the landscape level, but not fully 
pay off for the farmer who planted them. To encourage 
such actions, there is a need for solid institutions and 
leadership to ensure that losers are compensated, and that 
those who need to take action have incentives to do so.
Many “climate-smart” interventions involve trees – 
planting trees on farmland (for fruit, timber, shade, soil 
improvement, and other purposes), and/or restoring and 
protecting forests around agricultural areas. Trees play a 
crucial role in producing the ecosystem services needed 
for agricultural productivity and resilience, and a growing 
body of agroforestry research and practical experience is 
showing the economic benefits of greater collaboration 
between the agriculture and forestry sectors. Forest 
conservation and restoration will be discussed in greater 
depth in subsequent sections; here we focus on landscape 
approaches that use trees through agroforestry as part 
of an overall strategy to improve agricultural productivity 
and build resilience. Agricultural landscape restoration 
might also include mosaic restoration of forest at the 
top of steep slopes to hold soil, retain water, and provide 
windbreaks; this topic will be dealt with in more detail in 
the forest section.
Niger offers a prime example of a successful landscape-
level intervention combining improved land and water 
management with agroforestry. Roughly 60% of Niger’s 
population lives on less than US$1.25 (2005$) a day, and 
most farms there are very small. Since the 1990s, farmers 
in the Maradi and Zinder regions have interplanted 
nitrogen-fixing trees on cropland, or allowed roots and 
stumps to regenerate, increasing tree and shrub cover 
10- to 20-fold. The strategy has significantly increased 
agricultural productivity on 5 million ha of farmland, and 
helped restore at least 250,000 ha of severely degraded 
land that had been of little use for agriculture or forestry. 
Sustainability also increased, as at least one-quarter of 
producers in the area adopted improved natural resource 
management techniques.85  Biodiversity was expanded and 
soil fertility improved measurably in the entire area. 
Thus, some of the world’s poorest people became 
substantially better off. Recent evaluations have found 
that farmers in the affected regions of Niger now 
regularly produce at least 100 kg/ha more grain than 
previously, other things equal, about 20% of 2010 grain 
yields in the zone,86  and even twice as much as before 
with micro-dosing of fertiliser. Gross real annual income 
in the region has grown by US$1,000 per household for 
over a million households, more than doubling real farm 
incomes and stimulating local non-farm services.87  Yet 
all of this required only modest additional government 
spending or business investment. The main driver was 
revised legislation on tree ownership; giving farmers 
more control of the resource provided them with 
incentives for better care of the trees and sustainable 
partial harvesting of branches, which allowed the trees to 
keep growing. 
Korea, now a developed country, was deeply 
impoverished when it emerged from decades of armed 
struggle and natural resource degradation in the 1950s. 
Great attention was then put on industrial development 
and reforestation, originally for firewood (see Box 6 on 
the latter). Rural economic and social development fell 
A growing body of research 
and practical experience 
shows the economic benefits 
of greater collaboration 
between agriculture 
and forestry.
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behind urban areas, and in the 1970s the government 
launched the highly acclaimed New Village Movement 
(Saemaul Undong), that was to serve elsewhere as a model 
for rural development through village empowerment 
in later years.88  Participation was voluntary, and the 
main intervention was technical training and assistance 
with improving participatory village decision-making 
processes and cooperation in using locally sourced and 
government development monies, with high success 
in boosting village incomes (and carbon sequestration 
through forest restoration) over the years. This was in 
fact a significant contribution to the development of a 
productive landscape approach to dealing with degraded 
soils and degraded forest.89 
The Loess Plateau projects in China are a particularly 
impressive example of collective action to stem and 
reverse land degradation. Deforestation, degradation of 
grasslands, overgrazing and cultivation of marginal land 
had led to huge soil erosion problems in China, reducing 
grain production by an estimated 5.7 million tonnes per 
year in the late 1980s, and increasing flood and landslide 
risks.90  One of the most degraded areas was the Loess 
Plateau, a region of about 640,000 km2 covering four 
of China’s poorest interior provinces and parts of Inner 
Mongolia.91 At the time, the Loess Plateau was a major 
source of air-blown dust in Beijing and silt for the Yellow 
River (almost 1.5 million tonnes per year).92 
 To tackle the challenge, the Chinese Ministry of Water 
Resources and the World Bank worked together to 
produce two watershed rehabilitation projects spanning 
1994 to 2005, and between them mobilised US$298 
million in Bank funds and US$193 million in Chinese 
government funding. The key elements of the projects 
were to halt the activities that led to degradation, in 
particular planting on steep slopes, tree-cutting, and 
free-range grazing of goats, and to actively encourage 
regeneration. Land tenure responsibilities and benefits 
were clarified. Earth-moving equipment was brought 
in to replace the farmers’ hand-dug terraces, which 
crumbled each year, with more stable terraces three 
or four times as wide (6–12 metres). Land that was 
unsuitable for grain production was planted with 
trees or shrubs instead, or allowed to grow wild again, 
resulting in large-scale reforestation and grasslands 
regeneration. To ensure local buy-in and sustainability 
of the projects, farmer groups and county-level 
government entities were fully engaged in decision-
making and implementation.
The World Bank estimates that the projects lifted more 
than 2.5 million people out of poverty and boosted 
incomes from about US$70 to about US$200 per person 
per year through agricultural productivity gains and 
diversification. Per capita grain output rose from 365 kg 
to 591 kg per year, and the employment rate increased,  
from 70% to 87%.93  Water retention was increased, 
making farms more resilient to drought. Soil erosion 
was curbed on 920,000 ha, and soil losses were reduced 
by 60–100 million tonnes per year. Soil carbon storage 
also increased, mostly due to the restoration of forests 
and grassland.94  Moreover, the approaches developed 
through the project have been applied more broadly 
across the Loess Plateau – where, as of 2008, more than 
half the degraded area had been restored – and in the 
Yangtze and Pearl River Basins.95 
Scaling-up landscape approaches to agricultural “triple 
wins” has both technical and resource issues, and 
benefits greatly from having policy-makers being able 
to see impressive changes first-hand. An important 
achievement of the Loess Plateau watershed projects 
was that the Government of China decided to scale up 
some elements nationally. Starting in the Loess Plateau 
itself in 1999 as a flood control measure and then 
nationwide in 2002 as a restoration tool, the Chinese 
national US$40 billion “Grain for Green” programme 
pays farmers for not planting on steep slopes and 
encourages good practice in water and land management. 
Twenty million people are reportedly now affected, with 
the reported payments made during the early years of 
restoration being the cash equivalent of US$500 plus 1.5 
tonnes of physical grain per ha concerned, to compensate 
for lost production until the tree seedlings grew large 
enough to provide income from fruit or branches.96 
Technical estimates suggest that the agroforestry and 
water harvesting approaches that have done so well in 
Niger could be scaled up to cover another 300 million 
ha in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Resources Institute 
estimates that this scale-up could provide 285 million 
people an additional 615 kcal per day per person in the 
zones concerned. It is already starting to occur in the 
Sahel as news of Niger’s success begins to spread.97  
One challenge is the political support that ensures 
stakeholder participation and collaboration, and 
ultimately facilitates funding access. This was vital 
in the Loess Plateau, where winners and losers 
needed to be identified and benefits redistributed 
to overcome resistance to the initiative. Funding for 
integrated landscape investment will also be essential, 
including from the private sector, to achieve the scale 
needed. A recent review supported by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) examined 
29 integrated landscape initiatives and 250 financial 
institutions that support landscape approaches in 
agriculture.98  The review identified finance provided 
by public and private financial actors, from NGOs to 
investment banks. Almost all cases involved public-
private partnerships, and in most cases, the private 
sector recognised that returns would be positive, but 
lower than if social and environmental benefits were 
fully compensated in the marketplace. On the other 
hand, these partnerships created trust and helped firms 
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resolve serious local problems such as upstream water 
pollution by smallholders, which otherwise could affect 
their operations.
The International Platform for Insetting (IPI) was 
pioneered by Vittel in France to try to overcome some 
of the financial and technical knowledge constraints for 
landscape investment in developing countries. It operates 
where there is potential to create significant shared 
value with smallholder farmers through higher-value 
crops such as coffee, cocoa, fruits, flowers and rubber, 
or where there is a need for ecosystem services such as 
clean water. Unlike companies that buy carbon offsets, 
these companies work directly with farmers to integrate 
measures to reduce GHGs or provide ecosystem services 
into their own operations. Projet Pur, an international 
collective based in France, provides implementation 
support to companies in the field.99  The Nestlé example 
above is an IPI “insetting” activity implemented in 
conjunction with Projet Pur. IPI is relatively new, but it  
is already working with five major corporations around  
the world.
4. Demand-side measures
Increasing food security is not just about increasing food 
supply; it is also about reducing inefficient or unnecessary 
demand for food crops and livestock. Three key demand-
side strategies can reduce economic costs while 
benefitting the climate: reducing food loss and waste, 
reducing biofuel demand for food crops, and shifting 
toward more healthy diets.
Sources: Lipinski et al., 2013, and WRAP, 2013.104
Figure 3:
Food loss and waste by region and stage in the supply chain (% of the lost or wasted calories)
Share of total food available that is lost or wasted
Stage in supply chain share of loss
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4.1 Reduce food loss and waste
On a caloric basis, an astounding 24% of all food intended 
for human consumption is lost or wasted between the 
farm and the fork.100  In developed regions, more than half 
of this loss and waste occurs “near the fork”– at market 
or at the point of consumption. Examples include food 
that spills or spoils at market, food that expires while still 
unsold in the store, and cooked food that is not eaten 
in homes or restaurants. In developing regions, about 
two-thirds of this loss and waste occurs “near the farm”– 
during harvest, storage and processing. Examples include 
fruits bruised during picking, and food degraded by pests, 
fungus, or disease (Figure 3). This huge level of inefficiency 
throughout the supply chain carries significant costs. For 
instance, food waste at home and at restaurants costs the 
average household in the UK £700 per year.101  In the US, 
an estimated $161.6 billion worth of food was wasted at 
the retail and consumer levels in 2010.102  Globally, the 
FAO estimates that food worth about US$750 billion is 
lost or wasted annually, based on 2009 producer prices.103
This inefficiency has significant social and environmental 
impacts as well. It exacerbates food insecurity and 
malnutrition, particularly in countries or locales 
that already find it difficult to adequately feed their 
populations. And food that is ultimately lost or 
wasted consumes about a quarter of all water used by 
agriculture,105 requires cropland area the size of Mexico,106 
and is responsible for 3.3 billion tonnes CO
2
e of global 
GHG emissions.107
But huge inefficiencies signal huge savings opportunities. 
The UK has reduced its household food waste by 21% 
between 2007 and 2012 – even as the number of 
households increased by nearly 4%. This reduction saved 
roughly £3.3 billion (US$5.3 billion) in 2012 alone, and 
avoided 4.4 million tonnes CO
2
e of emissions.108  
In the developing world, the priority needs to be to 
reduce post-harvest losses during storage and handling. 
Improvements in transport infrastructure, IT and storage 
technology for larger-scale operations are gradually being 
adopted, perhaps slowed by the fact that much of the 
large-scale storage in developing countries since 2008 has 
been for public long-term security stock purposes that do 
not attract private capital for improvements. And dealing 
with grain storage losses in places such as the interior of 
Africa means getting to the farm level, as 70% of grain 
storage is done on-farm in small farms.109 
At the global level, in order to scale up food loss and 
waste, governments and companies need to start by 
consistently measuring where and how much food is 
being lost or wasted within national borders and along 
food supply chains. What gets measured gets managed. 
Second, governments, intergovernmental agencies and 
companies need to increase investment in low-cost, low-
emission technologies for storing food in low-income and 
middle-income countries, and in improved food inventory 
systems everywhere. For example, farmers in West Africa 
are beginning to make widespread use of airtight, reusable 
plastic storage bags to prevent insects from damaging 
cowpeas. These farmers have seen an average increase 
in cowpea-related income of 48%, and cowpeas that had 
been stored in these bags generally fetch a price 5–10% 
higher than those stored by other methods due to higher 
quality.110  Similar approaches are being used for in-village 
grain storage in the Sahel.
Third, food retailers need to push their suppliers to 
squeeze waste out of their food supply chains and educate 
consumers on how to avoid wasting food at home. The 
UK’s leading food retailers are already showing how this 
can be done. Some may be concerned about lost sales, 
but recent studies in the UK indicate that consumers 
who reduce their household food waste are “trading up”, 
spending about half of their savings on higher-value – 
which often means higher-margin – foods in the store.111  
Finally, more food that now goes to waste can be put to 
good use if governments in high-income countries support 
“Good Samaritan” laws and/or tax breaks to facilitate  
or encourage donations of excess food by restaurants  
and supermarkets. 
Reducing food loss and waste at scale will generate 
significant benefits. In developing countries, reducing 
losses near the farm can increase net farmer incomes, 
make more food available locally and even nationwide, 
make the country’s agriculture sector more competitive, 
and help combat poverty – while reducing pressure on the 
natural resources used in farming. In developed countries, 
reducing food waste can improve profit margins for food 
retailers and restaurants, save households money, and 
reduce waste management costs. 
4.2 Reduce biofuel demand for food crops
Another demand-side opportunity concerns biofuels. 
Liquid biofuels – ethanol and biodiesel – provided 2.7% of 
the world’s transport fuel in 2010, and consumed nearly 
5% of world crop production in terms of energy content.112 
Feedstocks for “first-generation” biofuels – which make 
up almost all the supply – are primarily major food crops, 
in particular maize, sugarcane, rapeseed (canola), and 
soybeans (Figure 4). 
The widespread use of first-generation biofuels raises 
serious questions about the opportunity cost of using 
all that land, water and energy to produce fuel.113 That 
Globally, the FAO estimates 
that food worth about 
US$750 billion is lost or 
wasted annually.
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Figure 4:
Shares of feedstocks and places in global liquid biofuels production (2010)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Searchinger et al., 2013.117
USA & Canada Brazil EU-27 Other
SugarcaneMaize SoybeanRapeseed Palm oilOther
60%
31%
28%
12%
29%
34%
6%
26%
55%
32%
12%
7%
59%
5%
4%
CROP USED
ETHANOL
100% = 88.2 billion litres
BIODIESEL
100% = 19.5 billion litres
WHERE
GENERATED
BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
LA
N
D
 U
SE
105
opportunity cost varies greatly depending on the 
feedstock used and the policy design. For instance, 
sugarcane-based biofuels provide far more energy 
relative to inputs required than maize-based biofuels.114  
An additional challenge to first-generation biofuels 
is the impact on food prices. There is widespread 
agreement that biofuels played at least a substantial 
role, amongst other factors, in the large increase in 
global crop prices since the mid-2000s.115 Inflexible 
mandates increase the price inelasticity of global 
demand for feedstocks in the face of supply shocks. 
Flexible mandates, as Brazil has used for sugarcane-
based ethanol, are preferable.116  
Policies that support inefficient biofuels are expensive. 
Transport biofuel subsidies in 2012 amounted to US$19 
billion,118 and consumers paid tens of billions more for 
higher-priced food.119 To limit cost, any policy in support 
of biofuels should carefully discriminate between 
feedstocks and focus on sources that do not compete for 
land and water.120
Yet more than 30 nations have established, or are 
establishing, targets and mandates that call for a greater 
share of their transportation fuel to consist of biofuels.121  
Many of these targets hover around 10%. If such a target 
level were global by 2030, then meeting it with first-
generation biofuels would require 23% of current crop 
production in energy terms.122  The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) estimates that if the entire global biomass 
harvested as food, feed, forage and timber in 2000 were 
converted to bioenergy under current technologies, it 
would only meet 20% of world energy needs in 2050.123  
Clearly such targets cannot be met with first-generation 
technologies, and should be based instead on waste 
materials and third-generation biofuels. 
Second-generation biofuels have been under 
development for many years, and rely on non-food 
biomass. The feedstocks include cellulose-rich plants and 
trees, agricultural by-products and food waste. Initially, 
development focused on using cellulose-rich plants and 
trees grown on natural resources that would also be 
suitable either for food production (crops) or carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity (forests). Attention has 
turned in recent years to using food waste (especially 
used cooking oil), paper, scrap wood, maize stover 
(leaves and stalks left after harvesting) and sugarcane 
bagasse (the fibre left after processing the stalks) as 
feedstock in biofuels, aiming to minimise both financial 
costs and drains on additional natural resource use. 
However, commercial viability to date has been limited 
in the absence of subsidies. Like other renewable energy 
sources, second-generation biofuels using wastes are 
likely to require transitional support for a number 
of years to scale and become competitive across a 
wider set of markets.
A recent report estimated that such waste-based 
biofuels could technically fuel up to 16% of all European 
road transport by 2030.124  This is based on a finding 
that Europe has 220 million tonnes of truly unused 
wastes which, if used for biofuels, could displace 37 
million tonnes of oil used for fuel, and on a net basis 
decrease GHGs that would have come from equivalent 
fossil fuel use by 60%, while adding €15 billion to the 
rural economy. Uncertainties remain, however, on 
technologies yet to be scaled up commercially and their 
need for subsidies. 
Third-generation biofuels, based on fast-growing algae 
and microorganisms, are now under development and 
in the demonstration phase. With further technological 
improvement and deployment, these advanced biofuels 
could potentially have much less impact on land and 
water use and food prices. While pilots exist, more R&D 
and demonstration is needed for these technologies to 
become commercially viable. (See Chapter 7: Innovation 
for further discussion of advanced biofuels.)
4.3 Shift diets
A third demand-side opportunity concerns diets. 
Reducing overconsumption of food in general and of 
livestock products – red meat in particular – can benefit 
human health, national economies, and the climate. In 
high-income countries and increasingly in some urban 
areas elsewhere, overeating has become a chronic health 
issue. The World Health Organization estimates that 
1.4 billion adults globally were overweight in 2008 and, 
of these, 500 million were obese.125  Obese people on 
average incur 25% higher health care costs than a person 
of normal weight.126
Shifting to more nutritionally balanced diets – which 
includes reducing over-consumption of calories and 
of red meat – in high-income countries and cities 
where diet-related diseases are on the rise would 
achieve multiple benefits. It would improve human 
health and would reduce health care costs. It also 
would benefit the climate by reducing excess food 
consumption and the greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with this, particularly for beef, which is on 
average more greenhouse gas-intensive than other 
sources of protein.127  Better nutritional education is 
important, and works.128
Transport biofuel subsidies in 
2012 amounted to US$19 
billion, and consumers paid 
tens of billions more for higher-
priced food.
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5. Forests
Throughout history, humanity has carved agricultural land 
out of natural forests, and this continues today. At least 
in theory, the strategies discussed in the last two sections 
could help ensure food security for a growing population 
while reducing pressure to turn more forests into cropland. 
But the latter is not guaranteed; higher financial returns 
per agricultural hectare could stimulate demand to farm 
even more land.129  Likewise, demand for timber, pulp and 
bioenergy is projected to grow over the next 15 years, 
putting even more pressure on lands currently supporting 
natural forests.130 Projections to 2050 indicate a threefold 
increase in wood removals by volume compared  
with 2010.131 
Yet the value generated by agriculture in former forestlands 
and by the extraction of forest products also brings costs. 
Forests are an important form of natural capital, generating 
economic returns (and climate benefits) for countries, 
companies and citizens. The ecosystem services that 
Agricultural growth need not depend upon or 
trigger deforestation, if agricultural intensification 
is complemented by forest protection policies. The 
experience of Brazil provides an important example. 
Since 1970, crop yields in Brazil have quadrupled and 
livestock productivity has doubled. Brazil is presently 
among the three largest global producers of sugarcane, 
soybeans and maize, and plays a major role in the global 
value chain for beef. This boom in productivity is the 
result of many factors, including investment in the 
national agricultural research agency, advances in soil 
improvement and crop breeding, expanded agricultural 
credit, and rural infrastructure. 
During the 1990s through 2005, however, this 
agricultural growth was linked with very high rates 
of deforestation. Productivity gains alone were not 
sufficiently relieving pressure to convert forests, 
particularly the Amazon. Complementary strategies 
that made clearing the forest frontier economically, 
legally and/or reputationally “expensive” were needed. 
And they came in the mid-2000s in the form of 
technology-enabled transparency on forest clearing 
activity, backed by law enforcement and agricultural 
finance conditioned on compliance with anti-
deforestation policies. 
The impact was significant. The rate of deforestation 
in the Brazilian Amazon fell by 76% between 2005 and 
2012 – although there was an uptick in deforestation 
in 2013. During the same time period, production (by 
tonnage) of Brazil’s major agricultural commodities 
increased as well. Soybean production grew by 29%, 
sugarcane by 70%, and beef by 8%. 
Box 4:
Produce and protect133
forests provide are especially important to the resilience 
of agricultural landscapes. For example, clearing of trees 
upstream and upslope creates significant erosion issues, 
leaching of nutrients, and water problems downstream and 
down slope. Thus, protecting remaining natural forests and 
restoring forest cover – globally and in individual regions 
– is a key part of feeding the world and building a resilient 
economy. It will become even more important as we 
intensify agriculture to boost crop yields and increase food 
production. In other words, we will need to “produce and 
protect” at the same time (see Box 4).
Like agriculture, which produces consumer goods (and 
a few intermediary products) for sale, forests can yield 
goods for markets, such as timber. As is the case with 
agriculture, increasing demand for forest products can 
increase pressures on land resources, although to an 
extent technological or organisational innovations can 
help to meet increased demand while minimising GHG 
emissions. However, for forests, the greatest economic 
value generated is not from products but from ecosystem 
services, most of which are not currently traded in markets. 
Leading forest specialists and economists estimate that 
conserved and sustainably managed forests generate more 
than US$6,000 per ha per year in aggregate value, with 
values varying between forests and coming mainly from 
non-remunerated ecosystem services.132  The preponderant 
importance of non-market ecosystem services, combined 
with the long time period required to regenerate forests, 
imply the need for institutions and actions to internalise the 
net social value of forests for all who impact on them. 
5.1 The natural capital of forests
Forests – ecosystems dominated by trees – today span 
about 4 billion ha and occupy about 31% of Earth’s 
land area excluding Antarctica.134  They are home to 
350 million people around the world, while 60 million 
indigenous peoples almost wholly depend on them for their 
livelihoods.135  And they are critical to everyone for the 
forest products, watershed protection, carbon storage, and 
other benefits they provide.
More specifically, forests are the source of several revenue-
generating benefits, including:
• Timber and pulp. Many forests are actively managed 
to yield timber and pulpwood. The economic value of 
industrial roundwood production, wood processing, 
and pulp and paper production amounted to US$606 
billion in 2011.136  If sustainably managed, forests can 
continue to provide these products for generations  
to come.
• Wood fuel and charcoal. Forests can provide energy in 
the form of wood fuel and charcoal, which had a global 
economic value of US$33 billion in 2011.137 
• Non-timber forest products. Forests provide a range 
of other products that can be used as food (e.g. wild 
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Forest trees and other vegetation actually remove 
carbon (in the form of CO
2
) from the atmosphere, 
providing substantial climate benefits. According to 
one study, stopping all tropical deforestation and forest 
degradation could reduce carbon emissions by 5.14 
gigatonnes (Gt) of CO
2
e per year.157  For comparison, 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial 
processes in 2010 have been estimated at 32 Gt 
CO
2
 (±2.7).158  Second, allowing all secondary forests 
and fallow lands from shifting cultivation systems 
to continue growing would sequester another 3.7 
to 11 Gt CO
2
e per year out of the atmosphere and 
store it in regrowing forests. Finally, re-establishing 
forests on 500 million ha of land that once supported 
them could theoretically provide an additional global 
carbon sink of about 3.7 Gt CO
2
e per year if the annual 
accumulation of carbon in trees and soil were a modest 
2 tonnes of carbon (or 7.34  t CO
2
e) per ha per year. 
Thus, implementing these measures could get us a long 
way towards stabilising the concentration of CO
2
 in 
the atmosphere. However, these figures reflect only 
the estimated biophysical potential. They do not factor 
in the opportunity costs of land in a world demanding 
more food and wood, nor the relative ease or difficulty 
of implementation. 
Nonetheless, more sustainable management of the 
world’s forest resources is a mitigation strategy 
that can be implemented now, and can thus lead 
to near-term emission reductions as we wait for 
emission reduction technologies in other sectors such 
transportation and energy to develop and evolve. 
Box 5:
Why forest carbon really matters to 
climate change156
fruits and nuts), source material for medicines (e.g. the 
cancer drug Taxol), dietary supplements (e.g. ginseng), 
traditional arts and crafts, landscape products (e.g. 
wood chips and pine needles for mulch and bedding), 
and more.138  The estimated economic value of non-
timber forest products was around US$88 billion  
in 2011.139 
• Crop yields. Some on-farm trees can increase 
agricultural productivity by preventing soil erosion, 
fixing nitrogen, enhancing soil organic matter, and 
increasing soil moisture levels. Niger, discussed earlier, 
is a case in point.140  Likewise, forests surrounding 
farmland serve as habitat for bees and other crop 
pollinators. Forest-based pollinators in Costa Rica 
increase coffee yields by 20% and reduce misshapen 
seeds by 27% when the coffee plantation is within 1 km 
of a forest.141  In addition, forests upstream of farmland 
can help ensure clean and regular water flows for 
downstream agriculture use.142 
• Recreation. People enjoy forests for hiking, camping, 
hunting, bird-watching, and other forms of recreation. 
In China, forest-based recreation and tourism in 
forest parks generates about US$3.3 billion in entry 
fees alone.143  In the United States, recreation and 
tourism in national forests alone contribute $2.5–3 
billion per year to national GDP.144  In some countries 
such as Costa Rica, forest-related ecotourism 
has become an important contributor to the 
national economy and jobs.145 
At the same time, forests generate several benefits or 
services that help avoid real economic costs, including:
• Water filtration. Forests are important for maintaining 
clean, stable drinking water supplies for downstream 
cities and other users.146  Rainwater percolates through 
forest soils before entering groundwater, filtering 
out impurities. Leaves and forest floor debris prevent 
sediment from entering streams and lakes. A US study 
found that drinking water treatment costs decrease as 
the amount of forest cover in the relevant watershed 
increases. In fact, the share of forest cover in a US 
watershed accounts for about 50–55% of the variation 
in water treatment costs.147 
• Landslide prevention. Through their roots and forest 
floor debris, forests on slopes can hold soils in place 
and thereby prevent landslides during heavy rain 
events. In Switzerland, the benefits of protected 
forests are estimated at US$2–3.5 billion per year 
due to avoided costs of avalanches, landslides, 
rock falls and flooding.148 
• Flood mitigation. Forests and forested wetlands can 
affect the timing and magnitude of water runoff and 
water flows by acting as “sponges”. Water is stored in 
porous soils and debris, and then is slowly released 
over time. Through this process, forests can lower 
peak flows during heavy rainfall or flood events.149  In 
the Upper Yangtze River Basin in western China, for 
instance, flood mitigation provided by forests saves an 
average of US$1 billion annually from avoided storm 
and flood damage.150  
• Coastal protection. By serving as “speed bumps” for 
incoming storms, some coastal forests can attenuate 
the impact of storm surges and thereby avoid costly 
damage. In Vietnam, the restoration of 18,000 ha of 
mangrove forests resulted in annual savings of US$7.3 
million in sea dyke maintenance and storm surge 
protection, an estimated cost-avoidance of US$405 per 
hectare.151  
• Air quality improvement. Forests can improve local 
and regional air quality. Trees can trap or absorb 
air pollutants – such as sulphur dioxide, nitrogen 
dioxide, and small particulate matter – that can 
trigger asthma or other respiratory problems and 
that are emitted by power plants, manufacturing 
facilities, and automobiles.152 
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• Global climate change mitigation. Forests play a 
significant role in the global carbon cycle and thus 
in regulating the world’s climate (Box 5). During 
the process of photosynthesis, trees absorb carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere. Some of this carbon 
gets stored in branches, trunks and roots, while 
some ends up in the soil as leaves and other parts 
of trees decay.153  The world’s forests absorbed an 
amount of CO
2
e equal to about half of the fossil 
fuel emissions in 2009.154  On average, forests can 
store up to 32 times more carbon in live biomass 
than grasslands or croplands.155  Forests are thus at 
the front lines of minimising the economic risks of 
climate change. 
 
Forests also play a positive role in regional and 
local climates. Of particular relevance to economic 
development is the fact that forests pump a lot of water 
vapour into the atmosphere and thereby can affect 
regional precipitation.159  One study found that Amazonian 
deforestation could lead to 12% less rainfall in the rainy 
season and 21% less in the dry season by mid-century. 
Such reductions could have significant consequences 
for agriculture and hydroelectric power, both inside and 
outside the Amazon region.160  
Finally, forests support more than half of the world’s 
biodiversity.161  While biodiversity has its own intrinsic 
value, it is also the storehouse of the genetic information 
for the planet which underpins many of the other benefits 
described above and is the basis for resilience to future 
climate change, diseases, and other phenomena that might 
affect humankind. 
Estimates of the value of ecosystem services provided 
by forests are typically very large, and mostly need to be 
derived from models and related calculations, as opposed 
to being observed in a marketplace. A new update of 
a landmark 1997 study illustrates the magnitudes. It 
estimated that forests alone in 2011 provided ecosystem 
services worth US$16.2 trillion in 2011 prices.162 
5.2 Trends in forest capital
Despite these benefits, market and governance failures 
mean that governments and companies are not sufficiently 
managing forests with long-term returns in mind. At the 
moment, the quantity and quality of this natural capital 
is declining. Between 2000 and 2010, the world lost 
on average 13 million ha of forest (gross) each year to 
deforestation – the clearing of forests and subsequent 
conversion of the underlying land to some other use.163  
This annual loss is equivalent in area to Greece. During 
the same decade, millions of additional hectares of forests 
were degraded – a reduction in biomass and carbon stocks 
due to fires and human-induced activities such as  
selective logging.164  
This decline poses considerable economic costs. It 
reduces the long-term capacity of forests to generate 
the revenue and avoid the costs described above. It can 
impact market access and performance for companies 
trading with concerned countries and consumers. For 
example, since 2008, a number of leading forest-product 
consuming countries have banned the import of forest 
products that have been harvested illegally in the country 
of origin. Examples include the 2008 amendments to the 
US Lacey Act, the EU Timber Regulation and Australia’s 
Illegal Timber Prohibition Act.165  These laws are beginning 
to pose market risks to companies that do not abide. 
For example, Gibson Guitar Corp. was fined $300,000 
to settle a US government probe into importing illegal 
wood from Madagascar.166  Retail flooring company 
Lumber Liquidators’ share price dropped as much as 13% 
immediately after US officials executed search warrants 
at its headquarters on suspicion of trading wood illegally 
logged in Russia.167 
In terms of climate, continued forest loss and degradation 
means forgoing some low-cost opportunities to combat 
climate change and adds to the economic risks of climate 
change.168  In fact, as noted earlier in this chapter, land  
use change – mostly deforestation and forest degradation 
in the tropics169  – currently accounts for close to 20%  
of annual global human-induced greenhouse gas  
emissions when reforestation and afforestation  
are excluded, or about 11% of global emissions when  
they are included.170  
A suite of interlinked factors is driving the decline in forest 
capital. Proximate causes include agriculture (clearing for 
both crops and livestock), timber harvesting, extraction for 
fuelwood or charcoal, mining and road-building.171   
In the tropics, commercial and subsistence agriculture  
are the leading drivers of deforestation, while timber  
and fuelwood extraction are the leading drivers of 
degradation (Figure 5). Behind this is the increasing 
demand for forest products from a rising population  
with rising consumption.
The underlying causes are a number of market and 
governance failures. For instance, market prices, tax 
policies, lending conditions, and commodity procurement 
practices often do not reflect the wider economic value 
of a forest. In economic terms, these benefits are not 
“internalised” by the market. These shortcomings are 
compounded by the fact that decisions about the fate of a 
forest are often made in the absence of good information, 
in a non-transparent manner, and without adequate 
accountability. In some places, corruption and powerful 
vested interests hold sway, institutions are weak, and 
the rule of law is not enforced.172  And in some places, 
local people who live in and near forests have weak or no 
property rights regarding forests or the benefits derived 
from forests.173  Any form of capital – whether natural, 
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Figure 5:
Proximate causes of tropical deforestation and forest degradation (2000–2010)
financial or human – needed to underpin strong economic 
growth cannot be enhanced and utilised effectively under 
such market and governance failures. 
5.3 Emerging recognition of the value of 
forest capital
Three general approaches to securing and increasing the 
value of forests’ natural capital are being implemented to 
various degrees around the world (Box 6):
• Conserve: Avoid deforestation and degradation in 
remaining natural forests.
• Sustain: Manage some forests – both natural and 
plantation forests – to yield timber, pulp, and other 
goods in a manner that is sustainable socially, 
environmentally and economically. 
• Restore: Restore some of the world’s degraded 
and lost forests into natural forests through active 
restoration and/or passive regeneration methods. 
If effectively implemented, the combination of these 
approaches would enhance forest capital, helping drive 
economic growth while combatting climate change. And 
history indicates that forest recovery can go hand in hand 
with economic development. During the latter half of the 
20th century, for instance, South Korea’s forest cover 
nearly doubled while its economy grew more than 25-fold 
in real terms.175  Between 1986 and 2005, Costa Rica’s 
forest cover increased nearly 20% while its economy grew 
2.5-fold in real terms.176  Of course, numerous factors 
were involved with these economic transitions, and 
cause-effect relationships between factors are complex. 
Still, these examples show that deforestation is not an 
inevitable part of economic growth.
5.4 Scaling and accelerating change
Scaling and accelerating the conservation, sustainable 
management, and restoration of forests will require 
addressing the governance and market failures that 
Source : Kissinger et al., 2012.174
www.newclimateeconomy.report
LA
N
D
 U
SE
110
Figure 6:
South Korea: Same area before 1960 (top) and after 2000 (bottom)
 Photo Credit: Korea Forest Service
currently undermine the natural capital of forests. There 
are many possible strategies for doing so. One is to 
incorporate the value of forests into national economic 
accounts, thereby appropriately recognising the 
contribution of forest capital to a country’s growth (see 
Chapter 5: Economic Policy for a discussion on better 
accounting approaches and metrics). Another is creating, 
financing, and sufficiently enforcing protected areas. Yet 
another is building markets for wood and paper products 
certified as coming from sustainably managed forests 
and for agricultural commodities certified as sustainably 
grown. Although important, we do not expand upon these 
here. A lot of research has gone into them already.181 
Rather, based on analysis and expert input, we highlight 
three of the enabling factors required for any successful 
management of forest resources for economic and climate 
benefits:
• Secure tenure;
• Improved land use planning; and
• Better law enforcement.
In addition, we highlight four seeds of transformational 
change – some recent developments, some needing 
greater attention – that could result in significant 
economic and climate benefits: 
• Technology-assisted transparency;
• Zero-deforestation supply chain models;
• Payments for watershed services; and
• Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation plus (REDD+) finance.
As is the case with cities and energy, many of these 
strategies harness one or more of the three key drivers 
of change. Improving land use planning processes is a 
means of raising resource productivity, in this case land 
use productivity. REDD+ finance and payments for 
watershed services are a form of increasing infrastructure 
investment, in this case investment in the natural 
infrastructure of forests. Innovations in information 
and communication technologies are enabling never-
before-possible transparency about forests, while 
zero-deforestation supply chains are an innovative new 
business model with great potential. Underlying these 
drivers of change is the potential for improvements in 
tenure and law enforcement – institutional conditions that 
set the context for how forests are managed.
Secure tenure 
Secure tenure – the assurance that the rights, rules and 
institutions governing the conditions of access and use 
of the land and its forest resources will be respected by 
government and society – is an important precondition for 
motivating people to invest in conservation, sustainable 
management, or restoration of forests. Individuals, 
families, or communities are unlikely to invest if they do 
not have clear rights to, or ownership, of that land, if that 
land can be taken away from them without due process 
and fair compensation, or if they do not have rights to any 
of the benefits of trees on that land. 
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Conserve: In addition to Brazil (see Box 4), countries 
such as Mexico, Thailand and Panama have reduced 
their rates of deforestation during the first decade of 
this century. 177 
 
Sustain: Sweden, a leading supplier of timber, has about 
80% of its forests certified as sustainably managed by 
either the Forest Stewardship Council or the Pan-
European Forest Certification systems.178
Restore: Between 1953 and 2007, South Korea restored 
its forest cover from 35% to 64% of the country’s 
total area (see photo).179  South Korean forests now 
provide a number of important economic benefits to the 
country, including water benefits (US$23 billion), carbon 
sequestration and air quality improvement (US$19 
billion), erosion control (US$12 billion), forest-based 
recreation (US$13 billion), and other benefits (US$27 
billion). The aggregate annual value of these economic 
benefits (about US$94 billion) is equivalent to about 9% 
of the country’s 2010 GDP.180 
Box 6:
National examples of conserve, sustain 
and restore
affecting forests and because of the scale of its potential 
impact. More than half a billion hectares around the 
world are legally or officially designated as indigenous 
and community forests. Getting every hectare of these 
forests to the level of clarity and enforcement of rights 
as in the Maya Biosphere Reserve and in the Bolivian 
Amazon would help sustain the forest capital of about 
one-eighth of the world’s forests. And potential exists 
in the additional forest areas held by communities 
under customary rights that are not yet recognised and 
protected by governments.184 
Improved land use planning
Good land use planning can help optimise how land is 
used, encouraging agriculture in highly productive areas 
and prioritising forests in areas in need of watershed 
protection, having high forest-dependent local livelihoods, 
and other factors. Tools for land use planning include 
forest zoning (e.g. designating protected areas), tax 
incentives, and more.185  Good land use planning provides 
clarity around procedures and land classifications, which 
can lower transaction costs and provide certainty to 
businesses and landowners. But in order to generate these 
impacts and avoid corruption, planning processes need to 
be transparent and participatory when being developed 
and enforced once approved. 
One example of improved land use planning is Colombia’s 
expansion of its protected forest areas through the 
enlargement of the Serranía de Chiribiquete National 
Natural Park in 2013. This protected area, in a highly 
biodiverse region within the Amazon rainforest, 
increased from 1.3 million ha to almost 2.8 million ha, 
an area as large as Belgium.186  In addition to zoning, the 
policies and interventions summarised by the associated 
“Amazon Vision” initiative (which includes the expansion 
of Chiribiquete) also promote improved governance of 
forest resources, alternative low-carbon development 
activities, and more secure rights and livelihoods 
for indigenous peoples in the regions concerned, in 
partnership with the private sector and civil society.187 
Another example is Costa Rica. The country has 
conserved and restored forest capital since 1986 
through land use planning policies and processes, in 
conjunction with wider market shifts in the national 
economy and agricultural subsidy reforms.188  For 
instance, the country prohibits conversion of mature 
Between 1986 and 2005, 
Costa Rica’s forest cover 
increased nearly 20% while 
its economy grew 2.5-fold in 
real terms.
Secure tenure has proven particularly effective when 
it comes to indigenous peoples and local communities 
with deep historical and cultural connections to the land. 
Emerging evidence from countries including Brazil, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Tanzania indicates that forests 
with clear and enforced property rights for indigenous 
peoples and local communities living in them are better 
conserved and more sustainably managed than forests 
that lack such security in rights. In Bolivia, for example, 
the deforestation rate in forests owned by indigenous 
communities is one-11th of the rate in other areas – which 
includes areas without secure tenure, privately owned 
forests, and those held by the government. In Guatemala, 
the deforestation rate in community concessions in the 
Maya Biosphere Reserve is one-20th of the rate in other 
parts of the Reserve, where the government owns and 
manages the forest, but illegal settlement and logging  
still occur.182  
Providing legal recognition of indigenous and local 
community rights to forests and supporting the integrity 
of these rights would be a low-cost way for a government 
to avoid deforestation and unnecessary conflict when it 
comes to natural resource management.183  Ways that 
governments can support these rights include mapping 
community forest boundaries, helping expel illegal 
loggers, and not granting commercial concessions within 
community forests.
Secure tenure is an important strategy because it 
addresses some of the underlying governance failures 
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forests to other land uses. Roughly 25% of the country 
is zoned as protected forest, while some surrounding 
areas are sustainable management zones. And the nation 
has implemented a payment for ecosystem services 
(PES) system designed to encourage land managers 
to conserve, sustainably manage, and restore forest 
landscapes (Box 7).189 
Better law enforcement
Economists have long argued that the rule of law is an 
important foundation for well-functioning markets and 
the efficient use of capital.190  This is no less true for 
natural capital. Having clear and enforced laws increases 
the likelihood that private-sector actors will be able to 
compete on a level playing field, that decisions of public-
sector actors are followed, and that natural resources will 
be more sustainably managed.191  
Better law enforcement is paying dividends in sustaining 
forest capital. For instance, a major cause of the decline in 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon from 2005 to 2012 
was that the government ramped up its enforcement of 
the Forest Code that set limits on forest clearing. The use 
of remote sensing to detect infractions in near-real-time, 
more agents in the field to follow up on those detections, 
and visible applications of fines and other penalties 
combined to boost law enforcement at the Amazon  
forest frontier.192 
Law enforcement is an important strategy because it 
addresses some of the underlying governance failures and 
because of its potential scale of impact. Well-executed law 
enforcement can affect an entire country’s forests.
Technology-assisted transparency
It has long been recognised that transparency regarding 
the physical state of forests and decision-making about 
forests is a critical foundation for any effort to conserve, 
sustain and/or restore the natural capital of forests. 
Recent advances in technology have the potential to 
amplify the power of transparency. The convergence of 
low-cost satellite imagery, cloud computing, high-speed 
internet connectivity, smartphones and social media is 
ushering in a new world of “radical transparency” where 
what is happening in a far-away forest can now be known 
close to home. Exemplifying this convergence, the Global 
Forest Watch system now makes it possible for anyone 
freely to identify changes in forest cover anywhere on the 
planet at relatively frequent time intervals.193  
This level of transparency is vital for the successful 
implementation of other strategies described in 
this chapter. For instance, it enables monitoring and 
verification in pay-for-performance PES finance. It 
enables commodity buyers and suppliers to demonstrate 
adherence to supply chain commitments. And it provides 
the information needed for better land use planning and 
effective law enforcement.
Technology-enabled transparency is an important strategy 
in part because its scale of impact is substantial. All of 
the world’s forests now have a level of transparency that 
they have never had before. It is also important because 
it helps tackle the governance failures that prevent the 
full realisation of forest’s natural capital. Transparency 
can trigger accountability, deter corruption, and empower 
better-informed decision-making.
Zero-deforestation supply chain models 
Increased transparency is leading to increased corporate 
supply chain pressure to curtail deforestation. Because 
many customers and employees of companies care  
about forest conservation, being associated with 
deforestation can negatively affect a company’s brand 
value, sales, and employee morale. And a company’s 
brand image can constitute a large share of its corporate 
value.194  Recognising this connection, some companies 
have taken steps to leverage their supply chain power  
to disassociate their business activities from  
deforestation-related commodities.  
Starting in mid-2006, for example, members of the 
Brazilian Vegetable Oils Industry Association and the 
National Grain Exporters Association committed to a 
moratorium on soybeans linked to deforestation in the 
Amazon.195  The moratorium has been quite effective; 
soy-linked Amazon deforestation has dropped to minimal 
levels.196  More recently, members of the Consumer Goods 
Forum (CGF) such as Unilever and Nestlé have been making 
commitments to achieve deforestation-free commodity 
supply chains by 2020 and to curtail procurement from 
suppliers who do not comply. Such pledges offer a hopeful 
glimpse of where supply-chain behaviour is moving, and 
their impact is already trickling upstream to commodity 
producers and traders. For instance, as of mid-2014, more 
than 50% of globally traded palm oil is covered by “zero 
deforestation” commitments.197  
The zero-deforestation supply chain model is an 
important strategy because it addresses both market 
and governance failures affecting forests. To the degree 
that buyers follow through on their commitments, the 
financial flows of commodity purchases will be aligned 
with sustaining forest capital. And the procurement 
practices will necessitate heightened transparency and 
accountability. This supply chain model is also important 
because it has the potential for impact at a large scale. 
The CGF consists of 400 of the world’s leading consumer 
In Bolivia, the deforestation rate 
in forests owned by indigenous 
communities is one-11th the 
rate in other areas.
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goods manufacturers and retailers from 70 countries with 
combined annual sales of €2.5 trillion.198  Its members 
reach deep into the global supply chains that most affect 
the planet’s forests. 
Building on the CGF’s work, the Tropical Forest Alliance 
2020 (TFA 2020) is bringing together governments, 
the private sector and civil society to support zero-
deforestation.199  TFA 2020 members are committed 
to reducing the deforestation in tropical forests that is 
driven by production of four major global commodities: 
palm oil, soy, beef and paper and pulp). It includes many 
of the major global companies that trade these products, 
manufacture consumer goods containing them, and sell 
them. This includes companies such as Unilever, Coca-
Cola, Pepsi Co, Nestlé, Danone, Kellogg, Colgate, Procter 
& Gamble, L’Oréal, Mars, Walmart, Cargill, Wilmar 
International, Golden Agri-Resources, Tesco, Casino and 
Carrefour. The participating companies have undertaken 
to remove products from deforested areas from their 
supply chains in some cases by 2015, and in others by 
2020. In the case of palm oil, companies participating 
in the initiative have 15% of the total consumer market 
by volume, and well over 50% of the global trade in the 
commodity. TFA 2020 also works with the governments 
of the producer countries (such as Indonesia, Colombia, 
Nigeria and Ghana), and with international donors, 
including the United States and several European 
governments, to ensure that local producers can meet the 
new sustainability standards and to help support anti-
deforestation policy. The CGF recently called for a global 
climate agreement that includes large-scale financial 
incentives for reduced emissions through REDD+.200  
Together with the CGF, a number of banks have 
also engaged in a Banking Environment Initiative to 
support consumer companies in their efforts to reduce 
deforestation through a Soft Commodities Compact.201  
The Compact commits banks to work with consumer 
goods companies and their supply chains to develop 
appropriate financing solutions that support the growth of 
markets producing timber products, palm oil, soy and beef 
without contributing to deforestation. Eight banks had 
adopted the Compact as of mid-2014.
Payments for watershed services
Payments for ecosystem services (Box 7) monetise some 
of the economic benefits that forests provide beyond 
those traditionally traded in private markets (e.g. timber). 
One form of payment gaining traction relates to investing 
in forests as a low-cost means of securing stable, clean 
freshwater supplies. Leaders of New York City, for 
example, opted in the 1990s to conserve and restore 
forests in upstream watersheds that supplied the city’s 
drinking water instead of investing in building an expensive 
new water filtration system. In so doing, the city saved 
$6.5–8.5 billion while securing long-term, clean drinking 
water supplies.202  Others are following suit, including 
cities such as Quito, Ecuador; São Paulo, Brazil; and 
Bogota, Colombia. Investments in watershed protection 
upstream of Bogota are projected to save the city US$35 
million over the course of 10 years.203  In essence, these 
payments for watershed services recognise forests as a 
form of natural infrastructure that can be lower cost than 
the traditional concrete-and-steel “grey infrastructure” of 
water filtration, water storage, and related technologies. 
Payments for watershed services are an important 
strategy because they monetise one of the traditionally 
non-marketed benefits that forests provide and thereby 
better reflect the economic value of forest capital. Their 
scale of impact, however, will likely not be global. Not every 
city relies on freshwater that is filtered and moderated by 
upstream forests. But such payments are an investment 
that some cities and businesses can make that provides 
both economic and climate benefits, complementing the 
strategies described in Chapter 2: Cities. And the next 15 
years are an opportune time. Analysis for the Commission 
has estimated water infrastructure investment at US$23 
trillion in 2010 prices, covering the period 2015–2030.204  
Investing in the natural infrastructure of upstream forests 
can be a viable alternative that could significantly reduce 
these projected costs.205
REDD+ finance 
Curbing forest loss in low- and middle-income countries 
will require a concerted effort along three tracks. First, 
governments must implement sustainable land use 
reforms that are in the long-term interest of its economy 
and its people. Second, the private sector, especially 
global commodity sellers and buyers, must implement 
zero-deforestation policies and create demand for 
sustainable supply. Third, the international community 
must support both transitions through REDD+ payments 
–  i.e. payments for verified reductions in  
forest emissions.
Some level of conserving, sustaining and restoring forests 
will be in the self-interest of governments, communities 
and companies in most cases, at least in the medium to 
long term. But this is unlikely to be sufficient to motivate 
the economically efficient level of investment in forest 
capital on its own, for two reasons. First, political 
economies in low- and middle-income countries often 
favour resources extraction in the short run. Second, a 
Transparency can trigger 
accountability, deter 
corruption, and empower 
better-informed decision-
making on forests.
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critical portion of the benefits provided by forests are 
important global public goods in nature, including carbon 
sequestration. International financing and support, such 
as through REDD+, will be required to close the near-
term gap and shift the political equation.  
REDD+ can help defray opportunity costs when shifting 
away from business-as-usual forest practices. If designed 
well, REDD+ programmes can help farmers and forest-
dependent people adopt new practices that conserve, 
sustain and/or restore forests. In most cases, forest 
loss is driven both by market failures – primarily the 
lack of valuation of the global carbon externality – and 
governance failures. 
When REDD+ was first introduced, most attention was 
given to the market failure. REDD+ payments were seen 
as a necessary financial tool to internalise the global 
carbon externality to match the opportunity cost of 
private landowners behaving rationally in functioning 
markets. In other words, REDD would “outcompete” 
profitable production that damaged forests and cause a 
shift away from business-as-usual forest practices. 
If designed well, REDD+ programmes can indeed 
help farmers and forest-dependent people adopt new 
practices that conserve, sustain, and/or restore forests. 
In most cases, however, REDD+ payments will not need 
to fully compensate the private opportunity costs of 
individuals  
or companies that wish to fell trees for timber or 
agricultural land. 
Rather, the most important function of REDD+ 
payments is arguably to deal with the governance 
failures. REDD+ should be seen as a transitional tool to 
strengthen reforms intended to implement sustainable 
land use policies and ramp up law enforcement. It is 
cheaper to clamp down on illegal logging or redirect 
agricultural expansion to degraded lands than to pay 
off those causing deforestation. Seen this way, even 
relatively small REDD+ payments can cover the “political 
opportunity costs” and help strengthen the hand of 
reformers within public authorities to overcome vested 
political and economic interests to promote good 
governance and the rule of law. This, in turn, can increase 
the legal, market and reputational “cost” to those who 
More than 300 payments for ecosystem services 
(PES) programmes have been established worldwide 
to support biodiversity, watershed services, carbon 
sequestration and landscape beauty. PES are 
arrangements whereby users or beneficiaries pay a 
provider, such as a farmer, for the ecosystem services 
from which they would like to benefit. Some are 
driven at the international level (e.g. REDD+), others 
at the national level, and others at the local level (e.g. 
payments for watershed services). The payments 
can be made by governments, development banks, or 
by private actors (e.g. beverage companies that pay 
upstream landowners to manage the land in ways that 
maintain downstream water quality and flow).  
PES are estimated to channel more than US$6.5 billion 
annually through national programmes in China, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, the UK and the US. However, in order 
to be effective, PES schemes require clearly defined 
property rights; clearly defined goals and objectives; 
monitoring and reporting; good enforcement; and 
approaches to ensure that the ecosystem benefits go 
above and beyond what would have occurred without 
PES, that they are long-lasting, and that they don’t 
simply shift environmental damage to another location.
Box 7:
Payments for ecosystem services206
deforest, and create a level playing field for sustainable 
producers. REDD+ finance can thereby help facilitate 
the politically and sometimes financially costly transition 
toward public policies and private practices that build 
forest capital. 
Most REDD+ financing thus far has focused on technical 
assistance, getting countries “ready” for larger-scale 
action. Areas supported include assessments of drivers 
of deforestation, economic impact studies, drafting 
national strategies and consulting key stakeholders, 
setting emission reference levels, developing forest and 
emissions monitoring, and designing payment and benefit 
distribution systems.
Such capacity-building has been important and will 
continue to be needed in some countries that lack the 
capacity to manage conditional cash transfer programs 
at an operational scale. Going forward, however, REDD+ 
financing will need to increasingly shift to pay-for-
performance, wherein REDD+ payments are made to 
governments or other relevant stakeholders once they 
demonstrate verified emissions reductions through 
avoided deforestation.207  Payments, in other words, are 
tied to and timed with delivery of quantifiable results. 
This shift is important for creating a financial push to 
rectify governance and market barriers, to implement 
critical policy reform, to start realising emissions 
reductions in the near term, and to start getting funds 
If designed well, REDD+ 
programmes can help farmers and 
forest-dependent people adopt 
new practices that conserve, 
sustain, and/or restore forests.
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flowing to the people living in and around forests whose 
land management practices need to change.
Making financing conditional upon performance has a 
track record from other sectors, and is gradually being 
seen as good practice in development assistance. It has 
been used in education, health, energy, and poverty 
alleviation.208  Brazil’s highly acclaimed multi-billion-
real “Bolsa Familia” programme, for instance, provides 
financial assistance to low-income families if their children 
are enrolled in school, maintain good attendance levels, 
receive vaccinations, etc.209  The “Bolsa Floresta” program 
emulates Bolsa Familia for communities preserving 
forests.210   Mexico, Costa Rica and other countries have 
implemented successful payments for ecosystem services 
schemes.211  Brazil has applied the concept to both positive 
and negative incentives. It blocked the equivalent of 
US$1.4 billion in agricultural credit on the grounds of 
illegal forest clearing from 2008 to 2011 – a step that 
played a role in curtailing deforestation rates and saved an 
estimated 2,700 km2 of forest.212 
Another example with potentially significant impacts is 
Indonesia, which has begun implementing land use policy 
reforms and law enforcement efforts following a major 
results-based REDD+ agreement with Norway. The 
forest conservation measures resemble those that led to 
success in the Brazilian Amazon, and represent a major 
policy shift.213  For recipient countries such as Indonesia, 
key benefits of such agreements include reinforcement of 
high-level political commitment, internal discipline, and the 
multiple benefits of increased confidence in the rule of law 
resulting from a transparent, results-based agreement. 
The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, managed by the 
World Bank, has set up a carbon fund to pilot REDD+ 
payments. So far, eight countries have been included in 
the pipeline, with six more to be considered in the coming 
months.214  Donors are increasingly applying a similar 
approach bilaterally. Germany signed its first contract 
with the state of Acre in 2013 under its promising new 
REDD Early Movers programme, which emphasises 
paying for emissions reductions through existing national 
mechanisms for sustainable development.215 
For REDD+ financiers, benefits of the pay-for-performance 
approach include greater transparency, more accountability, 
and increased confidence that their investments are 
achieving more immediate impact. For the receiving 
country, key benefits include reinforcement of high-
level political commitment; internal discipline; increased 
transparency of forest loss and what drives it; mobilisation 
of new internal constituencies, such as indigenous peoples 
and local communities advocating reforms, and the multiple 
benefits of increased confidence in the rule of law. This 
approach can also offer a welcome source of revenue to 
local communities and local governments.
A number of international financing streams are available 
to support REDD+. One assessment estimated that 
donors from 15 countries and the European Commission 
had pledged about US$4 billion for 2010–2012 (about 
US$1.3-2 billion per year); US$2.5 billion of this has been 
pledged for future payments pending performance.216  
Other studies indicate total pledge figures in the US$3 
billion range.217  But to sufficiently secure the world’s 
forest capital and meet the challenge of climate change, 
much more REDD+ funding will be required, for capacity-
building and increasingly for payments for performance. 
The Stern Review, for instance, estimated that the 
opportunity costs of forest conservation in eight countries 
responsible for 70% of land use-based emissions in the 
early 2000s were US$5 billion per year.218  The Eliasch 
Review estimated the cost of achieving a 50% reduction 
in global deforestation by 2020 via carbon markets to be 
US$11–19 billion per year.219  This estimate is likely to be 
too high, since it assumed paying the global market price 
and the need to cover full opportunity costs. Yet these 
figures serve to illustrate the discrepancy between need – 
however estimated – and current availability of funding. 
The international community has agreed on the rules 
for REDD+, including results-based REDD+ payments 
through the Warsaw Framework.220  The key remaining 
question is how to generate the demand for emission 
reductions to mobilise sufficient finance. Options include 
carbon markets, a results-based REDD+ window in 
the Green Climate Fund (assuming it is sufficiently 
capitalised),221  or countries deciding to count emission 
reductions from REDD+ as part of their “nationally 
defined mitigation contributions” to the climate agreement 
(or as an additional international mitigation commitment). 
With a clear signal for the post-2020 period agreed as part 
of the Paris agreement in 2015, donors could potentially 
cover the scaling-up of results-based finance for the 
remainder of this decade. But clear policy is urgently 
needed for the next 15 years. 
6. Recommendations
Several recommendations emerge from the Commission’s 
work. We present them here in three categories, matching 
the structure of the discussion above:
Enhancing agricultural productivity and resilience 
in developing countries
• Governments and their development partners 
should commit to and start restoring 150 million 
ha of degraded agricultural land through scaled-up 
investment and adoption of proven landscape-level 
approaches, including improved soil and water 
management.
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The recommended amount is equivalent to restoring 12% 
of degraded agricultural land by 2030.222  This will require 
working with farmers, farm groups and the private sector. 
Where infrastructure and cross-farm externalities are 
big issues (e.g. China’s Loess Plateau), launching 20 new 
intensive projects per year, spanning 1 million ha globally, 
for the next 15 years could be achieved with US$1 billion 
per year in new investment. Where farmers can directly 
recover benefits from their own actions (e.g. the Maradi 
and Zinder regions of Niger), with supportive policies and 
extension services, farmer-managed natural regeneration 
could restore another 9 million ha per year, or 135 million 
ha cumulatively – a significant share of which would be 
landscapes incorporating agroforestry.223  By year 15, the 
combined 150 million ha of restored agricultural lands 
could provide US$30–40 billion/year in extra smallholder 
income, additional food for close to 200 million more 
people, more resilient landscapes, and an additional 2 Gt 
per year in sequestered CO
2
e. 
• Multilateral and bilateral funders, as well as 
foundations, should sharply increase finance 
for climate change adaptation, prioritising the 
poorest farmers in countries that are exposed to 
significant climate hazards and lack credible access 
to infrastructure, alternative employment, and risk 
insurance mechanisms.
Specific instruments to support include infrastructure, 
institutions and programmes that help smallholders to 
invest more fully in their own market-oriented agricultural 
activities in the presence of rising climate risks. An 
example is the African Risk Capacity fund (ARC) recently 
launched by the African Union at a US$200 million level, 
covering drought insurance in Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, 
Senegal and Mauritania – an innovative pilot in risk pooling 
across regions of Africa. Similar interventions may be 
useful in remote rural areas in other parts of the world, 
where adaptive capacity is also low.
• Bilateral donors, foundations and national 
governments in developing countries should 
collectively double the financing of crop, livestock 
and agro-forestry R&D in developing countries from 
US$15 billion in 2008 to US$30 billion in 2030.
The additional funding should target higher-yield and 
climate-resilient agriculture opportunities, and assess 
added value for carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
in the process, as in “climate-smart” agriculture. This 
includes (but is not limited to) stakeholder-coordinated 
funding through the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which currently amounts 
to US$1 billion per year.
• Governments should phase out direct agricultural 
input subsidies, and redirect the savings to support 
the efforts described above and to provide more 
direct support to low-income farmers.
Input subsidies – including on the order of US$46 billion 
in input subsidies in China and India and US$32 billion 
in input-based payments to farmers in OECD countries, 
among many others – reduce efficiency where inputs 
are overused, and add to greenhouse gas emissions, 
particularly when directed to nitrogenous fertiliser and 
electricity subsidies for pumping irrigation water. Input 
subsidies may still be appropriate, however, as temporary 
solutions to specific market failures or to help farmers in 
the poorest countries deal with global shocks.
Managing demand for agricultural products
• Nations and companies should commit to reducing 
the rate of post-harvest food loss and waste by 50% 
by 2030 relative to present levels.
In so doing, they should commit to measure, report, and 
take action on food loss and waste. Savings from reducing 
post-harvest food losses in developing countries will be 
vital to their being able to meet projected future food 
needs. A 50% reduction in global consumer food waste 
alone by the developed countries and middle class in 
developing countries could save up to US$200 billion in 
food expenditures and 0.3 Gt of CO
2
e per year by 2030.224 
• Governments that subsidise or mandate the use of 
biofuels should phase out these interventions to 
the extent that they involve food crops.
If  biofuels are considered important to meeting climate 
and/or energy policy goals, policies should focus on 
supporting the development of second- or third-
generation biofuels using feedstocks that do not compete 
in major ways for productive land and fresh water. If the 
purpose of the policies is to boost rural incomes, the funds 
can be applied to other measures that do not put as much 
pressure on land and freshwater resources. 
Forests
• Governments, companies and trade associations 
should commit to eliminate deforestation from the 
production of agricultural commodities by 2020 and 
halt the loss of natural forests globally by 2030.
This target should be achieved in a manner that 
contributes to improved livelihoods of forest-dependent 
people. It builds upon progress already being made by 
some forest-rich countries and momentum started by the 
Consumer Goods Forum and the Tropical Forest Alliance 
2020. Achieving it will require leveraging many promising 
seeds of change. For instance, advances in agricultural 
productivity (both on the supply and demand side) will be 
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needed to satisfy food needs on existing agricultural land. 
Likewise, improved land use planning, REDD+ finance, 
technology-enabled transparency, zero-deforestation 
supply chain models, secure tenure, and better law 
enforcement all have a role to play.
• Developed countries should aim to provide at least 
US$5 billion per year in REDD+ financing (focused 
increasingly on payments for verified emission 
reductions).
This amount is at least a doubling of current annual 
financing of REDD+ and is beyond whatever funding is 
provided by carbon markets.225  There needs to be a shift 
from the current focus on capacity-building to incentive 
payments for verified emission reductions, recognising 
that some countries may still require financing for 
readiness and preparatory activities. Financing for REDD+ 
is an essential part of international cooperation and 
burden-sharing on climate, particularly since forests are 
providing a global public good by absorbing and storing 
carbon. It helps governments that are determined to 
protect national forest capital, but that also worry about 
the livelihoods of people living in and near forests and the 
interests of formal commercial enterprises.
• Governments should commit to and start the 
restoration of at least 350 million ha of lost and 
degraded forest landscapes by 2030.
This target complements the restoration of 150 million 
ha of degraded agricultural land discussed above. It is 
needed to catapult restoration onto the global policy 
agenda, raise awareness of restoration’s benefits, trigger 
active identification of suitable areas for restoration, 
create enabling conditions, and mobilise the human and 
financial resources needed for restoration at scale. This 
target includes and builds upon the Bonn Challenge, an 
existing voluntary goal of getting 150 million ha of degraded 
forest landscapes into the process of restoration by 2020. 
Restoring 350 million ha by 2030 is consistent with Aichi 
Target 15, which calls for restoring 15% of degraded 
ecosystems,226  and could generate net benefits on the 
general order of US$170 billion per year.227 
www.newclimateeconomy.report
LA
N
D
 U
SE
118
Endnotes
1 World Bank data; see http://data.worldbank.org/topic/agriculture-and-rural-development. [Accessed 16 July 2014.]
2  The World Bank, 2012. Global Monitoring Report 2012: Food Prices, Nutrition, and the Millennium Development Goals. Washington, DC.  
Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/B8CQ09GOZ0.
3  A further 8% of agricultural land is moderately degraded, and the amount is increasing. See: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), 2011. The State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture (SOLAW) – Managing Systems at Risk. Rome.  
Available at: http://www.fao.org/nr/solaw/.
See also work by partners of the Economics of Land Degradation: A Global Initiative for Sustainable Land Management, launched in 2013: 
http://www.eld-initiative.org. [Accessed 29 April 2014.] 
4  Kissinger, G., Herold, M. and de Sy, V., 2012. Drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation: A Synthesis Report for REDD+ Policymakers. Lexeme 
Consulting, Vancouver.  
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/deforestation-and-forest-degradation-drivers-synthesis-report-for-redd-policymakers. 
5  We assume the population growth rate to 2040 to be 0.86% per year, following the UN’s medium-variant estimate to 2050. Similarly, the urban 
population is projected to grow about 1.6% per year over this period, and this can be used as a proxy for growth of the middle class to a lower bound 
of 3 billion. An upper bound is derived from an OECD estimate of 4.9 billion middle class people in 2030.  The central tendency of 4 billion seems 
reasonable, recognising the uncertainties in predicting global household income distribution patterns 15 years in advance.
See: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2013. World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. UN DESA 
Population Division, New York. Available at: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm. 
For the OECD estimate, see: Pezzini, M., 2012. An emerging middle class. OECD Yearbook 2012. 
Available at: http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3681/An_emerging_middle_class.html.
6  The World Bank, 2014. Poverty Overview. Last updated 7 April 2014. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview.
7  The poverty figure is from: The World Bank, 2014. Poverty Overview. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview.  
The hunger figure is from: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2013. The State of Food Insecurity in the World. Rome. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/2013/en/.
8  The classic work on these earlier famines and their drivers remains Sen, A., 1981.  Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.  A comprehensive assessment of why widespread severe hunger continues into the present era can be found 
in: von Braun, J., Vargas Hill, R., and Pandya Lorch, R. (eds.), 2009.  The Poorest and Hungry: Assessments, Analyses and Actions. An IFPRI 2020 Book.  
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Available at: http://www.ifpri.org/publication/poorest-and-hungry.  
9  The average yield of rice in India, for example, more than doubled from 1968–70 to 2010–2012, accounting for nearly 90% of the growth in 
aggregate Indian rice production over the period. Calculated from FAO data at http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat-gateway/go/to/home/E. [Accessed 16 
May 2014.] 
10  Searchinger, T., Hanson, C., Ranganathan, J., Lipinski, B., Waite, R., Winterbottom, R., Dinshaw, A. and Heimlich, R., 2013. Creating a Sustainable 
Food Future: A Menu of Solutions to Sustainably Feed More than 9 Billion People by 2050. World Resources Report 2013-14: Interim Findings. 
World Resources Institute, the World Bank, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
Washington, DC. Available at: http://www.wri.org/publication/creating-sustainable-food-future-interim-findings.
11  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2013. 
OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2014-2023. Paris and Rome. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2014-en.
12  The World Bank, 2007. World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/H999NAVXG0.
13  Available at: http://maplecroft.com/about/news/food_security_risk_index_2013.html.
14  This is based on the period 1961 to 2012 inclusive. See: http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat-gateway/go/to/browse/R/RL/E Accessed 14 August 2014.
15  Houghton, R. A., 2013. The emissions of carbon from deforestation and degradation in the tropics: past trends and future potential. Carbon 
Management, 4(5). 539–546. DOI:10.4155/cmt.13.41.
16  See: http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml. [Accessed 14 August 2014.]
17  IPCC, 2014. Summary for Policymakers. In Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, et al. (eds.). 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York. Available at: http://www.mitigation2014.org.
The IPCC reports net total anthropogenic GHG emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) in 2010 as 10–12 Gt CO
2
e, or 24% 
of all GHG emissions in 2010. The AFOLU chapter further specifies that GHG emissions from agriculture in 2000–2009 were 5.0–5.8 Gt CO
2
e per 
year. See: Smith, P. and Bustamante, M., 2014. Chapter 11: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU). In Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of 
Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. O. Edenhofer, 
R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, et al. (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York. 
Available at: http://www.mitigation2014.org.
18  The 11%  global emissions from the FOLU component of AFOLU is from Searchinger et al., 2013, Creating a Sustainable Food Future, who then 
attribute a further 13% of global GHG emissions to agriculture directly. The estimate of roughly 20% of global emissions from gross deforestation is 
derived from adding estimates from carbon savings from reforestation and afforestation to estimates of emissions from net deforestation in Houghton, 
R. A., 2013. The emissions of carbon from deforestation and degradation in the tropics: past trends and future potential.
BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
LA
N
D
 U
SE
119
19  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2010. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. FAO Forestry Paper 163. Rome. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/fra2010/en/. 
Also see: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2012. Global Forest Land-Use 
Change 1990–2005. By E.J. Lindquist, R. D’Annunzio, A. Gerrand, K. MacDicken, F. Achard, R. Beuchle, A. Brink, H.D. Eva, P. Mayaux, J. San-Miguel-
Ayanz & H-J. Stibig. FAO Forestry Paper 169. Rome. Available at: http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/fra2010/en/.
20  FAO, 2010. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. 
21  The climate change impacts part of the text is based on: IPCC, 2014. Technical Summary. In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. C. B. Field, V. R. Barros, D. J. Dokken, K. J. Mach, M. D. Mastandrea, et al. (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New 
York. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/. 
On crop yields in particular, also see: Porter, J. R., 2014. Chapter 7: Food Security and Food Production Systems. In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. C. B. Field, V. R. Barros, D. J. Dokken, K. J. Mach, M. D. Mastandrea, et al. (eds.). Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/.
The point on linear growth in cereal yields is from Searchinger et al. 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future. The same point with respect to 
population can be observed in the straight line sections of population graphs by year in UN DESA, 2013. World Population Prospects: The 2012 
Revision.
Also see: Skoufias, E. (ed.), 2012. The Poverty and Welfare Impacts of Climate Change: Quantifying the Effects, Identifying the Adaptation Strategies. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-0-8213-9611-7.
22  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2012. Global Forest Land-use Change 1990–2005. Rome. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i3110e/i3110e00.htm.
Houghton, R.A., 2008. Improved estimates of net carbon emissions from land cover change in the tropics for the 1990s. In TRENDS: A Compendium of 
Data on Global Change. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, TN, US. 
Available at: http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/landuse/houghton/houghton.html. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2012. World Energy Outlook 2012. Paris. 
Available at: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publications/weo-2012/.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2012. The Emissions Gap Report 2012. Nairobi, Kenya. 
Available at: http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgap2012/.
US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2012. Annual Energy Outlook 2012 – with Projections to 2035. Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo12/.
23  Watkins, K., 2014 (forthcoming). Climate Risk in African Agriculture – The Case for Adaptive Transformation. New Climate Economy contributing 
paper. Overseas Development Institute, London. To be available at: http://newclimateeconomy.net.
24  Watkins, K., 2014. Climate Risk in African Agriculture.
25  Watkins, K., 2014. Climate Risk in African Agriculture.
26  Watkins, K., 2014. Climate Risk in African Agriculture. The Watkins paper and several cited therein from his ODI colleagues and others at the 
International Food Policy Research Institute make this case in detail for interested readers.
27  Asian Development Bank (ADB) and International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2009. Building Climate Resilience in the Agriculture Sector 
of Asia and the Pacific. Mandaluyong City, Philippines. 
Available at: http://www.adb.org/publications/building-climate-resilience-agriculture-sector-asia-and-pacific.
28  The agricultural and rural development parts of this box are based on Bragança, A., Assunção, J., and Ferraz, C., 2014. The Impacts of Technological 
Change on Agricultural Development: Evidence from the Brazilian Soybean Revolution. PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro. 
Available at: http://www.economia.puc.cl/images/stories/seminarios/BRAGANCA.pdf.  
The results of the 2008 government survey of vegetation loss are at: Ministry of the Environment, 2010. Plano de Ação para Prevenção e Controle do 
Desmatamento e das Queimadas no Cerrado (PPCerrado), Revised Version, September.  
Available at: http://www.mma.gov.br/florestas/controle-e-preven%C3%A7%C3%A3o-do-desmatamento/plano-de-a%C3%A7%C3%A3o-para-
cerrado-%E2%80%93-ppcerrado. 
For a discussion of biodiversity and carbon intensity in the Brazilian Cerrado and the impact of soybean development, see:  WWF-UK, 2011. Soya and 
the Cerrado: Brazil’s Forgotten Jewel.  Available at: http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/soya_and_the_cerrado.pdf. 
For recent scientific work on the carbon cost of soy development in the Cerrado, see, e.g.: Persson, U. M., Henders, S. and Cederberg, C., 2014. A 
method for calculating a land-use change carbon footprint (LUC-CFP) for agricultural commodities – applications to Brazilian beef and soy, Indonesian 
palm oil. Global Change Biology (early view article published 14 June). DOI:10.1111/gcb.12635.
29  Marker-assisted selection (MAS) is a biotechnology used in plant or animal breeding whereby a marker (morphological, biochemical or one based on 
DNA/RNA variation) is used for indirect selection of a trait of interest (e.g. productivity, disease resistance, abiotic stress tolerance, or quality). 
30  See http://www.c4rice.irri.org for details, and also Chapter 7: Innovation.
31  See: The new green revolution: A bigger rice bowl. The Economist, 10 May 2014. 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21601815-another-green-revolution-stirring-worlds-paddy-fields-bigger-rice-bowl. Rice in 
particular is a crop that farmers can replant from their own harvests without yield loss, so it is hard to recover the cost of private breeding.
www.newclimateeconomy.report
LA
N
D
 U
SE
120
32  The World Bank, 2012. Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided. Report for the World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, Washington, DC. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17862361/.
33  The International Rice Research Institute has a research programme to investigate this potential specifically; 
see http://irri.org/our-impact/tackling-climate-change/addressing-water-scarcity-through-awd.
34  For a discussion of SRI and other pertinent case studies of triple wins, see: Cooper, P.J.M., Cappiello, S., Vermeulen, S.J., Campbell, B.M., Zougmoré, 
R. and Kinyangi, J., 2013. Large-Scale Implementation of Adaptation and Mitigation Actions in Agriculture. CCAFS Working Paper No. 50. CGIAR 
Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security, Copenhagen. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10568/33279.
35  See FAO (2009). Food Security and Agricultural Mitigation in Developing Countries: Options for capturing synergies. Rome, FAO.
36  Global milled rice production is forecast to be 500 million tonnes in 2014 (90% in Asia), export priced at approximately US$400 per tonne (as of May 
2014). Prices are for the benchmark Thai 100% B grade. See: http://www.amis-outlook.org. World rice markets are thin (about 7% of production), so 
this example assumes that increases in market supply occur gradually over, say, 15 years.
37  Based on 70% of fresh water being used by agriculture and rice using 40% of all agricultural freshwater. See FAO, 2011. The State of the World’s 
Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture (SOLAW). However, it is not clear how water not used would be available for other human use at 
the time available. Decreased fertiliser use would presumably decrease emissions, but it is hard to say by how much on a net basis.
38  Beintema, N., Stads, G.-J., Fuglie, K., and Heisey, P., 2012. ASTI Global Assessment of Agricultural R&D Spending. International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington, DC, and Global Forum on Agricultural Research, Rome.
 Available at: http://www.ifpri.org/publication/asti-global-assessment-agricultural-rd-spending.
39  See: http://www.cgiar.org/resources/cgiarannual-reports/ and http://www.asti.cgiar.org/pdf/China-Note.pdf.
40  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2013. Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2013. Paris. 
Available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/agr_pol-2013-en.
41  “Government Appropriations of Budget Outlays for R&D”, 2013 or latest year available, extracted from OECD.stat on 22 May 2014.
42  Raitzer, D. A. and Kelley, T. G., 2008. Benefit–cost meta-analysis of investment in the International Agricultural Research Centers of the CGIAR. 
Agricultural Systems, 96(1–3). 108–123. DOI:10.1016/j.agsy.2007.06.004.
43  Following its complete structural reform in 2011, CGIAR needs, and is capable of using well, a significantly higher amount of support, especially 
through its unrestricted funding window. 
44  Searchinger et al., 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future.
45  Zhang, W., Dou, Z., He, P., Ju, X.-T., Powlson, D., et al., 2013. New technologies reduce greenhouse gas emissions from nitrogenous fertilizer in China. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(21). 8375–8380. DOI:10.1073/pnas.1210447110.
46  Gale, F., 2013. Growth and Evolution in China’s Agricultural Support Policies. Economic Research Service Report No. 153. US Department of 
Agriculture. Available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err-economic-research-report/err153.aspx.
47  Grossman, N., and Carlson, D., 2011. Agriculture Policy in India: The Role of Input Subsidies. USITC Executive Briefings on Trade.
48  OECD, 2013. Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2013.
49  Zhang et al., 2013. New technologies reduce greenhouse gas emissions from nitrogenous fertilizer in China. 
50  Hoda. A., 2014. Low Carbon Strategies for India in Agriculture and Forestry. Unpublished paper presented at The Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations (ICRIER) Workshop on the New Climate Economy, ICRIER, India Habitat Center, New Delhi, 15 April.
51  The World Bank, 2007. World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/H999NAVXG0.
52  Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). 2013. Africa Agriculture Status Report: Focus on Staple Crops. Nairobi. 
Available at: http://agra-alliance.org/download/533977a50dbc7/.
53  See: http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat-gateway/go/to/download/R/RL/E.
54  See The World Bank, 2007, World Development Report 2008, 150-153, for a discussion of when and how fertiliser subsidies make sense in Africa.
55  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2013. 
OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2013-2022. Paris and Rome. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/site/oecd-faoagriculturaloutlook/.
56  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2014. 
OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2014-2023. Paris and Rome.  Available at: http://www.oecd.org/site/oecd-faoagriculturaloutlook/meat.htm.  
57  Delgado, C., Rosegrant, M., Steinfeld, H., Ehuis, S., and Courbois, C., 1999. Livestock to 2020: The Next Food Revolution. Food, Agriculture and the 
Environment Discussion Paper 28. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. 
Available at: https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/333/dp28.pdf.
Delgado, C., Narrod, C.A., Tiongco, M.M., et al., 2008. Determinants and Implications of the Growing Scale of Livestock Farms in Four Fast-Growing 
Developing Countries. IFPRI Research Report 157 International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pubs/abstract/157/rr157.pdf. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2013. Food Outlook. June. Rome. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/al999e/al999e.pdf.
BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
LA
N
D
 U
SE
121
58  For the golden age of grain-fed livestock growth in Asia, see Delgado et al., 2008. Determinants and Implications of the Growing Scale of Livestock 
Farms in Four Fast-Growing Developing Countries. 
59  The current annual projections by the USDA to 2023 confirm the outlook for high cattle prices in response to projected developing country demand, 
but also project maize prices in 2023 at roughly half their 2010-2012 levels. 
(See http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/oce-usda-agricultural-projections/oce141.aspx, accessed 12 August 2014). 
A less optimistic view of feed prices from the perspective of livestock producers is found in: Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, 2014. U.S. 
Baseline Briefing Book: Projections for Agricultural and Biofuel Markets. FAPRI-UM Report #02-14, March. 
Available at: http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/outreach/publications/2014/FAPRI_MU_Report_02_14.pdf. 
Also see the caution on future feed costs in Schulz, L., 2013. Agricultural Cycles: Livestock Market Assessment and Long-term Prospective (Beef Cattle 
and Hogs). Iowa State University. Available at: https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/info/agcycles/schulz.pdf.
60  Ruminants are mammals that are able to acquire nutrients from cellulose in plants – but in the process, they produce a lot of gas (methane), which 
they burp out. See: Gerber, P. J., Steinfeld, H., Henderson, B., Mottet, A., Opio, C., Dijkman, J., Falcucci, A. and Tempio, G., 2013. Tackling Climate Change 
through Livestock: A Global Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Opportunities. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/resources/en/publications/tackling_climate_change/.
61  Assunção, J., and Heller, T., 2013. Production and Protection: A First Look at Key Challenges in Brazil. CPI Report. Climate Policy Initiative and 
Nucleo de Avaliacao de Politicas Climaticas (PUC), Rio de Janeiro. 
Available at: http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/production-protection-a-first-look-at-key-challenges-in-brazil/.
62  A recent analysis of a 2006 survey of municipalities with small farms in Brazil showed that average net farm revenue per hectare employed in 
beef production was 29% higher, and per ha employed in dairy was 72% higher, in municipalities with higher-than-average lime use compared with 
municipalities with lower-than-average lime use. The additions to average income were BRL 550 and BRL 690/ha respectively (about US$275 to $345/
ha as of this writing); the average cost of lime applied is about US$50/ha. See: Assunção, J., Gandour, C., Hemsley, P., Rocha, R. and Szerman, D., 2013. 
Production & Protection: A First Look at Key Challenges in Brazil. CPI Report. Climate Policy Initiative. 
Available at: http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/production-protection-a-first-look-at-key-challenges-in-brazil/. 
63  Searchinger et al., 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future. 
64  Assunção et al., 2013. Production & Protection. Another, global study finds little evidence that increased technological capacity to intensify is 
associated with increased deforestation; see: Villoria, N. B., Byerlee, D. and Stevenson, J., 2014. The Effects of Agricultural Technological Progress on 
Deforestation: What Do We Really Know? Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 36(2). 211–237. DOI:10.1093/aepp/ppu005.
65  Enteric methane (CH4) emissions are the main component of ruminant emissions, but the share of enteric CH4 is nearly double in % terms per head 
of cattle in South Asia compared with Eastern Europe (and CO
2
e emitted is five times greater). Other sources of livestock emissions include manure, 
feed production, land use change, energy, and post-farm handling; see Gerber et al., 2013. Tackling Climate Change through Livestock.
66  Gerber et al., 2013. Tackling Climate Change through Livestock. The low end assumes that there is little or no market value to reducing emissions, 
but there are efficiency savings from the technologies in question.
67  Personal communication from Dr. Pierre Gerber.
68  Although demand for individual meats is typically quite responsive to price changes (of the order of 1% decrease in consumption in response to a 1% 
rise in own-price), meats of different kinds are good substitutes, and consumption tends to shift to cheaper meats rather than to other foods. 
See: Wohlgenant, M.K., 1985. Estimating Cross Elasticities of Demand for Beef. Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, 10(2): 322–329. Available 
at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40987719. If anything, the measured effects in this classic paper have likely been amplified by the increased consumer 
acceptance of chicken and leaner pork for health reasons in recent years.
69  Delgado et al., 1999. Livestock to 2020. See also: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2011. Global Livestock Production 
Systems. Rome. Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2414e/i2414e00.htm. By 2005, developing countries produced 72% of all poultry, 65% 
of which under intensive (industrial or larger-scale) conditions, and 76% of swine, 57% of which are in intensive systems.
70  Eggs in India are a case in point. India is the world’s fourth largest producer and exporter, with production of 70 billion eggs in 2013, up from 27 
billion in 1996. Egg producers are particularly vulnerable to transaction costs. In Hyderabad, the centre of the Indian egg zone, egg margins were at 
most 4% for independent producers in the early 1980s, but daily wholesale prices typically could fluctuate by 10%. Without contractual arrangements 
or advance information, independent producers and especially smaller ones could easily lose their investment. The industry stagnated. Then the 
creation of an active producer association in the early 1980s and the rapid rise of vertical coordination through contract farming since led to the 
industry growing at 8% per annum for 20 years with a current annual turnover of US$4 billion at wholesale prices. In 2007, there were 200,000 layer 
and broiler contractors in India, with more than half having 10, 000 birds or less, and only 10% were larger farms of more than 50,000 birds at any one 
time. See Mehta, R., and Nambiar, R., 2007. The Poultry Industry in India, FAO Corporate Document Repository, Rome. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/lead/x6170e/x6170e2k.htm.
71  Animal products are highly perishable, especially in the tropics; quality differences among producers are often large and hard to observe without 
destroying the product. It is also hard to brand smallholder products outside of the village setting, and thus to establish trust in quality and safety 
in continually larger, more anonymous markets outside the village. See Delgado et al., 2008. Determinants and Implications of the Growing Scale of 
Livestock Farms in Four Fast-Growing Developing Countries. 
72  FAO, 2013. Food Outlook. 
73  Calculated from parameters in Gerber et al., 2013, Tackling Climate Change through Livestock, assuming both that milk consumption is unchanged 
and that beef herds are reduced commensurately with the decline in beef consumption.
74  US Department of Agriculture (USDA), 2013. Livestock and Poultry: World Markets and Trade. Foreign Agricultural Service, Washington, DC. 
November. Available at: http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/fas/livestock-poultry-ma//2010s/2013/livestock-poultry-ma-11-08-2013.pdf.
Fish data (2012) from: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2014. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (SOFIA).
www.newclimateeconomy.report
LA
N
D
 U
SE
122
Rome. Available at: http://www.fao.org/fishery/sofia/en.
75  Ibid.
76  The largest is JBS of Brazil, with revenues of US$38.7 billion in 2012. See: Heinrich Boll Stiftung and Friends of the Earth-Europe, 2014. Meat Atlas: 
Facts and Figures About the Animals We Eat. Berlin. Available at: http://www.boell.de/en/2014/01/07/meat-atlas.
77  See http://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com.
78  See the National Audit Office summary: http://www.nao.org.uk/press-releases/the-2001-outbreak-of-foot-and-mouth-disease-2/.
79  For further discussion, see the website of the World Organisation for Animal Health: http://www.oie.int. See also: Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO), 2012. Mapping Supply and Demand for Animal-Source Foods to 2030. By T.P. Robinson and F. Pozzi. Animal Production 
and Health Working Paper No. 2. Rome. Available at: http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/resources/en/glw/GLW_supply.html.
80  Source for this and subsequent discussion is: USDA, 2014. Livestock and Poultry, except on the lifting of the ban on Brazilian beef imports. For the 
latter, see: Bedington, E., 2014. China lifts Brazilian beef ban. Global Meat News, 22 July. 
Available at: http://www.globalmeatnews.com/Industry-Markets/BSE-ban-on-Brazilian-beef-lifted-by-china-Australian-concerns. 
81  FAO, 2011. The State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture (SOLAW). A further 8% of agricultural land is moderately 
degraded, and the amount is increasing. 
82  Based on work by partners of the Economics of Land Degradation: A Global Initiative for Sustainable Land Management launched in 2013 and based 
at the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, reported on at http://www.eld-initiative.org. [Accessed 29 April 2014.] Scientific 
coordination of the ELD initiative is provided by the United Nations University – Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH). UNEP, 
IUCN, and The International Food Policy Research Institute are key technical partners.
83  Berry, L., Olson, J., & Campbell, D., 2003. Assessing the extent, cost and impact of land degradation at the national level: findings and lessons learned 
from seven pilot case studies. Global Mechanism. global-mechanism.org/dynamic/documents/document_file/cost-of-land-degradation-case-studies.pdf
84  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2010. “Climate-Smart” Agriculture: Policies, Practices and Financing for Food 
Security, Adaptation and Mitigation. Rome. Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1881e/i1881e00.htm.
85  World Resources Institute, 2008. World Resources 2008: Roots of Resilience – Growing the Wealth of the Poor. Produced by WRI in collaboration 
with United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, and the World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.wri.org/publication/world-resources-2008.
86  The 100 kg/ha increase in grain yields for participating households is reported in: Pye-Smith, C., 2013. The Quiet Revolution: how Niger’s farmers are 
re-greening the parklands of the Sahel. ICRAF Trees for Change, No. 12. World Agroforestry Center, Nairobi. 
Available at: http://www.worldagroforestry.org/downloads/publications/PDFs/BL17569.PDF.
The 100 kg/ha yield increase is also reported in Reij, C., Tappan, G., and Smale, M., 2009.  Agroenvironmental Transformation in the Sahel: Another Kind 
of “Green Revolution”.  IFPRI Discussion Paper 914.  International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.  
Accessible at:  http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp00914.pdf.  
The IFPRI source reports the number of participating households as 1.25 million, although this may include some in Niger from outside the Maradi and 
Zinder regions, and a million is a more reasonable approximation.
Grain yields in the Maradi and Zinder regions in 2010 can be found at: 
http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaires_Statistiques/Annuaire_ins_2011/agriculture.pdf.
87  Sendzimir, J., Reij, C. P. and Magnuszewski, P., 2011. Rebuilding Resilience in the Sahel: Regreening in the Maradi and Zinder Regions of Niger. 
Ecology and Society, 16(3), Art. 1. DOI:10.5751/ES-04198-160301. 
And: Pye-Smith, C., 2013. The Quiet Revolution: how Niger’s farmers are re-greening the parklands of the Sahel. ICRAF Trees for Change, No. 12. 
World Agroforestry Center, Nairobi. Available at: http://www.worldagroforestry.org/downloads/publications/PDFs/BL17569.PDF.
88  Lee, K., 2013. Saemaul Undong and Forest Rehabilitation in Korea: Saemaul income boosting project and the role of the Village Forestry Cooperative. 
Seoul: MOSF; Korea Saemaul Undong Center: KDI School.
89  The Korea Economic Daily, interview with Jeffrey Sachs: “Korea had better invest in Africa.” 12 December 2013.
90  Rozelle, S., Veeck, G. and Huang, J., 1997. The Impact of Environmental Degradation on Grain Production in China, 1975–1990*. Economic 
Geography, 73(1). 44–66. DOI:10.1111/j.1944-8287.1997.tb00084.x.
91  There are conflicting estimates of the area of the Loess Plateau, ranging from 620,000 to about 648,000 km2 in literature reviewed for this study. 
Here we use the 640,000 km2 area cited by the World Bank in its project summary – 
available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2007/03/15/restoring-chinas-loess-plateau – and in this case study, which summarises and 
builds on the World Bank’s project reports: 
Xie, M., Li, J., Asquith, N., Tyson, J., Kleine, A. and Huan, Y., 2010. Rehabilitating a Degraded Watershed: A Case Study from China’s Loess Plateau. World 
Bank Institute, Climate Change Unit, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/0928313-03-31-10.pdf.
92  Huang, M., Gallichand, J. and Zhang, P., 2003. Runoff and Sediment Responses to Conservation Practices: Loess Plateau of China. Journal of the 
American Water Resources Association, 39(5). 1197–1207. DOI:10.1111/j.1752-1688.2003.tb03702.x.
93  See the World Bank project summary: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2007/03/15/restoring-chinas-loess-plateau.
94  Dang, Y., Ren, W., Tao, B., Chen, G., Lu, C., et al., 2014. Climate and Land Use Controls on Soil Organic Carbon in the Loess Plateau Region of China. 
PLoS ONE, 9(5). e95548. DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0095548.
BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
LA
N
D
 U
SE
123
95  Xie et al., 2010. Rehabilitating a Degraded Watershed. 
96  Cooper et al., 2013. Large-Scale Implementation of Adaptation and Mitigation Actions in Agriculture.
97  Winterbottom, R., Reij, C., Garrity, D., Glover, J., Hellums, D., McGahuey, M. and Scherr, S., 2013. Improving Land and Water Management. Creating a 
Sustainable Food Future, Installment Four. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.wri.org/publication/improving-land-and-water-management.
98  Shames, S., Kissinger, G. and Clarvis, M. H., 2014. Global Review: Integrated Landscape Investment – Synthesis Report. In Financing Strategies 
for Integrated Landscape Investment. S. Shames (ed.). EcoAgriculture Partners, on behalf of the Landscapes for People, Food and Nature Initiative, 
Washington, DC. Available at: http://landscapes.ecoagriculture.org/documents/financing_strategies_for_integrated_landscape_investment.
99 For more information about Projet Pur, see: http://www.purprojet.com.
100  Lipinski, B., Hanson, C., Waite, R., Searchinger, T., Lomax, J. and Kitinoja, L., 2013. Reducing Food Loss and Waste. Creating a Sustainable Food 
Future, Installment Two. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.wri.org/publication/reducing-food-loss-and-waste.
101  WRAP, 2013. Household Food and Drink Waste in the United Kingdom 2012. Waste & Resources Action Programme, Banbury, Oxon, UK. Available 
at: http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/hhfdw-2012-summary.pdf.
102   Buzby, J. C., Wells, H. F. and Hyman, J., 2014. The Estimated Amount, Value, and Calories of Postharvest Food Losses at the Retail and Consumer 
Levels in the United States. Economic Information Bulletin No. EIB-121. US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/eib-economic-information-bulletin/eib121.aspx#.U_LTHfldUfE.
103  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2013. Food Wastage Footprint: Impacts on Natural Resources. Rome.
Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3347e/i3347e.pdf.
104  See: Lipinski et al., 2013, Reducing Food Loss and Waste; WRAP, 2013, Household Food and Drink Waste in the United Kingdom 2012; and: WRAP, 
2013. Reducing Household Food Waste in the UK. Information sheet. Waste & Resources Action Programme, Banbury, Oxon, UK. 
Available at: http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/Information%20sheet%20-%20reducing%20household%20food%20waste%20in%20the%20
UK%202012_0.pdf.
105  Kummu, M., de Moel, H., Porkka, M., Siebert, S., Varis, O. and Ward, P. J., 2012. Lost food, wasted resources: Global food supply chain losses and their 
impacts on freshwater, cropland, and fertiliser use. Science of the Total Environment, 438. 477–489. DOI:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2012.08.092.
106  Kummu et al., 2012. Lost food, wasted resources. 
107  FAO, 2013. Food Wastage Footprint.
108  WRAP, 2013. Reducing Household Food Waste in the UK. 
109  Golob, P., 2006. Protection of Grain from Farm Storage in Africa. UK Department for International Development. 
Available at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Output/56403/Default.aspx.
110  Grace, J., Ugbe, U., and Sanni. A., 2012. Innovations in the Cowpea Sector of Northern Nigeria: Research Into Use Nigeria. Presentation. Cited in 
Lipinski et al., 2013. Reducing Food Loss and Waste, Figure 7.
111  Britton, E., Brigdon, A., Parry, A., and LeRoux, S., 2014. Econometric Modelling and Household Food Waste. Waste & Resources Action Programme 
(WRAP), Banbury, Oxon, UK. Available at: http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/Econometrics%20Report.pdf.
112  Authors’ calculations based on Searchinger et al., 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future.
113  Searchinger et al., 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future.
114  Estimates of the ratio of energy inputs to energy outputs for sugarcane ethanol vary; it is commonly given as 8:1, but a more recent analysis 
suggests it is lower, 3.7:1, but still more than triple the same study’s estimated ratio for maize ethanol, 1.1:1. See: Dias de Oliveira, M. E., Vaughan, B. E. 
and Rykiel, E. J., 2005. Ethanol as Fuel: Energy, Carbon Dioxide Balances, and Ecological Footprint. BioScience, 55(7). 593–602. DOI:10.1641/0006-
3568(2005)055[0593:EAFECD]2.0.CO;2.
See also: Wang, M., Han, J., Dunn, J. B., Cai, H. and Elgowainy, A., 2012. Well-to-wheels energy use and greenhouse gas emissions of ethanol from maize, 
sugarcane and cellulosic biomass for US use. Environmental Research Letters, 7(4). 045905. DOI:10.1088/1748-9326/7/4/045905.
115  High Level Panel on Food Security (HLPFS). 2013. Biofuels and Food Security. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i2952e.pdf. 
See also: Westhof, P., 2010. The Economics of Food: How Feeding and Fueling the Planet Affects Food Prices. FT Press, Upper Sadle River, NJ, US. 
Available at: http://www.ftpress.com/store/economics-of-food-how-feeding-and-fueling-the-planet-9780137006106.
116  Many observers commented on this in 2008. Flexible mandates help avoid harmful food price spikes and facilitate the management of shocks. See 
also: The World Bank, 2012. Responding to Higher and More Volatile World Food Prices. Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/01/16355176/responding-higher-more-volatile-world-food-prices.
117  Searchinger et al., 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future.
118  International Energy Agency, 2013. World Energy Outlook 2013. Paris. Available at: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publications/weo-2013/.
119  Roberts, M. J. and Schlenker, W., 2013. Identifying Supply and Demand Elasticities of Agricultural Commodities: Implications for the US Ethanol 
Mandate. American Economic Review, 103(6). 2265–2295. DOI:10.1257/aer.103.6.2265. 
www.newclimateeconomy.report
LA
N
D
 U
SE
124
This is likely to continue to be the case; see: Roberts, M.J., and Tran, A.N., 2013. Conditional Suspension of the US Ethanol Mandate Using Threshold 
Price Inside a Competitive Storage Model. Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Associations 2013 AAEA 
& CAES Joint Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 4-6 August 2013.  
Available at: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/150717/2/AAEA2013_Tran.pdf.
120  Complex institutional details are key to achieving this goal; see, for example, Rostberg, C.J., and Johnson, F.X., 2014. The Path Not Yet Taken: 
Bilateral Trade Agreements to Promote Sustainable Biofuels Under the EU Renewable Energy Directive. The Environmental Law Reporter, 44(7). 
10607. Available at: http://elr.info/news-analysis/44/10607/path-not-yet-taken-bilateral-trade-agreements-promote-sustainable-biofuels-un.
121  High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, 2013. Biofuels and Food Security. HLPE Report No. 5. Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i2952e.pdf.
122  Authors’ calculations based on Searchinger et al., 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future.
123  International Energy Agency (IEA), 2011. Technology Roadmap: Biofuels for Transport. Paris. 
Available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/biofuels_roadmap.pdf. 
See also: Searchinger et al.. 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future.
124  Malins, C., Searle, S., Baral, A., Turley, D. and Hopwood, L., 2014. Wasted: Europe’s Untapped Resource – An Assessment of Advanced Biofuels from 
Wastes & Residues. International Council on Clean Transportation, Institute for European Environmental Policy and NNFCC. 
Available at: http://europeanclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WASTED-final.pdf.
125  Overweight is defined as having a body mass index (BMI) of 25 or higher, and obese, as 30 or higher. The BMI is the ratio of a person’s weight, in 
kg, divided by the square of the person’s height in metres. See: World Health Organization, 2014. Obesity and Overweight. Fact Sheet No. 311. Last 
reviewed May 2014. Available at: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/. 
126  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 2010. Obesity and the Economics of Prevention: Fit not Fat. Paris. 
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/health/fitnotfat.
127  Searchinger et al., 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future.
128  Horton, S., Shekar, M., McDonald, C., Mahal, A., and Krystene Brooks, J., 2010. Scaling Up Nutrition: What Will it Cost? The World Bank, 
Washington, DC. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/.
129  Angelsen, A. and Kaimowitz, D., eds., 2001. Agricultural Technologies and Tropical Deforestation. CABI Publishing in association with CIFOR, 
Wallingford, UK. Available at: http://www.cifor.org/library/1068/agricultural-technologies-and-tropical-deforestation/. 
See also: Searchinger, T., 2012. The Food, Forest and Carbon Challenge. National Wildlife Federation, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/Global-Warming/Reports/TheFoodForestandCarbonChallenge.ashx.
130  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2014. State of the World’s Forests 2014: Enhancing the Socioeconomic Benefits 
from Forests. Rome. Available at: http://www.fao.org/forestry/sofo/.
See also: IEA, 2012. World Energy Outlook 2012.
131  WWF, 2012. Chapter 4: Forests and Wood Products, In WWF Living Forest Report. Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/conservation/forests/publications/living_forests_report/.
132  The precise figure given is US$6,120; it includes the following goods and services from forests: food, water, raw materials such as timber, genetic 
resources, medicinal resources, improved air quality, climate regulation, regulation of water flows, waste treatment, water purification, erosion 
prevention, recreation, and tourism. See: TEEB, 2009. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) Climate Issues Update. 
Available at: http://www.teebweb.org/publication/climate-issues-update/. 
133  The notion of “Produce and Protect” is laid out in: Assunção, J., and Heller, T., 2013. Production and Protection: A First Look at Key Challenges in 
Brazil. CPI Report. Climate Policy Initiative and Nucleo de Avaliacao de Politicas Climaticas (PUC), Rio de Janeiro. 
Available at: http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/production-protection-a-first-look-at-key-challenges-in-brazil/. 
Brazilian crop and agricultural export growth is from FAO. http://faostat.fao.org. [Accessed 25 March 2014.] Additional details on implementation 
of Brazilian forest policy, through the use of remote sensing to aid law enforcement, are found in Assunção, J., Gandour, C., and Rocha, R., 2013. 
DETERring Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Environmental Monitoring and Law Enforcement, CPI Report. Climate Policy Initiative and Nucleo 
de Avaliacao de Politicas Climaticas (PUC), Rio de Janeiro. 
Available at: http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/deterring-deforestation-in-the-brazilian-amazon-environmental-monitoring-and-law-
enforcement/. 
A more recent update from the Brazilian space agency is in: INPE/MCTI, 2014. PRODES Project: Monitoring of Brazilian Amazon Rainforest Satellite. 
In Portuguese. http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.php. 
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon in 2013 increased by 28% relative to 2012 levels. That said, the amount of forest area deforested in 2013 
still was 69% lower than that in 2005. At the time of publication, it is not yet clear whether or not this is an anomaly or an indication of a new trend. 
Furthermore, the decline in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon from 2005-2012 appears to be part of a wider decline in forest clearing for the 
nation as a whole. The amount of gross “tree cover loss” (which includes conversion to agriculture, logging for timber, and felling of tree plantations) in 
all of Brazil declined by 30% between 2005 and 2012, according to Global Forest Watch. 
See: http://www.globalforestwatch.org/country/BRA. [Accessed 12 August 2014.]
134  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2010. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. Rome. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra2010/.
135  Eliasch, J., 2008. Climate Change: Financing Global Forests – the Eliasch Review. Her Majesty’s Government, London. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228833/9780108507632.pdf.
BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
LA
N
D
 U
SE
125
136  FAO, 2014. State of the World’s Forests 2014.
137  FAO, 2014. State of the World’s Forests 2014. Note that the benefits here and in the previous bullet relate primarily to legitimate revenue 
generation, but a recent report also estimated the cost of illegal logging and other illegal extraction of forest products globally at US$30–100 billion per 
year, representing not only a loss of national natural capital, but also significant lost tax revenue. This can be compared with total official development 
assistance for all purposes of US$135 billion in 2013. 
See: Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Raxter, P., Ash, N., and Mrema, E. (eds.), 2014. The Environmental Crime Crisis: Threats to Sustainable Development 
from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources. A UNEP Rapid Response Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme 
and GRID-Arendal, Nairobi and Arendal. Available at: http://www.unep.org/unea/docs/RRAcrimecrisis.pdf.
138  Hanson, C., Yonavjak, L., Clarke, C., Minnemeyer, S., Boisrobert, L., Leach, A. and Schleeweis, K., 2010. Southern Forests for the Future. World 
Resources Institute, Washington, DC. Available at: http://www.wri.org/publication/southern-forests-future.
139  FAO, 2014. State of the World’s Forests 2014.
140  Pye-Smith, C., 2013. The Quiet Revolution: How Niger’s farmers are re-greening the parklands of the Sahel. ICRAF Trees for Change No.12. World 
Agroforestry Centre, Nairobi. Available at: http://worldagroforestry.org/newsroom/highlights/niger%E2%80%99s-re-greening-revolution.
141  Ricketts, T.H., Daily, G.C., Ehrlich, P.R. and Michener, C.D., 2004. Economic value of tropical forest to coffee production. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 101(34). 12579–12582. DOI:10.1073/pnas.0405147101.
142  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2013. Forests and Water: International Momentum and Action. Rome. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i3129e/i3129e.pdf.
143  FAO, 2014. State of the World’s Forests 2014.
144  US Forest Service, 2013. National Visitor Use Monitoring Results. USDA Forest Service National Summary Report. Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.fs.fed.us/recreation/programs/nvum/2012%20National_Summary_Report_061413.pdf.
145  Bien, A. 2010. Forest-based ecotourism in Costa Rica as a driver for positive social and environmental development. Unasylva 61(236), 49-53. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1758e/i1758e12.pdf.
146  Hanson et al., 2010. Southern Forests for the Future.
147  Hanson et al., 2010. Southern Forests for the Future.
148  United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2008. Opportunities in Environmental Management for Disaster Risk Reduction: Recent 
Progress. Geneva. Available at: http://postconflict.unep.ch/download/DRR_platform/opp_DRR.pdf.
149  Hanson et al., 2010. Southern Forests for the Future.
150  Fu, B., Wang, Y. K., Xu, P. and Yan, K., 2013. Mapping the flood mitigation services of ecosystems – A case study in the Upper Yangtze River Basin. 
Ecological Engineering, 52. 238–246. DOI:10.1016/j.ecoleng.2012.11.008.
151  United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2011. Forests in a Green Economy. Nairobi. 
Available at: http://www.unep.org/pdf/PressReleases/UNEP-ForestsGreenEco-basse_def_version_normale.pdf.
152  Hanson et al., 2010. Southern Forests for the Future.
153  Hanson et al., 2010. Southern Forests for the Future.
154  Pan, Y., Birdsey, R. A., Fang, J., Houghton, R., Kauppi, P. E., et al., 2011. A Large and Persistent Carbon Sink in the World’s Forests. Science, 333(6045). 
988–993. DOI:10.1126/science.1201609.
155  Eggleston, S., Buendia, L., Miwa, K., Ngara, T. and Tanabe, K., eds., 2006. Volume 4: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use. In 2006 IPCC 
Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Published by the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies on behalf of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, Hayama, Japan. Available at: http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol4.html. Table 4.12, Table 5.1, and Table 6.4.
156  Unless otherwise specified, the material in this box is based on: Houghton, R.A., 2013. The emissions of carbon from deforestation and degradation 
in the tropics: past trends and future potential. Carbon Management, 4(5). 539–546. DOI:10.4155/cmt.13.41.
See also: Le Quéré, C., Peters, G. P., Andres, R. J., Andrew, R. M., Boden, T. A., et al., 2014. Global carbon budget 2013. Earth System Science Data, 6(1). 
235–263. DOI:10.5194/essd-6-235-2014.
157  Houghton, R.A., 2013. The emissions of carbon from deforestation and degradation in the tropics: past trends and future potential. 
158  IPCC, 2014. Summary for Policymakers. (IPCC AR5, Working Group III.) 
159  Spracklen, D.V., Arnold, S.R. and Taylor, C.M., 2012. Observations of increased tropical rainfall preceded by air passage over forests. Nature, 
489(7415). 282–285. DOI:10.1038/nature11390. 
Ellison, D., N. Futter, M. and Bishop, K., 2012. On the forest cover–water yield debate: from demand- to supply-side thinking. Global Change Biology, 
18(3). 806–820. DOI:10.1111/j.1365-2486.2011.02589.x.
160  Spracklen et al., 2012. Observations of increased tropical rainfall.
161  United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2011. UNEP Year Book 2011: Emerging Issues in Our Global Environment. Nairobi. 
Available at: http://www.unep.org/yearbook/2011/. 
US Agency for International Development (USAID), 2014. Conserving Biodiversity and Forests. Washington, DC. Last updated 9 July 2014. 
Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/biodiversity. 
www.newclimateeconomy.report
LA
N
D
 U
SE
126
162  Costanza, R., de Groot, R., Sutton, P., van der Ploeg, S., Anderson, S.J., Kubiszewski, I., Farber, S. and Turner, R.K., 2014. Changes in the global value of 
ecosystem services. Global Environmental Change, 26. 152–158. DOI:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.04.002.
163  This figure is the gross amount of forest converted. The amount of deforestation net of reforestation and afforestation was 5.2 million ha per year 
on average during the 2000–2010 period. See: FAO, 2010. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. 
164  Markku, S., 2009. Forest Degradation: The Unattended Party in REDD+. UN-REDD Programme Newsletter, Issue #5, December 2009/January 
2010. Available at http://www.un-redd.org/Admin/Newsletter5_Forest_Degradation/tabid/2898/language/en-US/Default.aspx
165  See the Forest Legality Alliance website, http://www.forestlegality.org/.
166  Smith, A., 2012. Gibson Guitar in settlement on illegal wood imports. CNN Money, 7 August. 
Available at: http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/06/news/companies/gibson-imports-wood/.
167  Rubin, B. F. and Banjo, S., 2013. Federal Authorities Raid Lumber Liquidators Headquarters. Wall Street Journal, 27 September. Business. 
Available at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303342104579101042712448428.
168  McKinsey & Company. 2009. Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy: Version 2 of the Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve. Washington, 
DC. Available at: https://solutions.mckinsey.com/ClimateDesk/default.aspx.
169  Nearly all net positive greenhouse gas emissions from land use change are from the tropics and the majority are from deforestation. Forest 
degradation (as opposed to deforestation and emissions from draining and burning peatlands) only accounts for 15-35% of net land use change 
emissions. See: Houghton, 2013. The emissions of carbon from deforestation and degradation in the tropics.
170  The estimate of roughly 20% of global emissions from gross deforestation is derived from adding estimates from carbon savings from reforestation 
and afforestation to estimates of emissions from net deforestation in Houghton, R. A., 2013. The emissions of carbon from deforestation and 
degradation in the tropics: past trends and future potential; the 11% estimate of total global emissions from the FOLU component of AFOLU is from 
Searchinger et al. 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future. The two sources are consistent with each other on net emissions from deforestation.
171  Rautner, M., Leggett, M., and Davis, F., 2013. The Little Book of Big Deforestation Drivers, Global Canopy Programme, Oxford.  
Available at: http://www.globalcanopy.org/LittleBookofDrivers.
172  Geist, H.J., and Lambin, E.F., 2001. What Drives Tropical Deforestation? A meta-analysis of proximate and underlying causes of deforestation based 
on subnational case study evidence. Land-Use and Land-Cover Change (LUCC) Project, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
Available at: http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~luedeke/lucc4.pdf.
173  Stevens, C., Winterbottom, R., Reytar, K. and Springer, J., 2014. Securing Rights, Combating Climate Change: How Strengthening Community Forest 
Rights Mitigates Climate Change. World Resources Institute and Rights and Resources Initiative, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.wri.org/securingrights.
174  Kissinger et al., 2012. Drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation.
175  GDP data from the World Bank, n.d. GDP (2005$ constant, 1960-2000). World DataBank. 
Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do. [Accessed 1 August 2014.] 
Forest data from: Bae, J. S., Joo, R. W. and Kim, Y.-S., 2012. Forest transition in South Korea: Reality, path and drivers. Land Use Policy, 29(1). 198–207. 
DOI:10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.06.007.
176  Forest cover data from: Calvo, J., 2009. Bosque, Cobertura y Recursos Forestales 2008. Decimoquinto Informe Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo 
Humano Sostenible. Consejo Nacional de Rectores, San José, Costa Rica. 
Available at: http://www.sirefor.go.cr/Documentos/Bosques/Calvo_Estado_Nacion_Bosques_2008.pdf. 
For updated forest coverage data for Costa Rica, see: Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, 2012. Cobertura forestal del país alcanza el 52.38%. Available 
at: http://www.minae.go.cr/index.php/actualidad/anuncios/37-cobertura-forestal-del-pais-alcanza-el-52-38.
GDP data from the World Bank, n.d. GDP (2005$ constant, 1986-2005). World DataBank. 
Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do. [Accessed on 1 August 2014.] 
177  FAO, 2010. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. 
178  Nordic Forest Owners’ Associations, n.d. Forests in Sweden. Nordic Family Forests. 
Available at: http://www.nordicforestry.org/facts/Sweden.asp. [Accessed on 1 August 2014.]
179  Bae, J., Joo, R., & Kim, Y. 2012. Forest Transition in South Korea: Reality, path and drivers. Land Use Policy, 29, 198-207
180  Korea Forest Service.2013. Korean Forests at a Glance 2013. 
Available at: http://english.forest.go.kr/newkfsweb/html/EngHtmlPage.do?pg=/esh/koforest/UI_KFS_0101_030000.html. [Accessed on 13 August 
2014.] GDP data are from the World Bank, n.d. GDP (current US$, 2010). World DataBank. Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do. 
[Accessed 1 August 2014.]
181  The World Bank, 2006. Strengthening Forest Law Enforcement and Governance: Addressing a Systemic Constraint to Sustainable Development. 
Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/08/7033661/strengthening-forest-law-enforcement-governance-addressing-
systemic-constraint-sustainable-development.
Kaimowitz, D., 2003. Forest law enforcement and rural livelihoods. International Forestry Review, 5(3). 199–210. DOI:10.1505/IFOR.5.3.199.19146.
WWF, 2012. Chapter 4: Forests and Wood Products.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2013. Forests. In Green Economy and Trade – Trends, Challenges and Opportunities. Nairobi. 
125–167. Available at: http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/GreenEconomyandTrade. 
182  Stevens et al., 2014. Securing Rights, Combating Climate Change.
BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
LA
N
D
 U
SE
127
183  For more, see Stevens et al., 2014. Securing Rights, Combating Climate Change.
184  Stevens et al., 2014. Securing Rights, Combating Climate Change.
185  Nepstad, D., Bezerra, T., Tepper, D., McCann, K., Barrera, M. X., et al., 2013. Addressing Agricultural Drivers of Deforestation in Colombia. Report to 
the United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department of Energy  Climate Change, Forests and Climate Change Programme. Earth 
Innovation Institute, San Francisco, CA, US. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/274185/drivers_of_deforestation_in_colombia.pdf. 
Spanish version available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/274198/drivers_of_deforestation_in_
colombia_spanish.pdf.
186  See a joint statement by Colombia, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom on their joint determination to work together under Colombia’s lead 
to reduce emissions from deforestation in the Colombian Amazon: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/273337/joint_statement_deforestation_colombian_amazon.pdf.
187  Ibid.; also see http://theredddesk.org/countries/actors/vision-amazonas-2030.
188  See, for example, Rodricks, S., 2010. TEEB Case: Enabling the Legal Framework for PES, Costa Rica. The Economics of Ecosystems & Biodiversity. 
Available at: http://www.teebweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Enabling-the-legal-framework-for-PES-Costa-Rica.pdf. 
Also see: Calvo-Alvarado, J., McLennan, B., Sánchez-Azofeifa, A. and Garvin, T., 2009. Deforestation and forest restoration in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: 
Putting conservation policies in context. Forest Ecology and Management, 258(6). 931–940. DOI:10.1016/j.foreco.2008.10.035.
189  FONAFIFO, CONAFOR and Ecuador Ministry of Environment, 2012. Lessons Learned for REDD+ from PES and Conservation Incentive Programs: 
Examples from Costa Rica, Mexico, and Ecuador. National Forest Finance Fund (Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal), National Forest 
Commission (Comisión Nacional Forestal), and Ecuador Ministry of the Environment. Published by the World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/03/17634356/lessons-learned-redd-pes-conservation-incentive-programs-examples-
costa-rica-mexico-ecuador. 
190  Scully, G.W., 1988. The Institutional Framework and Economic Development. Journal of Political Economy, 96(3), 652–662. 
Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1830363.
Weingast, B.R., 1995. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization, 11(1), 1–31. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/765068.
191  Berg, L. –A., and Desai, D., 2013. Background Paper: Overview on the Rule of Law and Sustainable Development for the Global Dialogue on Rule of 
Law and the Post-2015 Development Agenda. United Nations Development Programme, New York.  
Available at: http://www.worldwewant2015.org/file/417693/download/454284.
192  Assunçao, J., Gandour, C. and Rocha, R., 2013. DETERring Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Environmental Monitoring and Law Enforcement. 
CPI Report. Climate Policy Initiative. Available at: 
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/deterring-deforestation-in-the-brazilian-amazon-environmental-monitoring-and-law-enforcement/.
193  See http://www.globalforestwatch.org. 
194  Interbrand, 2003. 2003 Ranking of the Top 100 Brands. Best Global Brands. 
Available at: http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-brands/previous-years/best-global-brands-2003.aspx.
195  Fabiani, L., Lovatelli, C., and Rudorff. B., 2010. Soy Moratorium: Mapping & Monitoring of Soy Plantings in the Amazon Biome in the Third Year. 
ABIOVE, GlobalSat, and INPE. Available at: http://www.abiove.org.br/site/_files/english/04092012-161845-relatorio_moratoria_2012_ingles.pdf.
196  See Ministry of the Environment, 2010. Fourth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Brazil. Office of the National Program for 
Biodiversity Conservation, Brasilia. Available at: http://www.cbd.int/doc/world/br/br-nr-04-en.pdf.
197  See Catapult, 2014. Tipping Point: Announcement by GAR means MAJORITY of world’s palm oil covered by deforestation-free sourcing policies. 
4 March. Available at: http://www.catapultaction.com/tipping-point-announcement-by-gar-means-majority-of-worlds-palm-oil-covered-by-
deforestation-free-sourcing-policies/.
198  See The Consumer Goods Forum, 2014. The Consumer Goods Forum Calls for Binding Global Climate Change Deal. 18 June. 
Available at: http://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/the-consumer-goods-forum-calls-for-binding-global-climate-change-deal.
199  See http://www.tfa2020.com/ for details.
200  The Consumer Goods Forum, 2014. The Consumer Goods Forum Calls for Binding Global Climate Change Deal.
201  See http://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/Business-Platforms/Banking-Environment-Initiative.aspx. [Accessed 12 August 2014.]
202  Gartner, T., Mulligan, J., Schmidt, R., and Gunn, J., 2013. Natural Infrastructure: Investing in Forested Landscapes for Source Water Protection in the 
United States. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. Available at: http://www.wri.org/publication/natural-infrastructure.
203  Tallis, H., and Markham, A., 2012. Water Funds Business Case: Conservation as a Source of Competitive Advantage. The Nature Conservancy, 
Arlington, VA. Available at: http://www.watershedconnect.com/documents/water_funds_business_case.
204  This figure is from the OECD, updated to 2010 price levels. See: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2006. Infrastructure to 2030. Paris. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/futures/infrastructureto2030/
infrastructureto2030telecomlandtransportwaterandelectricity.htm. 
For comparison, McKinsey has a lower estimate of $11.7 trillion, obtained by projecting estimates from Global Water Intelligence to 2016 forward to 
2030. See: Dobbs, R., Pohl, H., Lin, D.-Y., Mischke, J., Garemo, N., Hexter, J., Matzinger, S., Palter, R., and Nanavatty, R., 2013. Infrastructure Productivity: 
How to Save $1 Trillion a Year. McKinsey Global Institute. 
www.newclimateeconomy.report
LA
N
D
 U
SE
128
Available at: http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/engineering_construction/infrastructure_productivity.
And: Global Water Intelligence, 2011. Global Water Market 2011. Oxford. 
Available at: http://www.globalwaterintel.com/market-intelligence-reports/. 
The Dobbs et al. estimate does not include the waste part of sanitation, not dams and flood control measures included in the OECD report. Either way, 
needs are huge.
205  Gartner et al., 2013. Natural Infrastructure.
206  Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2010. Paying for Biodiversity: Enhancing the Cost-Effectiveness of 
Payments for Ecosystem Services. Paris. Available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264090279-en.
And: Lipper, L., Sakuyama, T., Stringer, R. and Zilberman, D., eds., 2009. Payment for Environmental Services in Agricultural Landscapes – Economic 
Policies and Poverty. Springer Verlag and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. 
Available at: http://www.springer.com/economics/agricultural+economics/book/978-0-387-72969-5.
207  The Prince’s Charities. 2012. Interim REDD+ Finance: Current Status and Ways Forward for 2013-2020. London. Available at: http://www.pcfisu.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Nov-2012-Interim-REDD+-Finance-Current-Status-and-Ways-Forward-2013-2020-Princes-Rainforests-Project.
pdf. 
208  O’Sullivan, R., Lee, D., Zamgochian, A., and Durschinger, L., 2013. US Experience on Results-based Finance. United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID)-supported Forest Carbon, Markets and Communities Program, Washington, DC.  
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/USAID-Results-Based-Finance-Climate.pdf. 
209 See: Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MDS), n.d. Bolsa Familia.  
Available at http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia. [Accessed 1 August 2014.]  
210  See http://www.forestcarbonportal.com/project/forest-conservation-grant-fund-bolsa-floresta. [Accessed August 15, 2014.] 
211  Lipper, L., Sakuyama, T., Stringer, R. and Zilberman, D., eds., 2009. Payment for Environmental Services in Agricultural Landscapes – Economic 
Policies and Poverty. Springer Verlag and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Available at: http://www.springer.com/
economics/agricultural+economics/book/978-0-387-72969-5.
212 Assuncao, J., Gandour, C., and Rocha, R., 2013. Does Credit Affect Deforestation? Evidence from a Rural Credit Policy in the Brazilian Amazon. 
Climate Policy Initiative and Nucleo de Avaliaco de Politicas Climaticas, PUC Rio. Rio de Janeiro. 
Available at: http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/does-credit-affect-deforestation-evidence-from-a-rural-credit-policy-in-the-brazilian-
amazon/.
213  Dahl-Jorgensen, A., and Wolosin. M., 2014. Indonesia’s Deforestation Problem – A Breakthrough in the Making? Climate Advisers Policy Brief. 
Available at: http://www.climateadvisers.com/climate-intel/publications/.
214  See: https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org.   [Accessed 15 August 2014.]
215  See: http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/topics/climate/FlyerREDD_lang.pdf. [Accessed 15 August 2014.]
216  The Prince’s Charities. 2012. Interim REDD+ Finance. Norway is providing the lead here in terms of funding, in partnership with Brazil, Indonesia 
and Guyana. 
217  A 2014 survey found that the donors to the five largest multilateral and three largest bilateral funding sources of REDD+ have pledged around 
US$3 billion and deposited just under US$2 billion (but the years were not specified), with $268 million disbursed. See: Global Canopy Programme, 
Amazon Environmental Research Institute, Fauna & Flora International, and UNEP Finance Initiative, 2014. Stimulating Interim Demand for REDD+ 
Emission Reductions: The Need for a Strategic Intervention from 2015 to 2020, Oxford and Cambridge, UK, Brasilia and Geneva. Available at: http://
www.globalcanopy.org/StimulatingInterimDemand-Report.
218  Stern, N., 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. From the Review: “Opportunity 
costs of action essentially reflect the different returns on land depending on its use. The NPV of income ranges from $2 per hectare for pastoral use to 
over $1,000 for soya and oil palm, with one off returns of $236 to $1,035 from selling timber. A study undertaken for the Stern Report (Grieg-Gran, 
2006) estimates that these returns in 8 countries, responsible for 70% of emissions from land use, are $5 billion a year including one-off timber sales. 
This level of financial incentive would offset lost agricultural income to producers, although it would not reflect the full value chain within the country. 
Nor would it reflect the possible response of existing timber markets to reduced supply, given the current margin between producers and financial 
market value. Nevertheless, the high carbon density of each hectare of forest that would be preserved (up to the equivalent of 1,000t CO
2
) would be 
worth $17,500-25,000 in terms of the carbon contained if it were kept as forest, a large difference compared with the opportunity costs at the low end 
of the range.” 
219  Eliasch, J., 2008. Climate Change: Financing Global Forests. 
220  See: http://unfccc.int/methods/redd/items/8180.php.  [Accessed 15 August 2014.] 
221  See, e.g.: Leonard, S., 2014. Forests, Land Use and The Green Climate Fund: Open for Business? Forests Climate Change, 5 June.  
Available at: http://www.forestsclimatechange.org/forests-climate-change-finance/forests-land-use-green-climate-fund/. 
222  See: http://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/ for details on the Aichi targets. The 12% figure comes from comparing 150 million ha to the 1.23 billion ha 
of severely degraded agricultural landscapes reported in: FAO, 2011. The State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(SOLAW).
223  Note that for clarity of exposition we have kept agricultural restoration for the purpose of restoring fertility and boosting income to farms separate 
from forest restoration. However, agricultural restoration using a landscape approach almost always means adding a significant amount of new tree 
cover to the degraded landscape. In Niger, for example, tree cover on the 5 million ha in question was very low or nil before restoration and averaged 40 
trees per ha afterwards. See: Winterbottom et al., 2013. Improving Land and Water Management.
224  Parry, A., James, K., and LeRoux, S., 2014 (forthcoming). Strategies to Achieve Economic and Environmental Gains by Reducing Food Waste. New 
BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
LA
N
D
 U
SE
129
Climate Economy contributing paper. Waste & Resources Action Programme (WRAP), Banbury, UK. 
To be available at http://newclimateeconomy.report. The Gt estimate is at the bottom of a large range given by WRAP.
225  The Prince’s Charities, 2012. Interim REDD+ Finance.
226  Minnemeyer, S., Laestadius, L., Sizer, N., Saint-Laurent, C., and Potapov, P., 2011. Global Map of Forest Landscape Restoration Opportunities. Forest 
and Landscape Restoration project, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. 
Available at: http://www.wri.org/resources/maps/global-map-forest-landscape-restoration-opportunities. They estimate that there are 2.314 billion ha 
of lost and degraded forest landscapes around the world (relative to land that could support forests in the absence of human interference; precise data 
and interpretation confirmed by map author Lars Laestadius, 14 August 2014). 
The Aichi Target #15 states: “By 2020, ecosystem resilience and the contribution of biodiversity to carbon stocks has been enhanced, through 
conservation and restoration, including restoration of at least 15 per cent of degraded ecosystems, thereby contributing to climate change mitigation 
and adaptation and to combating desertification.” 15% of 2.314 billion ha is 347 million ha. See http://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/. [Accessed 22 July 2014.]
227  The estimate is a doubling of the estimate of US$85 billion given for 150 million ha in Verdonne, M., Maginnis, S., and Seidl, A., 2014 (forthcoming). 
Re-examining the Role of Landscape Restoration in REDD+. International Union for Conservation of Nature. Thus, the estimate is conservative, as it 
ignores the last 50 million ha of the 350 million ha estimate.  Their calculation assumes 34% of the restoration is agroforestry, 23% is planted forests, 
and 43% is improved secondary and naturally regenerated forests, all distributed across different biomes. Benefits assessed included timber products, 
non-timber forest products, fuel, better soil and water management remunerated through crop higher yields, and recreation.
130 www.newclimateeconomy.report
E
N
E
R
G
Y
131BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
E
N
E
R
G
Y
Chapter 4
ENERGY
Main points
• Fast-rising energy demand will require some US$45 trillion in new infrastructure investment by 2030. This is an 
opportunity to build more efficient, less polluting, more flexible energy systems that are also less vulnerable to 
rising and volatile fossil fuel prices. 
• The choices made in next 15 years are also critical for the climate, as energy production and use already account 
for two-thirds of global GHG emissions. A large-scale shift to low-carbon energy supplies is crucial for avoiding 
levels of dangerous climate change.
• Coal now accounts for over 40% of global electricity production, but there are compelling reasons to reduce 
that share. Coal accounts for 73% of power sector GHG emissions, and its use in power generation and industry 
can also result in severe air pollution. Moreover, fast-growing economies such as China and India are having to 
import coal as domestic supplies cannot keep up with growing demand. These factors make it sensible to shift the 
“burden of proof”, so that coal is no longer the default choice for new power plants, but the last resort if no better 
options can be found. 
• Key renewable energy sources have fast gone from prohibitively expensive to realistic options for future energy 
supply, and for the generation of electricity in particular. The cost of wind power is one-third or one-quarter what 
it was 25 years ago; solar power costs have fallen by half just since 2010. Thus, the cost gap between renewables 
and fossil fuels is narrowing, and in some markets, renewables are already cost-competitive – even more so if 
their multiple benefits are considered.
• Energy efficiency offers large potential to meet future energy needs without resorting to more marginal and 
harmful sources of energy. In developed countries, it is already the biggest source of “new” energy supply, but 
large untapped potential remains. Developing countries have even more to gain by managing demand. India’s 
energy requirements in 2030, for example, could be as much as 40% greater in a scenario of low energy efficiency 
than in one with high energy efficiency. 
• Natural gas has become a key energy source in many markets, displacing coal and reducing GHG and air  
pollution impacts. For gas to be a potential “bridge” to lower-carbon energy systems, there must be strong 
policies to limit fugitive methane emissions, put a price on carbon emissions, and continue to drive a shift towards 
lower-carbon technologies. 
132 www.newclimateeconomy.report
E
N
E
R
G
Y
low-carbon technologies may increase upfront costs, but it 
will also bring multiple benefits.  
This chapter explores key issues for energy systems in 
countries at different stages of development. We start by 
noting major energy trends around the world, then take 
stock of “seeds of change” that may offer opportunities 
for countries to strengthen and diversify their energy 
systems and improve productivity. We also assess some 
of the barriers to change, which can be considerable, 
and discuss ways to overcome them, which may require 
new decision-making frameworks, business models and 
financing arrangements. Like major changes in the past, 
transforming energy systems will require deliberate effort. 
We end the chapter by identifying concrete steps that can 
be taken in the next 5–10 years.
Energy is a broad topic, and our analysis is not 
comprehensive. While we discuss other sectors, we 
give priority to electricity production, which is crucial 
to economic growth, is increasing rapidly, and offers 
significant near-term opportunities for improvement. 
Most models for mitigating climate change also agree that 
the electricity production has the largest potential for 
rapid reductions in energy-related CO
2
 emissions, while 
decarbonising other sectors will be slower.3
Key energy-related issues are also covered in other 
chapters. Chapter 2: Cities examines how more compact 
urban forms can reduce energy use, especially for 
transport; Chapter 3: Land Use and Chapter 7: Innovation 
both discuss biofuels, and Innovation examines how 
policy can support and accelerate technological advances 
that could fundamentally change energy consumption 
and supply patterns. Chapter 5: Economics of Change 
addresses the role of carbon pricing and the need to 
reform fossil fuel subsidies, and Chapter 6: Finance looks 
at stranded-asset risks and at ways to reduce financing 
costs for low-carbon energy.
2. A changing energy landscape
We are in a period of unprecedented expansion of energy 
demand. Energy use has grown by more than 50% since 
1990,4 fuelling a global economy that has more than 
doubled in size.5 As much as a quarter of current world 
energy demand was created in just the last decade. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, energy demand growth was 
roughly evenly split between Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD 
countries, but since 2000, against most predictions, all of 
the net growth has occurred in non-OECD countries, with 
China alone accounting for more than half of the increase.6 
Past projections often failed to anticipate these dramatic 
shifts, which nonetheless have affected the energy 
prospects of nearly all countries. The future is now even 
more uncertain, as projections show anything from a 
20% to 35% expansion of global energy demand over the 
1. Introduction 
Energy is vital to modern economies: for industry, 
transport, infrastructure, information technology, building 
heat and cooling, agriculture, household uses and more. 
Any nation that wants to grow its economy and improve 
living standards must secure a robust energy supply. As 
incomes rise, so does energy use: high-income countries 
consume more than 14 times as much energy per capita 
as Least Developed Countries, and seven times as much 
as lower-middle-income countries.1 As more countries 
rise out of poverty and develop their economies, energy 
demand will rise with them, putting pressure on local 
supplies as well as global energy systems. 
Energy is costlier, prices are more volatile, and for 
several fast-growing countries, supplies are now also 
less secure. There is a need to reconsider which energy 
options are lowest-cost and “safe bets”; the advantages 
of coal in particular have been eroded as large, fast-
growing economies find their domestic supplies cannot 
keep up with demand, some regions have seen low-cost 
gas emerge as an alternative, and many grapple with air 
pollution and other social costs. Reducing coal use is also 
crucial to reducing climate risk.      
Responding to these new challenges will require a multi-
faceted approach. One key task is to increase resource 
efficiency and productivity – to make the most of our 
energy supplies. Some countries have already made 
significant gains in this regard, but there is much untapped 
potential. Innovation also is expanding our energy options: 
from the revolution in unconventional gas and oil, to the 
rapid growth of renewable energy resources, most notably 
wind and solar power. In many countries, falling costs are 
already enabling renewables to become a mainstay of new 
energy supply. Maintaining the speed of innovation will 
further expand these opportunities. 
Policy-makers face crucial choices in the next few years. 
A massive wave of energy infrastructure investment 
is coming: to keep up with development needs, around 
US$45 trillion may need to be invested in the next 15 
years.2 This gives countries a chance to build robust, 
flexible energy systems that will serve them well for 
decades to come, but it also represents a critical window 
to avoid locking-in technologies that expose them to future 
market volatility, air pollution, and other environmental 
and social stresses. Investing in energy efficiency and  
A massive wave of energy 
infrastructure investment 
is coming: to keep up with 
development needs, spending may 
need to increase by 40–50%.
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Figure 1
Global primary energy consumption by region 1970–2012
Note: A terawatt-hour (TWh) is a trillion watt-hours, or the annual power consumption of about 100,000 average US homes. Primary 
energy refers to energy inputs not yet subject to conversion or waste. 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013.8
next 15 years.7 The exact nature of the change that this 
will bring cannot be known with any certainty. Given the 
economic importance of energy, however, countries need 
to ensure that their energy systems are robust and able to 
adapt to a range of possible future scenarios.
Fossil fuels now provide 87% of our primary energy 
supply: oil (33%) is used mostly in transport and 
petrochemicals production, while coal (30%) is a mainstay 
of electricity production and some industries; natural gas 
(24%) is gaining ground across sectors, from electricity 
and heat production to manufacturing.9 These global 
shares have changed only slowly, but conceal disparate 
trends. Coal use has grown by nearly 70% since 1990, 
but almost entirely in a handful of countries (China alone 
accounted for 90% of the increase). In the rest of the 
world, coal provides just 16% of energy, and the large 
majority of new supply outside transportation has involved 
natural gas.
Electricity demand grows fast as countries develop, with 
increased reliance on electricity to meet a range of needs. 
Electricity’s share of energy use has nearly doubled in 40 
years and looks set to increase further.10 Close to 40% of 
all energy is now used to produce electricity; 63% of coal 
is consumed for this purpose, and 41% of power comes 
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1: One terawatt-hour (TWh) is equivalent to 1012 watt-hours, or the energy needed to power 100,000 average US 
homes per year.  A typical coal-red power plant in the US generates 4 TWh per year.
NOTE: “Primary energy” refers to energy inputs not yet subject to conversion or waste.
SOURCE: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013.
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from coal-fired plants.11 Twenty countries rely on coal 
for more than half their electricity production, but 30 
others get more than half their power from natural gas, 
34 from hydropower, and a handful from nuclear power.12 
In recent years, renewable energy sources, particularly 
solar and wind power, have been growing rapidly, and non-
hydropower renewables supplied 4.7% of electricity in 
2012, more than double their share in 2006.13
Global energy markets have also undergone major 
changes that affect all countries. Prices are much higher 
overall: oil and natural gas prices are three to four times 
higher in real terms, and coal prices are twice as high, as 
25 years ago. Even in the shale-gas-rich United States,  
gas prices are almost twice what they were in 1990.14 
Although global gross national product (GDP) is twice  
as high, the share we spend on energy has risen from  
8% in 1990 to 10% today, and while total energy use has 
increased by one-third, more than 80% of the increase in 
expenditure since 2000 has been due to increasing 
prices.15 Fossil fuel prices also are more volatile, with 
larger, more frequent and more unpredictable 
fluctuations, which can depress investment and cause 
other economic damage. It is unclear whether this  
pattern will continue: as with energy demand, past 
forecasts of energy prices have proven to be poor guides 
to the future. Given the recent record, however, it seems 
unwise for any country to bank on a future of low, stable 
fossil fuel prices.
Adding to the uncertainty is a steep rise in energy 
trade. Not only is 62% of oil internationally traded,16 
but increasingly, so are coal and natural gas, which have 
historically been produced and consumed domestically. 
Combined with high prices, this puts pressures on the 
balance of payments in several countries. Given that oil 
and gas reserves, especially, are highly concentrated 
– in each case, just five countries hold more than 60% 
of proven reserves17 – importers worry about energy 
security. Up to now, coal’s local availability has been a big 
part of its appeal, but increasingly, major coal users (India 
in particular, and to some degree also China) are having to 
rely on imports to cover much of their demand growth.
Finally, the environmental impacts of fossil fuel use have 
become hard to ignore. Many countries are struggling with 
severe air pollution, especially in urban and industrial 
areas; China is the most visible example, with public 
outrage about air quality leading the government to launch 
a “war on pollution” in early 2014.18 Concerns about 
climate change have also escalated. Energy use already 
accounts for two-thirds of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions,19 and those emissions continue to rise. The 
future of the climate therefore depends, to a great extent, 
on whether we can reverse this trend and meet the 
world’s energy needs with low-carbon systems (see Box 1).
The evidence suggests that, without a deliberate change of 
direction, fossil fuel use will continue to grow, and so will 
its economic, security and environmental impacts. There 
is no imminent “peak” that will slow this trend; the world is 
not “running out” of fossil fuels. The cost of developing  
and extracting new resources is increasing: global 
investment in fossil fuel supply chains rose from US$400 
billion in 2000 to US$950 billion in 2013, and 80% 
of upstream oil and gas spending through the 2030s 
is expected to be used to compensate for declining 
production at existing fields.26 Conditions are also shifting 
in other, fundamental ways:
China’s energy use has nearly tripled since 2000,  
mostly fuelled by coal.27 This phenomenal increase has 
been accompanied by strong economic growth, but 
also resulted in a highly energy-intensive economy with 
significant distortions, high levels of air pollution, and an 
emerging need to import energy. Changing direction  
will be a Herculean task, closely connected with efforts  
Box 1 
Carbon budgets and emissions from 
energy use
Climate impacts depend on the total emissions 
accumulating in the atmosphere. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that 
for a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 2°C, 
cumulative GHG emissions up to 2100 cannot exceed 
4.4 trillion tonnes of CO
2
 equivalents (CO
2
e).20 After 
discounting past emissions, and accounting for non-CO
2
 
greenhouse gases, just over 1.1 trillion tonnes remain for 
CO
2
 emissions from human activities, including energy 
use. This thus sets a “carbon budget” for GHG emissions.
Yet proven fossil fuel reserves (i.e. resources that can 
be economically recovered) would release far greater 
volumes if burnt. Coal reserves alone would exceed it by 
a factor of almost two. Though estimates are uncertain, 
fully exploiting coal, oil and gas reserves could mean an 
overshoot up to a factor of five (see figure). There are 
also vast resources beyond these reserves (estimated up 
to 50 times the CO
2
 budget), though it is unknown what 
share of these might become economically viable to 
extract in the future.
Containing climate change to safe levels will require 
reducing GHG emissions by up to 90% between 2040 
and 2070, the IPCC has said.21 Yet energy emissions 
are rising rapidly. Growth in energy supply sector 
GHGs accelerated from 1.7% per year in 1991-2000 to 
3.1% per year in 2001–2010.22 Energy CO
2
 emissions 
are more than 40% higher now than when the Kyoto 
Protocol was signed in 1997.23 Several studies have 
found, however, that it would be technically feasible  
to meet energy needs while sharply curbing emissions, 
and that the cost, while substantial, is manageable on a 
global scale.24  
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Figure 2 
Implied CO
2
 emissions of fossil fuel reserves vs. remaining CO
2 
budgets for a 2˚C pathway
Note: The figure shows the implied CO2 emissions of conventional and likely unconventional fossil fuel reserves vs. the remaining CO2 
budget for given probabilities of staying below 2˚C above pre-industrial levels. Budgets are adjusted for likely non-CO2 emissions.  
Resource estimates are much greater, particularly for coal (30,000-40,000 Gt for coal, 2,000-5,000 Gt for gas, and 1,000-1.500 Gt  
for oil). Estimates for unconventional gas are highly uncertain, with little agreement on what resources are appropriately  
classified as reserves.
Sources: For carbon budgets: IPCC, 2013; fossil fuel reserves shown are ranges for mid-point estimates of a range of different sources, 
including BGR, 2013; BP, 2014; IEA, 2013; World Energy Council, 2013; and GEA, 2012.25
to achieve a more service-based economy. Chinese  
policy is already responding, with measures including 
industry restructuring, new infrastructure for urban 
heating, major international gas deals, and promoting 
alternatives to coal in power generation. Some analyses 
suggest coal use could peak or level off in the early 2020s 
as a result.28
India’s energy use has nearly doubled since 2000 
(though just to one-fifth of China’s use).29 Yet much of the 
population still lacks access to modern energy, and there 
are long-standing difficulties investing domestically in 
new supplies, not least because prices are kept too low to 
make new investments viable. In recent years, the country 
has sourced nearly half its new coal use from abroad, and 
the electricity system, once almost entirely fuelled by 
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domestic resources, increasingly depends on imports to 
meet new demand.30 This new dependence raises both 
geopolitical and balance-of-payments concerns. India also 
cannot ignore where future energy growth will take it in 
terms of air pollution, as many Indian cities already have 
worse air quality than Chinese cities, even prior to a heavy 
industrial expansion.31
The United States, always rich in energy resources, has 
made a concerted effort to increase domestic energy 
production. It may become the world’s top oil producer  
by 2015, and be close to energy self-sufficiency in the next 
two decades.32 A surge in low-cost gas supply has  
reduced energy prices and reduced demand for coal, 
which until recently provided half of US electricity.33 
Stricter environmental standards are also making coal  
less viable; new wind power and even solar photovoltaic 
(PV) electricity can be less costly than new coal-fired 
plants. Overall, coal-fired power has accounted for just 5% 
of new generation since 2000, closures of plants have 
accelerated, and proposed regulations would require  
that any new coal be fitted by carbon capture and  
storage (CCS). Energy efficiency has also improved, and  
in some states may in fact stall demand growth in the  
next decade.34
The European Union (EU) is recasting its energy systems, 
with strong policies in place to cut CO
2 
emissions, 
increase renewable energy, and improve energy efficiency. 
Climate objectives are a major driving force behind 
this transformation, but energy security is also a strong 
motivation. The EU has been pioneering new approaches 
to energy supply, and in particular has driven the adoption 
of renewable energy for electricity generation. There 
have been remarkable successes, not least in helping 
spur innovation that has reduced the cost of low-carbon 
energy – but those investments have also been politically 
controversial. Meanwhile, the flagship climate policy 
of carbon pricing through emissions trading has failed 
to generate a sustained price signal to give investors 
certainty. Policy now needs realignment, including to 
ensure the reliability of the electricity system.
The Middle East is facing constraints from inefficient 
energy use. Primary energy use is growing at more 
than twice the global rate,35 driven by rapidly growing 
populations and policies that keep energy prices very low. 
Yet it is far from clear that cheap energy is helping the 
economy. While around the world, energy productivity 
(the amount of economic value created per unit energy 
used) is rising, here it is falling. The cost in terms of 
forgone export revenues is high and rising, as domestic 
demand eats into the surplus available for export. National 
oil companies in some countries are constrained in their 
ability to finance investment in new fields.
Latin America and the Caribbean have seen energy 
demand increase by one-third in just a decade amid 
growing industrialisation and regional commerce.36 It has 
a high share of renewable energy (25%), with extensive 
use of hydropower in several countries and potential 
for further growth, although social and environmental 
impacts are a concern. Natural gas use has risen twice as 
fast as energy demand overall, but with only 4% of global 
reserves, the region imports most of its supply.37 Wind 
power has grown rapidly in Mexico, which has some of the 
lowest costs in the world, about US$60 per megawatt-
hour (MWh), as well as in Brazil, Uruguay and some 
Central American countries. The region also has great 
solar potential and is increasingly exploiting it.
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
are still struggling to scale-up their energy systems 
to fuel economic growth and provide modern energy 
services to all. Power supplies are often unreliable, and 
large shares of the poor urban and rural populations 
lack basic energy access.38 Average per-capita energy 
consumption in sub-Saharan Africa is one-seventh of that 
in high-income OECD countries, and in South Asia, it is 
one-ninth.39 Aiming to close these gaps, countries in both 
regions – individually and through regional networks – are 
making massive new investments in energy infrastructure 
– including grid expansion, large-scale coal power and 
hydropower, and increasingly, wind and solar.40
These examples make it clear that there is no single way 
forward, but “business as usual” is unlikely to persist. 
In the following sections, we delve deeper into the new 
strategies that countries are pursuing, as well as into the 
factors that may inhibit change.
3. Seeds of change
Global energy systems are evolving on many levels. Here 
we focus on a few areas with significant potential for 
achieving climate and economic goals together, and where 
decisions in the next five to ten years are crucial:
• A changing outlook for coal power;
• Air pollution as a driver of energy  
system transformation;
• The emergence of renewable technologies as  
large-scale, cost-competitive energy sources;
• A growing focus on off-grid approaches to expanding 
energy access;
Wind power has grown rapidly 
in Mexico, which has some of 
the lowest costs in the world, 
about $60 per MWh. 
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• A surge in natural gas use, often replacing coal, and
• Advances in energy efficiency, with significant 
untapped potential. 41
We call these “seeds of change”, and if they can be 
successfully grown to large-scale change, they could 
provide a foundation for a more productive, low-carbon 
future energy system.
3.1 A changing outlook for coal power
The rise of new opportunities is occurring at a time of 
increased challenges to established solutions to expand 
energy supplies, as noted above. Coal in particular has 
been abundant and affordable for many generations, and 
in several fast-growing economies, it remains the default 
option for rapid expansion of the electricity supply, as 
well as the key source of energy for heavy industry. Coal 
power has proven scalable, reliable and controllable, and 
institutions, grid arrangements, and financing systems are 
set up to support it. Moreover, coal-rich countries have 
been able to rely on locally available (and thus secure) 
supplies at times at costs as low as US$20/tonne (t) and, 
until the last decade, often with a backstop price of no 
more than US$50/t. Even at higher prices than these, coal 
can be the cheapest option (in pure financial terms) for 
new electricity production. 
But as noted above, conditions are changing, driven by 
fast-rising demand and a sharp increase in coal trade. . 
Since 2007 China has gone from a net coal exporter to 
the world’s top coal importer, buying almost one-quarter 
of the global trade.42 Work for the Global Commission 
indicates that the domestic supply-demand outlook is 
highly uncertain. Continuation of past trends would 
lead to a drastically changed energy security situation: 
in a scenario of continued energy-intensive growth and 
reliance on coal, China might need to import more than 
half of its additional coal requirements over the next 10–
15 years.43 Such a scenario may be unlikely, as China has 
other strong reasons to curb coal use, not least concern 
with air pollution and ambition to diversify the economy. 
Energy security adds to the reasons to seek different, 
less coal-intensive patterns of both energy supply and 
economic activity. 
India has followed a similar trajectory: from near self-
sufficiency a decade ago it is now meeting half of growth in 
coal requirements through imports. It is now the third-
largest importer, after China and Japan.44 Unless it can 
manage demand growth through improved efficiency and 
find new sources of electric power, some scenarios suggest 
it may have to import even larger shares of its coal.45
The rise in coal trade has also brought higher import 
prices, with scenarios in the range of US$85–140/t for 
the next two decades. Prices are now lower than five 
years ago, but twice the levels that prevailed historically.47 
The market has also become more volatile, and future 
prospects depend greatly on China’s and India’s import 
needs. Even at higher prices, vv, if other benefits of 
moving to other sources of electricity are not accounted 
for, especially in parts of Asia. Yet the cost gap to some 
alternatives is now smaller than ever – not least as 
renewable energy costs are in rapid decline. In many parts 
of the world, options such as hydropower, natural gas 
and wind are at or near levels where other concerns – air 
pollution, energy security, and climate – can tip the balance.
Coal mining and coal-fired power generation also can 
put pressure on water resources. Thermal power plants 
consume up to several thousand litres of water per MWh 
produced, but coal plants typically use more than gas 
plants, in some cases more than 10 times as much. Mining 
the coal can add hundreds of litres per MWh – on par with 
unconventional gas production, and an order of magnitude 
more than conventional natural gas extraction. Growing 
coal use can thus cause water stresses and compete with 
other water uses in regions with water shortages, which 
include many of today’s rapidly growing economies.48 This 
has already been identified as a challenge to electricity 
supply growth in South Africa, and water shortages affect 
70% of mines in China.49
From a climate perspective, meanwhile, major reductions 
in coal use are an essential feature of climate mitigation 
scenarios that limit global warming to safe levels.50 At 
current production rates, proven coal reserves could 
last 100 years, and produce 1.6–2 trillion tonnes of CO
2
 
emissions.51 Coal is the most carbon-intensive of fossil 
fuels. In the power sector, coal accounts for 73% of 
emissions but only 41% of generated electricity.52 Once 
built, coal-fired power plants typically operate for decades, 
“locking in” their high emissions. Work for the Commission 
shows that about US$750 billion was invested in new coal 
power plants in 2000–2010 alone, and those plants will 
emit around 100 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO
2
) if 
operated for 40 years. Those built in 2010-2020 will add 
a similar cumulative amount.53 Any effort to reduce the 
energy sector’s climate impact therefore must include 
strategies to encourage energy supply options that can 
displace new coal infrastructure investments.
Shifting to a lower-risk trajectory
On the current course coal could account for 35–45% of 
global net growth in electricity generation over the next 
Coal-fired electricity will still 
be the cheapest near-term 
option in some countries – yet 
the cost gap to alternatives is 
smaller than ever.
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Figure 3 
Ranges for domestic coal production and coal demand scenarios in India and China, 2012–2030, 
absent change in policies
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two decades, resulting in a 50-60% increase on current 
levels of coal consumption. Nearly all of the increase is 
projected in fast-growing regions of Asia, where coal 
could account for 50–70% of new power supply unless 
policies are changed.54 In some countries that momentum 
is already shifting, however, and implementing policies 
already proposed (particularly in China) could significantly 
dent this growth – potentially to just half these levels – 
while effecting a 15% reduction in the OECD.55 However, 
given the long lifetimes of the infrastructure involved, coal 
could still have a 35% share of global generation in the 
early 2030s (as noted, it is currently 41%).
These developments contrast with those required to limit 
global warming to 2°C. Many such scenarios see unabated 
coal-fired emissions falling to one-tenth of current levels 
by 2050, with significant near-term reductions. For 
example, the IEA 450 scenario sees coal-fired power 
generation falling to 60% of 2011 levels by 2030, even 
with the development of CCS, and total reductions in 
coal emissions of 11 Gt.56 However, analysis carried out 
for the Commission suggests that as much as half of this 
reduction could be achieved at zero or very low net cost, 
once the changing cost of alternatives and reduced health 
damages and other co-benefits are taken into account.57
A key step in shifting policies and investment choices away 
from coal is to ensure that the full implications of coal use 
are consistently accounted for. All of the factors discussed 
above have serious economic and health costs, often high 
enough to shift the cost-benefit balance in favour of 
alternatives. Given the known risks associated with coal, it 
is time to shift the “burden of proof”, so coal is no longer 
assumed to be an economically sound choice by default. 
Instead, governments should require that new coal 
construction be preceded by a full assessment showing 
that other options are infeasible, and the benefits of coal 
outweigh the full costs. Simply taking a full set of  
domestic policy concerns into account could lead to a 
much lower reliance on coal than many national decision-
makers now take for granted. Such approaches are already 
being considered. For example, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is already 
developing a policy which would only fund coal-fired 
power generation in exceptional circumstances, and a 
simple quantitative methodology for assessing  
projects along dimensions of affordability, security  
and sustainability.58
Nevertheless, new coal-fired capacity will continue to be 
built for some time, undermining efforts to keep climate 
risk at acceptable levels. From a climate perspective, 
there is therefore a strong case for developing CCS, and 
ensuring that new coal power plants either include CCS 
or can be easily retrofitted in the future.59 Even with CCS 
at a large scale, coal use will have to be curbed. However, 
CCS is the only option that enables the continued use of 
coal while avoiding CO
2
 emissions. Significant progress 
has been made to develop CCS technology, but it still has 
a long way to go before it can be counted on as solution. 
Near-term action is thus needed to make CCS a significant 
contributor to climate risk mitigation (see Box 2).
3.2 Air pollution as a driver of energy  
system transformation
The air pollution arising from energy use has multiple 
and severe impacts, and the increasingly urgent need 
to reduce it is driving everything from clean cookstove 
initiatives, to tighter vehicle emission standards, to shifts 
in power production and industry.71 
Pollution from energy use accounts for as much as 5% of 
the global burden of disease.72 Air pollution is also linked 
to an estimated 7 million premature deaths each year, 
including 4.3 million due to indoor air pollution, mostly 
from cooking and heating with solid fuels.73 Crop yields 
also are affected, with ground-level ozone reducing 
the yield of four major staple crops by 3–16% globally, 
particularly in South and East Asia.74
Valuing these impacts in monetary terms is not 
straightforward, but existing estimates suggest very 
high costs, often exceeding the cost of shifting to other 
energy sources that would also significantly reduce CO
2 
emissions. Recent climate mitigation scenarios have 
estimated global average health co-benefits at US$50 to 
more than US$200 per tonne of CO
2
 avoided, relative 
to baseline development.75 Translated into energy costs, 
these numbers have a dramatic impact on the relative 
attractiveness of lower-carbon technologies. For example, 
coal-fired power enjoys a financial advantage in large 
parts of Southeast Asia, at costs of US$60–70 per MWh. 
But accounting for air pollution even at the bottom of the 
range of avoided damages (US$48/tCO
2
) adds a cost of 
US$40/MWh, enough to bridge or exceed the cost gap to 
alternative sources of electric power.76 Even with pollution 
controls, coal plants in the top 20 CO
2
-emitting countries 
cause global average damages valued as high as US$49/
MWh of electricity, although with wide variation (higher 
as well as lower) between countries.77 Impacts rise even 
further if the upstream impact of coal mining, transport 
and processing are included; one estimate for 2005 put 
the total life-cycle “true” cost of coal in the United States 
as high as US$150/MWh,78 although emissions have since 
fallen. For comparison, the cost of electricity production 
 
At current production rates, 
proven coal reserves could last 
100 years, and produce 1.6–2 
trillion tonnes of  
CO2 emissions.
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CCS offers the potential to capture CO
2
 emissions from 
power plants and large industrial facilities and prevent 
their release to the atmosphere. It thus provides the 
option to reduce CO
2
 emissions while continuing to use 
some fossil fuels.
From a climate mitigation perspective, CCS could be 
highly valuable. Many scenarios to limit global warming 
to 2°C rely on some level of CCS deployment. Although 
no assessments suggest that CCS could capture all or 
most of current CO
2
 emissions or allow a continuation 
of current trends in fossil fuel use, the cost of achieving 
a low-carbon energy system could be significantly 
higher without the availability of CCS.60 In several 
industrial sectors there are currently no other options 
for deep emissions cuts. 
The development of CCS can build on significant 
technology progress, and most component technologies 
are in place, as CCS is already a proven technology in 
the upstream petroleum sector, and some trials and 
demonstration projects are under way in other sectors. 
In the power sector, however, CCS is only starting to 
be demonstrated: there have been several successful 
small-scale pilot projects, but the first two full-scale 
demonstration projects for coal-fired power plants are 
scheduled to start only in 2014.61
Overall, however, CCS development and deployment 
are not where they need to be to significantly reduce 
climate risk. For example, for CCS to fulfill its role in 
climate mitigation,62 the IEA’s 2013 CCS technology 
roadmap envisages 30 large-scale projects by 2020, 
capturing and storing 50 million tonnes (Mt) of CO
2
 
per year.63 At present, 12 projects are operating, 
capturing about 25 Mt per year, but only four carry out 
monitoring consistent with long-term storage. Nine 
additional confirmed projects under construction would 
increase the total to about 40 Mt per year captured 
in 2020, though many projects would use the CO
2
 for 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR),64 which to date has usually 
not involved monitoring to ensure long-term storage.65
The picture for investment is more challenging still; in 
the IEA’s 2°C Scenario (2DS), the annual investment rate 
in CCS-equipped facilities would reach almost US$30 
billion/year in 2020, with cumulative investment reaching 
more than US$100 billion,66 while actual investment 
in 2007–2012 averaged only US$2 billion per year.67 
Full-scale deployment and construction of supporting 
infrastructure after 2020 would require further rapid 
escalation, with more than 2,000 Mt per year captured 
and stored in 2030, and more than 7,000 Mt per year 
by 2050. By 2050, a cumulative US$3.6 trillion would 
need to be invested.68 While there are many other ways 
to reduce emissions to levels compatible with the 2°C 
target, it is clear that efforts must be stepped up if CCS is 
to play a major role.
Future CCS use also would need support through long-
term mechanisms to create demand, underpin investment 
in infrastructure, and enable the development of new 
business models for the scaling of the technology. Unlike 
many other mitigation options, such as renewable energy 
or energy efficiency, CCS lacks intrinsic value beyond 
greenhouse gas mitigation, except for niche applications 
such as Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR). Although some 
other commercial uses of CO
2
 are under development,69 
they face the challenges of CO
2
’s low value, low energy 
content, and the sheer volume that would need to be 
absorbed to make a real climate impact. EOR and other 
forms of CO
2
 use may nevertheless help improve the 
economics of demonstration projects and initial scale-up.
Long-term demand therefore would likely need to be 
driven by stable climate policy. This could take the 
form of a subsidy such as a feed-in tariff or quota, but 
ultimately, a long-term carbon price would be more cost-
effective. The cost and level of support required cannot 
be judged with certainty prior to demonstration at scale. 
In the power sector, estimates have ranged around 
US$25-100 per tonne CO
2
 using current technologies.70 
In addition, there is a need to resolve legal uncertainties 
and to make the technology acceptable to the public, as 
concerns (including the risk of CO
2
 leakage) have held 
back some past projects.
The next steps required are clear; if governments want to 
make the option of CCS available, a rapid scaling of CCS 
demonstration is the first place to start, but early long-
term commitment to climate mitigation also will  
be a prerequisite. 
from new coal plants in the US is around US$100/MWh.79 
Actual impacts may go further still. For example, it is likely 
that heavy pollution affects cities’ attractiveness to talent, 
and thus their capacity to be longer-term engines of 
economic growth (see Chapter 2: Cities).
There is significant variation and uncertainty in monetised 
estimates of the cost of coal-fired power. Still, the overall 
evidence is clear that continuing to make energy decisions 
without accounting for these factors leads to pathways 
with significant health damages, in many cases entailing 
costs that exceed the cost of switching to lower-polluting 
alternatives. Rational economic policy would include such 
costs when comparing energy options. 
Many countries have raised air quality standards and 
tightened regulations as their populations demanded it. 
In Europe and the United States, air pollution has been 
reduced significantly, and improvements continue. For 
example, the damage caused by electricity generation 
Box 2 
What would it take to develop carbon capture and storage at scale?
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that expensive corrective action will be needed in the 
future to reduce pollution. Judging by China’s case, such 
corrections may well be necessary well within the lifetime 
of energy infrastructure that is now being built, which in 
turn affects its relative economics vis-à-vis lower-polluting 
alternatives. On the brighter side, as we discuss next, 
many renewable energy options are now much more 
economically viable than they were when China and other 
countries built out their power infrastructure.
3.3 A new era for renewable energy sources
Renewable energy sources have emerged with stunning 
and unexpected speed as large-scale, and increasingly 
economically viable, alternatives to fossil fuels.91 These 
technologies have existed for decades, but until recently, 
only hydropower was used at large scale.92 That is 
changing rapidly: while in 1996–2001, just 7% of the 
increase in electricity production came from renewable 
sources. In 2006–2011, 27% did, even as total power 
production grew almost twice as fast.93 Much of this 
growth involved hydropower, the main electricity source 
 in more than 20 countries. Yet new renewables, in 
particular solar and wind power, have also emerged as 
large-scale options.
This has created a sea-change in expectations. While a 
decade ago, most analysts expected wind and solar power 
to remain marginal for decades to come, they now are 
seen as key contributors to future global electricity needs. 
For illustration, the IEA’s central scenario (New Policies) 
envisions solar and wind combined adding more electricity 
production than either coal or gas until 2035.94 All energy 
projections are very uncertain, and in the past those for 
the role of renewables have rapidly been outdated as 
policies and technologies changed at a fast pace.95 Yet it 
is clear that, for countries seeking cleaner, more secure 
energy systems, the new viability of renewable energy 
has opened up an enormous opportunity to diversify and 
expand domestic energy production.
A fast-changing cost profile
The key reason that renewable energy can now play a 
major role is that costs have fallen very fast. In 1990, 
wind power was 3–4 times more expensive than fossil 
fuel electricity, making it infeasible at scale.96 Since then 
costs have dropped by half or more while performance has 
increased dramatically. Improvements have been driven 
in part by the willingness in some countries to build out 
wind while costs were still high. In places as diverse as 
Australia, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, and several 
US states, the cost of electricity production from onshore 
wind power now is on par with or lower than fossil fuel 
alternatives. In Brazil, wind power has been the cheapest 
source of new power in recent auctions for new electricity 
contracts. South Africa similarly has seen wind power 
procured at costs as much as 30% below those of new 
in the EU is half what it was in 1990.80 As noted above, 
tighter air pollution controls have also led older coal-fired 
plants to close and discouraged new construction. In the 
United States, only 5% of new capacity since 2000 has 
come from new coal plants.81
Now it’s China’s turn to wage these battles. Many Chinese 
cities, especially in the north, have severe air pollution, 
with annual particulate-matter (PM
10
)82 levels five to 
seven times the World Health Organization (WHO) 
guideline level, and average annual sulphur dioxide (SO
2
) 
levels that are triple the WHO 24-hour guideline level.83 
Notably, even requiring coal power plants to install flue-
gas desulphurisation systems only slightly reduced SO
2
 
emissions, because rising coal use in industry mostly offset 
the benefits.84
Mortality from air pollution in China is now valued at 10% 
of GDP.85 The pollution has caused severe health effects 
and growing public concern, pushing the issue to the top 
of China’s political agenda – most notably through the 
Chinese government’s new “war on pollution”. 
The task at hand is enormous. China’s air pollution 
problem is due to multiple factors: high population density, 
geographically concentrated energy consumption, a highly 
energy-intensive economy, and heavy reliance on coal 
across sectors. Modelling carried out for the Commission 
indicates that solving the problem will require not only 
“end-of-pipe” technologies to control pollution, but a far-
reaching and accelerated transition for the entire energy 
system. Coal use in particular must substantially decline, 
with major implications both for power production and  
for industry.86 
China thus must find a more even balance of energy 
sources, but it also needs to restructure overall economic 
activity towards less energy-intensive activities. Notably, 
the new air quality targets are driven not only by concerns 
about air pollution, but also by dwindling profit margins, 
runaway energy demands in China’s heavy manufacturing 
sector, and by concerns about energy security, given 
the growing need for coal imports unless the current 
trajectory of coal increase is broken. Political leaders also 
increasingly recognise the multiple potential benefits of 
a cleaner development pathway, with more innovation 
, and more value-added services and differentiated 
manufacturing. All these factors together are creating 
strong pressures for change.87
These dilemmas in China have direct implications for 
other countries. India, in particular, also has unusually 
high levels of coal dependence, high population density, 
and rapidly growing energy demand, as well as severe air 
pollution in many cities. Investments in the next few years 
could exacerbate and lock-in all these problems. Energy 
use needs to increase, but the near-term cost advantage 
of polluting options needs to be balanced against the risk 
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coal-fired power.97 Wind power remains more expensive in 
places where wind resource is poor, fossil fuels are cheap, 
or where financing or other costs are high, and in offshore 
installations. As discussed below, larger volumes of wind 
power also need to account for costs of grid integration. 
However, in large parts of the world, it is now a fully 
economically viable source of incremental power supply.
Box 3 
Air pollution control in the Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei region of China88 
In In the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region (also called 
JingJinJi) has been targeted by the central government 
for stringent air pollution reductions, including a 25% 
cut in ambient PM2.5 concentrations by 2017 on 2012 
levels. The region’s air pollution is in large part linked 
to extensive coal use, including for power generation, 
heating, and heavy industry; Hebei province alone 
produced one-eighth of the world’s steel in 2012.
In response, Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei have jointly 
agreed to reduce coal consumption by 62 million tonnes 
from 2012 levels. Key measures include eliminating 
coal-fired power generation and renovating the 
residential heating infrastructure in Beijing, as well 
as drastic industrial restructuring in Hebei province, 
where a quarter of iron and steel and half of cement 
production capacity is to be phased out by 2017. 
While air quality is undoubtedly a major problem, 
threatening not just health but also economic 
development, the air quality programme also seeks 
to reap multiple potential benefits from a cleaner 
development pathway. These include addressing the 
dwindling profit margins and runaway energy demands 
in the region’s oversized heavy industry, through 
innovation and restructuring towards more value-
added production.
The planned actions will entail massive investment, 
the sacrifice of considerable sunk costs, and difficult 
political trade-offs. Industrial restructuring will pose 
formidable economic and social dilemmas, especially for 
areas such as Hebei province, with its high development 
pressure and limited financial resources.89 
Although impressive, there are indications that the 
planned measures will shift energy use and pollution 
loads to other parts of China, rather than reducing 
them altogether; for example plans to scale up coal-
to-gas production and coal-fired generation capacity 
in western areas.90 Not only would this reduce 
the potential for multiple benefits but also add a 
considerable pollution burden to other regions and do 
nothing to stem the increase of China’s total carbon 
emissions. Furthermore, although ambitious, the 
planned measures would still be insufficient to meet 
basic air quality standards.
Solar PV power remains costlier, but is now half the cost it 
was just in 2010,98 as module prices have fallen 80% since 
2008.99 The world’s largest, unsubsidised solar PV plant 
was contracted in 2013 in Chile: 70 MW in the Atacama 
Desert.100 At least 53 solar PV plants over 50 MW were 
operating by early 2014, in at least 13 countries, and 
several planned projects are now considered competitive 
without subsidies.101 Rooftop solar for homes is also 
competitive with retail electricity prices in several 
countries, including Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Germany 
and Italy. Even at high financing rates, solar PV is now 
cheaper than diesel generators, often the main alternative 
in rural areas in developing countries where grid 
connections are unavailable or cost-prohibitive.102
Other options are growing in prominence as well, such 
as geothermal energy, modern bioenergy (using residues 
from agriculture and forestry, among other fuels), and 
energy from waste. The use of solar thermal systems for 
heat is growing rapidly, with China as the global leader; 
some countries, such as Brazil and Morocco, are installing 
solar water heaters in low-income housing.104 At the 
same time, hydropower continues to be developed at 
large scales around the world, and in poor countries from 
Bhutan to Ethiopia, it is dramatically improving energy 
access and economic opportunities. (See Box 4 for a 
discussion of hydropower and nuclear.)
The rapid cost reductions have allowed renewables to 
continue to grow even as investment has slowed; in 2013, 
adding the same total non-hydro capacity as in 2011 
required 23% less capital.105 New solar PV capacity was 
one-third higher in 2013 than in 2012, despite 22%  
lower investments.106
Detailed analyses indicate that cost reductions and 
performance improvements can continue for many years. 
For example, the technologies to cut the cost of producing 
solar PV modules by another half are already developed.107 
Further cost reductions will depend on active R&D, which 
also is increasing in volume, albeit that higher levels are 
needed for a range of energy technologies (see Chapter 7: 
Innovation for a discussion of innovation requirements in 
energy). They also will depend on continued deployment, 
which has proven critical in enabling the cost reductions 
that have taken place to date.
Growing interest in renewables
While continued cost reductions strengthen the case, 
there already are compelling reasons for countries to 
invest in renewable energy. As noted above, developing 
renewables can strengthen energy security, reducing 
dependence on fossil fuels and exposure to global market 
volatility. Virtually all countries have renewable energy 
sources of some type that they can exploit.108 The technical 
potential for renewable energy is far greater than current 
human energy use, and studies suggest it could supply 
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95% of global energy demand by 2050,109 and double its 
current share by 2030, at a relatively low net cost.110 Apart 
from biomass, renewable energy also has negligible air 
pollution impacts and few or no CO
2
 emissions. And except 
for geothermal and large hydropower, new capacity can be 
built quickly and at a wide range of scales.
Many countries have recognised these potential benefits 
and adopted policies to stimulate renewable energy 
growth. More than 140 nations had some form of 
renewable energy target as of early 2014.111 Germany 
has been a pioneer: 80% of its new generating capacity 
in the last decade came from renewables (50% from 
solar and wind), with significant resources expended 
on early deployment when costs were still high to drive 
technologies towards commercial viability. Spain, Portugal, 
and Denmark have expanded wind power to more than 
20% of electricity over the past decade.
Fast-growing nations are also pursuing renewables. 
In China, the share of coal power in new electricity 
generation, 85% in the last decade, dropped to just over 
50% in 2013, while 15% came from solar and wind and 
30% from hydropower. In 2013 China accounted for 21% 
of all global renewable investment,112 adding more than 
five times more wind and nearly twice as much solar as any 
other country.113 Chile doubled its target for renewable 
electricity to 20% in 2013, seeking affordable, rapidly 
scalable ways to reduce its dependence on gas imports 
and on drought-vulnerable hydropower.114 And as of 
2013, almost half of African nations had done national 
assessments of renewable resources;115 Ethiopia, best 
known for its ambitious development of hydropower,  
also has Africa’s largest wind farm and is pursuing 
geothermal energy, as well as biofuels and off-grid 
renewable solutions.116 
Still, both current and likely future renewable energy 
growth vary greatly across countries. In high-income 
regions that have prioritised renewable energy, it already 
contributes 5–25% of total electricity generation  
(wind, solar and bioenergy, or 10-70% including 
hydropower).117 Scenarios also suggest that in those 
countries, a majority of new electricity generation to 
2030 (50–100%) will come from renewables, based 
on improved economics and existing policies.118 Many 
countries have announced policies thaVt would further 
increase deployment, which could result in renewables 
providing all new net generation capacity additions in 
those countries. Overall, depending on the extent to which 
policies that have already been announced are in fact 
carried through, non-hydro renewable energy thus could 
grow to 15%–25% of total generation by 2030 in  
high-income regions, and higher still for ambitious 
individual countries.
Fast-growing economies could not realistically achieve 
such high shares of non-hydro renewables by 2030, 
given much faster demand growth. In Asia, these sources 
currently provide only 1–5% of electricity. Scenarios 
suggest they could account for 10–20% of net growth in 
electricity supply. The picture is similar in middle-income 
countries elsewhere. In individual countries, however, 
large hydro resources can drive the total share of 
renewables as high as 80–90% of electricity in  
individual countries.
Yet there is potential for more growth. Countries 
have often underestimated how quickly renewable 
energy sources would become more affordable and the 
contribution they could make to energy and economic 
objectives. Although national circumstances vary, the 
evidence suggests that most high-income countries could 
ensure that renewables (including hydropower where 
available) could grow to cover all new net demand for 
electricity to 2030. They could also displace 20% or more 
of coal-fired generation by not extending plants’ lives or 
closing the most polluting and inefficient units (targets in 
the EU already go beyond this). Similarly, middle-income 
countries that now depend heavily on coal could aim to 
have non-hydro renewables provide 25–30% of net new 
electricity supply without resorting to high-cost options 
– higher still for those with particularly good resources 
and technical capabilities. Additional hydropower growth 
should also be pursued, where local resources and 
sustainability concerns allow it. The benefits of reduced 
lock-in to air pollution and possibly volatile fuel costs mean 
that such increased ambitions could often be met at low 
incremental cost.
Overall, the Commission finds, renewable energy is 
already well positioned to become a mainstay of energy 
policy – and in some countries, of development more 
broadly. Yet real barriers remain – some systemic, and 
some specific to solar and wind power. Below we discuss 
the biggest issues and potential policy measures to 
address them.
Overcoming barriers to large-scale deployment 
The most salient barrier is cost. Renewable energy can 
already compete with fossil fuels where resources and 
supply chains are favourable and low-cost finance is 
available. As noted, many countries can exploit such 
At least 53 solar PV plants 
over 50 MW were operating 
by early 2014, in at least 13 
countries, and several planned 
projects are now considered 
competitive without subsidies.
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Note: Solar PV costs can vary by ~50% or more up or down depending on solar resource and local non-technology costs, and even more with 
variations in capital and financing costs. Assuming 9.25% WACC, 17% capacity factor for solar PV, US$70/t coal price and US$10/MMBtu 
natural gas price. The estimated lowest 2014 utility-scale cost is based on a recent power purchasing agreement by Austin Energy, Texas 
(adjusted for subsidies). 
Sources: Historical solar PV costs: Channell et al., 2012, and Nemet, 2006; illustrative fossil fuel range based on US LCOE for conventional 
coal from US EIA, 2014 (upper range) and capital cost assumptions from IEA, 2014 (lower range).103 
Figure 4
Indicative levelised costs of solar PV electricity over time, and estimated lowest utility-scale 
cost to date, compared to a global reference level for coal and natural gas
opportunities. In most of the world, however, new 
renewables at larger scale will still require public support 
– which, in turn, creates political trade-offs, especially 
when budgets are tight. Done badly, subsidies also can 
distort markets and result in overpayment. Renewable 
energy subsidies have grown fast, to more than US$80 
billion for electricity in 2012 (60% in the EU).126 Much of 
this has been akin to an innovation down-payment, arising 
from early commitments to deploy technologies when 
they were still expensive in order to achieve further cost 
reductions improve performance. Thus, they are not a 
guide to what future subsidy levels will be needed. For 
example, achieving Germany’s solar PV build-out today 
would cost a third of what Germany spent over the past 
10
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Integrating variable renewables thus requires much more 
active coordination and management. Much has been 
learnt in the last 10 years as mechanisms to accommodate 
high shares have been put in place in several countries, 
such as Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Germany, and some 
US states. A mix of supply- and demand-side options 
have been deployed, including flexible conventional 
generation, new transmission, more responsive demand, 
and changes in power system operations to maintain the 
same ability to reliably meet demand as a more traditional 
“baseload” system. This process has benefited from steady 
innovations in forecasting, grid planning, market design, 
and other solutions.133 
Very high levels of variable renewable power have not yet 
been attempted, but from a technical perspective, they 
look increasingly feasible. For example, a modelling 2014 
study for a major US electricity market (PJM) concluded 
that 30% variable renewables could be integrated with 
modest additions of grid extensions and flexible gas-fired 
power plants.134 Detailed modelling for the United States 
as a whole showed how an electricity system with 80% 
renewables would be feasible with technologies that are 
commercially available today.135 Costs were estimated 
at 8–22% above baseline developments, including all 
integration costs, but depending on the rate of continued 
technology development to reduce generation costs. 
Most countries will not have variable renewable anywhere 
near these levels for a long period of time. For example, 
putting in place the full set of REmap options only four 
countries reach shares of variable renewables exceeding 
30% by 2030, and most (including India and China) stay 
below 20%.136 Starting from a low base, most countries 
could technically continue to build out variable renewables 
for many years before hitting levels where costs escalate.
Still, it is important to prepare. Failing to properly plan for 
the integration of variable renewables can drive up costs and 
complicate further expansion of wind or solar power even 
at modest levels of penetration.137 Problems have ranged 
from unavailable network connections in Brazil, to strains 
on the grid from “hotspots” of production in India, or failure 
to provide incentives to enable fossil fuel plants to vary their 
output to complement varying wind or solar PV production 
in China, to failure to anticipate new grid requirements in 
Germany. Other examples show that many of these problems 
can be kept manageable with good policy, but integrating 
renewables clearly increases demands on coordination and 
institutional capacity. Additionally, countries need to bear 
in mind that the value (in terms of meeting power needs) 
of adding more generation with the same time-variability 
declines as shares increase; for example, solar PV might be 
very valuable initially as a way to manage peak load, but then 
have lower capacity value. An important guiding principle 
to address these issues is that renewables should not be 
managed separately, but should be built into the power 
system’s design and operation.
decade – and potentially much less in a country with 
better solar resource.127
Assessments now suggest that support will continue to be 
needed for some time, but that the required support per 
unit of electricity is falling fast. For example, the IEA now 
envisions a six-fold increase in non-hydro renewables with 
just over twice the current subsidies. Other scenarios see 
renewables scaling faster still, and with lower subsidies. 
For example, the “REmap” assessment by the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) identifies potential 
that would give 60% more generation from renewables 
than is realised in the IEA scenario, and would result 
in 44% share of renewables in electricity production 
by 2030.128 Despite the higher volumes, the estimated 
subsidies are lower per unit, and the average increase 
in cost is US$20/MWh.129 Other assessments have 
suggested that, by the 2020s, there will be no need for 
further subsidy of onshore wind and solar PV in Europe.130
Where subsidies continue to be necessary, they are often 
on the same level as the monetary value of the multiple 
benefits of more diverse and less polluting energy 
supplies. For example, the IRENA assessment suggests 
that accounting for air pollution could reduce the true 
incremental cost to society by half or more.131 Likewise, 
the support required would be much lower in the presence 
of a carbon price. 
Another value of deploying renewable energy now is that 
it helps drive down future costs – not just through global 
technology improvements, but by improving individual 
countries’ ability to make use of the technologies. Even for 
similar circumstances, the cost of solar and wind power 
can vary by a factor of two or three depending on the 
maturity of local industries, economies of scale, variation 
in the cost of financing, and the regulatory environment.132 
In other words, the “learning by doing” that helps drive 
costs down is not just about global technological progress, 
but also about developing local capacity. One key step 
in this regard is to ensure that renewables can access 
finance on terms at least as beneficial as those extended 
to conventional sources. Costs are now often 20% higher 
than they would be with financial solutions tailored to 
the characteristics of renewables rather than fossil fuels 
(see Chapter 6: Finance for a deep-dive on how improving 
investment conditions can reduce the cost of renewable 
power). Countries that want to avail themselves of 
renewables as they fall in price should thus build the local 
capacity to do so ahead of time. 
Expanding the use of solar and wind power also depends 
on successfully integrating these technologies into the 
overall electricity system. Unlike gas, coal, nuclear or 
hydropower, wind and solar power production is variable 
and cannot be controlled or fully predicted in advance. 
Good resources are also can be located far from centres 
of demand, requiring new extensions of power grids. 
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Both hydropower and nuclear power are well-established 
energy sources with low local emissions as well as low GHG 
profiles. While solar and wind power have grabbed the 
spotlight in recent years, hydropower and nuclear power 
are still by far the biggest non-fossil sources of electricity, 
at 16% and 12% of global generation, respectively.119 
Both offer nearly emissions-free energy, with very low 
marginal costs, and have a proven record at large scales. 
However, they are also highly capital-intensive, can take a 
decade or more to plan and build, and come with a range of 
environmental and social risks.
Hydropower provides clean power that can be ramped 
up and down quickly, with minimal losses. Its flexibility 
and storage capacity make it useful in many settings, and 
it can be a good complement to renewable sources with 
variable output, such as solar and wind. There is also great 
untapped potential: current generation is 3,200 terawatt-
hours (TWh) per year, but another 1.5 times that could be 
added at costs not exceeding those of fossil alternatives. 
These attractive features continue to drive hydropower 
development, with growing economies in Asia and Latin 
America adding the equivalent of 3% of existing global 
capacity per year.120 
Yet hydropower can also have serious social and 
environmental impacts. Building dams and reservoirs may 
displace communities and widely disrupt ecosystems, and 
can also be contentious when downstream water supplies 
are disrupted. In addition, reservoirs can be significant 
sources of methane, a potent greenhouse gas; the GHG 
emissions of 25% of reservoirs are one-quarter or more  
of those of an equivalent coal plant.121 
Nuclear power provides 20% of electricity in OECD 
countries, having expanded rapidly from the late 1960s 
to the late 1980s.122 Its advantages have included stable 
electricity supply with very low fuel costs, as well as good 
environmental characteristics if accidents and leaks of 
radioactive material are avoided. The ability to provide 
zero-carbon energy has since been added to its list of 
advantages. However, nuclear power also raises concerns 
about how to handle radioactive waste, proliferation 
risks, and severe worst-case accident scenarios. Public 
support was severely eroded by the Three Mile Island 
accident in 1979, and then the Chernobyl and Fukushima 
accidents. Increasingly stringent safety standards and 
a limited number of approved suppliers have increased 
construction costs in OECD countries three to seven 
fold since the early 1990s.123 Projects now under way in 
Europe are reaching historic highs in terms of delay and 
cost escalation.
As a result, deployment of new nuclear capacity  
has slowed to a crawl, with less than 15% cumulative  
growth since 1995.124 Several OECD countries have  
since announced plans to reduce or phase out nuclear 
power completely, a process that has firmed after  
the Fukushima accident in 2011. Nuclear power’s 
continued growth will likely depend on a small number of 
non-OECD countries, which are aiming to add capacity 
corresponding to a third of the current total by 2025, 70% 
of it in China.125
Innovations such as small modular reactors and thorium 
fuel, spurred by increased deployment in non-OECD 
countries, may improve the outlook for nuclear energy.  
It does offer many benefits in terms of energy security  
and avoided emissions, but nuclear energy’s challenges 
– from waste handling, to high capital costs, to public 
concerns, are likely to persist.
Box 4
Nuclear and hydropower: Two proven low-carbon technologies 
Further innovations will also be needed as renewables’ 
share of energy production grows. These may include new 
technologies (energy storage, smart grid management), 
but equally important new business models (e.g. for 
demand response and for the provision of other flexibility 
services), as well as new financing mechanisms, regulatory 
 
An important guiding principle 
to address these issues is 
that renewables should not 
be managed separately, but 
should be built into the power 
system’s design and operation.
approaches, and market designs. Emerging experience in 
both Europe and the United States shows that the entry 
of renewables can prove very challenging to incumbent 
utilities, and create a need for new mechanisms to ensure 
that the fossil fuel-fired plants required for system 
stability can continue to operate in a situation of lower 
wholesale electricity prices and lower running hours 
caused by the entry of new renewable sources. A few 
pioneering countries are acting as laboratories to develop 
the full solution set, much like early support was crucial for 
driving down the cost of equipment. Continuing  
these investments in innovation will be critical to long-
term success.
In addressing these, barriers the first step often will be 
conceptual: to adjust to the rapid pace of change and start 
evaluating plans that include much higher contributions 
for renewable energy than ever considered before. The 
starting point must be for all countries to evaluate an 
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3.4 Opportunities to expand energy access
The people with the most to gain from modern energy are 
those who still lack it. As noted earlier, 1.3 billion people 
have no access to electricity and 2.6 billion lack modern 
cooking facilities. More than 95% of this unmet need is in 
sub-Saharan African or developing Asia; 84% is in rural 
areas.143 Furthermore, in many urban and peri-urban areas 
in the developing world, large numbers of people have only 
partial or unreliable access to a grid connection. 
Access to electricity allows households to have more 
productive hours, including time for children to study; with 
moderate rises in income, it also provides access to welfare- 
and productivity-enhancing electronics such as mobile 
telephones and refrigeration.144 Reliable electricity access 
also improves business productivity, and provides access to 
telecommunications, which can facilitate  
up-to-date and integrated candidate scenario where 
renewable energy provides a large share of new electricity 
production, set against a full suite of energy and other 
objectives. This, in turn, requires mapping the available 
resources, understanding additional grid requirements, 
accounting for future cost developments in both fossil and 
renewable energy, understanding the impact on energy 
security parameters, accounting for the value of avoided 
lock-in to higher-polluting forms of energy, and valuing 
the reduced exposure to volatile fuel prices. The results 
will differ, depending on local circumstances and priorities, 
but the evidence suggests that many countries will find 
renewable energy much more attractive than currently 
assumed by comparing project-level costs. Several proven 
measures can also help make renewables more cost-
competitive (see Box 5). 
Much has been learned about how to deploy renewable 
energy cost-effectively. Some level of financial support still 
is needed in most countries, and it should be minimised 
through best practice:
1. Achieve sufficient scale and efficient operation. Both 
the cost of developing and operating renewable energy 
projects vary by as much as 50% between locations. 
For example, the balance of system costs of solar PV in 
Germany are half those of the United States.138 For 
wind power, maintenance costs and success in 
maximising production also vary sharply. Achieving 
sufficient scale and maturity of local supply chains as 
well as operational expertise are all elements in 
reducing the effective cost of electricity  
from new renewables. Ensuring sufficient competition  
between project developers can be a major driver for  
such improvement.
2. Mitigate risk and legacy barriers. In many parts of the 
world, power investment is generally held back by 
the risk that investments will not be recovered over 
time. This is amplified in the case of renewables, both 
because a larger share of the total cost has to be sunk 
upfront, and because the economic case often depends 
on government support mechanisms to a greater 
degree. Identifying and addressing regulatory and 
other barriers, and streamlining planning and approval 
requirements, is critical to reducing construction time 
and removing the risks that either raise the cost of 
capital or prevent financing altogether. 
3. Improve the financing structures. Current investment 
structures for power generation typically are set 
up to serve projects with the cost structure of fossil 
energy, including a large share of ongoing costs and 
fossil fuel price risk. Adapting financing to the specific 
features of renewable energy can reduce financing 
costs, in turn reducing the total cost of renewable 
electricity production by as much as 20%.139 The 
YieldCo solutions pioneered in the United States are an 
example of this.140 
4. Use flexible and efficient support mechanisms. With 
rapidly falling costs support levels risk being set 
too high. Countries are now increasingly turning to 
auction mechanisms to enable cost-effective use of 
support, and also building in automatic revisions of 
levels and relating support to underlying electricity 
prices. Done right, such improvements can be made 
without retroactive changes to arrangements or the 
introduction of other risk that is damaging investor 
confidence. In addition, where the objective is centred 
on greenhouse gas mitigation, renewables deployment 
should be backed by  
carbon prices.141 
5. Plan for grid integration. Ineffective planning for 
the integration of renewables to the power grid can 
increase cost substantially. Costs can be kept down 
even at substantial levels of renewables penetration 
through greater use of demand response, advance grid 
construction, increased balancing area size, improved 
forecasting of renewables output, or market design 
improvements such as shorter time windows for the 
planning of electricity production. Failures to adopt these 
can increase costs substantially. For example, China had 
to curtail as much as 10% of its wind power production 
last year due to insufficient grid connections.142 
Box 5 
Reducing the cost of renewable energy deployment 
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growth in a range of development areas such as health 
care, institutional access, and political voice. Conversely, 
lack of access to electricity can impede a range 
of economic activities.145 
In the past, electricity access has expanded both through 
urbanisation and through extension of centralised power 
grids. China, Thailand, and Vietnam recently achieved 
near-universal access through these routes,146 and they 
will continue to be important to relieving energy poverty. 
However, in much of the world the process is slow and 
faces multiple barriers. Without new policies, the total 
number of people without access to modern energy in fact 
could increase rather than fall in the next two decades.147 
Overcoming energy poverty also requires upgrading 
the quality and efficiency of household thermal energy, 
primarily used for cooking. This has significant benefits by 
reducing or replacing the need for traditional biomass fuels 
such as wood and dung.148 Eliminating the need for fuel 
wood collection also liberates considerable time for other 
productive activities, especially for women and girls.
For electricity, there is growing agreement that renewables 
can complement traditional approaches to overcome 
barriers to expanded access. Falling costs, new business 
models, and technological innovations are making 
decentralised solutions increasingly attractive. For example, 
a recent IEA scenario for universal energy access by 2030 
assumes 56% of the investment would go to “mini-grids” 
and off-grid solutions, with up to 90% using renewable 
energy sources.149 In principle, these technologies are a 
good fit because they are modular and can be installed at 
small scales. Inexpensive low-carbon solutions are also 
emerging to meet specific needs, such  
as solar mobile-phone chargers and rooftop solar water 
heaters. Further, the distribution cost of access via grid 
expansion will be high in many cases. Distributed generation 
technologies can often provide electricity  
more cost-effectively in these cases, though care  
should be taken to ensure that the technologies employed 
do not imply a lock-in to perpetually low-power  
electricity consumption.
Renewable energy also can have long-term advantages. 
Providing universal basic energy access would not 
significantly increase greenhouse gas emissions, even if 
only fossil fuels were used.150 But longer-term, energy use 
must move beyond basic services, scaling up to productive 
uses that support community development and income 
generation. Low-carbon alternatives can therefore be 
more attractive where the potential future scale of CO
2
 
emissions, air pollution, and fuel cost and availability is a 
concern. Conversely, those alternatives will only be viable if 
they can scale up and fit into a future with the full range of 
modern energy services.
As with renewables more generally, the Commission’s 
research suggests that effective policies and institutions 
are vital to the success of low-carbon options for expanding 
energy access. While the political momentum around 
expanding energy access and mitigating climate change 
has been high in recent years, few, if any, countries have 
aggressively pursued both goals at once. Consultations 
with policy actors in Africa (see Box 6) suggest that there 
is a great unmet need for evidence about the feasibility 
and benefits of low-carbon options; without it, even 
governments that vocally support climate action will tend 
to stick with conventional technologies and fossil fuels. 
Overcoming this inertia will require demonstrating how a 
low-carbon path can advance not only climate or energy 
goals, but broader social  
and economic well-being. There is also a need to understand 
how off-grid low-carbon technologies take hold “on the 
ground”, and what it takes to build sustainable business 
models. 
Overall, this calls for much accelerated experimentation and 
demonstration. This needs to go beyond just technologies, 
and include business models, financing arrangements, 
and policy environments. Cooperation in other areas, 
such as the CGIAR model151 for agricultural applications, 
can offer lessons here on how to pursue context-
specific innovation in a structure of regional hubs and a 
distributed institutional structure.
Two other key barriers need to be overcome as well: First, 
access to finance remains limited, hindering the scale-
up of low-carbon solutions. Since upfront capital costs 
are often higher than for conventional options, the risks 
of investments are notable, and banks are reluctant to 
offer loans. Overcoming this for utility-scale technologies 
requires targeted, long-term funding schemes, including 
a robust and supportive institutional framework on the 
national level. For distributed energy technologies, it 
requires business financing products, such as seed capital 
and working capital, to allow companies offering consumer 
and commercial energy products to develop and reach the 
market. There could be significant value from a business 
incubator approach to underpin the innovation framework 
mooted above.
Second, while the private sector has a key role to play 
in bringing low-cost renewable solutions to the market, 
many businesses struggle to generate revenues and be 
sustainable over time. Capacity- and skills-building – 
not just in the technologies, but in business and market 
development – will be essential.
3.5 Natural gas as a potential “bridge” to 
low-carbon energy systems
Natural gas has become a preferred fuel in much of the 
world. Outside a handful of coal-intensive countries, it has 
provided 60% new energy since 1990, and almost 80% 
outside transport – increasing its share across electricity 
generation, heating of buildings, and industrial uses.153 The 
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transport; the end-to-end cost of transporting liquefied 
natural gas (the only option where pipelines cannot be built) 
can be substantial and has been increasing sharply over the 
last decade as the cost of capital intensive infrastructure 
has escalated and demand increased. Outside the US, 
natural gas has also become less cost-competitive, 
quadrupling in price since 1990 while coal doubled.155 
Energy security is a concern as well, with regional 
dependence on single large suppliers, and global reserves 
concentrated in just five countries. For these  
and other reasons, less than a third of natural gas is 
internationally traded.156 In particular, natural gas  
has made barely made a mark in India and China,  
where supplies have not been available on terms  
deemed acceptable.
Shale-gas production has drawn considerable attention as a 
potential way to overcome these challenges. In the United 
States, the availability of shale-gas supplies has resulted 
in a 60% drop in gas prices, a 20% reduction in coal used 
for electricity generation, and a consequent reduction in 
versatility of the fuel across a number of end-use sectors 
is complemented by its ability to reduce local air pollution 
where it displaces coal. It also has been a major factor in 
reducing GHG emissions in some countries, including the 
United Kingdom and Germany in the 1990s, and the United 
States recently. In electricity production in particular it 
has been discussed as a potential “bridge technology” in 
the transition to a lower-carbon economy:154 electricity 
produced from natural gas can emit just half the CO
2
 as 
the same amount of electricity from coal, and natural gas 
has a proven track-record of scaling rapidly where supply 
is available. At best, turning to natural gas therefore could 
help avoid new coal construction and even dislodge the 
preference for coal as the default new option for new power 
supply. In addition to reducing CO
2
 emissions directly, 
the flexibility of gas in electricity generation makes it a 
potentially important enabler of higher levels of penetration 
of variable renewable energy sources. 
The expansion of natural gas would be greater still if key 
challenges were overcome. Natural gas is difficult to 
In order to better understand how low-carbon options 
are contributing to energy access expansion, the 
Global Commission convened a workshop in Nairobi, 
Kenya, in April 2014 with policy-makers, business and 
nongovernment organisation (NGO) representatives, and 
academic experts from across Africa.152 A key insight from 
that workshop was that low-carbon options have not (yet) 
altered the fundamental barriers to expanding modern 
energy access in the region, including high costs to supply 
rural households; weak implementing capacity; lack of 
reliable financing, and low demand and ability to pay on the 
side of consumers. Participants also noted the wide range 
of low-carbon options being pushed by different interests, 
and a lack of evidence for policy-makers to evaluate the 
suitability of those options.
Morocco was cited as a prime example of successful  
use of low-carbon options to expand energy access. The 
country is a net energy importer and heavily dependent 
on oil, which accounted for 62% of its primary energy 
consumption in 2011. Its geography also gives it one of  
the highest potentials for wind and solar in the world. 
To seize that potential and improve its energy security, 
Morocco has put in place consistent policy support, 
including favourable financing options and regulatory 
frameworks, to support the deployment of renewable 
energy solutions. Today, about 15% of the population  
gets energy from a low-carbon source. The impact  
has been particularly great in rural areas, where the 
electrification rate increased from 18% to 98% between 
1995 and 2012, first through a grid expansion programme 
and then through off-grid solar PV where grid expansion 
was uneconomical.
Morocco’s success is credited to several factors: 1) strong 
political commitment to universal energy access, backed 
by appropriate institutions and incentive schemes for 
participation; 2) strong financial support, drawing on 
multiple sources, including a clearly defined programme 
that attracted international funds, targeted subsidies from 
the national utilities, and a solidarity tax of 2% paid by all 
households connected to the grid; 3) a strong public-private 
partnership designed to deliver power to rural customers at 
costs comparable to what grid-connected households pay; 
4) extensive piloting programmes that gathered detailed 
data to fully understand the preferences and needs of  
the end-users, including their willingness to accept the  
new technology.
The workshop also highlighted several other cases where 
off-grid, low-carbon technologies have successfully filled 
a niche, such as the widespread use of rooftop solar water 
heaters in South Africa, which has also been supported by 
the government. Some private-sector initiatives have also 
done well, such as solar-powered mobile phone chargers 
– individual kits or village charging stations – which are 
spreading across sub-Saharan Africa, meeting both energy 
and communications needs. 
The success stories highlight the need for sustainable 
business models, and workshop participants also said that 
building market-development capacity is a key gap to fill 
in technology-transfer efforts. Several participants also 
noted that African countries can learn a great deal from 
one another, by comparing their energy-access strategies 
and the ways in which they are using enabling policies, 
institutions and investments to support the deployment of 
low-carbon technologies.
Box 6 
Low-carbon options for energy access: African perspectives 
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national GHG emissions.157 It even offers the prospect 
of substantial gas exports. A key question is whether 
this phenomenon can endure and spread more globally, 
delivering wider benefits to the economy and climate and 
make the “bridge” role for gas more likely.   
Can greater natural gas supplies be a game-changer?158 
A number of assessments suggest that the potential natural 
gas supply is large. Although there is uncertainty about 
the realistically recoverable reserves from unconventional 
gas deposits, by some estimates it could provide as much 
as two-thirds of incremental gas supply over the next two 
decades. By 2035, the IEA has suggested that China in 
principle could produce nearly 400 billion cubic metres per 
year of unconventional gas, as much as the US produces 
today and 10 times the amount China recently agreed 
to import from Russia after 10 years of negotiation.159 In 
India, production could climb to nearly one-quarter this 
level. Furthermore, greater globalisation of gas markets 
through expanded liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 
pipeline infrastructure would allow abundant, low-cost 
conventional and unconventional gas resources to reach 
supply-constrained markets, including those where much of 
the world’s new coal plants could otherwise be built. Such 
developments would make it likelier that gas could play an 
important “bridging” role.
Such a scenario is far from certain, however. Not only is the 
technical potential highly uncertain, but several  
factors could get in the way. Developing new supplies is 
capital-intensive and involves long lead times, and at the 
current rates of development, it may not be possible to 
increase the supply fast enough to meet substantial new  
demand. Producers will also need to address social  
and environmental concerns related to production  
practices, particularly those associated with hydraulic 
fracturing (“fracking”).
Will natural gas growth benefit the climate?160
Moreover, the climate implications of a high-gas scenario 
are far from straightforward. It matters where low-cost gas 
becomes available; the benefits will be greatest in regions 
that would otherwise depend on coal, and greater if natural 
gas is used for electricity production than for heating and 
transport applications. Also, if natural gas operations are 
not well managed, methane emissions from venting and 
leaks in production and transport can partly offset and even 
negate the GHG advantages of natural gas (see box). In fact, 
research for the Commission indicates that natural gas is 
likely to provide net climate benefits only if it is backed by 
robust climate policy and environmental regulations, for 
two key reasons. 
First, in the key regions of Asia that now depend on coal, 
gas – especially imported LNG – is likely to remain more 
expensive, suggesting that it will be difficult for gas to 
compete on market price alone, and giving it a very limited 
role in electricity production in particular. Policies to reflect 
social and environmental costs, as the US, China and others 
have pursued, will thus be essential for gas use to increase. 
Second, without carbon pricing or other emissions 
constraints, cheap and abundant natural gas supplies could 
both increase energy demand and displace lower-carbon 
options that would otherwise be used. The high initial 
investment and long life of gas infrastructure also amplify 
the risk of “locking out” zero-carbon options including 
renewable and nuclear energy. Meanwhile, coal that is 
displaced in one geography can be internationally traded, 
a phenomenon that already has reduced the global GHG 
emissions reductions resulting from increased gas use in 
the United States. Several modelling exercises suggest that 
these factors combined could be enough to negate GHG 
emissions benefits from displacing coal and oil use in a high-
gas scenario. 
In other words, policy-makers cannot count on abundant 
natural gas, on its own, to serve as a “bridge” fuel, nor should 
they promote gas as a climate solution without strong 
supporting policies. Active interventions, such as attributing 
to coal its full social cost, regulating gas production 
practices to limit fugitive methane emissions (see Box 7), 
putting a price on carbon emissions, and supporting low-
carbon technologies so their development and deployment 
are not slowed down, will be needed for gas to fulfil this role. 
Fortunately, such interventions have other societal benefits 
as well. Making gas a viable “bridge” therefore could be a 
component part of a general approach to enabling better 
energy supply, even if it cannot be counted on as a solution 
on its own.
3.6 Making the most of our energy supply
A final, huge opportunity – also seen as crucial by the IEA 
– is the potential to improve energy productivity: the value 
created per unit of energy input. Countries at all income 
levels have made great strides in recent decades, with 
the biggest progress in fast-growing economies: China, 
for example, improved by as much as 6% per year for 
some time. But even mature economies have seen steady 
improvements near 2% per year. However, some countries 
have made little progress, and in a few – most notably in the 
Middle East, where energy prices are heavily subsidised – 
energy productivity has in fact worsened.168
Getting on track to maximise energy productivity has 
direct implications for energy demand. Businesses and 
households do not need energy for its own sake, but rather 
for the energy services it provides: mobility, heat, lighting, 
mechanical power, etc. Energy efficiency has steadily 
improved over the past four decades; without those 
improvements, energy supplies would have had to grow 
far more rapidly, magnifying the associated expense and 
disadvantages (see exhibit). More likely, countries would 
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have had to accept much lower levels of benefits from 
energy use. It is often overlooked that increased energy 
efficiency can be the primary mechanism by which countries 
expand their benefits from energy use over time.
Still, much greater potential exists, at all levels of 
development: from improved biomass cookstoves, to gains 
from electrification, to specific opportunities in a wide 
range of uses across modern economies. Buildings offer 
particularly large potential, especially with heating and 
cooling but also with lighting and other energy services. 
Baseline scenarios project a doubling or tripling of energy 
demand from buildings; but more efficient technologies 
are already available that could provide the same energy 
services to users with barely any increase in energy 
demand. In the transport sector, energy efficiency and 
vehicle performance improvements range from 30–50% 
relative to 2010 depending on mode and vehicle type.170 
Industrial energy use, meanwhile, has stronger mechanisms 
for ensuring energy use is efficient, but even here a scenario 
with the global application of best-available technology 
could reduce energy use by 25%.171 
Countries’ ability to realise this potential will greatly affect 
their future energy needs. For example, India’s 2030 energy 
demand may be 40% higher in a scenario of low energy 
efficiency vs. one with (very) high energy efficiency; the 
difference is equivalent to all the energy the country uses 
today.172 This has knock-on effects on many other factors, 
such as the need to import energy, the capital requirements 
for low-carbon energy generation, and balance-of-
payments pressures. On a global scale, the energy required 
to provide energy services in 2035 could vary by the 
amount of energy used today by the OECD, depending on 
whether a high or low efficiency path is struck.173 
Boosting efficiency requires upfront investments, but 
there is much evidence to suggest that the resulting fuel 
savings for many measures exceed the costs. Specifically, 
even adopting just the measures that meet criteria of rapid 
“pay-back” in terms of the price of energy (and thus imply 
an acceptable cost of capital and discount rate), the IEA has 
estimated, could reduce demand by 14% by 2035 relative 
to a reference case. The US$12 trillion total investment 
required would yield fossil fuel savings almost twice as 
large over 20 years. This scenario also suggests that energy 
efficiency would be cost-effective in the sense that it costs 
less than an equivalent increase in supply. This brings 
potential for substantial economic benefits. GDP in the 
2030s could be increased by 3% for China, 2% for India, and 
1.7% for the United States. Total global economic output 
could increase by US$18 trillion, close to the combined 
GDP of the United States and China today.174 These 
estimates are borne out by experience in several countries. 
For example, state-level energy efficiency programmes in 
the United States regularly save consumers over US$2 
for every US$1 invested, and in some cases up to US$5.175 
These magnitudes leave significant room for energy 
efficiency to remain an attractive option even if there were 
in fact “hidden costs” or other factors that might dent the 
estimates proposed by the models.
The potential for efficiency improvements also is growing 
rapidly. The cost of improving the energy efficiency 
of buildings has fallen significantly in recent years.176 
Lighting is undergoing a step-change in efficiency with 
the introduction of light-emitting diodes (LEDs). New 
opportunities – from much-more efficient air conditioning 
to automated energy management – promise further 
reductions (see Chapter 7: Innovation). 
Net gains for the climate, but especially for the economy
Some share of the gains may be offset by increased 
consumption – the “rebound effect”. Improved energy 
efficiency lowers the effective cost of energy services 
and the prices of goods that require significant energy for 
their production. This, in turn, reduces the cost of energy 
services, increasing consumption of such services, and frees 
up resources to spend on other goods and services, which 
can further increase energy consumption. The size of the 
rebound effect is uncertain, and credible estimates range 
between 10% and 50%, including economy-wide effects 
such as lower fuel prices.177 Levels may be higher still in 
some cases, and especially in countries with significant 
unmet demand for energy.
This has led some to argue that energy efficiency is less 
worthwhile, as it does not translate one-to-one into reduced 
consumption. However, rebound only occurs to the extent 
that energy efficiency has economic benefits: it means that 
end-users enjoy still greater levels of energy services due to 
improved energy efficiency than they would if there were 
no rebound. The total resulting energy consumption and 
emissions will depend on a number of factors, including the 
structure of the economy, regulatory conditions, and energy 
prices. To reduce GHG emissions, all of these as well as 
other factors need to be modulated. 
Actions to realise higher efficiency gains
Countries vary significantly in their ability to capture 
energy efficiency opportunities. The very fact that so much 
cost-effective potential remains untapped is an indication 
that it often can be difficult to realise within the market 
arrangements that now prevail. As a starting point to getting 
there, appropriate energy pricing is particularly important. 
The IEA estimates that phasing out fossil fuel consumption 
subsidies over the next decade could reduce world energy 
demand by almost 4% by the time subsidies are fully phased 
out, and by 5% in the following 25 years. By 2030, this 
could imply reductions in global CO
2
 emissions of as much 
as 0.4–1.8 Gt.178 The influence of prices, moreover, can be 
deep and structural. For example, cheap fuel in countries 
with low fuel taxation encourages car-centric development, 
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The release of methane from energy production is a 
major source of GHG emissions. Recent estimates put 
the total released from energy activities in 2010 at 
around 125–129 million tonnes of methane per year 
(4.2–4.4 billion tonnes of CO
2
 equivalents), with 80–90 
Mt from oil and gas supply and distribution (2.7–3.1 
Gt CO
2
e).161 For comparison, this is the equivalent of 
16–18% of the 17 Gt CO
2
 emitted from oil and gas 
combustion in 2010. However, although estimates tend 
to be close to one another, data are in fact very poor. 
Actual emissions levels could in fact be much higher. For 
example, estimates of leakage from natural gas systems 
range as widely as 1–5% of total gas produced, with 
individual studies identifying still higher numbers.162
A number of assessments suggest that reducing 
methane emissions could be economically attractive 
and offer co-benefits through reduced air pollution, as 
well as substantial climate benefits. For example, the US 
Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that 
methane emissions from oil and gas systems could be 
reduced by 35% by 2030, or 880 Mt CO
2
e, at no net cost 
once the value of the gas is taken into account.163 More 
near-term, the IEA has identified measures in upstream 
activities could achieve 580 Mt CO
2
e of emissions cuts 
by 2020, as part of a set of GDP-neutral measures to 
reduce GHG emissions.164 Other detailed assessments 
for individual countries similarly show substantial 
reductions available at negative or low cost.165 As 
methane also has adverse impacts on human health and 
crop yields through its contribution to the formation 
of ozone, reductions of fugitive emissions also would 
have other co-benefits.166 Moreover, reducing methane 
emissions from natural gas systems, and unconventional 
gas production in particular, may be a prerequisite to 
enable a “bridge” function of natural gas in a transition 
to a low-carbon energy system.167
Achieving these reductions would require a combination 
of better measurement and monitoring to understand 
the scale of fugitive emissions; increased industry 
awareness and commitment to options to effect 
reductions; and sharper incentives to change practices 
and underpin long-term investment programmes. Some 
of these may be achievable through voluntary industry 
initiatives, notably in raising awareness and improving 
monitoring. Others may require regulation, including 
increased enforcement of existing regulations (e.g. 
to reduce flaring of gas) and new regulations to set 
standards across oil and gas supply chains.
Box 7 
Reducing methane emissions
which is a major reason why per capita transport fuel use is 
nearly three times as high in the United States as in Europe. 
Likewise, subsidies for energy are a major reason for the 
Middle East’s declining energy productivity.
Yet efficient pricing alone is unlikely to capture all 
economically efficient energy efficiency opportunities, 
especially if there is a substantial upfront cost. 
Countries that have employed effective additional policy 
interventions, including standards, information, behavioural 
“nudges” and other means have seen much greater success 
in improving the productivity of their energy use. Three 
characteristics stand out among leaders in this field:
• Effective understanding of their current status: 
Countries need to know where they stand, relative to 
others and relative to where they could be. Measuring 
and communicating the potential has proven an 
important step for planning effective interventions and 
mobilising action.
• Standards for markets that lack automatic 
mechanisms to ensure efficiency: When the costs 
and benefits of efficiency measures do not accrue to 
the same actors – e.g. with rental properties – there 
is reduced incentive to invest in efficiency. Energy 
efficiency standards are then crucial – e.g. building 
codes, vehicle fuel-efficiency requirements, and 
appliance standards. Such standards also help induce 
innovation over time, especially when they are adjusted 
over time, as in Japan’s Top Runner Program.179 
Governments should exercise caution, however, to 
ensure that higher upfront costs do not price housing 
or key services and goods beyond consumers’ reach.
• Effective finance: Many countries have had success 
supporting energy efficiency through advantageous 
finance programmes, such as those of KfW in 
Germany.180 Increasingly, new business models also 
help make finance available, through energy service 
contracting and other approaches.
The countries that best succeeded in these respects, and 
which have been able to steer economic activity towards 
sectors that are more energy productive, are now able to 
produce twice as much GDP per unit of energy as they did 
in 1980.181 In contrast, several other countries have  
barely improved. 
Businesses also can take action to benefit directly from 
improved energy efficiency. In particular, companies with 
extensive supply chains have an opportunity to work 
with their suppliers to increase efficiency. The potential is 
significant: reducing the energy use of just 30% of the top 
1,000 corporations by 10–20% below business-as-usual 
levels would save about 0.7 Gt CO
2
 per year by 2020, 
and likely more as the economy grows in later years.182 
The impact increases when measures are propagated 
throughout supply chains: a 10% emission reduction in the 
supply chains of the same 30% of companies would reduce 
emissions by another 0.2 Gt. There are already many 
companies taking such steps, such as the 100 companies 
in the Better Buildings Challenge in the US, which have 
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direct subsidies, lower rates of taxation, or price controls 
to keep energy affordable. The total gap between the 
market value of fuels and the prices at which they are sold 
is more than US$500 billion per year.185 The influence of 
low prices goes deep: often they have realigned economic 
priorities, favouring energy-intensive sectors when their 
overall costs would not justify it; they have rewarded energy 
inefficiency and waste; and they have even reshaped the 
physical landscape, encouraging sprawling cities. They 
have also depressed energy investment in many countries, 
magnifying energy access and supply problems. Correcting 
price distortions is thus crucial to building more productive, 
robust, flexible and sustainable energy systems. Yet doing 
so can be very difficult; the most successful efforts have 
been accompanied by careful measures to avoid negative 
social and economic impacts. 
In addition, today’s energy systems have been shaped 
by multiple market failures that allow companies and 
consumers to benefit from individual choices that together 
harm the economy or society at large. The most visible 
is the environmental impact of pollution from fossil fuel 
extraction and combustion, but it extends further, to land 
and food systems (e.g. for the production of bioenergy) or 
water (e.g. hydropower, hydraulic fracturing, or thermal-
power plant cooling). Less visible, but also significant, is that 
design choices that affect energy consumption often are out 
of end-users’ control. Rental properties and urban design 
are prime examples: in some cases, poor choices made 
decades ago still limit options and hinder change today. This 
is a significant challenge for cities, as discussed in Chapter 
2: Cities, but also extends to many other energy uses. 
Over time, energy use patterns are embedded in culture, 
becoming even harder to change. 
Finally, the attractiveness of energy options in one country 
depends strongly on what others do. For example, a small 
group of countries pioneered the energy innovations that 
now create opportunities for all others. Likewise, as noted, 
widespread action to increase energy efficiency and adopt 
low-carbon alternatives could take pressure off fossil fuel 
prices, but countries acting individually do not have enough 
market power. Overall, cooperation on energy matters can 
have many benefits, but it is hard to achieve. 
These barriers are not a cause for despair or inaction. 
There are numerous examples where deliberate strategic 
direction has yielded rapid results, such as the rapid switch 
to natural gas in the UK and the Netherlands, the build-
out of nuclear power in France or Sweden, the reduction 
in overall energy import dependence in Denmark, and the 
recent success in extending energy access in rural China. 
What these examples show, however, is that overcoming 
inertia in energy systems requires deliberate action. 
This need not mean government control over energy 
sectors, but it means governments need to put in place the 
prerequisites to enable new solutions. 
pledged to reduce the energy intensity of their buildings 
by 20% over 10 years.183 Mutually beneficial agreements 
between companies and their suppliers, such as innovative 
financing for energy efficiency investments in return for a 
share of cost reductions through lower future prices, could 
provide powerful incentives to improve energy efficiency in 
a range of businesses.
4. Barriers to a better system
Cumulatively, the developments surveyed above offer 
substantial promise to relieve a range of pressures on 
economies by turning to new ways of meeting energy 
demand. Yet achieving this is far from assured. Today’s energy 
systems are the result of numerous choices made over 
several decades, by both public and private actors. They will 
not change easily. Building an energy system fit for the next 
25 years will require deliberate effort – and an updated 
framework for energy decision-making. In this section, we 
begin to sketch out that new framework, and identify 
priorities for policy action. But first, we explore the key 
barriers to change, and how to overcome them.
Capital investments are a big factor in energy-system inertia: 
The total global value of energy supply infrastructure has 
been estimated at US$20 trillion,184 and much of it – from 
power plants and transmission networks to steel plants and 
buildings – is very long-lived (multiple decades). Changing 
the way energy is supplied and used affects the value of 
existing infrastructure and may lead to “stranded” assets, with 
implications for both the energy sector, and those invested in 
it (see Chapter 6: Finance). Thus, there can be great political 
resistance to actions that affect energy-sector assets. 
Conversely, there is a penalty associated with not acting in 
time, as infrastructure choices today “lock in” dependencies 
and impacts for a long time in the future.
Governments also have a direct stake in how energy 
systems work. Many states own substantial stakes in energy 
companies, and governments derive substantial revenues 
from energy activities, through taxes and fees. Large 
numbers of jobs may be on the line.
Moreover, changing energy supplies requires changing laws 
and regulations, which can be slow and politically fraught. 
Energy is a heavily regulated sector, not only in terms 
of energy network monopolies, but also price controls, 
licenses for new energy activities, standards for energy-
using devices, and parameters for how different types of 
energy supplies are used for power and other purposes. If 
reforms cannot be achieved, or the regulatory framework 
is unstable, it will be more difficult to attract capital to new 
classes of investment.
Another major obstacle to change, already mentioned, is 
artificially low energy pricing. Prices around the world are 
set through highly political processes, and often include 
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Figure 5
Impact of energy efficiency on energy consumption in 11 countries, 1974–2010
Note: The figure shows the actual increase in annual final energy consumption, and the energy that would have been needed without  
energy efficiency improvements. Energy services doubled, but energy use went up by only 20%. The countries surveyed are Australia,  
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK, and US Energy efficiency was four times more important 
than any actual fuel source for enabling growth in energy services. 
Source: IEA, 2013.169 
4.1 Rethinking energy priorities
These changes must be underpinned by a framework 
for decision-making fit for a new energy situation and a 
broader set of priorities. Energy systems need to be more 
flexible and nimble, able to grow and adapt to fast-changing 
conditions. They must be better able to meet demand 
through productivity and efficiency improvements, not 
just increased supply. They must be able to accommodate 
a wider range of energy sources, through new business 
models and trade relationships, and at different scales 
of operation. They must be able to drive investment and 
innovations to meet the next wave of demand. And they 
must be grounded in a full understanding of the costs 
and benefits of different options, with prices that reflect 
the true cost of energy, including its impact on security, 
volatility, balance of payments, pollution, and the climate. 
Climate in particular, though likely not the top priority 
Actual 2010 energy use was 20% higher than 
in 1974
...but would need to be 100% higher had 
energy efficiency not improved.
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for energy decision-makers, is a highly time-sensitive 
consideration, since choices made over the next 5–15 years 
will have long-lasting impact on cumulative CO
2
 emissions.
Decision-makers also need to be more forward-looking, 
alert to potential environmental or economic missteps that 
could require expensive corrective action, and conscious 
of rapid technological change when setting policy. A better 
handling of uncertainty and risk must be an indispensable 
part of this. Energy decisions need to account for the value 
of insurance against adverse scenarios. This will place a 
greater value on keeping options open until major structural 
uncertainties are resolved. Early diversification is also an 
important way to approach the dilemma of making long-
term commitments in a situation of irreducible and growing 
uncertainty.
The next 5–10 years are critical for the future of energy 
systems. No single approach can meet all countries’ needs; 
each will have to choose its own pathway, with the best 
technologies, policies and investment strategies to meet its 
people’s needs. Still, the Commission has identified broad 
areas that offer particular promise, with benefits within the 
next decade. All are areas where near-term policy decisions 
can make a large medium- to long-term difference. Action in 
these areas will help countries keep their options open, be 
flexible, and be able to adjust to a range of future scenarios. 
5. Recommendations
• Get energy pricing right: Implement energy prices 
that enable cost recovery for investment; remove 
subsidies for fossil fuel consumption, production 
and investment; avoid lock-in to wasteful economic 
structures and consumption patterns, and better 
reflect national wider priorities.
In implementing such reforms, countries should:
• Eliminate price distortions that perpetuate the 
under-investment that in turn imperils growth in 
energy access;
• Account for social objectives, including by 
complementing reform with compensating 
measures to protect the poor; and
• Put an effective price on carbon emissions as a 
foundation for overall efforts to reduce climate risk 
and a more.
• Reverse the “burden of proof” for the construction 
of new coal-fired power, and adopt an improved 
framework for energy decision-making.
Governments should ensure that new coal fired power 
is built only when other options have been proven not to 
be viable when considered against the full set of energy 
objectives. In high-income countries, commit to avoiding 
further construction of new unabated coal as a minimum 
first step to avoid further lock-in to high GHG emissions 
and accelerate retirements of old plants. In middle-income 
countries, take steps to limit new construction, and consider 
avoiding new construction altogether beyond 2025. In 
all countries, make decisions on the understanding that 
unabated coal infrastructure cannot be expected to operate 
beyond 2050.
Such strategies should be underpinned by appreciation of 
uncertainty rather than single scenarios, and include the 
following key elements:
• Start now to build the capacity to use new sources 
of energy, accounting for the value of having a 
greater range of options given future uncertainty;
• Place a value on insurance against adverse 
scenarios, whether geopolitical or in terms of 
energy prices;
• Evaluate the cost of taking future corrective action, 
including to undo lock-in to high levels of import 
dependence or air pollution;
• Incorporate a valuation of exposure to fossil fuel 
price volatility that cannot be hedged in markets;
• Account for the ongoing trends in cost, including 
continued systematic shift in favour of renewable 
energy sources; and
• Adopt policies which impose a price on pollution 
– explicitly through taxation or implicitly through 
standards or other regulation – with damages from 
coal-fired power priced at least at US$50/MWh, or 
more for plants without local air pollution controls.
• Raise ambition for zero-carbon electricity.
Without a deliberate reassessment many countries risk 
continuing to treat renewable energy as a marginal or 
experimental part of energy supply, even where it can be a 
core contributor. The steps and degree of ambition will vary 
across countries, but include:
• In fast-growing countries, adapt electricity system 
planning to enable the integration of renewables;
• In high-interest countries, enable lower-cost 
finance and address key risks as the most cost-
effective ways to channel public support; 
• In mature economies, adapt market arrangements 
to support the next wave of innovation to enable a 
higher share of renewables;
• Include off-grid and mini-grid solutions in 
approaches to expanding energy access;
• Design support systems to create regulatory 
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certainty, minimise distortions to electricity 
markets, and transparently adjust support levels as 
costs and circumstances change.
• Launch a platform for public-private collaboration for 
innovation in distributed energy access.
Governments should collaborate to establish and provide 
resources for a network of regional institutions for a) 
publicly funded R&D in off-grid electricity, household 
thermal energy, and micro- and mini-grid applications;  
and b) incubation of businesses that apply new technologies 
and new business models for new distributed energy 
technologies.
This network can build on the strengths of the CGIAR 
model186 for key agricultural applications, including  
public financing of R&D to develop innovations with 
stronger social outcomes and a distributed institutional 
structure, through regional hubs, that allows context-
specific innovation.
It can further improve on the CGIAR model by adopting a 
business incubator approach complemented by context-
specific social and behavioural approaches:
• Adopt a portfolio and venture approach, with 
tolerance for failure of individual businesses as 
opposed to the risk-minimising approaches often 
taken in public initiatives;
• Provide relatively small amounts of seed capital to 
multiple companies, to help each innovator with a 
promising new business model or technology grow 
to scale;
• Build on social impact investment by using financial 
leverage to achieve social objectives;
• Address economic and behavioural hurdles to 
dissemination of new technology, and develop 
approaches that are context-specific; and
• Complement with cash transfers to enable access 
by the very poor.
• Adopt energy demand management measures, to 
address the barriers that prevent the development 
of energy-productive economic activity and energy-
efficient end use.
A key first step is to get energy prices right, as discussed 
above. Energy decision-makers should also:
• Map the potential by creating national roadmaps 
that identify and prioritise energy efficiency 
opportunities: countries, companies, and 
consumers need to know where they stand, 
relative to others and relative to where they  
could be. 
• Monitor and develop benchmarking targets for 
the energy intensity of key industries, extending to 
voluntary or mandatory programmes, depending 
on circumstances;
• Set and frequently update standards where 
market barriers stand in the way or prices to drive 
efficiency cannot be implemented, including for 
buildings, appliances, and vehicles. Standards need 
to balance the benefits of efficiency against costs 
to ensure net higher access to key energy services 
for low-income consumers.
• Provide concessional and other finance to ensure 
that measures to improve efficiency at a minimum 
benefits from the same support that is extended to 
enable the expansion of energy supply.
• Address non-CO
2
 GHG emissions from energy, 
starting by accelerating efforts to identify and curtail 
fugitive methane emissions.
Policy interventions are needed to improve measurement 
and monitoring, accelerate voluntary initiatives that 
help raise awareness, create incentives for higher-cost 
measures, and introduce new standards for maximum 
fugitive emissions from oil and gas systems. Enforcement 
should also become increasingly stringent over time.
Methane emissions from oil and gas supply and distribution 
have a significant climate impact and can be reduced at 
negative or low cost, and with co-benefits from improved air 
quality. Several measures can help  
spur action:
• Launch a major initiative to improve understanding 
of methane leakage levels around the world, 
through increased measurement and monitoring, 
and use the resulting data to inform decision-
making and GHG mitigation strategies.
• In the near-term, put in place the requirements 
(industry initiatives, incentive schemes, 
and enforced and sufficient regulation) to 
enable changes to practices and support 
selected investment initiatives in the 
upstream oil and gas sector.
• Over a longer period (decade or more) make 
methane leakage reduction a core component of 
network construction and maintenance.
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Chapter 5
ECONOMICS OF CHANGE
Main points
• The next fundamental transformation of the global economy can deliver strong economic growth and poverty  
reduction, and at the same time reduce the growing potential risks of climate change. 
• Many of the perceived short- to medium-term trade-offs between economic growth and climate action disappear 
when policy is examined in a dynamic context of change, and when existing economic inefficiencies and the multiple 
benefits of action are taken into account. 
• The multiple benefits of low-carbon policies, such as health benefits from reduced fossil fuel use and increased fiscal 
efficiency through recycling of revenues from carbon pricing, could offset the costs of climate action. Agile labour 
markets and just transition policies for workers can also reduce the economic costs, including limiting the impact on 
aggregate employment.
• Many model-based assessments do not consider these multiple benefits and market dynamics. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, recent modelling suggests economic costs of climate action for a 2°C path are likely to be small, at 
around 1.7% (median) of baseline global GDP in 2030. This is equivalent to reaching the same level of baseline GDP 
around 6 to12 months later.
• Delay raises costs, potentially cutting global consumption growth by around 0.3% per year in the decade 2030 to 
2040, compared to less than 0.1% per year over the same period if we act now. Delay may also lead to greater  
climate damage in the long-term, which could impact the drivers of growth and hit sovereign credit ratings of  
vulnerable countries.
• To manage change and realise growth opportunities, clear and credible policies are needed to align expectations, 
guide investors, stimulate innovation, and avoid locking in to carbon intensive infrastructure and behaviour. Policy 
frameworks will differ by country but should aim to include a price on carbon as part of wider fiscal reform and phase 
out of fossil fuel subsidies, estimated at around US$600 billion per year. 
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Countries face radical choices 
that will shape their economies, 
including their cities, energy 
systems and land use, in decisive 
ways for decades to come.
1. Introduction 
Throughout history economies have constantly had to 
adapt to changing preferences, politics and technologies. 
Such shifts have driven changes in investment in energy, 
cities, land use and transport. Public institutions and 
financial services have had to innovate to adapt. Over 
the past few decades economies and technologies have 
changed rapidly and profoundly, and the next few decades 
will see continuing transformation. Countries now face 
radical choices that will shape their economies, including 
their cities, energy systems and land use, in decisive ways 
for decades to come. This chapter is about these choices. 
Some change is more predictable and this knowledge 
can help governments plan. Coming changes are likely to 
include: a continued, strong rise in the share of output 
from emerging markets and developing economies; a 
world population that may increase by an estimated 
one billion or more people by 2030; rising pressure 
on resources as the world industrialises; continuing, 
rapid urbanisation; population aging and a decline in 
the working-age population in many countries; and the 
building and rebuilding of energy systems. At the same 
time the world has seen and will see increasing risks from 
global climate change. Some change is less predictable, 
however, for example as a result of technological or other 
innovation breakthroughs, resource price shocks or 
geopolitical conflict.
The structural transformations that will take place may 
be handled well or badly. If they are handled well they 
will be less costly and stimulate more innovation and 
opportunity. Lessons from economic history are helpful 
here. We have the advantage of learning from several 
transformations since the industrial revolution, including 
from a rich Schumpeterian tradition of analysis, discussed 
in Section 5.3. The opportunities and risks from the 
structural changes different countries face are highlighted 
in Chapter 1: Strategic Context.
Institutions and policies are central to transition. 
Economies with accountable institutions and responsive 
policy frameworks will be better placed to adapt, evolve, 
embrace and manage change, to reallocate resources 
more efficiently, and to foster growth opportunities. 
They will have the flexibility to tap new markets and 
adopt new innovations. The alternative – of resisting 
change, protecting vested interests, propping up declining 
industries and delaying action – risks locking in less 
productive growth and leaving investors, firms and 
households vulnerable to shocks. Resisting change may 
enable economies to squeeze a little more out of their 
existing structure in the short-term, but it is unlikely to 
benefit them in the medium- to long-term.1  
This chapter outlines the policies that governments could  
implement over the next 15 years to steer the next  
transformation of the world economy in a  
low-carbon direction. 
The view that there is a rigid trade-off between low-
carbon policy and growth is partly due to a misconception 
in many model-based assessments that economies are 
static, unchanging and perfectly efficient. Any reform 
or policy which forces an economy to deviate from this 
hypothetical counter-factual baseline incurs a trade-off or 
cost. In fact, there are a number of reform opportunities 
that can reduce market failures and rigidities that lead 
to the inefficient allocation of resources and hold back 
growth, including excessive greenhouse gas emissions. 
Indeed, once market inefficiencies and the multiple 
benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, including 
the potential health benefits of reduced air pollution, are 
taken into consideration, the perceived net economic costs 
are reduced or eliminated. But tackling market failures 
and taking advantage of these multiple benefits requires 
ambitious and coherent policy. 
This chapter focuses its analysis on the three key drivers 
of growth: resource efficiency; better infrastructure 
investment; and innovation. These will be critical for 
determining the pace and shape of change. It illustrates 
this through reference to the three critical systems 
highlighted throughout the report – energy, cities and 
land use – which are at the heart of structural change. 
Governments can provide clear and credible policy 
incentives to stimulate these drivers of growth in a way 
that guides a structural shift to a low-carbon economy.
It should be viewed alongside the rest of the report. For 
example, Chapter 1: Strategic Context, describes the story 
of structural change in different economies and explains 
how this motivates the analytical bases of this report. 
Chapter 6: Finance describes how to drive low-carbon 
investment, taking forward analysis here of a low-carbon 
policy framework. Policies to tackle market failures are 
discussed further in Chapter 7: Innovation, regarding 
research and development.
The chapter starts by outlining the key elements of a 
strategy for low-carbon growth. Section 3 discusses the 
broad policy mix, focussing on fiscal reform including 
carbon pricing and fossil fuel subsidies. Section 4 discusses 
policies to ease the transition for the poorest and most 
vulnerable. Section 5 analyses how to achieve clear and 
credible policy signals, including better metrics and 
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Other market failures include imperfections in risk and 
capital markets, for example a failure to consider the 
full range of investment costs and benefits. Such market 
failures misprice risk; limit access to finance; and reduce 
investment in infrastructure. Another failure is in early 
stage research and development (R&D), where technical 
knowledge “spills over” to others. This prevents the 
innovator from capturing the rewards of their efforts and 
deters investment in innovation. Market failures around 
the provision of information and networks are also crucial. 
For example, poor awareness of the potential for long-
term energy savings would result in under-investment in 
energy efficiency (see Section 3.3). 
These combined market failures imply that policy reforms 
are possible today that can effectively and efficiently boost 
productivity and growth. Policy to reduce fiscal distortions 
from unpriced greenhouse gases will enhance resource 
efficiency and deliver multiple other benefits including 
reduced local air pollution. Policy to tackle market failures 
in capital markets will boost productive infrastructure 
investment. And policy to tackle the spillover problem can 
stimulate innovation, the benefits from which can often 
come through more quickly than expected. In economic 
terms, policy to tackle market failures can give rise to the 
possibility of a Pareto improvement, where at least one 
person is made better off with nobody worse off.4 
The cost-effectiveness and efficiency of such a strategy 
will be enhanced further if it is well-coordinated and 
complemented with policies to promote economic 
flexibility, including more responsive labour markets; a 
better educated workforce; and open and free trade. 
Strong and trusted institutions that align expectations on 
the direction of change and which reduce policy risk are 
also important. 
But this framework goes far beyond an exercise in 
“comparative statics”, where the limitations of the  
existing economic system are stated and the policies that 
can correct market failures are described. This approach 
is about the dynamics of change: recognising that the 
transformation is likely to be non-marginal, and embracing 
this change through a broad suite of social and economic 
policies to steer the economy onto a low-carbon path.  
In other words, this is about combining the economics  
of market failures with the economics of change  
and transformation. 
Investment, growth and structural change in different 
country contexts
Policies to foster low-carbon growth and realise the 
multiple benefits discussed throughout this report may 
require additional investment in the next 15 years,  
above what would be required without climate action  
(see Section 4.3). The appropriate way to consider  
these additional investment costs is the “dynamic net  
economic cost”. 
models, to guide expectations, and provides lessons from 
history. Section 6 concludes with recommendations  
for policy-makers. 
2. A framework for economic growth 
that also tackles climate risk
2.1 The framework
This chapter and report discusses how to achieve 
“better growth” that increases quality of life across key 
dimensions, including incomes, social stability, equality, 
and better health, while also achieving a “better climate”. 
By “better climate” we mean reducing the risk of 
dangerous climate change by cutting greenhouse  
gas emissions. 
The economic framework presented in this chapter for 
“better growth” and a “better climate” recognises that 
economies are not “static” but are dynamic and constantly 
changing. As such the economic analysis and tools 
deployed must be appropriate for this context. 
The framework has four main building blocks:
• The short-run opportunities to tackle market 
imperfections that hurt economic performance  
and increase climate risk;
• Investment, growth and structural change in  
different country contexts;
• Flexible approaches to managing transition, especially 
given political economy challenges, and distributional 
issues that need to be tackled; and 
• The development and deployment of improved 
measurement and modelling tools that can improve 
economic decision-making and lead to better  
policy choices.
Tackling market imperfections and steering innovation
Economic principles inform us that there are opportunities 
to pursue strong economic growth today that are also 
good for climate because a range of market failures persist 
with immediate social, economic and environmental costs. 
Greenhouse gases are a market failure as the emitter does 
not bear the costs of the damage and disruption from 
their activities. Some have suggested that greenhouse 
gases may be the largest market failure of all.2  Beyond the 
long-run impact of greenhouse gases on the climate and 
thus the economy, emissions from burning of fossil fuels 
cause severe local air pollution today which damages the 
health and productivity of millions of people, particularly 
in urban areas in rapidly developing countries. Outdoor 
air pollution caused 3.7 million premature deaths in 2012, 
according to the World Health Organization (WHO). 
Emissions from transport, industry and power generation 
are a major source of this pollution.3  
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The dynamic net economic cost includes the additional  
up-front investment, for example, the cost of upgrading 
and constructing new networks and new low-carbon 
energy infrastructure. These are monetary costs and  
must be financed (see Section 3.3 and Chapter 6: Finance). 
The additional investment may also impose a resource 
cost if it ties up additional inputs to produce the same 
amount of output, e.g. an off-shore wind farm may require 
more skilled labour and more physical resources than a 
fossil fuel plant to produce a megawatt of electricity.  
This would reduce total output as it uses up existing 
productive resources. 
 
However, this resource cost does not reflect the final 
economic cost. For example, climate policies are likely to 
incentivise substitution away from more to less carbon-
intensive goods, often with attractive fuel savings. The 
more substitution opportunities available in the short-
term, and as innovation makes more substitutes available, 
the lower the economic cost. 
But calculating the final dynamic net economic cost 
requires us to consider the full range of costs and benefits, 
including the returns to the up-front investments. These 
include a reduction in long-run climate risk but also  
short- and medium-run benefits such as health, 
congestion, security and innovation (see Section 3.1).  
In fact, there is evidence that low-carbon investments  
may have greater scope for learning- and innovation-
driven cost reductions than high-carbon alternatives,  
and also greater scope for spillover into other sectors.5        
The full dynamic net economic cost must also reflect net 
economic benefits that will be forgone if action is delayed. 
Taking action later to derive the same economic returns 
will require a larger investment, and with high-carbon 
infrastructure, technologies and behaviours further 
locked-in, the dynamic costs will rise.     
Therefore this is not a “free lunch” - some additional 
upfront investment is needed to pay for the attractive 
benefits and this may have an economic cost in terms 
of additional resources. But after considering the net 
benefits it is a “lunch worth paying for” - these investments 
have attractive economic returns and could quickly pay for 
themselves. Delay raises the dynamic net economic cost.
The precise policy framework required to drive investment 
for low-carbon growth will differ from country to country, 
depending on their individual contexts. For example, 
industrial policies have often been favoured in the past 
by countries, such as South Korea, trying to progress 
rapidly from middle- to high-income. When well-targeted, 
such policies have helped to foster investment in new and 
productive low-carbon industries. Another approach is 
tax reform to boost demand for environmental goods and 
services. Vietnam adjusted tax rates on polluting goods 
and services, such as fuels and chemicals, to reflect their 
environmental damage. This reform boosted investment 
and domestic demand for goods and services, but better 
recycling of the additional tax revenues could have 
reduced the costs of the reforms for particular groups.6  
China has incorporated growth and low-carbon objectives 
into its 5-year plans, with the 12th plan containing a range 
of measures to reduce emissions growth and promote 
investment in strategic high-tech, low-carbon industries.7  
The shape of its 13th plan (2016-2020) is likely to 
strengthen this transformation. 
This chapter has many relevant lessons for least 
developed countries. However, their special circumstances 
demand additional analysis and focus. For example, a 
study prepared for the Commission examines the role 
that agriculture can play in addressing poverty reduction 
in Africa. It discusses how transformative adaptation 
in agriculture could present opportunities for “triple-
win” outcomes with benefits for economic growth, 
poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. 
Crop intensification, minimum tillage, agroforestry 
coupled with designation and maintenance of protected 
for¬ests, support for social protection and development 
of insurance markets, are examples of techniques and 
policies that can deliver these outcomes. Such adaptation 
also presents an opportunity to tackle long-standing 
barriers holding back productivity gains in agriculture, 
including restrictions on regional trade, under-investment 
in infrastructure and limited provision of social protection. 8
Managing the challenges of transition
In practice, governments have found it difficult to 
implement the most cost-effective and efficient policies 
for growth and reducing climate risk, such as legislating 
an explicit carbon price coupled with productive use of 
the resulting auction or tax revenues. This difficulty is 
partly a result of political economy pressures, including 
powerful vested interests in a fossil fuel-based economy, 
concerns around competitiveness, and concerns around 
any regressive impact of these policies on households. 
In a low-carbon transition, the specific costs, trade-offs 
and benefits that affect particular groups need to be 
carefully analysed. Dedicated, transparent measures are 
likely to be needed to reduce the costs and trade-offs for 
workers and firms. Managing change also requires strong 
institutions that can set clear and credible policies to guide 
expectations on the direction of change. Weaknesses 
in institutions and policy uncertainty raise the costs of 
change and slow the transition.
Where political and institutional 
realities are difficult to overcome, 
countries have adopted pragmatic 
“second-best” approaches
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In cases where political and institutional realities are 
difficult to overcome, many countries have adopted 
pragmatic “second-best” approaches where the alternative 
may be no policy at all. Governments may need to take a 
step-by step approach, to discover the right combination 
of instruments and institutions to advance overall welfare. 
Where possible, governments could maintain flexibility in 
these policy frameworks, so that they can move towards 
more efficient and effective approaches over time - 
second best policy is only useful if it moves policy in the 
right direction. To ensure a continuing transition towards 
more optimal policy design, governments can legislate 
provisions to review the effectiveness and efficiency  
of policies.
Metrics and models for better policy
The appropriate metric for judging an economic policy 
intervention is its impact on overall welfare. If the policy 
creates a net welfare gain, it will still be important to 
consider the possible negative impacts on different 
groups, and whether some mechanism for redistributing 
the benefits of the policy is needed, e.g. assistance for 
some groups towards adjustment costs. Sometimes 
a policy may appear costly because not all its benefits 
are included in the balance of costs and benefits or are 
not easily identified. It is also of great importance to 
consider the counter-factual baseline with which a new 
policy is compared. In the case of low-carbon policies, the 
usual baseline assumption of “business as usual” growth 
may not hold due to the transformation that is coming 
anyway and the risks from future climate impacts. An 
appropriate counter-factual for comparison should reflect 
the economic costs of climate change and other impacts 
of continued growth in fossil fuel combustion, such as 
worsening air pollution. 
Ministries of Finance need to tackle such shortcomings in 
their decision-making by adding several steps to routine 
policy evaluation. First, they could take an economy-wide 
view of costs and benefits. Second, they could recognise 
classes of costs and benefits not traditionally included 
in cost-benefit analysis, such as health costs from air 
pollution. Third, they could provide guidelines for how to 
incorporate these wider costs and benefits into planning 
and cost-benefit analysis tools.9  Fourth, they could 
consider longer term returns rather than focus solely on 
up-front costs, as is standard practice when assessing 
investments in education or infrastructure. Governments 
can formalise this wider consideration of costs and 
benefits in economic policy-making through better use 
of metrics and models for monitoring and assessing the 
impacts of policy and change on quality of life, as  
discussed in Section 5.
Welfare must be approximated and gross domestic 
product (GDP) is often used. But GDP remains just one 
indicator among many attempting to measure changes 
in welfare. Supporting indicators are also necessary. For 
example, measuring the risk of overuse and damage to the 
natural world requires metrics beyond GDP. Governments 
and firms can incorporate such risks into decision-making 
by monitoring cumulative human impacts on various types 
of natural capital, including, water, ecosystems, species, 
minerals, the atmosphere and oceans. Monitoring would 
require governments and firms to include natural capital in 
national and corporate accounts (see Section 5). A failure 
to measure and manage natural capital is likely to result 
instead in its depreciation and possible destruction, with 
direct impacts on productivity, growth and output.10  On 
the other hand, in recognising and measuring the value 
of natural capital, efficient environmental management 
can become a productive investment that is comparable 
with investments in physical or human capital. In this way 
there is a real opportunity to boost medium- to long-term 
growth through policies that increase the productivity of 
natural capital, including the atmosphere. Chapter 3: Land 
Use illustrates how this can happen in practice, through 
better management of degraded agricultural lands and by 
curbing deforestation.
To conclude, with economies constantly changing and 
transformation of the world economy likely over the 
coming decades, it makes sense to start to manage this 
change now. The framework for growth presented is a 
realistic one that can be implemented over the coming 15 
years. The proposed approach would tackle the factors 
impeding economic growth today, while also accelerating 
a low-carbon transition. It will help to avoid the lock-in of 
long-lived high-carbon infrastructure, promote resource 
efficiency, reduce fiscal distortions, tackle pollution-
related health issues, enhance energy security, drive low-
carbon innovation, and increase the momentum for more 
effective and ambitious mitigation measures in the future. 
The policy decisions taken in the next 15 years will be 
crucial for both long-term growth and the climate. There 
are huge opportunities for human welfare if change is 
managed well, and huge risks if managed badly. Sustained 
policy efforts will be needed beyond 2030 to ensure that 
these short- to medium-term reforms achieve the long-
term, internationally agreed goal of reducing greenhouse 
gases to levels consistent with keeping global average 
temperature rise to below 2°C compared with pre-
industrial levels.
2.2 The broad policy mix and institutions  
to enable change
Countries which anticipate and plan for change are 
likely to perform better. Various policy instruments will 
be needed to manage change. This does not mean more 
or unnecessary regulation, rather better policies and 
institutions for more efficient markets and for managing 
the type of change that countries will likely experience 
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over the coming decades. The main types of policies and 
tools examined in this chapter are: fiscal policies such 
as carbon pricing and subsidies; policies to complement 
carbon pricing, such as standards; adjustment policies 
to ease the transition for households, workers and 
businesses; and models and metrics to manage  
change better.
Putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions is perhaps 
the most important policy, in particular to keep the costs of 
action low. Efforts should be focused on getting the design 
of such carbon pricing policies right, including applying the 
price across a wide base of different sectors, establishing 
a reasonable and robust price that rises over time, and 
using the revenues raised in productive ways, for example 
for fiscal reforms which make the broader tax system 
more efficient. But, carbon pricing is one among several 
instruments, to tackle a range of market failures, including 
in innovation, which should play an important role in the 
policy mix (see Section 3.3). 
Additional policies to create a more flexible and responsive 
economy can also help to facilitate change more cost-
effectively and efficiently. They will cover a broad range 
of areas including competition and product market policy, 
trade and investment policy, labour market policy, and 
human capital and education policy, among others. These 
additional policies will increase the flexibility with which 
resources are deployed and support the conditions for 
growth. Campaigns against corruption, graft and fraud 
will ensure more responsive policy-making. More rigid 
economies, for example with inflexible labour and capital 
markets, will face higher costs of adjustment to structural 
changes, including those needed for a transition to a low-
carbon economy. 
A competitive product market is essential for a more 
responsive economy. This will lower entry barriers for 
new, more efficient and cleaner firms and products that 
can challenge incumbents. It will also allow inefficient  
firms to decline and exit. To encourage enterprise and 
boost productivity, product market regulation should 
be set in a way that does not hamper competition and is 
combined with a clear and effective antitrust framework  
to ensure a fair, level playing field among firms.11 Openness 
to trade also makes economies more agile and adaptable,  
by making them less constrained by the limits of  
domestic markets.12 
Progressive labour market policies similarly enhance 
economic flexibility, providing firms with the ability to 
adapt to ever-changing market conditions, on the one 
hand, and workers with adequate employment rights, on 
the other (see Section 4 below). Providing adjustment 
assistance for workers in declining industries will be an 
important task of transition policies. An affordable and 
flexible housing market facilitates labour mobility so that 
workers can move from regions with declining industries 
to expanding ones, aiding cost-effective economic 
transformation. Human capital and education policies 
ensure that workers have the right education and skills to 
benefit from structural change. Without training and  
re-skilling opportunities, some workers may find their 
existing skills are mismatched to those demanded in  
new growth industries.13  
Finally, any discussion of efficient and effective policies 
must take into account the nature of existing institutional 
frameworks and governance structures of individual 
countries. Effective and supportive institutions are crucial 
as they can help to shape expectations, strengthen policy 
co-ordination, and manage and resolve political  
economy challenges.
Political institutions that are trusted by citizens to execute 
policies in the public interest will perform better, as they 
better guide public expectations, and will be held account-
able for their successes and failures. To take one example, 
governments in Scandinavia have long been expected to 
invest in long-run issues relating to childcare, education 
and the environment, and will be held electorally liable if 
they do not. By contrast, institutions which are not trust-
ed, for example because they are subject to corruption and 
graft or because they fail to innovate and are not respon-
sive to a changing economy and society, will not be trusted 
to deliver policies in the public interest. Opposition even 
to policy reforms in the public interest may arise on the 
assumption that the benefits will not reach citizens. This 
expectation itself reduces incentives for policymakers to 
implement reforms in their country’s long-run interest, 
especially when the costs to upsetting the beneficiaries of 
a corrupt system are high, and so the spiral continues. 
Strong, trusted and responsive institutions can align 
expectations and reduce the costs of change by sending 
clear and credible policy signals across the economy on 
the direction of change. This will give the private sector 
the confidence to deliver the necessary efficiency gains, 
infrastructure and innovation that will drive productivity 
of all forms of capital and growth. Box 1 describes 
institutional structures that can reinforce policy credibility. 
Clear policy signals lower the risk of premature stranding 
of infrastructure investments, while helping to accelerate 
and scale investments in more efficient products, new 
business models, new markets, new skills and jobs, and 
more productive ways of working and operating. Policies  
that send weak, absent or muddled signals slow or hinder 
change and increase costs.
Carbon pricing is one among 
several instruments which 
should play an important role 
in the policy mix.
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Policies to tackle market failures do, however, create 
their own risk of government interventions that are 
poorly designed or lock us into the wrong path. The 
story of path-dependency amplifies the potential size 
and duration of any such policy failure. This makes the 
need for accountable, trusted institutions, and credible, 
cost-effective and transparent policies, designed to make 
markets work well and achieve well-specified (emissions 
reduction) goals, all the more important. 
3. Policy and coordination 
3.1 Fiscal reform – carbon prices
Greenhouse gas emissions cause long-term climate 
change and economic damage. The most economically 
efficient way to tackle the greenhouse gas market failure 
is by requiring polluters to pay a price per tonne emitted.15  
This approach discourages emissions and incentivises 
investment in low-carbon infrastructure, efficiency and 
innovation. Carbon pricing should also be part of a broader 
fiscal reform package, where taxes are shifted away from 
things we want to encourage such as labour and business 
activities, towards taxing “bads” such as pollution and 
resource use. This will help markets to guide resources 
away from declining and less productive activities, toward 
growing, more flexible and productive activities, leaving 
economies better able to prosper and absorb shocks. 
The primary tool to tackle the damage from greenhouse 
gas emissions is an explicit carbon pricing instrument: a 
Given that governments are often in power only a 
few years, it is important to consider how longer term 
commitments to policies for managing change could be 
made more credible, recognising that total certainty  
can never be guaranteed. 
Some institutional and legal structures can provide 
policy stability and credibility, and lower uncertainty. 
For example, Britain’s statutory climate adviser, 
the Climate Change Committee, recommends 
decarbonisation targets 15 years or more ahead, under 
legislation which has a 40-year horizon. Similarly, 
Australia’s statutory adviser on infrastructure 
investment, Infrastructure Australia, recommends 
long-term investment strategies to state and federal 
government. The National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK helps government 
to design health policy more effectively by providing 
evidence-based guidance and advice, quality standards 
and performance metrics, and information services.14  
National development banks can also help to reduce 
policy risk and give credibility (see Section 4.3). 
Box 1
Institutions for policy stability  
and credibility 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a theoretical 
measure which attempts to value the full social cost of 
damage from an additional tonne of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Theoretically, it is the appropriate welfare-
based measure of greenhouse gas externalities, and 
should ideally be applied as a carbon price across all 
greenhouse gas emissions sources and countries, with 
international finance provided to ensure equity.16  It 
signals what society should, in theory, be willing to pay 
now to avoid the future damage caused by incremental 
greenhouse gas emissions.17  
There is ongoing debate and uncertainty around 
how to calibrate the factors that determine the SCC. 
These factors include climate sensitivity, climate 
damages and discount rates. Recent discussions have 
recommended a declining discount rate, which would 
see carbon costs rise over time.18  Some studies have 
emphasised the need for two discount rates: a social and 
private discount rate.19  Estimates of SCC values range 
anywhere from a few dollars per tonne of greenhouse 
gas emissions, measured in carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO
2
e), to several hundred dollars.20  
In practice, a global carbon price is unlikely to be 
agreed in the near term. Individual countries and 
regions will decide a price (in the case of a carbon 
tax) or an emissions cap (in the case of an emissions 
trading system) which reflects their climate ambition, 
other climate and energy policies, and a range of other 
political and economic factors. The key is that the price 
sends a clear, credible signal that aligns expectations, 
and so shifts investment toward low-carbon 
infrastructure and activities over time.
In the absence of more universal carbon pricing, but in 
the expectation that this may one day arrive, a number 
of government agencies, companies and organisations 
have applied “internal” or shadow carbon prices to 
their critical investment decisions. For example, the US 
government has established a SCC of around US$35 
today, rising to around US$50 in 2030, and recommends 
that US government agencies use this price in cost-
benefit analysis of regulatory actions that impact 
emissions.21  (See Section 5.2 for a discussion on the 
models that produce these estimates). More than 100 
major businesses worldwide have disclosed that they 
use an internal carbon price in their operations.22  In 
the United States, around 30 companies indicated that 
they used an internal carbon price ranging from US$6 to 
US$60 per tonne of CO
2
e. Most of these were energy-
intensive firms such as BP and Exxon-Mobil, but also 
included were Google, Microsoft, Disney, Walmart,  
and Delta Airlines.23  
Box 2
What price for greenhouse  
gas emissions?
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carbon tax or emissions trading system.24  Our focus here 
is on explicit carbon pricing, but it is also possible to  
ensure that prices of fossil fuels reflect their full costs to 
society through the extension of existing fuel taxes, with 
the tax rate adjusted to reflect the carbon and pollution 
content of the particular fuel. Many developing countries 
may find this an attractive alternative, while they develop 
the necessary institutions to support explicit carbon 
pricing, because such taxes are already in place and are 
easily administered.25  
New work from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
calculates “corrective” tax estimates by fuel across 156 
Local environmental benefits
Carbon pricing reduces greenhouse gas emissions and local 
air pollution from the burning of fossil fuels. This generates 
significant benefits for health, quality of human life and 
labour productivity. The health benefits arise because 
burning fossil fuels produces pollutants including ozone, a 
result of the reaction of organic compounds in sunlight, and 
fine smoke particles called particulate matter, both of which 
contribute to lung and heart disease. These potentially 
large benefits accrue mainly to the country taking action, 
and are realised in the short-term.
There is extensive literature assessing the value of these 
non-climate benefits. In total, outdoor air pollution in cities 
and rural areas was responsible for 3.7 million premature 
deaths annually in 2012, according to the World Health 
Organization.27  Much of this pollution was particulate 
matter emitted from burning fossil fuels in transport, 
industry and power generation. A review of 37 studies, 
published in 2010, found the value of air quality benefits 
from climate change mitigation ranged from US$2-128 
(average US$44) per tonne of abatement of greenhouse gas 
emissions in developed countries, and US$27-196 (average 
US$81) in developing countries.28  Developing countries 
tend to have high emission rates (including less use of 
emissions control technologies) and greater  
population exposure. 
In its latest review of climate science, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
reported an estimate for the global benefits of avoided 
mortality from less burning of fossil fuels, which uses 
new relationships between mortality and exposure to 
ozone and particulate matter, at US$50-380 per tonne of 
CO
2
e abatement.29  Another study by the International 
Monetary Fund has estimated the value of the benefits 
by country, accounting for externalities including air 
pollution and traffic congestion, net of any pre-existing 
fuel taxes and subsidies. The total value of such un-priced, 
local externalities associated with burning fossil fuels was 
around US$58 per tonne of CO
2
, on average, across the top 
20 global greenhouse gas emitters.30  All these indicative 
estimates show potentially very large multiple, monetised 
benefits from reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
While it may be possible to tackle local air pollution and 
vehicle congestion more cheaply directly, this approach 
would not necessarily help reduce climate risk. For example, 
coal plants may be required to fit equipment which reduces 
emissions of sulphur dioxide, but this would not reduce CO
2
 
emissions. Recent studies show that doing the two together 
is best, meaning that the net total benefits of a combined 
policy are larger than either of the separate policies.31   
(See Chapter 1: Strategic Context). 
Reduced local air pollution also has significant benefits 
for ecosystems which have been impacted for decades by 
pollution: sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides acidify soil 
and waterways and reduce tree health and productivity; 
ground-level ozone reduces crop and forest productivity; 
mercury decreases reproductive success and changes fish 
and wildlife behaviours.32  The Economics of Ecosystems 
and Biodiversity (TEEB) study published in 2010 analysed 
approaches for the valuation of ecosystem services  
and biodiversity.33 
Enhanced energy security in fossil fuel  
importing countries 
A stable and affordable energy supply is critical for 
economic development. In the short- to medium-term, 
carbon taxes can drive a switch from imported fossil fuels, 
such as coal, oil and gas, to domestic, lower carbon sources 
such as wind, solar, hydro and geothermal power. In such 
cases, energy security can be enhanced and the risk of 
supply disruption reduced. In the longer term, an increasing 
share of low-carbon energy in the domestic mix will result 
in less volatile energy prices. Carbon prices and efficiency 
standards can also incentivise investments in energy 
efficiency, reducing total energy consumption and thus 
demand for imports.
Box 3
Multiple benefits from carbon pricing 
countries, and shows large differences between “efficient” 
fuel taxes that would reflect their carbon, environmental 
and other impacts, and the actual, current tax levels. Their 
research also provides some rough estimates of the fiscal, 
environmental, and health benefits that “efficient” prices 
could bring.26  Some of the multiple benefits from carbon 
pricing are outlined in Box 3.
Carbon pricing also provides dynamic efficiency benefits 
in the short-, medium- and long-term. These include 
motivating continued emissions reductions by providing 
incentives for innovation, and increasing macroeconomic 
efficiency through the recycling of carbon tax revenues.  
These are briefly summarised. 
175BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
S O
F
 C
H
A
N
G
E
• Incentives for innovation
Carbon prices provide incentives for innovation to-
ward less emission-intensive products and processes, 
because companies are motivated to innovate  
continuously to reduce their carbon tax liability. For 
example, a case study analysis of the United Kindom’s 
Climate Change Levy found that firms subject to 
the full rate of the levy submitted more technology 
patents than firms subject to a reduced rate.34  Expec-
tations of high future carbon prices are an important 
factor affecting innovation, as reflected in patenting 
activity.35  The benefits from innovation in one sector 
can also spill over and benefit other sectors. This is a 
key reason why carbon pricing is an extremely cost- 
effective instrument, particularly in the medium- to 
long-term.
• Revenue-raising for government
If developed countries used carbon pricing to 
implement emissions cuts as pledged in Cancun 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, they could raise more than US$400 
billion annually by 2020.36  Many countries are already 
moving to higher rates of auctioning of permits in cap-
and-trade systems. For example, about 40% of permits 
were auctioned in the European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) in 2013, compared to very 
little auctioning in the second phase of the scheme 
from 2008-2012. Around 90% of allowances are 
auctioned in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) in the north-eastern United States, and a 
growing share are auctioned in California. 
However, as carbon prices rise, they are likely to 
incentivise consumers and businesses to shift their 
behaviour to avoid the tax, through adopting low-
carbon products and practices. As this happens, the 
net revenues from carbon prices can be expected  
to fall.
• Macroeconomic efficiency through the recycling of 
carbon revenues, under wider fiscal reforms
Carbon tax or auction revenues can be recycled 
through the economy. Such uses can reduce the 
economic costs associated with a carbon price and 
potentially lead to increased employment, thus 
increasing political acceptability of the policy. In 
practice, the potential for reducing the economic  
cost of carbon pricing will depend on the nature  
of pre-existing distortions or inefficiencies in a 
country’s tax system and the nature of the revenue  
recycling (Box 4).  
The best use of carbon tax or auction revenues 
should be guided by good principles of public finance, 
including efficiency, distribution, and incidence. Some 
potential uses include: reducing existing distortionary 
taxes; funding innovation; financing international 
climate action; and public support for infrastructure 
investment, for example by capitalising green 
investment banks. A share of the revenues will also 
be needed to compensate vulnerable households and 
businesses, for example for higher energy prices. 
A well-established literature has examined the pre-
existing distortions and the most effective revenue 
recycling options.37  A clear message from the 
literature is that revenues must be put to good use, 
e.g. to reduce existing distortionary taxes rather than 
giving out emissions permits for free, as their use has 
a large impact on the cost-effectiveness of carbon 
pricing. In this way, the appropriate way for most 
countries to view carbon pricing is not as a choice 
between policy and no policy, but between different 
ways of raising and returning revenues.
Explicit carbon prices in practice
The use of carbon pricing as a policy instrument is already 
widespread, both nationally and regionally. About 40 
national and over 20 sub-national jurisdictions have 
implemented or have scheduled a price on carbon40 (Figure 
1). The use of carbon pricing also appears to be expanding. 
Twenty national and six sub-national jurisdictions are 
considering a price on carbon.41  
Together, the actual, scheduled and considered schemes 
cover around 12% of global greenhouse gas emissions.42  
The highest carbon prices are found in Sweden. These 
were introduced in 1991 at a relatively low rate, but are 
currently as high as US$168 per tonne of CO
2
e in some 
sectors.43  The Swedish scheme raises annual tax revenues 
of almost US$3.7 billion.
There are several technical lessons that can be learned 
from countries with experience of emissions trading 
systems or carbon taxes. These examples show that 
carbon pricing has indeed created incentives to reduce 
emissions. In the Australian National Electricity Market 
(NEM), carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions reductions 
attributable to the carbon price, implemented on 1 July 
2012 and repealed in July 2014, were between 5 to 8 
million tonnes of CO
2
 in the fiscal year 2012-13, and 
between 6 and 9 million tonnes in 2013-14.  
Carbon prices provide incentives 
for innovation toward less 
emission-intensive products and 
processes, because companies 
are motivated to innovate 
continuously to reduce their 
carbon tax liability.
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A range of modelling studies, including new analysis for 
the Commission as well as empirical evidence, suggest 
that smart revenue recycling can reduce or eliminate 
the short-run costs of carbon pricing. 
New analysis prepared for the Commission simulates 
fiscal reform for 35 developed and developing 
countries, with revenues raised from carbon prices 
recycled through either lump sum transfers, deficit 
reduction, cuts in labour taxes or increased government 
investment.38  The results show that recycling options 
that influence the supply-side of the economy, such 
as government investment that increases the capital 
stock or personal income tax cuts that increase the 
supply of labour, reduce the impact of carbon pricing 
on short-run growth, and in some countries, e.g. Brazil, 
could offset any impact and boost short-run growth. 
Using carbon tax revenues to pay down government 
debt had the most negative impact on short-run growth. 
A country’s economic structure and sources of energy 
also influence the results.
Over the medium- to long-term, modelling evidence 
suggests that the economic cost of efficient climate 
policies is likely to be small; for example, in the range 
of about 0.5–2% of a country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2030 (compared with baseline) in most 
studies, with costs varying in part based on how tax or 
auctioning revenues are recycled.39  
These modelling exercises are useful tools but their 
results must be interpreted carefully as they are likely 
to overstate the costs to GDP for a range of reasons. 
For example, they are unable to capture the full range 
of economic distortions in the existing tax system. In 
real life, therefore, greater welfare gains are likely 
from revenue recycling to reduce existing taxes. They 
also largely ignore the value of the other benefits from 
carbon pricing. And GDP impacts only reflect part of 
overall welfare impacts. Some of the modelling results 
cited in this report overcome some of the reasons 
models tend to overstate costs, for example by allowing 
for capacity gaps and unemployment, but all models 
face some limitations (see Section 5.2).
Box 4
Recycling carbon tax revenues
The reductions represent 3 to 6% of total emissions in 
the NEM in each of those years.45  See also the example of 
British Columbia in Box 5. 
However, their effectiveness has been limited in a number 
of cases, for example because prices were too low, a lack of 
credibility around the future of the policy, or key energy-
intensive industries were either exempted or given overly 
generous compensation. For example, some of the recent 
emissions reductions in the European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) were achieved primarily through 
other policy instruments or the economic downturn, 
rather than the carbon price. Experience also shows the 
importance of considering the potential overlap and 
interaction with other policies, such as feed-in tariffs 
for renewable power and energy efficiency regulations, 
as this has the potential to reduce the efficiency and 
effectiveness of carbon pricing (see Section 3.4). 
Regarding emissions trading, market surprises may call 
for adjustments to emissions caps. Examples include EU 
provisions for setting aside some permits, to remove 
a surplus generated during the financial crisis, and a 
proposed “market stability reserve”. The north-eastern US 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) scheme used 
cap tightening to achieve an objective of faster  
emissions reductions. 
Emissions trading systems can also be designed as “hybrid” 
schemes, in some ways mimicking a bounded carbon tax. 
Price floors can ensure a minimum level of effectiveness in 
emissions trading, as is the case in California and in seven 
Chinese pilot schemes. Price ceilings can limit the costs 
of permits, which can be important in terms of ensuring 
industry acceptability. 
Among governments which are auctioning or selling a 
significant amount of allowances, or applying a carbon tax, 
some are using the revenues to cut income taxes for low 
income earners or corporate taxes, with evidence that 
these fiscal reforms can achieve distributional objectives 
and economic efficiency gains (for example British 
Columbia). Other governments are recycling the revenue 
into emissions reductions programmes (California and 
RGGI), innovation programmes (EU), or for international 
climate action (Germany, in the EU ETS). 
It is common practice that permits are allocated for free 
to industry. This increases the costs of carbon pricing as 
it fails to realise the efficiency benefits from the recycling 
of revenues, but may increase political acceptability in the 
short-run. However, this practice is increasingly confined 
to shielding trade-exposed and emissions-intensive 
industries from adverse effects on their international 
competitiveness, as in the EU. Free permits to the power 
industry are now largely confined to situations where 
power producers cannot pass on carbon costs (as in China) 
or to support large and politically influential coal-fired 
generators (in Eastern Europe).46 
3.2 Fiscal reform - subsidies.
Just as it is efficient to price negative externalities, or 
“bads”, it is inefficient to subsidise them. Many countries 
start from a position of negative carbon prices because 
of subsidies for fossil fuels. But subsidies go beyond fossil 
fuels: they are likely to total over US$1 trillion globally 
per year in energy, water, steel and food alone.49  Any 
serious attempt by a country to get fiscal policy right 
for both growth and climate change should start with a 
reassessment of these distortions. 
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Figure 1
Carbon pricing around the world
Source: © 2014 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development - The World Bank.44 
The International Energy Agency (IEA), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) have estimated 
and reported on various fossil fuel subsidies over a 
number of years, and assessed the impacts of their phase-
out.50  The group of 20 leading global economies (G20) has 
been discussing the removal of fossil fuel subsidies for the 
past five years. 
The OECD has estimated the value of support for fossil 
fuel production and consumption in OECD countries 
at around US$55-90 billion per year over the period 
2005 to 2011, with most of this in the form of tax breaks 
for consumption.51  Even countries which are now re-
evaluating their support for renewable energy still have 
fossil fuel subsidies in place. For example, Germany 
provided €1.9 billion in subsidies to its hard coal sector 
in 2011.52  The IEA estimated fossil fuel consumption 
subsidies in emerging and developing countries at around 
US$540 billion in 2012.53  The majority of these were for 
energy consumption in net fossil fuel exporting  
countries (Figure 2).54 
Countries subsidise fossil fuel consumption in various 
ways. Governments may keep local energy prices below 
international market prices, or provide grants or vouchers 
to make energy more affordable. Such subsidies are 
Any serious attempt by a country 
to get fiscal policy right for both 
growth and climate change 
should start with a reassessment 
of subsidies to fossil fuels
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An explicit carbon tax was introduced in British 
Columbia on 1 July 2008 at C$10 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (CO
2
e), rising by C$5 per year until 
it reached C$30 in 2012. The tax applies to nearly all 
fossil fuels, including petrol, propane, natural gas, and 
coal. It covers nearly 80% of the province’s greenhouse 
gas emissions from residential, commercial and 
industrial sources. It is designed to be revenue neutral; 
all revenues raised are recycled to reduce other existing 
taxes, with a focus on corporate and labour taxes, and 
tax relief for vulnerable households.
In the 2012-2013 fiscal year, the scheme raised 
revenues of around C$1.2 billion, from a tax rate 
of C$30 per tonne. That is equivalent to 0.7% of 
2012 nominal GDP. After 5 years of operation, the 
government has delivered C$500 million more in tax 
cuts than total carbon tax revenues raised. Petrol prices 
rose around 7 cents per litre over the period 2008-
2012; this price rise has cut per capita consumption 
of petroleum fuels subject to the tax by around 17%, 
compared to a 1.5% increase in the rest of Canada. 
From vvzzemissions fell by 10%, compared to a 1.1% 
drop in the rest of Canada. Over the same period, 
GDP per capita declined by 0.15% in British Columbia, 
compared to a 0.23% fall for the rest of Canada. 
As the tax rate has increased, however, evidence has 
emerged that the tax is becoming more regressive.48  
Such an outcome would call for higher compensation 
for vulnerable groups. 
Box 5
British Columbia, Canada: an example 
of a well-designed carbon tax47  
particularly popular in developing countries, for example 
as a way to distribute the benefits of a country’s natural 
resource wealth to the general population. This is 
particularly important in countries without social safety 
nets or other means of delivering support for their 
populations. These motives are powerful and make reform 
politically difficult. It is therefore important to understand 
the costs of these subsidies and the benefits of reform, as 
this may help to identify more efficient ways of achieving 
the same social objectives. 
The limitations and costs of fossil fuel consumption 
subsidies fall into five key categories. 
• Inefficient - They are often economically inefficient. 
Subsidies artificially incentivise greater use or 
production of fossil fuels than is economically efficient 
for a given welfare level. 
• Budget impact - There is an opportunity cost from 
selling energy domestically below its international 
price, assuming there are further international market 
opportunities in the case of oil exporters. There is a 
real cost for a country which taxes fossil fuel energy at 
a lower rate. These foregone revenues represent 5% 
or more of GDP in some countries.56  By this measure, 
Indonesia and Mexico have spent more on energy 
subsidies than on health or education in recent years. 
• Environmental impact - Increased consumption 
of fossil fuels, in response to subsidies, increases 
air pollution, including indoor air pollution where 
fossil fuels are used for cooking and heating. Lower 
energy prices can also lead to excessive pumping of 
groundwater, as for example in India. And subsidies 
accelerate climate change by increasing carbon 
emissions. 
• Lock-in - Subsidies promote fossil fuel dependence 
and long-term lock-in to a high-carbon economy, for 
example they encourage greater reliance on private 
vehicles and urban sprawl.
• Regressive - Subsidies tend to favour well-off urban 
middle classes, who can afford large cars and multiple 
electric appliances, at the expense of taxpayers or the 
poor who would benefit more from targeted pro-poor 
public spending. An example is Mexico where 80% 
of electricity subsidies for irrigation water pumping 
accrued to the richest 10% of farmers.57  The  
poorest 20% in Mexico capture only 11% of  
residential electricity subsidies and less than 8%  
of transport fuel subsidies. Price controls can also  
undermine electric grid investment, and therefore 
energy access for vulnerable people, as utilities have 
less incentive to invest and fewer financial resources.
Subsidy reform reduces an economic distortion and 
increases fiscal revenues, which leads to gains in real 
incomes and GDP from more efficient resource allocation. 
Reform also leads to higher energy prices and stronger 
incentives to invest in energy access and renewable 
energy. Higher energy prices also encourage investment 
in energy efficiency and conservation, cut carbon 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion, and yield other, 
related benefits including lower air pollution. The impact 
of subsidy removal on global greenhouse gas emissions 
is uncertain, but some estimates exist. One study reports 
that if all 37 countries covered by the IEA fossil fuel 
subsidy database removed their subsidies by 2020, global 
greenhouse gas emissions could be around 8% lower in 
2050, compared with a baseline projection.58  
It is vital to tackle equity issues arising from fossil fuel 
subsidy reform, such as the impact of rising energy prices 
on vulnerable people, who may be below or just above 
a defined poverty line. Such problems can be tackled 
through cash transfer payments, funded by a share of 
the savings from reduced subsidies. However, in some 
countries administrative challenges could prevent these 
payments being made effectively, suggesting fossil 
fuel subsidy reforms will need to be accompanied by 
institutional reforms. Also, given the lack of trust in the 
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Figure 2
Fossil fuel consumption subsidies in emerging and developing countries, 2012.
Source: IEA, 2013.55 
political process in many countries, governance reforms 
that increase fiscal transparency and trust in government 
institutions will be a vital. To build trust, some support 
may need to be provided for vulnerable people through 
up-front financing before implementing the reforms. 
Reductions in subsidies are unlikely to be supported if 
there is no expectation of receiving compensation, if 
revenue savings are expected to line the pockets of elite 
groups, or if they are simply returned to the public coffers.
Experience in reducing fossil fuel subsidies
Many countries have experimented with reforms to 
reduce subsidies. These have often proved politically 
challenging and there are many barriers, but reform is 
possible and some useful lessons emerge.
International organisations have proposed a range of 
measures that can support successful subsidy reform. 
The components for successful fossil fuel subsidy reform 
include: a comprehensive reform plan integrated with 
broader fiscal reforms; credible and targeted measures 
to protect the poor; a clear communications strategy; 
appropriately phased and sequenced price increases; 
and improvements in the efficiency of state owned 
enterprises.59  Box 6 provides some further lessons from 
five countries that have undertaken subsidy reform.
Innovative ideas are also emerging that may help 
governments overcome some of the barriers to reducing 
fossil fuel subsidies. A recent example is the idea of a 
“subsidy phase-out and reform catalyst” (SPARC) bond. 
Such bonds would enable governments to raise money 
from private investors, with only a small contribution from 
government to cover some of the risk. The proceeds would 
provide the up-front finance necessary to demonstrate 
the benefits of reform and build public acceptance. The 
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The examples of Ghana, Tunisia, Bolivia, Nigeria and 
Indonesia provide useful lessons from fossil fuel  
subsidy reform in practice.60  
Ghana – an example of a successful reduction in the 
overall level of subsidies. Ghana carried out an impact 
assessment prior to the reform, and a widespread 
advertising campaign. The government increased fuel 
prices by around 50% in 2006, followed by several more 
increases to bring prices in line with the international 
market price. The revenues saved were partly used 
to compensate the poor for energy price increases. 
A new petroleum authority (NPA) was introduced 
to depoliticise the price-setting process.61  This was 
not a structural policy reform in isolation. Ghana has 
implemented a comprehensive fiscal reform package 
that is transforming its economy. 
Tunisia – an example of countering the impacts of fossil 
fuel subsidies with support for renewable energy. 
Tunisia implemented an innovative reform programme 
from 2005 that encouraged households to shift away 
from water heaters run on subsidised fossil fuels, 
to solar water heaters. The scheme tackled the key 
local challenges hindering the shift. First, it provided 
subsidies to reduce the upfront costs of the solar 
system. Second, it developed the supply chain, such as 
training installers and creating accreditation and quality 
certification programmes. Third, it raised community 
awareness and confidence in the alternative technology. 
And fourth, it used the state utility to act as debt 
collector, guarantor and enforcer, overcoming credit 
market weaknesses.62 
Bolivia - an example of unsuccessful reform. In 2010, 
the Bolivian government announced a dramatic 70% 
increase in prices for fossil fuels. This quickly led to riots 
and civil unrest and the reform was abandoned. 63 
Nigeria – another example of poor communication. 
The Nigerian government had to scale back initial price 
increases of 117% for gasoline in 2012, to around 
50%.64  Concerns in Nigeria included fear of loss of 
competitiveness, loss of income for low and middle 
income households and job losses. 
Indonesia – an example of public opposition, despite 
a compensation scheme. The Indonesian government 
doubled the price of diesel and nearly tripled the price 
of kerosene in 2005, while offering compensation in 
the form of an unconditional cash transfer programme 
and cash payments to low-income individuals. Despite 
the compensation programme, subsequent attempts to 
phase out energy subsidies and provide compensation 
have faced strong public opposition.65  
Box 6
Lessons learned from reform of fossil 
fuel consumption subsidies
future savings from reduced fossil fuel use would repay 
the bond over time. The World Bank or other international 
financial institutions could potentially act as guarantor and 
intermediary for the bonds.66 
3.3 Policies to tackle other market failures 
and political economy barriers
A well-coordinated portfolio of different policies is needed 
to tackle different market failures, boost productivity 
and growth, and to lower the costs of emissions 
reductions.67  We now discuss targeted policies to tackle 
the market failures beyond greenhouse gases. The failures 
are categorised into three broad areas: innovation; 
infrastructure investment; and networks.
It should be noted that other chapters in this report  
provide further detail on these market failures and policies 
to tackle them, for example in Chapter 6: Finance and 
Chapter 7: Innovation. They are introduced here.
Policy for market failures in innovation, investment and 
networks
Innovation is crucial for productivity and growth.68  But 
there are market failures throughout the innovation chain, 
in particular in the early stages of R&D, which hold back 
investment in low-carbon innovation. When a firm invests 
in early stage R&D, it produces technical knowledge that 
can be replicated across many firms at very low cost. This 
knowledge spills over from one firm to another through 
imitation and learning.69  Knowledge spillovers cause 
firms to under-invest in R&D compared with the public 
optimum, because innovators do not fully appropriate 
the returns to their investment.70  Policies that can help 
to remedy this include direct government investments in 
R&D, innovation prizes, patenting systems, and carefully 
targeted tax breaks and subsidies.71  
Analysis for the Commission finds innovation is generally 
path-dependent, meaning that the type of innovation 
path we follow will depend on our expectations of future 
technologies and the initial conditions of the innovation 
process.72  Government thus has an important role not 
only to tackle market failures, but also to help set the initial 
conditions that can shift innovation from high- to low-
carbon. Direct subsidies for low-carbon R&D can be an 
effective tool to deal with the spillover externality, and in 
combination with carbon prices, can shift expectations 
for the innovation process to low-carbon. 
Support for early-stage R&D for renewable energy and 
energy efficiency has risen rapidly in recent years and is 
starting to overcome a long legacy of government R&D 
support for fossil fuels. In 19 countries in the OECD, 
renewable energy and energy efficiency R&D increased 
from around 15% of total government energy R&D 
spending in 1990 to nearly 50% in 2011.73  Government 
R&D spending on fossil fuels fell from 20% to 12% of total 
energy R&D over the same period.74  
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A second market failure concerns investment in the 
deployment of clean energy infrastructure. In this case, 
market failures include a failure to price risk properly, 
including some important social costs and benefits, and 
policy uncertainty, which together raise risk premiums 
and deter clean energy investment. Experience across 
most countries shows that a mix of economic, fiscal and 
financial incentives are needed to tackle these failures 
in a way that reduces the costs of debt and equity 
and unlocks investment in deployment of low-carbon 
technologies. Specific policies will differ depending on 
individual country risk characteristics and the type of 
technology. Two complementary instruments that can 
be used to support low-carbon deployment are feed-in 
tariffs and concessional debt. Chapter 6: Finance provides 
more detail on the types of policies to boost low-carbon 
investment, according to national income characteristics.
Concessional debt is particularly useful in countries 
where governments are unable to provide clear and 
credible policy signals. However, such credit may not 
always provide investors with the level of risk reduction 
necessary. In such cases feed-in tariffs (FITs) can provide 
renewable energy generators with a fixed long-term price, 
and so can reduce market risks further. FITs can function 
simultaneously as a policy de-risking instrument (through 
guaranteed grid access and “must-take” requirements)  
and a financial de-risking instrument (through a 
guaranteed price over a period of years). Much has been 
learned over recent years on how to design FITs better.75  
But problems remain. For example, they are still more 
costly compared to a carbon price (Box 8). And as a form 
of subsidy, they should be limited in their use, and time-
bound with transparent and pre-announced plans for how 
they will be phased out over time as more efficient options 
become feasible. Many countries, such as China and 
Saudi Arabia, are starting to use auctions to ensure that 
price incentives are economically efficient and to avoid 
excessive subsidies. In some countries, these economic 
incentives may need to be supplemented by other fiscal 
and financial incentives, to tackle remaining investment 
risks, as discussed in Chapter 6: Finance. 
A third market failure is around networks. Lack of suitable 
networks or access to them can provide a barrier to new 
technology uptake by would-be adopters, and prevent 
new technologies from competing on a level basis with 
incumbent technologies.76  For example, the widespread 
uptake of the current generation of electric vehicles is 
dependent on access to a reliable network of charging 
stations. Policies to tackle network-related market 
barriers include public investment in smart electricity 
grids, public transport and broadband, and to open existing 
networks, for example to allow local renewable energy 
generators to sell electricity into existing grids. 
The importance of networks is pervasive and crucial for 
fostering innovation and the transition to a  
low-carbon economy.77 
The challenge with support for low-carbon technologies 
and systems is therefore one of designing the optimal 
policy package that includes the appropriate combination 
of economic, fiscal and financial incentives to ensure 
effectiveness at the lowest cost.
The role of regulations and standards in tackling market 
failures
Regulations such as standards (see Box 7) can tackle a 
range of market failures and provide confidence and clear 
signals. If designed well, they can help to make carbon 
pricing schemes more effective and efficient.
A market failure that regulation can help tackle is that 
of split incentives. One example is in the rented building 
sector. In this case, landlords may not reap the benefits of 
investing in better insulation, because they do not pay the 
electricity bills, while tenants are reluctant to make such 
long-term investments, as they do not own the property. 
As a result, energy efficiency investments are missed, 
even when the returns are high. Examples of relevant 
regulations include a requirement that tenants qualify 
for subsidised insulation, or the introduction of minimum 
building efficiency standards in buildings. Split incentives 
apply in other sectors such as in shipping, where owners 
of fleets often have little incentive to improve efficiency, 
because customers pay fuel costs. Regulations can 
mandate shipping fuel efficiency standards. 
Regulations can also help to tackle existing restrictions 
and barriers that reduce competitiveness, such as barriers 
that prevent new products from accessing established 
markets, and which can hinder innovation. These barriers 
are already proving powerful in the case of electric 
vehicles, with, for example, car dealerships in many US 
States blocking Tesla from bypassing the dealer network 
and selling their electric vehicles directly to the public.79  
Regulations are particularly useful where there are 
systematic behavioural biases and preferences that 
can reduce the effectiveness of explicit carbon prices.80  
Understanding consumer and household behaviour is 
central to cost-effectively reducing the demand for energy, 
which helps limit emissions, lower resource costs and 
enhance energy security. Such behavioural biases include 
an excessive focus on the short-term among consumers 
in their purchase decisions, which can undervalue the 
benefits of energy efficiency. Regulation can tackle such 
behavioural bias, for example through standards which 
draw attention to energy savings, and so emphasise 
long-term benefits. Mandatory or voluntary energy 
efficiency labelling on appliances has proved a particularly 
effective way to shift consumer behaviour.81  A review of 
energy demand reduction experiments around the world 
finds that providing additional information on electricity 
bills - such as advice on energy efficiency, feedback on 
energy usage, information on potential cost savings and 
social comparison -can be effective at motivating energy 
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Standards can provide clear signals and policy certainty 
for the private sector. If they are announced sufficiently 
in advance, they can drive private investments in 
R&D and innovation in low-carbon technologies. They 
can influence the design of new products and R&D 
strategies, as seen in the car industry. They have also 
been found to positively affect consumer preferences 
and social norms.
Performance standards may also have greater political 
acceptability compared with policies such as carbon 
pricing, for a variety of reasons: 
1. In most sectors, standards do not immediately 
affect existing industries and equipment, only new 
investments, so incumbents are less likely to object to 
their introduction. 
2. Many countries already have performance standards, 
and these may only need strengthening and better 
enforcement to reduce emissions further. Thus 
governments can avoid the trouble of creating entirely 
new policy tools. 
3. Performance standards achieve measurable results 
more rapidly than carbon prices, and their benefits can 
thus be observed over shorter timescales. 
4. Performance standards convey a positive message 
and focus on achievements and progress, for example 
contributing to development goals such as moving 
domestic manufacturing toward higher value-added 
products, rather than focusing on limits and constraints.
There is criticism of the cost-effectiveness of standards, 
particularly in the auto industry. The literature 
evaluating Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) 
Standards in the United States suggests that increased 
fuel duties and taxes would be a more cost-effective 
way of reducing emissions.78  However, standards can be 
designed to overcome some of these concerns through 
incorporating price ceilings and floors. The price ceilings 
can contain compliance costs, while the price floors 
provide ongoing incentives for improvement in periods 
when the costs of meeting the standard falls. 
Box 7
Standards 
savings.82  One of the most powerful forms of information 
on bills is social comparison. Comparing household energy 
bills to energy uses of neighbours can “activate” social 
norms and pro-environmental attitudes and “nudge” 
households towards lower energy use.83   
The role of regulations and positive subsidies in tackling 
political economy and institutional barriers
Regulations including standards can be useful where 
political realities and institutional factors prevent the 
implementation of explicit carbon pricing. Such hard-
nosed realities which can obstruct the legislation of carbon 
pricing include resistance from powerful pressure groups, 
more obvious short-run consumer costs compared with 
relatively opaque costs of standards and rebate schemes, a 
lack of institutional capacity domestically, and a particular 
difficulty agreeing carbon pricing schemes internationally. 
Pressures from powerful vested interests have been 
particularly effective in delaying the wider use of explicit 
carbon pricing, even in countries like the United States, 
Canada and Australia where carbon pricing at the regional 
level has proved successful. The resistance is generally 
based on competitiveness and equity concerns, as 
discussed in Section 4 of this chapter. Pressure groups 
that resist pricing are often well-mobilised, well-resourced 
and influential. 
Standards may offer an easier alternative, especially 
where governments already have the legislative authority 
to use these; the use of vehicle standards in the US is 
one example. And standards may pave the way to carbon 
pricing in the future; proposed US regulation of emissions 
from power plants allows states to use some form of 
carbon pricing. 
Other policy instruments, besides standards, may attract 
less political resistance than carbon pricing. For example, 
“feebates”, which have proved popular with consumers. 
They impose a fee on a dirty product and offer a rebate 
on a clean substitute. The “feebate” can be closely aligned 
with the market failure that they are tackling and, unlike 
standards, they provide a constant incentive to improve 
efficiency.84  They have proved effective in driving the 
switch to more efficient vehicles. Investment subsidies, 
for example for home insulation or purchase of energy 
efficient equipment, are also popular. Many governments 
also provide subsidies to clean energy.
It is noted that while policies such as standards and 
subsidies may, in certain cases, attract less political and 
public resistance than carbon pricing, this may be because 
the costs associated with these instruments are often 
diffused or hidden in the detail of income tax regulation, 
general fund expenditure, utility financial regulation,cost-
pass through arrangements and energy bill levies. As a 
result, these advantages may disappear over time, as the 
costs become more obvious. The result could then be a 
political backlash. Examples include the opposition to  
the costs of subsidising offshore wind farms in many  
EU countries.
Regulations including standards 
can be useful where political 
realities and institutional factors 
prevent the implementation of 
explicit carbon pricing.
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Policy-makers can make the real cost of standards more 
transparent using the concept of an implicit or “effective” 
carbon price. Box 8 presents estimates of “effective” 
carbon prices for different policy instruments. Economic 
costs may be reduced over time by leaving flexibility in 
the system to move toward a more cost-effective mix 
of policies as the political and institutional barriers to 
implementing such measures are overcome. This could 
involve, for example, conditions that any new type of 
subsidy needs to be well targeted and gradually phased 
out over time. Failure to ensure such a condition could 
see policy become less efficient over time and distortive, 
for example where the subsidy fails to fall in line with 
technology costs.
Besides industry opposition, carbon pricing may also 
be obstructed by weaknesses in institutional capacity. 
Regulations can be useful in countries without the capacity 
to support and administer carbon prices, including some 
developing and emerging economies. China is an example 
of a country that uses regulations extensively, but is now 
experimenting with carbon pricing and starting to build 
the necessary institutions to support this. The World 
Bank Partnership for Market Readiness is helping in this 
regard, providing support for countries preparing for fiscal 
reforms that include carbon pricing and reducing fossil 
fuel subsidies.86  
Regulations may also be easier to agree nationally and 
internationally. The “en.lighten” initiative is one example of 
an international approach to efficiency standards. Some 
55 countries have committed to implement policies and 
measures that will reduce inefficient lighting by 2016. The 
initiative aims to eliminate inefficient lighting by 2030, a 
goal which could save about 1,000 terawatt hours (TWh) 
per year in electricity consumption; cut carbon emissions 
by some 500 million tonnes of CO
2
 annually in 2030; and 
shave more than US$100 billion from electricity bills. 
Another example is the Global Fuel Economy Initiative 
(GFEI), which is working to help 20 countries increase 
their vehicle fleet efficiency. If these countries committed 
to doubling the fuel efficiency of passenger vehicles by 
2030, they could avoid at least one billion tonnes of CO
2
 
per year in 2030, achieve fuel savings worth up to US$2 
trillion, and secure large health benefits from reduced air 
pollution in cities.87  Chapter 8: International Cooperation 
provides more detail of multilateral initiatives to drive cuts 
in greenhouse gas emissions.
3.4 Coordination across the policy mix
The policies discussed above, and indeed throughout this 
report, will be most effective and efficient when carefully 
integrated in a well-coordinated policy mix. They will be 
better at driving short- medium-run growth and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Planning policies in cities provide a clear example of 
coordination benefits. For example, carbon or petrol taxes 
are much more effective at reducing emissions when an 
effective, reliable public transport system is in place.88  
Carbon taxes would have to be higher to achieve the same 
level of emissions reductions if there is no suitable public 
transport alternative. 
In the power sector, emissions reductions are more 
cost effective when coupled with strong investment in 
energy efficiency, with evidence of this relationship in 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the 
north-eastern United States.89  Adequate grid capacity 
will ensure low-carbon electricity can be utilised when the 
wind blows strongly. 
An uncoordinated approach to policy can potentially lead 
to overlap and negative interactions between policies.90  
The coexistence of the European Union Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) and its renewable targets is often given 
as an example of overlap. The EU-wide renewable energy 
target, underpinned by subsidies, aims to reduce emissions 
in the energy sector, rather than allowing the EU ETS to 
allocate emission reductions where they are cheapest. 
The EU made a choice to structure its policies in this way 
in order to incentivise early investment in the deployment 
of renewables, as they are central to decarbonisation of 
the energy system and investments now will bring down 
their cost, potentially enabling greater ambition in future 
years. In addition, the carbon price required to incentivise 
sufficient renewables deployment to meet EU emissions 
targets without these supporting policies and targets may 
be too high politically. 
As the emissions cap in the EU ETS is fixed, driving 
emissions reductions in the energy sector in this way may 
reduce demand for permits elsewhere, reducing permit 
prices and creating space for other sectors to emit more. 
One solution to this perceived problem would be to adjust 
the cap downwards, but attempts to do this have proved 
politically difficult. However, recent evidence finds that 
this overlap is not the main cause of low EU ETS carbon 
prices. This research shows that the recession, which has 
led to emissions below the level of the cap, renewable 
support policies, and international credits, can only explain 
around 10% of the EU ETS price decline from almost €30 
in 2008 to less than €5 in 2013.91  A lack of long-term 
While policies such as standards 
and subsidies may, in certain cases, 
attract less political and public 
resistance than carbon pricing, 
this may be because the costs 
associated with these instruments 
are often diffused or hidden.
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The OECD has analysed the cost-effectiveness of 
various approaches for cutting carbon emissions in the 
electricity sector, and found wide variation. For each 
policy approach, the study calculated the total cost per 
tonne of CO
2
 abatement, or the so-called “effective” 
carbon price. These estimates have several limitations: 
they do not account for the value of additional benefits 
from these policies, such as improved air quality; and 
they don’t compare different approaches to energy 
taxes. This is also a static analysis; it doesn’t consider 
the dynamic incentives of each approach for inducing 
innovation over time. Nevertheless, the estimates are 
still informative.
1. Carbon trading systems and broad-based taxes 
have so far proved to be the most cost-effective and 
economically efficient policy tools. 
2. Taxes on fossil fuels are also cost-effective in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Vietnam is an example of an 
emerging country that has taken this route. Fuel duties 
can be a fairly good proxy for explicit carbon pricing 
and have been shown to be effective. For example, they 
can have a high impact on reducing emissions in the 
transport sector. 
3. Regulations are more costly, with an average cost of 
around €50 per tonne, including considerable variation 
around this average. Feed-in tariffs and investment 
Box 8
The cost of carbon abatement according to policy instrument, using the example of the 
electricity sector85 
subsidy instruments are the most commonly used 
instruments in practice, and some of the most expensive, 
costing an average of over €150 per tonne of avoided CO
2
. 
They are often the easiest policy instruments to put in 
place, due to political constraints on carbon pricing and 
their popularity with those who benefit from the subsidy 
payments. A greater understanding of their implied and 
often hidden costs could inform more efficient policy mixes. 
This discussion should not imply that only the “cheapest” 
policy option should or can be used in all cases; for 
example, regulations are likely to be needed to tackle other 
market failures beyond greenhouse gas emissions. But, in 
general, using regulations and subsidies as the main tool 
to tackle the greenhouse gas market failure is likely to be 
more expensive than a well-designed mix of policies, with 
regulations and other measures used to support explicit 
carbon pricing, and where carbon pricing revenues are 
recycled to productive uses.
A key point from the OECD analysis is that these policies 
are often applied in a piecemeal fashion within countries 
today. As a result, effective carbon prices vary widely 
across countries. For example, for the electricity sector, the 
average effective carbon price in Korea is around €200 per 
tonne of CO
2
 abated, around €100 per tonne in the UK and 
Germany, and below €50 for Australia, the US, Chile and 
China. Policies could be coordinated in more effective and 
efficient ways to better tackle the market failures. 
credibility around the future of European climate and 
energy policy appears the likely explanation of most of  
the decline.92  
More research is required into the most effective and 
credible coordination of policies across a wide-range 
of areas relating to energy, climate, competition, fiscal 
management, innovation, development cooperation, 
agriculture, investment policies, competition policy and 
trade policy.93  It is clear that coordination is best applied 
across sectors, such as cities, transport, energy and land 
use. Poor coordination, coupled with an incomplete 
range of policy instruments to tackle the relevant market 
failures, will raise costs, impact credibility, and lower the 
effectiveness of policies. For example, the presence of 
fossil fuel subsidies raises the carbon price needed to 
achieve a certain level of emissions reductions. Another 
example of competing policies is trade rules, which are not 
always compatible with support for low-carbon energy. 
This is discussed in Chapter 8: International Cooperation. 
Better coordination of policy could transform efficiency 
and accelerate the pace of change. In May 2014, Ministers 
of Finance and Economy requested the OECD and the 
IEA to provide recommendations on how to align policies 
to achieve a low-carbon transition. Such work will be an 
important follow-up to this report.
4. Managing and monitoring change 
and learning from experience
4.1 Policies to ease the transition
Policies can help firms and households manage and 
adapt to the structural change associated with a low-
carbon transition. This will minimise the economic and 
social costs. Countries that have a record of proactively 
managing change and easing the costs of transition will do 
better and experience less resistance to reforms. 
Managing change requires recognising where there will 
be winners and losers, and smoothing the transition for 
affected groups. Some workers and firms may face higher 
costs or dislocation. Some firms and industries will decline. 
Governments have a role to identify the most effective 
policies to reduce these costs without impeding change. 
Phasing in policy reforms according to a pre-announced 
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schedule, after public consultation, can provide time and 
clarity for businesses and workers to adapt or identify  
new opportunities. 
Three key challenges are identified, related to the 
structural shifts associated with policies to boost growth 
and reduce climate risk: 
• Equity, to distribute the benefits and burdens of 
change fairly; 
• Employment, to help workers re-skill and retrain; and, 
• Competitiveness, to help firms benefit from 
change, and not be put at a disadvantage relative to 
competitors. 
Each is examined in turn below.
Equity
Carbon taxes and fossil fuel subsidy reforms can have 
regressive impacts when they raise domestic energy 
prices. Poorer households may take a relatively bigger 
hit than others.94  Targeted compensation policies can 
alleviate these costs for households, for example, through 
cash transfers or social security payments, or by reducing 
marginal income tax rates for households.95 
Poorer households may not have benefited so much from 
fossil fuel subsidies. While energy consumption subsidies 
are often intended to help the poor, they are often 
proportionate to the level of energy consumption, which 
is generally higher for rich households, who then capture 
most of the benefit. The subsidies also tie households to 
purchasing fuel or electricity if they wish to benefit. By 
contrast, poor households can use direct income support, 
rather than subsidies, for other needed spending, such as 
on clothing, food and education.96  These support packages 
can be adjusted over time as the carbon price level and the 
structure of the economy changes. 
One policy challenge in making compensation transfers is 
to devise appropriate mechanisms, given the lack of social 
safety nets in many developing countries. A lack of such 
mechanisms and institutions is often part of the reason 
why such countries relied on fuel or electricity subsidies in 
the first place. Much experience has been gained in recent 
years with the introduction of cash payment schemes, 
and the World Bank is assisting a number of countries to 
introduce these. The introduction of the “Aadhaar” proof 
of identity and address scheme in India has enabled better 
targeted support to poor households and has been an 
essential factor in recent energy subsidy reforms, despite 
implementation issues that have reduced public trust 
in the scheme. In countries that have social safety nets, 
governments must be careful to ensure additional support 
is in fact required. For example, social security payments 
often adjust automatically to price levels, including the 
impact of higher energy prices. 
Jobs and unemployment 
Workers are at the centre of economies, and will be 
directly affected by any form of structural change. As 
economies develop and grow, labour will continually 
transition from declining sectors to more profitable and 
productive activities. 
Various policies can ensure a just transition for workers. 
They can take many forms but should minimise 
unemployment, promote job creation in growing sectors 
and tackle labour market distortions efficiently, while also 
providing protection for the most vulnerable. They should 
tackle the wide range of factors related to the risk of job 
loss and impacts on the communities in which workers 
live.97  Such measures are a central part of the integrated 
framework for managing change described in this chapter. 
These policies can increase the responsiveness of the 
workforce to change and new opportunities in a way that 
benefits both employees and employers: it is not about 
making it easier for employers to hire and fire workers. 
They include: 
• Pro-active training to equip people for change 
by acquiring new skills. Sweden, the Netherlands 
and Germany have demonstrated successful 
training and re-skilling policies to prevent long-
term unemployment. Singapore actively promotes 
structural change through public policy to encourage 
knowledge-intensive skills and activities. 
• Unemployment benefits must be designed to motivate 
workers to re-enter the workforce, in particular 
because learning on-the-job remains an effective 
way to prevent skill atrophy. This means finding the 
right level for benefits that incentivise re-entry into 
the labour market without creating financial distress 
for the unemployed, and provision of in-work credits 
or wage subsidies to get people back to work. It may 
also be more efficient to promote job creation in new 
sectors rather than protecting old jobs.98  
• Assisting workers is harder where job losses are 
concentrated in particular geographical regions, such 
as a remote coal mining town, or where losses hit 
older or less skilled workers. Recent experience shows 
that these workers can end up among the long-term 
unemployed for many years, or drop out of the labour 
Policies can help firms and 
households manage and adapt to 
the structural change associated 
with a low-carbon transition. This 
will minimise the economic and 
social costs.
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force altogether. In these cases, the government may 
need to provide unemployment benefits, resources 
for job search, relocation assistance, improve 
the flexibility of the housing market, and provide 
geographic mobility programmes to get people back to 
work. In cases where long-term workers are unlikely 
to be able to retrain or relocate, the provision of social 
protection mechanisms to ensure workers receive 
adequate pensions and health insurance is key to a 
just transition and to overcome resistance to change.
• Reforms to ensure strong labour market institutions, 
to protect the most vulnerable workers, such as 
minimum wages and collective bargaining, are also 
important for a well-managed transition.
Experience has shown a range of risks that governments 
should be aware of when implementing such policies. 
For example, severance payments or loans need to be 
linked to suitable training that improves employability. 
Poorly designed training programmes and work creation 
schemes can develop the wrong skills and fail to increase 
employability of workers. Inadequate schemes can send 
negative signals to employers, who then avoid employing 
these workers. Multiple training programmes can reduce 
the motivation of workers to search for new jobs, and so 
these should be limited and well-targeted. And retrained 
workers can end up displacing existing workers. 
Despite the complexities and pitfalls of such transition 
programmes, experience has shown that propping up 
declining sectors rather than actively managing structural 
change is counterproductive. Following are some brief 
examples from around the world. 
• The UK experience of trying to shield its ailing 
shipbuilding, steel and car-making industries from 
adjustment in the 1970s illustrates the risks, 
including the heavy social cost of subsequent rapid 
restructuring  
of the economy
• Germany has in the past managed structural change 
by welcoming an appreciating exchange rate, which 
has put less productive firms under increasing 
pressure to innovate, as part of a process of 
“Schumpeterian” or continual change. 
• Japan provides a good example of actively managing 
structural change in industries that are in decline. 
From 1987, the government provided long-term 
support to smooth the decline of what it called 
“structurally depressed” industries, including textiles 
and ship-building. This support reallocated resources 
within and outside the depressed industries; provided 
financial assistance to troubled firms; and mitigated 
negative impacts on the labour force.99  
• In Poland, starting in 1990, the government 
restructured its loss-making mining sector through 
debt restructuring, mine closures and a radical 
reduction in employment. Initial reforms were 
resisted as they did not provide adequate support 
for miners. From 1998 the employment reduction 
programme was accompanied by incentives for 
firms to hire ex-miners; free retraining programmes 
financed by the European Commission; social benefits 
and severance payments, which were effective but 
very costly for government; loans and credits for 
ex-miners, which were mainly used for household 
consumption; job guarantees for miners close to 
retirement; and benefits for miners with long tenure, 
such as five-year voluntary vacations at 75% pay. 
These measures were designed in cooperation with 
the unions, which helped overcome resistance to the 
reforms. From 1998 to 2002 alone, some 53,000 
workers left the industry and 33,000 received some 
form of support (total coal mining employment in 
Poland fell from around 390,000 in 1990 to 120, 000 
in 2006). 100 The total cost of the 1998 programme 
was around €1 billion, which was probably far less 
costly than propping up the ailing industry for years to 
come. In 1998 the industry made a net financial loss 
of around US$ 1.5 billion but by 2004 had returned 
to profitability with a net financial profit of around 
US$730 million.101   
• The United States instituted the US Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) programme several decades ago 
to help workers adjust to trade liberalisation. The 
programme provides: income support for over 100 
weeks; training expenses; health coverage tax credit; 
wage insurance that “tops up” a potential lower 
income in a new occupation for up to two years for 
workers over 50 years of age; and costs associated 
with job search and relocation. This assistance 
package is designed to be targeted and calibrated 
to worker needs. However, recent assessment of its 
effectiveness finds mixed results.102  
Evidence from the OECD suggests that a combination of 
a carbon price with revenue recycling to productive uses, 
and fair transition policies which help workers adjust to 
change, could help offset the employment impacts of a 
low-carbon transition.103  They model the economic costs 
of a carbon price across OECD countries, assuming a 
moderate carbon price in 2030 with lump-sum transfers, 
and find that markets with just transition policies and 
more responsive labour markets as a result, could see as 
little as a 0.78% fall in the level of GDP and a 0.32% fall 
in employment. In one scenario with revenue recycling 
through reduced labour taxes, there was a small but 
net positive impact on employment. In contrast, rigid 
labour markets could see a 2% fall in GDP and a 2% fall 
in employment in 2030 compared with the baseline. The 
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modelling suggests that ensuring a just transition for 
workers could significantly reduce the economic costs  
of transition. 
A number of reports suggest that policies can boost the 
gross number of jobs in new and less polluting sectors. 
A recent study commissioned by the International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC) suggests that investing 2% of 
GDP in the green economy could create up to 48 million 
jobs in five years.104  Bottom-up analyses, for example a 
recent study by the World Bank, finds that if Brazil sent all 
solid waste to sanitary landfills, with methane and biogas 
produced for electricity, it could create 44,000 new jobs 
and increase national GDP by over US$13 billion, and if 
India built 1,000 kilometres of new bus rapid transit lanes, 
it could create 128,000 new jobs and save 27,000 lives 
from lower air pollution and accidents.105  
However, many such studies focus only on gross job gains 
in green sectors, and do not consider economy-wide 
impacts such as job losses in other, declining industries, 
or consider skill or location mismatch that could prevent 
workers filling these new jobs. Studies that do account 
for economy-wide effects, and take a general equilibrium 
approach, tend to confirm that the net employment 
impacts from a low-carbon transition would likely be small 
over the medium- to long-term. For example, a major 
survey of the literature for the European Commission 
in 2013, regarding a shift to low-carbon energy in 2050, 
concluded that there was no clear consensus about 
whether the overall net impact on employment would be 
positive or negative, but in almost all cases the impacts 
were small at the macroeconomic level.  As indicated 
above, depending on how the revenues from carbon taxes 
are recycled back, fiscal reform could lead to a small net 
employment gain.106
That net effects are found to be small should not be 
surprising, given that the policy framework presented 
here is likely to induce a substitution between different 
types of production and consumption, away from more 
polluting and toward less polluting activities. Overall net 
employment gains or losses from such policies should be 
small. However, there will be changes in the numbers and 
types of jobs across and within economic sectors and, as 
is the case with all industrial change, workers will need to 
move from declining to expanding sectors, firms and job 
types. This gives rise to the need for policies to support 
workers in their transition. 
Risks to competitiveness for early movers
Many governments and individuals are concerned that 
taking early or ambitious action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions will increase energy costs and leave an economy, 
sector or firm at a relative economic disadvantage, 
compared with peers in jurisdictions with less strict 
carbon regulation. 
This concern needs careful consideration. Carbon pricing 
and investments in energy efficiency and renewable 
energy will raise costs for certain sectors. In response to 
climate legislation, firms and sectors producing carbon-
intensive, globally traded goods and services could reduce 
their cost base by relocating production to countries with 
more relaxed environmental regimes. This is known as 
carbon leakage and it will limit the effectiveness of climate 
action as emissions do not fall but are merely displaced.
There is substantial evidence suggesting that the direct 
competitiveness impacts are small for a country which 
is an early mover in legislating climate policy.107  Other 
factors, such as labour costs and access to materials and 
markets, are the primary drivers of firms’ investment 
and location decisions, rather than climate change policy. 
In addition, relocation of physical plants or investment 
will make sense only if investors expect the asymmetric 
application of climate policies across trade competing 
countries to endure long enough to cover a sufficient part 
of the lifespan of the new capital. Otherwise, future policy 
changes might render such relocation decisions costly  
and unnecessary.  
However, there is general agreement that a few carbon-
intensive globally traded sectors and sub-sectors, which 
account for less than 5% of GDP in most countries, may 
see competitiveness impacts if stringent climate policy is 
enacted in one country but not in trade partners. These 
sectors include metals, cement, paper, and chemicals. Even 
for these carbon-intensive sectors, however, most studies 
fail to find evidence that current policies as applied, for 
example in the European Union or California, have had a 
significant effect on business competitiveness.108  
Generally, ex-post econometric studies using empirical 
data from actual policies have found a smaller 
competiveness impact than was predicted by ex-ante 
models.109  This is partly because carbon pricing and other 
environmental policies introduced so far have not been 
very stringent, as for example in the EU ETS, and partly 
because a large swathe of compensatory measures or 
preferential treatment was provided to energy-intensive 
industries to limit competitiveness impacts. In the 
Many governments and 
individuals are concerned 
that taking early or ambitious 
action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions will increase energy 
costs and leave an economy, 
sector or firm at a relative 
economic disadvantage.
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Border Carbon Tax Adjustments (BCA) or Border 
Adjustment Measures (BAMs) are measures that would 
apply a tax on the carbon embedded in traded products 
and services, based on the CO
2
 emitted in their production. 
Some commentators and governments have promoted 
them as a way to level the playing field and tackle 
competitiveness concerns given the lack of climate policies 
in some countries. They have also been suggested as a 
means to spur countries towards more comprehensive 
global climate action. But such BCAs are very controversial, 
especially where they are seen as discriminating against 
developing countries.
In economic theory, applying a BCA could internalise the 
costs of greenhouse gas emissions in their production, 
enhancing the efficiency of unilateral climate policy.113  
However, some modelling studies have found that carbon 
leakage would in any case be low, except under scenarios 
where very few countries took climate action. BCAs 
may therefore have a limited impact in reducing carbon 
leakage.114  A recent cross-model comparison under the 
Energy Modelling Forum found that full BCAs could reduce 
leakage rates on average only by one-third.115  Given 
growing climate action worldwide, even if patchy and 
uneven, it is increasingly unlikely that BCAs would have 
much effect in protecting energy-intensive industries or 
reducing global emissions.116 
There is extensive discussion in the literature on 
whether and how BCAs could be designed in a way that 
is compatible with international trade rules, for being 
non-discriminatory in their application and applying a 
consistent measurement of “comparable effort”. A number 
of approaches to ensure WTO compatibility have been 
suggested, but such amendments may further limit the 
effectiveness or efficiency of the measure.
Recent guidance on how a BCA could be applied in 
practice highlights a number of significant technical 
challenges, in particular measuring production-related 
emissions and in setting the right tax levels.117  Establishing 
an appropriate BCA would require identifying a carbon 
tax level commensurate with the local tax in the importing 
country, and accurate measurement or benchmarking 
of the production-related greenhouse gas emissions in 
the exporting country. The latter can be complicated. 
For example, regarding steel production, a basic oxygen 
furnace technology emits over four times as much CO
2
 per 
unit of steel produced than standard electric arc furnace 
technology. One resolution could be to base the BCA on 
the carbon intensity of best available technology.118  This 
may be seen as fairer, as it does not require discrimination 
among like products according to production processes.119  
Ideally, a BCA would discount any explicit or implicit 
carbon “price” that may already be applied in the 
producing country, via regulations or other policies, but 
this would be incredibly difficult given the number and 
variety of different policies affecting greenhouse gas 
emissions. Recent analysis of “effective” carbon prices of 
various policy instruments has found the average costs 
of some regulations are over €400 per tonne of CO
2
 
abated.120  Such uncertainty about the implicit carbon 
price in exporting countries, coupled with uncertainties 
about the exact emissions associated with production 
processes in countries without extensive emissions 
monitoring, may make the practical challenges and 
administrative costs of applying even a very narrow  
BCA prohibitive. 
Box 9
Border carbon adjustments
European cement industry, for example, the EU ETS has 
not forced carbon emissions cuts in addition to those the 
sector would have made anyway as a result of general 
gains in best practice, because of the allocation of free 
permits and a low-carbon price. 110 Also, as a result of 
this compensation, the scheme has not yet prompted 
relocation of cement production abroad. Indeed, energy- 
and carbon-intensive industry may have profited from the 
scheme as a result of large opportunities for firms to make 
windfall profits from carbon trading.111  This compensation 
may have served to achieve early buy-in from industry, but 
it makes for a wasteful use of public funds in the long-run. 
A recent study of competiveness impacts on the  
European Chemicals Industry found that there are 
significant opportunities to reduce emissions by 80-95% in 
the sector by 2050, while at the same time maintaining or 
enhancing competitiveness.112 
Concerns about the potential competitiveness impacts of 
climate policies remain, however, and governments must 
tackle them. The best option, from an efficiency point of 
view, is to apply climate policies across more countries, so 
that significant trade effects do not arise. 
Another option, where international coordination does 
not exist, is the application of so-called border carbon tax 
adjustments, as described in Box 9. Given the absence of 
strong international coordination currently, it is inevitable 
that these are being discussed and examined. But they 
are “second” or “third-best” instruments, and the primary 
policy effort should be on achieving internationally 
coordinated policymaking, or targeted measures to 
mitigate impacts in the small number of sectors where 
differential carbon regulation makes a genuine difference. 
Compensation schemes to smooth the low-carbon 
transition for truly vulnerable sectors can help to level 
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the playing field and mitigate the impacts of asymmetric 
policy application across countries. Lessons from recent 
experience and economic theory include:
• This protection should not be provided through 
exemptions from carbon pricing, as this would 
reduce the incentives to reduce emissions, improve 
efficiency, and shift consumption toward lower carbon 
alternatives. Indeed, even energy intensive sectors are 
likely to become more productive in the long-run as a 
result of incentives to improve efficiency. Instead, some 
of the revenues raised through carbon pricing could 
be recycled back to companies in proportion to output. 
One study suggests that recycling approximately 15% 
of revenues to carbon-intensive, tradable sectors in 
the United States might be sufficient to eliminate any 
negative impact on profits.121  
• Compensation to affected industry reduces the 
revenues available for other productive recycling 
purposes, such as cuts in distortionary taxes. 
Therefore, it is important that compensation 
mechanisms are well-designed and well-targeted, to 
avoid encouraging rent-seeking. Failure to recycle 
revenues in the most productive manner, for example 
by allocating allowances for free, will raise costs.
• In the case of cap and trade, most countries have 
opted for some free allocation of permits in emissions 
trading systems, given the relative simplicity and 
political popularity of such measures to level the 
playing field and protect against competiveness 
impacts for carbon intensive tradable products. In 
the EU, RGGI, and other schemes, there is now a shift 
towards decreasing the percentage of permits that 
are allocated for free. 
• In the case of carbon taxes, compensation to selected 
affected industries could take the form of lump sum 
rebates. Other support could include grants to re-skill 
and retool production, especially for smaller firms,  
or support investment in low-carbon and energy  
efficient technologies.
• Industry compensation should be transparent, 
temporary and avoid overcompensation and rent-
seeking. It can be designed in ways that enable 
industries and investors to adjust proactively, for 
example by consulting in advance with stakeholders, 
pre-announcing the policy and starting with low levels 
of carbon pricing but with agreed ratcheting up. This 
allows firms to plan investments accordingly, including 
investments in clean solutions, without prematurely 
scrapping carbon-intensive capital and shifting 
production to other areas.
In summary, how carbon pricing policies change 
comparative advantage will depend on skill levels, 
innovation and flexibility to respond to structural 
change and reallocate resources toward new markets. 
The impacts also depend on expectations: if others 
are expected to also take climate action soon, the 
competitiveness opportunities for early movers will be 
larger than if they are not. China and other countries have 
realised that a low-carbon economy can provide new 
business opportunities and help tackle growing resource 
challenges. This should encourage other countries to 
adopt stronger policy as both the expectations of costs of 
waiting and of opportunities rise.
4.2 Strong institutions for clear and credible 
policy signals to align expectations around 
future growth
As introduced in Sections 2 and 3, managing structural 
change requires strong institutional frameworks that are 
able to set clear and credible polices to guide expectations 
on the direction of change. This is a prerequisite for cost-
effective, low-carbon investment across the economy. 
Countries such as the UK and Mexico have legally 
enshrined climate change acts which provide a credible 
underpinning to the legislative process, tying the hands of 
future governments to the extent that they must accede to 
amend or repeal legislation if they are to renege on climate 
policy targets. Such institutions set clearer signals that 
align expectations on the future direction of growth  
and development.
Clear signals are especially important because of the long-
lived nature of physical networks and infrastructures, in 
particular in energy generation, transport and the urban 
form. Because such infrastructure becomes entrenched 
in an economy and society, the pattern of development 
of infrastructure therefore builds on what went before, 
or becomes locked-in. Such “path dependence” is a 
common phenomenon in behaviours, technologies and 
networks. For example, some major road and rail networks 
in England were determined by choices made by the 
Romans two thousand years ago. Path dependence is 
also relevant to innovation, where new technologies tend 
to be based on existing networks. Path dependence can 
lead to positive synergies, through the development of 
new systems and networks. For example, the creation of 
cycling and walking paths and the presence of good public 
transport can, in time, drive a modal shift: politicians will 
then invest more in cycling and walking paths and public 
Managing structural change requires 
strong institutional frameworks that 
are able to set clear and credible 
polices to guide expectations on the 
direction of change.
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transport infrastructure, because there are more users, as 
shown in Amsterdam and Copenhagen. 
The degree to which populations embrace a shift from 
historical norms will depend on their expectations. For 
example, people are more likely to embrace a shift towards 
low-carbon growth if they understand its virtues, policies 
are clear and credible and they expect others to move 
in tandem. They will see the benefits of supplying new 
markets; expect technology costs to fall; and anticipate 
easier access to finance for a sector that is no longer 
considered niche. Once enough decision-makers act in this 
way, the expectations become self-fulfilling: technology 
and business costs come down as a result of experience, 
learning and deployment. Political institutions and groups 
not making the transition can then find themselves at a 
competitive disadvantage. For example, China’s significant 
investments in renewables in recent years have helped 
drive down technology costs and this has opened large 
new markets. The scale of other similar developments may 
be sufficient to start a domino effect, where by a critical 
mass of countries move, prompting all the others to move 
in an unstoppable transition.122 
By contrast, if businesses expect no one else to move,  
they are less likely to be proactive. They will see high risks 
in the prospect of new markets, and the costs of acting are 
higher and the decision to hold back looks sensible. Many 
business leaders are calling for governments to provide 
this signal and adopt a clear, credible and predictable  
long-term price on carbon, against which they can  
plan investment. 
Expectations determine which path countries take, 
whether they move quickly to innovate and take 
advantage of the opportunities of a low-carbon and 
resource efficient transition, or remain stuck in a hedging 
or waiting game. Both paths can look rational to individual 
agents, depending on expectations, although as the risks 
of climate change mount with time and new technologies 
emerge, the incentive to tip toward action will increase.
4.3 Policy risk and muddled expectations  
delay investment 
As highlighted in Chapter 6: Finance, the infrastructure 
investment requirements for growth will be large over 
the coming decades. Global infrastructure investment 
required to achieve a broad-based, low-carbon transition 
is likely to be in the region of US$93 trillion (constant 
$2010) over the period 2015 to 2030. The estimated 
infrastructure investment required under a business as 
usual, high-carbon path is around US$89 trillion over the 
same period. Therefore an extra US$4 trillion will need to 
be invested over the next 15 years to shift the world onto 
a low-carbon path. The appropriate way to consider these 
additional investment costs is in the wider context of the 
dynamic net economic cost, as discussed in Section 2.1.
Government induced policy uncertainty from vacillation, 
inconsistency, sudden shifts in policies, or a belief that 
there may be such shifts in the future, can prevent or delay 
financing for these investments. Along with market failures 
and the risk of government failure, this is one of the 
biggest barriers to investment. Some European countries, 
notably Spain, have dramatically reduced renewable 
energy support recently, sometimes retroactively. 
Investors are confronting the risk that policy changes will 
render some investments less profitable or even loss-
making. This policy risk is likely to reduce investments in 
renewable energy compared to what would otherwise be 
the case. It should be noted, however, that many of these 
European countries have faced extraordinary budgetary 
pressures in the wake of the financial crisis, and there is an 
argument that renewable energy developers should share 
some of the burden of austerity. 
Chapter 6: Finance explores in detail how governments 
and international finance institutions can take some share 
of the financial and regulatory risk of developing low-
carbon technologies. Such assistance can provide a signal 
of the government’s commitment to the policy: if the 
policy were reversed or failed to deliver, the public sector 
would stand to lose. Government-backed infrastructure 
banks and green investment banks have a particular 
role. As well as increasing a government’s financial 
commitment to the policy, such banks can develop 
dedicated expertise in clean infrastructure finance, 
something that is often lacking in the more traditional 
private finance sector. They can draw on strong networks 
to convene different coalitions and sources of finance. 
And their capital structure allows them to take a long-
term view. If they are combined with well-coordinated, 
clear and credible policies, and strong institutional 
governance, they can foster rapid change.123 
The degree to which 
populations embrace a shift 
from historical norms will 
depend on their expectations.
Government induced policy risk 
can prevent or delay financing for 
low-carbon investments. Along 
with market failures and the risk of 
government failure, this is one of the 
biggest barriers to investment.
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For some governments royalty payments, taxes, 
and other revenue streams from upstream oil and 
natural gas rents are a major source of income. This 
can represent as much as 90% of total government 
revenues in some oil-producing countries, such as  
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya. 126
In such countries, the structure of the economy and 
the government revenue base is highly dependent on 
continued fossil fuel production. Even in countries 
where fossil fuel revenues are much smaller, such as 
in Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, where they 
represent under 4% of total government revenues, 
there are often policies in place to actively discover and 
exploit new fossil fuel reserves. This is likely to increase 
dependence on this source of revenue.
Box 10
Carbon entanglement
For much of the world, now is a good time to support 
resource-efficient investment. There is no lack of private 
money seeking positive returns, with real, risk free 
interest rates at record lows, or even negative. There is, 
however, a perceived lack of opportunity, and developing 
a bankable pipeline of viable projects is always a challenge. 
The World Bank Energy Group is helping countries 
identify upstream renewable investment opportunities. 
With many economies forecast to operate below capacity 
for the foreseeable future,124  the potential to crowd-out 
alternative investment and employment is much smaller 
now than when the economy was operating close to full 
capacity.125  Clear and credible structural policies now 
could restore confidence and generate growth, and 
accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
4.4 Overcoming barriers to change 
Political economy and institutional barriers 
Political economy and institutional barriers prevent 
reforms and hamper efficient long-term decisions. 
Entrenched networks and technologies, as well as 
behaviours, institutions and lobbies work to resist change, 
even where it is in the economic interests of society. 
Powerful vested interests, with political influence, actively 
seek to prevent or delay these changes. Distributional 
impacts, a feature of any transition on this scale, create 
often vocal losers in the short-term, even when the long-
term aggregate impact of the transition is largely positive. 
So-called entanglement with the existing high-carbon 
economy, for example where governments derive a large 
share of their fiscal revenues from fossil fuels, can also 
stand in the way of reforms (Box 10).
These types of barriers have been present throughout 
history. In the case of low-carbon change, the losers are 
generally concentrated and well-defined, and include 
carbon intensive fossil fuel industries and particular 
entangled governments, while the beneficiaries 
are dispersed and unorganised or cannot yet easily 
understand the gains. This is particularly true given that 
most of the gains from climate action now will be to the 
benefit of future generations, in the avoidance of costly 
climate damage. 
In that this affects policy decisions it is the institutions 
and politics which are the key barriers to aligning 
expectations and embracing change. Many politicians and 
commentators have ruled out the most efficient market-
based policies, in particular explicit carbon pricing, based 
on judgments of what might be politically feasible, without 
those judgements being made explicit and their validity 
examined. Some of the underlying assumptions are being 
challenged, however, in countries that are forging ahead 
and learning how to compensate losers and manage 
existing vested interests effectively. Such lessons include 
designing transitory support with a pre-announced phase-
out to avoid creating a new class of vested interests. In the 
future, the barriers countries face today may be viewed 
in the same light as other reforms once perceived as 
politically impossible, such as public bans on smoking.
Behavioural psychology provides broad and high level 
lessons and ideas for how to overcome political economy 
barriers to change.127  A combination of the following may 
be needed, beyond evidence that this is good policy:
• Trusted leaders across society, including community 
leaders, Heads of Government and Ministers, 
and labour, military and religious leaders, telling a 
convincing story that appeals to the public intuition, 
thereby empowering and inspiring people to take 
action; 
• Key countries (and businesses) taking the lead and 
acting strongly, encouraging others to act through the 
power of example, with leaders recognising “moments 
of power”, where people are more willing to listen, 
consider the arguments, and commit; 
• Smaller communities, cities and regions setting  
strong examples and providing social proof for others, 
through experimentation, learning and discovery, 
of the benefits of more locally controlled networks 
for distributed energy, food production, waste 
management, transport coordination and stewardship 
of natural capital. Some relatively poor regions may  
turn out to be pioneers of this new, more  
ecological economy;128 
• Involvement and actions by key decision-makers who 
have a reputation for “getting things done”; 
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• Engagement of the young, including their power to 
pressure leaders to do more. Examples include the UN 
Major Group for Children and Youth; 
• Encouraging public discussion and reasoning on 
policy and standards of behaviour, including a better 
understanding of social and personal responsibility 
and values. This includes discussion on the multiple 
benefits of policy and transparency on the short-run 
adjustment costs and on our willingness to confront 
the challenges. 
• Social compacts between governments and 
community organisations, labour unions, civil society 
groups, to ensure an inclusive and just transition. 
Government liability risk, as insurer of last resort 
Overcoming barriers may require a greater awareness of 
the risk of the alternative from inaction or delay, including 
large contingent liabilities for governments. Private 
insurance covers only a fraction of the possible climate-
related or severe weather event losses. Governments 
would end up bearing the residual risk, as insurers of last 
resort. That residual risk is often hidden, but it is likely to 
grow, for example as homes and other infrastructure lose 
their value as a result of climate impacts including rising 
sea levels and more frequent floods and storms.  
There is a related risk that the long-run impacts of 
climate risk could hit government credit ratings in some 
countries. Downgrades are likely to manifest through 
lower economic growth, weaker external performance, 
and increased burdens on public finances. This is likely to 
be most damaging for low-income countries, particularly 
in Africa and Asia, in part because of their higher exposure 
to climate risk, and also because of their inherently more 
fragile credit ratings. A measure has been devised to 
assess potential sovereign vulnerability. The measure is 
composed of three variables: share of population living 
in coastal areas below 5 meters of altitude; the share of 
agriculture in national GDP; and a vulnerability index 
measuring susceptibility to adverse climate impacts, 
based on exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. 
The 10 most vulnerable nations are Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, Senegal, Mozambique, Fiji, Philippines, 
Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia.129 
A recent study attempted to quantify local and national 
US government costs from climate change.130  The 
“Risky Business Project” focused on the impacts of 
storm surges, heat waves and sea level rise on particular 
regions and sectors, such as agriculture in the Mid-West, 
and coastal infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico. One 
of the main conclusions was that climate change would 
put government budgets at risk, as the insurer of last 
resort, in the same way that countries were forced to 
use government balance sheets to bail out the banks in 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Illustrating the scale of 
potential risk, the report estimated that current trends 
in global greenhouse gas emissions would see stronger 
storms that could result in an additional US$2 billion to 
US$3.5 billion in property losses per year by 2030, along 
US eastern and Gulf coasts.
5. Better metrics and models for 
better macroeconomic management 
Better metrics and models are necessary to steer a low-
carbon transition. Regarding metrics, as is often stated, 
we cannot manage what we cannot measure. Regarding 
models, we cannot assess the likely impacts of what we 
struggle to predict. 
5.1 GDP is a limited measure of changes  
in welfare
There is a growing realisation that macro-economic 
statistics, such as those based on GDP, are useful but do 
not provide policy-makers with a sufficiently detailed 
picture of economic and societal well-being. For example, 
an overreliance on the GDP statistic can promote an 
excessive focus on increasing this measure, potentially at 
the expense of other important aspects of welfare  
and development. 
The GDP measure has advantages and disadvantages, 
here briefly described. 
GDP has merit as a key indicator of living standards. 
Shrinking GDP implies lower incomes, and possibly idle 
factories and rising unemployment. Furthermore, GDP 
is a well-known indicator and is consistently measured. It 
also correlates fairly well with many elements pertinent 
to social welfare such as happiness, poverty reduction, 
gender equality and social mobility. On the other hand, 
GDP is a measure only of the flow of production, income 
and expenditure, not the stock of assets or wealth. As a 
result, it will fail to register deterioration in a country’s 
natural resources. Furthermore, some services derived 
from these assets as flows are not adequately valued or 
priced, and so are not registered or are under-represented 
in the income accounts. Such flows include environmental 
goods and ecosystem services. Nevertheless, as relative 
prices change and appropriate policies such as carbon 
Overcoming barriers to low-
carbon change may require a 
greater awareness of the risk of 
the alternative from inaction or 
delay, including large contingent 
liabilities for governments.
193BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
S O
F
 C
H
A
N
G
E
pricing are implemented, the value of environmental 
services will begin to rise, increasing their price weight in 
the measure of real GDP. 
Even where market prices are absent, statistical agencies 
can value non-marketed activities and bring them 
formally within the national accounts. For example, until 
recently there were few direct estimates of the output 
of the public sector activities that were not generally 
sold on the market, including for example police output 
or education. As a proxy, inputs were used to estimate 
output, with no explicit measure of productivity change. 
Since then, statistical agencies have developed a range of 
measures from educational attainment, medical results 
and crime statistics, to capture public sector value. Similar 
improvements can be expected to evolve to measuring 
environmental services, and include these within GDP. 
However, GDP remains just one indicator among many 
attempting to quantify the variables that society cares 
about, and its limitations make it important to develop 
and use other, complementary indicators. A number of 
countries and organisations have been making progress 
in establishing a more representative set of indicators 
to measure progress, building on the recommendations 
made in 2009 by the Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress, also 
known as the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission. Those 
recommendations recognised that no informative 
assessment of welfare can be reduced to a single 
dimension. A practical and informative alternative would 
be to monitor several indicators, in addition to GDP. 
There are many suggestions on how to expand and 
improve the range of metrics for better decision-making. 
Some are being implemented. 
• Studies by the OECD have proposed broad 
frameworks of indicators, to assist decision-makers 
manage growth while at the same time considering 
social and environmental dimensions.131  
• The World Bank has developed an adjusted net 
savings (ANS) metric, which measures the net rate of 
saving after taking into account investments in human 
capital, depletion of natural resources and damages 
caused by pollution.132  The indicator provides an 
assessment of an economy’s sustainability based on 
the System of National Accounts (SNA), a framework 
finance ministries use on a regular basis.
• Countries have established through the United 
Nations a System of Environmental-Economic 
Accounting (SEEA), which contains internationally 
agreed concepts, definitions, classifications, and 
accounting rules for producing internationally 
comparable statistics on the environment and its 
relationship with the economy.133  A multi-year 
process to revise the SEEA is underway, with the 
participation of various international organisations. 
The first element, a Central Framework, was adopted 
by the UN Statistical Committee in 2012. 
• The US states of Vermont and Maryland have adopted 
the “genuine progress indicator” (GPI), an adjusted 
economic measure, to monitor welfare, and are using 
it to inform legislative and budgetary decisions.134  The 
GPI uses personal consumption expenditures, which is 
a measure of all spending by individuals, as its baseline 
and makes more than 20 additions and subtractions 
to account for factors such as the value of volunteer 
work, and the costs of divorce, crime and pollution.135  
The choice of metrics needs to reflect the specific 
demands of decision-makers. In the case of change over 
the coming decades, various specific indicators will be 
needed to allow decision-makers to evaluate progress 
in transitioning toward a low-carbon economy. For 
example, an indicator such as environmental tax revenue 
as a share of GDP could be useful to monitor progress 
in internalising environmental externalities.136  A list 
of specific indicators could span carbon and energy 
intensity, share of renewables, pollution and environment 
indicators, as well as economic indicators linked to low-
carbon policies, to provide a comprehensive picture. 
Some countries are starting to measure natural capital. 
England’s Natural Capital Committee (NCC) is tasked 
with advising on how to integrate natural capital into the 
English economy and the UK Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) has released some preliminary work valuing part 
of the UK’s natural capital assets.137  The valuation of 
natural capital in government accounts would enable a 
more comprehensive assessment of the total wealth of 
a country, and better identify where policy is needed to 
improve the quality and quantity of natural capital.138  In 
parallel, better measures of exposure to climate and other 
environmental risks are also needed, covering intrinsic 
vulnerability, system resilience, and contingent liabilities 
affecting the public balance sheet.
The private sector can also be involved, through the 
development of corporate natural capital accounts that 
document an organisation’s ownership and extended 
Macro-economic statistics, such as 
those based on GDP, are useful but 
do not provide policy-makers with 
a sufficiently detailed picture of 
economic and societal well-being.
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reliance on natural capital, together with related assets 
and liabilities. This would allow for a more comprehensive 
assessment of the value of corporate assets and enable 
better management of business operations.139  
The financial statements produced by firms also fail to 
provide all the information investors need so they can 
assess risks and opportunities and allocate their capital 
efficiently. For example, there is no standardised system 
of sustainability accounting that provides an interested 
investor with reliable information on an automobile 
company’s investments in fuel efficiency and electric 
vehicles. This is not disclosed in a standardised way, 
and may not be disclosed at all.140  Cities face a similar 
but currently much greater problem, given the lack 
of standardised accounting frameworks to measure 
economic and environmental impacts at the urban level. 
5.2 Economic modelling can significantly  
undervalue the net benefits of climate action 
Researchers working in academia, policy institutes, and 
Finance Ministries use a range of economic models to 
provide economic forecasts, and to simulate the effects 
of policy or other developments. Relevant questions that 
they seek answers to include, how would the economy 
change if a policy was introduced, relative to some 
counter-factual, for example with the introduction of a 
carbon price? Or how might the economy respond to an 
energy price spike?
There are many different types of applied economic 
models with different strengths and weaknesses. Applied 
economic models are essentially simplified frameworks 
to describe the workings of an economy. They are 
an essential tool to help us formulate, examine and 
understand interactive relationships. 
Economic modelling can help to shed light on what types 
of policy measures are likely to be lower cost, or more 
effective. Cross-model comparison exercises such as 
those undertaken for the 5th Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), or 
through Stanford University’s Energy Modelling Forum, 
can provide insights about, for example, the driving forces 
behind different cost estimates of climate change policies, 
as well as about the range and nature of the uncertainties 
involved. However, economic models also have a number 
of limitations, and when used inappropriately or without a 
proper understanding of their assumptions and relevant 
caveats, can lead to poorly informed policy decisions.
Climate modelling involves the use of Integrated 
Assessment Models (IAMs). They are “integrated” 
because they bring together science (climate and impact) 
and economics models. In this way their aim is to utilise 
information from diverse fields of study including 
climate science, economics and technology in order to 
assess the impact of actions such as policies on human 
welfare through time. But there is no rigid specification 
for an IAM; the term describes a whole array of diverse 
heterogeneous models developed by different groups in 
different ways that try and capture features pertinent to 
the climate story. Increasingly, decision-makers are turning 
to IAMs to inform options for tackling climate change. 
Two main kinds of economic models have traditionally 
been deployed in IAMs when they are used to assess 
the impact of energy and environment polices on the 
economy. These are commonly referred to as “top-down” 
and “bottom-up” economic models. More recently, a 
number of “hybrid” models have also been developed, 
combining features from top-down and bottom-up models. 
Most economic models used in IAMs have reduced form 
equations to characterise the drivers of key variables such 
as greenhouse gas emissions, global mean temperatures, 
the damages caused by temperature changes and their 
impact on social welfare, as well as the costs of  
abating emissions.
Bottom-up models contain a detailed, technological 
treatment of the energy system. The models aim to 
minimise the costs of a policy goal by choosing the 
cheapest technologies to meet final energy demand for a 
given level of energy services under certain greenhouse 
gas emissions constraints. They do not contain a 
behavioural component, and often ignore partial as well as 
general equilibrium costs and trade effects. 
Top down models attempt to characterise overall 
economic activity by applying a theoretically consistent 
description of the general economy. Because they try 
to represent the entire economy, by simulating selected 
representative households and the production and sale 
of goods and services, they are by necessity less detailed 
than bottom-up models when it comes to individual 
components, and tend to aggregate technologies into 
a simple production function. Three types of top-down 
models dominate estimates of climate policy costs: 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models; macro-
econometric models; and neoclassical growth models, 
including so-called overlapping generation models. 
They all provide simplifications of reality by condensing 
complex relationships into a few equations that are easily 
Economic models have a 
number of limitations, and when 
used inappropriately or without 
a proper understanding of 
their assumptions and relevant 
caveats, can lead to poorly 
informed policy decisions.
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understood and manipulated. This helps simulate key 
relationships, but means they often miss the full array of 
dynamic substitution options available in the transition to 
a low-carbon economy.141  
Most CGE models start from the assumption of an 
economy where resources are already efficiently allocated, 
for the good reason that it is not easy to model properly 
the real and dynamic world of multiple imperfections and 
numerous market failures. The effects of policy reforms 
are thus judged against the assumed starting point of an 
efficient economy. Such results, while interesting, need 
to be used cautiously as a guide to policy when one is 
judging the results of reform versus non-reform in a highly 
imperfect and inefficient world. 
Such shortcomings have been examined, regarding the 
use of UK Treasury’s CGE model to assess the short-run 
cost of UK climate policies. This analysis illustrated the 
limiting assumptions of the model. It showed that including 
the values of health benefits from reduced air pollution 
and the value of carbon emissions that are not traded in 
the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), would 
reverse the model results - the benefits of the policy would 
exceed the costs.142 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the most recent 
modelling, highlighted in the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 5th Assessment Report, finds the 
economic costs from taking ambitious climate action 
consistent with a 2°C path are in the order of 1-4% of 
global GDP (median: 1.7%) in 2030, relative to a baseline 
without climate policy.143  GDP costs of this magnitude 
look like “background noise” when compared with the 
strong underlying growth that the global economy is likely 
to experience. For example, the next 15 years could see 
the size of the global economy increase by around 50%. 
And when the benefits of acting are factored in, including 
variables such as better local air quality, the net costs are 
likely to fall further. 
While the costs of climate action are small, they will 
vary by country. They are also likely to rise sharply with 
delay. If global action to reduce emissions is delayed until 
2030, global CO
2
 emissions would have to decrease by 
6-7% per year between 2030 and 2050 in order to have 
a reasonable chance of staying on a 2°C path.144  Such 
rates of reduction are unprecedented historically and 
are likely to be expensive (estimates of delay suggest 
an average annual consumption growth loss of around 
0.3% in the decade 2030 to 2040, compared to a 
loss of less than 0.1% over the same period if we act 
now).145  In addition, many of the modelling scenarios 
assume the immediate implementation of an efficient, 
globally co-ordinated policy response, for example they 
assume a uniform global carbon price is implemented 
simultaneously across all countries and all technologies 
specified in the model assumptions are available. Delay 
in immediate implementation of a single global carbon 
price or technology constraints raises the economic 
costs, as does misguided, inconsistent or poorly designed 
policy, including poor coordination with the wider policy 
framework for managing change. In contrast, providing a 
clear, well-coordinated and early policy-direction can help 
build investor confidence and encourage innovation, which 
should bring economic costs down in the long-run. 
A number of recent modelling efforts have started to make 
progress in better reflecting the benefits of climate action, 
including the multiple benefits of reduced air pollution 
and related health costs, which are usually ignored in such 
modelling. Others have made progress in recent years in 
better modelling endogenous technical change, a critical 
factor in understanding the potential economic growth 
and greenhouse gas impacts of long-term climate policies. 
But significant data limitations and technical challenges 
remain (Box 11).
As further progress is made to improve and enhance the 
modelling frameworks, they will be able to capture better 
the net economic benefits of efficient and ambitious 
climate action. Even so, no single model will ever tell the 
full story of how an economy could transition dynamically 
to a low-carbon economy. These models adjust at the 
margins based on our current understanding of the 
economy. As a result they tend to over-estimate costs. 
Ex post analysis of the costs of environmental policies 
tend to find that they are significantly cheaper than ex 
ante analyses suggest, because models fail to capture the 
broad range of innovations in technologies, behaviours 
and institutions that may occur as a result of strong and 
coherent policies. Models therefore need to be seen 
as just one input to inform analyses and discussions 
about policy reforms; they do not constitute a fully 
comprehensive assessment. 
5.3 The history of change
Quantitative models are one part of the tool-kit required 
to understand the relationship between growth and 
climate policy. History can also help to better understand 
the long-run transformation story described in this 
chapter and report, providing valuable insights on 
Notwithstanding the limitations 
of models, GDP costs of climate 
action look like “background 
noise” when compared with the 
strong underlying growth that 
the global economy is likely to 
experience over the 
coming 15 years.
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managing change. We have the advantage of learning 
from several transformations since the industrial 
revolution,152  including the current information and 
communications technology (ICT) revolution, and there is 
a rich Schumpeterian tradition of analysis on medium- to 
long-run technological transformations.153  This tradition 
argues that capitalism develops through innovations by 
entrepreneurs, namely, the creation of new production 
technologies, new products and new markets, with new 
and innovative firms and progressive ideas displacing 
existing firms and ideas from the previous period.154  
Box 12 provides an informative neo-Schumpeterian 
interpretation offered by Carlota Perez, a member of the 
Global Commission’s Economics Advisory Panel (EAP). 
Today the world is likely to be mid-way along an economic 
transformation driven by the ICT revolution, blending 
digitisation with distributed energy and more circular 
business models. 
As described in Chapter 7: Innovation, the present 
ICT transformation has significant implications for the 
shape of future economic growth and development, 
and for opportunities to tackle climate change. This is of 
profound significance for all countries, in particular for 
emerging nations such as China, which is keenly aware of 
There is an extensive literature on modelling the costs of 
policy action and the avoided damage costs from reduced 
climate impacts, most notably the quantification of costs 
and benefits of policy action outlined in the 2007 Stern 
Review.146  Much less has been done to analyse how climate 
impacts and mitigation might affect economic growth in 
specific sectors. 
Regarding climate risks, difficulties encountered when 
integrating an appropriate assessment of impacts into 
economic models include continued uncertainty regarding 
the magnitude of and probability distribution of climate 
impacts, especially at the regional level, and challenges in 
converting the impacts to monetary values. The traditional 
approach of valuing static damages from climate change 
fails to account for the impacts of these damages on the 
drivers of future economic growth. For simplicity, growth 
is usually, and implausibly, assumed to carry on at some 
predetermined baseline rate. This leads standard modelling 
to systematically underestimate the case for urgent 
action.147  A recent study found that reflecting some of 
the potential impacts of climate change in a dynamic CGE 
model incurred global GDP losses (damages) of 0.7% to 
2.5% by 2060, and with much larger sectoral and  regional 
variations.148  
Regarding the net costs of mitigation, another set of 
challenges emerge. One problem is that many standard 
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) do not adequately 
model the drivers of innovation.149  Many recent climate 
economic models have attempted to incorporate 
innovation.150  However, these models usually treat 
innovation as an economy-wide, aggregate phenomenon 
rather than firm-level and sector-specific process with 
complex spillovers and interactions across sectors, 
Box 11
Challenges and progress in modelling the net economic benefits of climate action.
institutions and behaviours. These could lead to a 
number of complementarities and scale economies which 
enhance the low-carbon impact of innovation. Hence, 
predictions of IAMs are biased towards innovations that 
seem more likely from the point of view of today, thus 
underestimating their likely impact on costs.  
Properly accounting for path dependencies makes early 
intervention in the innovation system more desirable, 
even under the higher discount rate assumptions made by 
some economists. This is because if we delay intervention, 
then as time progresses, conventional technologies will 
become more entrenched and making a low-carbon 
transition more expensive. Inadequate modelling of 
innovation has the potential to significantly over-estimate 
the cost of future low-carbon technologies. See the 
discussion in Chapter 4: Energy on the underestimation of 
the recent large declines in renewable energy costs.
The empirical literature on how changes in climate 
variables affect economic activity is slowly growing, and 
will help further improve future modelling exercises. The 
OECD is presently undertaking a multi-year exercise 
to incorporate climate change and environmental 
degradation including air pollution, water scarcity 
and biodiversity loss into an in-house dynamic CGE 
model. The aim of the CIRCLE project (Cost of Inaction 
and Resource Scarcity; Consequences for Long-
term Economic Growth) is to identify the impacts of 
environmental degradation and resource scarcity on long-
term economic growth. The adjusted baseline projections 
for GDP, reflecting the impacts of climate damage, have 
been already included in the OECD@100 project, which 
informs the OECD Economic Department  
growth projections.151
Overcoming barriers to low-
carbon change may require a 
greater awareness of the risk of 
the alternative from inaction or 
delay, including large contingent 
liabilities for governments.
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In the middle of the depression in the 1930s it 
was difficult to recognise the vast range of viable 
innovations connected with plastics, energy intensive 
materials, energy using devices and the new mass 
production methods that were capable of creating 
a consumerist way of life that could fuel economic 
expansion for decades. Today an equivalent, perhaps 
even greater, technological potential resulting 
from advances in information and communications 
technology (ICT) is yet to be unleashed and its 
consequences are equally difficult to prefigure. The 
potential of ICT to transform industries and activities 
has barely been realised.
Historically, every technological revolution has led to 
a radical change in consumption patterns, reflecting 
the range of products shaped by new technologies. 
However, as with every other aspect of paradigm shifts 
brought by each technological revolution, the processes 
of change are slow and uneven and only intensify when 
society in general assimilates the new possibilities 
and gives a clear impulse to the transformation. What 
is lacking today is a policy direction that will tilt the 
playing field, in a manner similar to the way in which 
policy for suburbanisation did in the post-war boom. 
It is not easy to steer such change. It requires deep 
understanding and bold leadership. Both businesses 
and politicians need to be persuaded that it is in 
everybody’s interest — medium and long-term — to 
build a new positive-sum game. It was not any easier 
to set up the conditions for the flourishing of the 
previous mass production, suburban revolution. But 
measures taken then, such as public roads, mortgage 
guarantees, subsidies, new taxes, official labour unions, 
expansion of public services, incomes policies and 
unemployment security, created the demand conditions 
for mass consumption as well as for tax-funded military 
innovation. Structural change in a low-carbon direction 
globally needs systematically important countries to 
take policy action that tilts the playing field decisively. 
With clear, credible and stable policies stimulating 
energy and resource saving, a massive wave of mutually 
reinforcing low-carbon innovations driven by ICT 
could be stimulated across all industries. Unleashing 
the transformative power of ICT to bring a sustainable 
global boom could do for the world population what the 
post-war golden age did for Western democracies.
Box 12
Lessons from economic history: 
a neo-Schumpeterian view
6. Concluding remarks and 
recommendations
This is a story about embracing and managing the next 
transformation of the world economy, in a way that both 
fosters growth and development, and reduces the risk of 
dangerous climate change by reducing greenhouse  
gas emissions. 
Achieving this outcome will require policy and institutional 
reforms to tackle market failures, particularly around 
greenhouse gases and innovation, align expectations and 
drive a more efficient and productive economy. 
In the past, countries that have overcome the barriers 
and political constraints to implement clear and credible 
structural reform policy have outperformed those that 
resisted or failed to embrace change. The framework 
presented here is in the economic interests of countries 
seeking to prosper over the coming decades. 
The Commission accordingly makes the following 
recommendations: 
• National, sub-national and city governments, 
businesses, investors, financial institutions and 
civil society organisations should integrate this 
framework for change and climate risk into their 
core economic strategies and decision-making 
processes. This includes decision-making tools 
and practices, such as economic and business 
models, policy and project assessment methods, 
performance indicators, and reporting requirements.
• Governments should design clear, credible and 
well-coordinated reform packages centred on fiscal 
reform, including carbon pricing and subsidy reform, 
to align expectations and send signals throughout 
the economy on the direction of change. 
More specifically, the Commission recommends that 
countries:
• Develop comprehensive plans for phasing out 
existing fossil fuel subsidies, essentially negative 
carbon prices. These should include enhanced 
transparency and communication and targeted 
support for poor people and affected workers. 
Developed countries could accelerate efforts to 
remove subsidies to fossil fuel exploration and 
production. Developing countries could explore 
innovative approaches with multilateral and 
national development banks on how to finance 
the up-front costs of reducing adverse effects on 
low-income households. Governments should 
build trust in the reforms by enhancing the 
delivery of services while subsidies are being 
phased out.
this moment in history, is thinking systematically about 
engineering a low-carbon transition, and is starting to 
reflect this objective clearly through its 5-year plans and 
other institutional mechanisms.
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• Apply a clear and credible carbon price signal 
across the economy. 
• Where political pressures for certain countries 
or sectors demand a lower price initially, ideally 
implement a predictable price escalator.
• Revenues from carbon pricing should be 
recycled to productive uses, for example cutting 
distortionary or poorly structured taxes. A share 
of the revenues should be prioritised to offset 
impacts on low-income households. 
• Regulations, standards, “feebates”, and other 
approaches should be used to complement 
carbon pricing. These can also help foster low-
carbon change in countries for which even 
a low level of carbon pricing is politically or 
institutionally difficult, preferably with flexibility 
built in to facilitate the introduction of carbon 
pricing later.
• Governments should plan to put initial policies in 
place over the coming 5-10 years, and increase 
their ambition and efficiency as quickly as possible 
thereafter. The exact package of policies used in any 
country will need to reflect its specific realities  
and context.
• Major companies worldwide should apply a 
“shadow” carbon price to their investment decisions 
and look to cascade this shadow price through their 
supply chains.
• Countries should recognise and tackle the social 
and economic costs of the transition. Change on 
this scale will require policy to ease adjustment for 
vulnerable workers; in particular enhancing their 
ability to participate in faster-growing low-carbon 
sectors. 
• Together with technical support from public 
international institutions such as the OECD, the 
World Bank and the IMF, national governments 
should accelerate the deployment of metrics and 
models that provide a more comprehensive, reliable 
analysis of potential climate risks to natural and 
societal capital, as well as the costs and benefits of 
climate action. 
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Chapter 6
FINANCE
Main points
• Maintaining or strengthening economic growth to 2030 will require a significant increase in investment, including an 
estimated cumulative US$89 trillion of investment in infrastructure. A shift to low-carbon infrastructure will have an 
additional impact, changing both the timing and mix of infrastructure investment. A low-carbon transition across the 
entire economy could be achieved with only 5% more upfront investment from 2015-2030. 
• From a broader financial perspective, the global economy could create value from the transition to low-carbon 
energy. Low-carbon infrastructure has significantly lower operating expenses and a longer expected lifespan than 
fossil fuel assets. Low-carbon infrastructure also has the potential to achieve lower costs of capital. 
• We estimate that the full investment impact of a low-carbon transition in the electricity sector would be a net 
financial benefit of up to US$1.8 trillion over the period 2015-2035. This accounts for all investment impacts 
including stranded asset costs, and refers to a transition to a 2°C scenario from “business as usual”. 
• A global low-carbon transition will lead to a decline in value of some fossil fuel assets, or “stranding”. Clear 
policy signals can reduce this value destruction by discouraging new investment in fossil fuels that would be 
at risk of stranding. 
• The potential stranding of investment in the coal sector is less than for oil and gas, because coal produces less 
economic value per tonne of CO
2
 emitted, and there is comparatively less sunk investment in coal production, 
including coal-fired power plants. Over the next 20 years, reducing the use of coal can achieve 80% of the required 
energy-sector emissions reductions at only 12% of the total potential stranded asset cost, supporting a focus on coal 
in climate policy. 
• There is sufficient capital available to finance a low-carbon transition. Accessing this capital will require the right 
long-term policies, however, including carbon pricing and regulation. Significant, near-term opportunities can 
reduce the costs of finance by up to 20% for low-carbon energy in all countries through a mix of financial innovation, 
greater use of national development banks and concessional debt, and increased development capital flows into 
low-income countries.
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1. Introduction 
Transitioning from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy 
will require significant investment by all sectors of society. 
Industries, land owners and households will invest to 
improve efficiency. Energy producers will invest in low-
carbon generation. Additionally, governments will invest in 
infrastructure to protect their nations against the long-
term effects of climate change and to knit all of this new 
investment into a well-functioning, low-carbon economy. 
Governments will play a dual role. First, they will invest 
directly in infrastructure to ensure an ordered transition 
to a well-functioning, low-carbon economy. Second, they 
will influence the direction of private finance through 
regulation, incentives and other policy measures. This 
chapter touches on both forms of government action, 
but focuses on the role of governments in shaping and 
motivating private finance. 
Much of the needed investment in low-carbon 
infrastructure can be handled through existing structures 
and mechanisms, with the help of effective policy, 
regulation and market signals. Energy efficiency is an 
example where value is already created within the 
existing commercial environment for consumers and 
businesses, providing cash flows that can make these 
investments attractive. 
Other investment requirements will need more 
intervention. In these cases, creating new, efficient finance 
structures and directing finance into these new industries 
becomes more challenging and may require dedicated 
policy to initiate and continue the transition. Energy 
supply is an important example, as the energy sector 
accounts for around two-thirds of global greenhouse 
gas emissions.A low-carbon transition in energy supply 
requires the highest near-term financing, and some of 
the most significant changes in financial and industry 
structures.
The good news is that between public and private sources, 
there is sufficient capital available globally to finance 
an energy transition. Many new industries and market 
structures are already emerging in both the developed 
and developing world. However, current industry and 
financial structures often allocate capital inefficiently, 
with risk, reward and geographic preferences that do not 
match well with an effective low-carbon energy transition. 
Some investors express concern that the transition will be 
unaffordable or will require capital that is not available. 
Others fear coal, oil and natural gas assets will suffer. 
The Commission has taken these concerns seriously and 
recognises that innovation in the financial sector will be 
as critical to the transition as innovation in the urban, land 
use and energy sectors. 
This chapter focuses on financing in the energy sector, 
given risk-return characteristics which are likely to see the 
most significant changes over the next decade. It begins by 
presenting estimates of the overall need for infrastructure 
investment between 2015 and 2030. Next, it discusses 
how to develop financing instruments and models which 
significantly cut the cost of investing in low-carbon 
energy assets, separately for high-income, middle-income, 
and low-income countries. Then it presents the likely 
additional investment and financial costs of an overall 
system shift to a low-carbon model that reduces the 
risk of dangerous climate change. Finally, it outlines how 
governments and private investors can minimise the risk 
of destroying the economic value, or “stranding”, of fossil 
assets during the transition. 
The chapter should not be viewed in isolation from the 
rest of the report. The focus here is the transition to a 
low-carbon energy system, with particular emphasis on 
investment in renewable energy. There are many other 
aspects of the low-carbon financing agenda which are 
touched upon throughout the report as a whole. Chapter 
2: Cities describes some of the key instruments that will 
be needed to strengthen capital mobilisation at the city 
level, for investment in smarter infrastructure. Chapter 
3: Land Use describes the forms of finance that will be 
needed to support tropical forest protection in the context 
of measures to increase overall capital mobilisation 
in developing country agriculture. Chapter 4: Energy 
addresses the challenge of mobilising capital for the more 
than one billion people who lack access to modern energy 
services. Chapter 5: Economics of Change considers the 
institutional and policy frameworks for mobilising the 
necessary capital. Chapter 7: Innovation more specifically 
addresses the funding of research and development and 
the early-stage, low-carbon innovation pipeline.
2. Overall infrastructure  
financing requirements
2.1 Infrastructure investment and  
global growth
The global economy will require substantial investments in 
infrastructure as the population and the middle class grow. 
An estimated US$89 trillion of infrastructure investment 
will be required through 2030, based on data from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and 
analysis for the Commission (see Figure 1). This is chiefly 
The good news is that between 
public and private sources there is 
sufficient capital available globally 
to finance an energy transition.
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investment in energy and cities. This estimate for the 
required investment is before accounting for actions to 
combat climate change. 
A significant shift in the composition of these 
infrastructure investments will be needed to move to a 
pathway consistent with a good chance of keeping global 
average warming below 2°C. This includes increased 
investments in energy efficiency, and the deployment 
of low-carbon technologies. Improvement in efficiency 
of energy end-use sectors such as buildings, industry 
and transport could alone account for an additional 
US$8.8 trillion of incremental investment according to 
the analysis presented here (see Figure 1). Investment 
for the deployment of low-carbon technologies 
including renewables, nuclear and carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) could lead to an additional investment of 
US$4.7 trillion. 
At the same time, however, a low-carbon scenario could 
potentially also lead to savings in several components 
of infrastructure investment. Savings of US$2 trillion to 
2030 are estimated from reduced investment in fossil fuel 
power plants in a low-carbon scenario. Reduced demand 
for fossil fuels could potentially also lead to further savings 
of US$3.7 trillion along the supply chain of fossil fuels.
This includes reduced investment in the exploration and 
transport of fossil fuels. 
Another source of savings could be from reduced 
investment in electricity transmission and distribution, 
by an estimated US$0.3 trillion, as a result of greater 
energy efficiency and thus less demand for energy. The 
IEA projects that the savings from energy efficiency will 
outweigh the additional investment in the electricity 
grid needed to integrate intermittent renewable energy 
sources. Finally, the construction of more compact, 
connected cities, in an effort to reduce emissions, pollution 
and congestion and to rejuvenate the urban core, has the 
potential to reduce the overall infrastructure requirement 
for roads, telecommunications, water and waste 
treatment. Our estimates suggest that these savings could 
be worth cumulatively up to US$3.4 trillion by 2030. 
Figure 1 understates the scale of the transition that would 
occur in such an economic transformation, as investments 
shift from higher- to lower -carbon. 
Overall, the net incremental infrastructure investment 
needs from a low-carbon transition could be just US$4.1 
trillion, if these investments are done well. In this case, 
the infrastructure capital spent in a low-carbon economy 
would be 5% higher compared to a business-as-usual 
scenario of high-carbon growth. Given the additional 
infrastructure investments that would likely be needed 
under business as usual, to adapt to the impacts of 
climate change which are not included here, it is possible 
that investments in infrastructure in a low-carbon 
economy may be about the same as those in a high-
carbon one. Other studies have suggested that, if done 
well, investment in low-carbon infrastructure could be 
even lower, given some of the potential synergies in 
fuel and infrastructure savings, for example in cities, 
indicated above.1   
Financial considerations other than upfront investment, 
such as lower operational expenditures from low-carbon 
energy, were not included in this comparison exercise. 
Including them would make the low-carbon scenario even 
more favourable in terms of overall costs, leading to net 
savings of US$1 trillion. Section 4 of this chapter provides 
an in-depth consideration of wider financial impacts of a 
low-carbon transition in the energy sector.
Given the uncertainties in projecting out to the future, 
these estimates are directional estimates, designed to 
provide orders of magnitude rather than precise figures. 
In addition, not all relevant infrastructure components 
and financial aspects were included in the comparison 
of the two scenarios. For example, the total investment 
needs for building infrastructure are not included in 
Figure 1, although the incremental costs of increased 
energy efficiency in buildings are reflected in the low-
carbon scenario. Global construction spending on 
buildings in 2010 has been estimated to be on the order of 
US$5.4 trillion (in constant 2005 US$).2 
2.2 Financing a low-carbon energy transition
The energy sector is the backbone of the global economy. 
Investment in energy and related infrastructure will 
be important to support economic growth, whether or 
not nations transition to low-carbon economies. From 
a climate change perspective, the sector acquires even 
more importance, because reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from the energy sector is crucial to reducing 
the risk of dangerous climate change. Energy supply and 
consumption represent approximately two-thirds of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.4  
Overall, the net incremental 
infrastructure investment needs 
from a low-carbon transition could 
be  just US$4.1 trillion, if these 
investments are done well. Including full, longer-term impacts 
on investment under a low-carbon 
transition make such an outcome 
even more favourable, leading to 
net savings of US$1 trillion.
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Figure 1
Infrastructure capital spend is 1% lower in a low-carbon scenario
3. Financing the electricity sector 
over the next five to 10 years
3.1 Power generation infrastructure
Since the beginning of the 20th century, electricity 
financing has been characterised by the need to create 
scale and efficiency. Large-scale capital was provided 
by the public sector or through investors in regulated 
companies under a de facto government guarantee. As 
the industry grew, the quest for the lower costs that scale 
could deliver led to large, integrated, monopoly providers. 
These integrated utilities capitalised on lower costs 
achieved through scale across a network that connected 
generation, transmission, distribution and end users, 
relying on whatever was the cheapest energy source – 
fossil fuels or hydropower – available in their region. 
A revolution in electricity system design began in the 
1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s, as governments and regulators 
saw the benefits of scale begin to taper off, and sought 
to increase innovation and flexibility and reduce the 
inefficiencies of what had become a large and monolithic 
However, the transition to low carbon need not add 
substantially to the required energy investment. One 
way to illustrate the scale of the task to shift to a low-
carbon energy economy is to measure investment as a 
proportion of fixed capital formation. The latter is a proxy 
for total investment across the economy.5 IEA estimates 
of infrastructure investment suggest that a transition 
to a low-carbon economy would increase global energy 
investment from 9% to 12% of fixed capital formation.6 
Alternatively, this can be viewed as a shift in investment 
equivalent to less than 0.5% of gross domestic product 
(GDP), arguably a small shift given the scale of the risk and 
challenge at hand. 
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sector. In 1978, the US Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act 
(PURPA) sought to promote energy efficiency and bring 
in non-utility generators and cogeneration in response 
to the oil crisis. 
Over the following years, many countries and regions 
developed independent power producers (IPPs), 
competitive short-term energy markets, privatisation, 
innovative regulatory systems and innovative risk 
sharing and financing schemes to enhance incentives for 
generators and utilities to improve efficiency and lower 
costs. New generators appeared, in some cases costs 
fell, and new investors entered the market and corporate 
structures shifted, sometimes beyond recognition. 
However, whether governments chose to introduce 
competition or remain mostly regulated, in most regions 
both the market and operating systems were, and are, 
still largely based around large-scale, mainly fossil fuel-
powered, generation. 
Finance for low-carbon energy continues to evolve
Within the electricity system transition, more can be 
done in all countries to increase low-carbon investment. 
There are several areas with potentially large investment 
requirements, but in the near-term, each of these have 
very different policy and financing needs:
• Energy efficiency: Improving the efficiency of energy 
use and production is an important element of nearly 
every plan to achieve a low-carbon system. According 
to estimates outlined in Figure 1, achieving a 2°C 
pathway will require US$8.8 trillion in incremental 
investment in energy efficiency between 2015 
and 2030, in areas like buildings, energy-intensive 
industry and transport. Financial incentives and 
loan programmes can be useful as a policy tool to 
accelerate investment in energy efficiency (see Box 3). 
However, the lack or high cost of finance are not the 
only impediments to most efficiency improvements. 
Demand for energy efficiency is constrained by other 
factors, including lack of information, transaction 
costs, agency problems, mispricing and a host of other 
barriers discussed in the energy efficiency literature. 
Energy efficiency investments also tend to be 
intimately wrapped into the operations of a business 
or household, and therefore are often difficult to 
finance independently of financing to the household 
or business in question. 
• Carbon capture and storage (CCS): Removing the 
CO
2
 from the exhaust gases of fossil fuel fired power 
plants can be an important strategy for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector. As 
discussed in Chapter 4: Energy, there were 21 large-
scale CCS projects in operation or under construction 
around the world as of February 2014. However, 
since the technology is currently more expensive 
than other technologies examined here, the financing 
policy challenges are not explored in this chapter. 
For the purposes of the next 5–10 years, financing 
of CCS is likely to be dependent upon research 
and public support schemes and therefore more of 
an issue for innovation, energy and climate policy 
than financing policy. 
• Nuclear energy: Like CCS, nuclear energy 
development will likely depend on public support 
mechanisms in many countries. In addition, however, 
nuclear energy could benefit substantially from 
many of the financing and industry structure 
arrangements to be discussed below with respect to 
renewable energy.
• Transmission and distribution: As natural monopolies, 
transmission and distribution is generally owned 
and operated by regulated or government-owned 
companies. While the specific assets requiring 
investment, and even the business models employed, 
may shift substantially in a low-carbon transition, total 
investment will be slightly less than under a business-
as-usual scenario. For instance, increased investment 
to connect new renewable sources will be offset 
by the impact of energy efficiency and distributed 
generation in reducing demand for centrally 
generated electricity. Thus, with appropriate system 
policy and design, current financing arrangements 
could work adequately for the near-term transition.
• Other associated infrastructure, including energy 
storage, information technology and advanced 
metering: The transition will require continued 
innovation across several technology areas, 
particularly on the demand side. In the near term, 
these are areas for continued innovation, as briefly 
discussed in Chapter 7: Innovation.
• Maintaining conventional generation during the 
transition: In many countries, the transition will 
involve phasing out the building of new coal- and 
gas-fired generation, and could reduce life extensions 
for many existing plants. Nevertheless, conventional 
generation will be needed for many years to support 
the transition: to provide ongoing energy to meet 
This can be viewed as a shift  
in investment equivalent to less 
than 0.5% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), arguably a small 
shift given the scale of the risk and 
challenge at hand.
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the demands of the economy; balance variable 
renewable power; and reduce the overall economic 
cost of a transition. In developing economies, some 
new conventional generation will be needed alongside 
low-carbon generation to support continued rapid 
economic growth. Thus, while investment needs for 
fossil fuel generation will decline, there will still be 
a need to ensure that this generation is financially 
viable. In developed countries, new capacity markets 
can value the flexibility and support that conventional 
generation offers, making these assets viable even 
at reduced output levels.7 Further consideration 
will need to be given to the integrated utilities that 
may lose value in the transition, and find it difficult 
to support the required growth in transmission or 
distribution businesses. 
The main, near-term financing concern lies in the growth 
of renewable energy investment and, to a lesser extent, 
nuclear energy. While costs were relatively high and 
falling, it made sense to finance and operate renewable 
energy sources, such as wind and solar, through existing 
corporate and financial structures, minimising industry 
disruption while concentrating on cost reduction and 
initial deployment. Today in some markets, the average 
cost of energy from many renewable energy sources is 
approaching that of new conventional generation, when 
levelised over the life of a new energy project, as detailed 
in Chapter 4: Energy. In some cases, the cost of renewable 
energy is lower than for conventional generation. 
With lower costs, a faster, larger scale roll out is more 
feasible and attractive, but the arrangements that helped 
when deployment was relatively small are inefficient at 
a larger scale. 
The principal challenge many countries now face in 
financing low-carbon energy is therefore to reduce the 
cost of investment in low-carbon energy assets, and 
to identify mismatches between investor and finance 
needs. Solutions to these challenges are discussed in the 
following section.
3.2 New finance approaches for high-income 
countries
The utility companies and independent power producers 
that currently build and finance most power plants in 
high-income countries have developed their corporate and 
finance structures around fossil fuel generation. These 
structures are inappropriate for renewable energy for a 
number of reasons:
• Renewable energy has no intrinsic fuel price risk  
as fossil fuels do. In current markets wholesale 
electricity prices fluctuate with fossil fuel prices. This 
imposes fossil fuel price risk on renewable energy 
either directly through wholesale power markets, 
or more often through the investment return 
requirements of regulated or unregulated power 
producers whose business models are built on  
earning a premium to manage these risks. Fossil fuel 
price uncertainty thus raises risk, uncertainty and 
finance costs;
• Variable renewable energy such as wind power is not 
dispatchable (its quantity and timing cannot be easily 
controlled), but utilities must ensure reliability of the 
electric grid, and in competitive electricity markets 
will expect a premium to manage this variability. Such 
a premium translates into higher costs associated with 
renewable energy generation;
• The initial investment is a higher proportion of total 
costs for renewable energy than fossil fuel energy, 
making the finance costs that spread these initial  
costs over the life of the renewable energy plant  
much more important.
Many of these differences can be, and are, handled 
through policy. Feed-in tariffs (FiTs) or fixed price 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) can eliminate the 
price risk that would be experienced by a renewable 
provider attempting to sell renewable generation on 
wholesale electricity markets. Where these PPAs offer 
longer-term price guarantees – often up to 15 to 20 
years or more – renewable energy projects can attract 
longer-term debt finance, which reduces the expected 
lifetime average finance costs for a project. Under 
current financing arrangements, extending the duration 
of a PPA by 10 years (say from 10 to 20 years) alone 
could reduce the average electricity generation costs 
over the lifetime of typical wind and solar projects by 
11–15%, while employing a FiT rather than a premium to 
wholesale prices can reduce costs by 4-11%.8 As the cost 
of renewable energy approaches that of market prices, 
the benefits of these policies will fall slightly, but the 
benefits in reducing risks remain. 
There is, however, another impact of policy on financing. 
Uncertain or changing policy can raise risk perceptions 
and increase borrowing costs or even make it impossible 
to borrow against a project without some sort of explicit or 
de facto government guarantee. Without debt, the cost of 
finance can increase markedly. 
Extending the duration of a PPA by 
10 years could reduce the average 
electricity generation costs over the 
lifetime of typical wind and solar 
projects by 11-15%, while employing a 
FiT rather than a premium to wholesale 
prices can reduce costs by 4-11%.
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New business models can attract long-term investors, 
reducing renewable energy costs by up to 20%.
The following analysis of the impact of policy on financing 
costs assumes that projects are financed with the current 
industry structure and common project development 
arrangements. Typically, these projects are developed and 
owned by independent power producers and investor-
owned utilities, and often use project finance to enhance 
returns to levels consistent with their business models. 
Investors in utility company shares expect certain levels 
of returns from their equity investments. Under current 
business and investment models, renewable energy 
returns have to rise to these expectations to make these 
investments attractive to utilities and to make utility 
shares attractive to the financial markets.
However, the key to optimising finance for any investment 
is to match the investment and the related regulatory 
and corporate structure with the investment pool that is 
most closely aligned with the financial characteristics of 
the investment. From this perspective, renewable energy 
is more similar to long-term infrastructure investments 
than fossil fuel investments, making renewable energy, if 
properly structured, particularly well-suited to three sets 
of investors:
• Institutional investors, like pension funds, seeking 
to match defined cash flow needs over a long period 
of time to service liabilities such as pensions and life 
insurance policies;
• Municipalities and other local and regional agencies, 
seeking to provide long-term infrastructure for 
themselves and their residents and companies;
• Energy users seeking long-term price certainty for 
energy, or a hedge against volatile energy costs.
As shown in Figure 2, solutions tailored to the investment 
needs of these types of investors could reduce the cost of 
renewable energy by up to 20%.
Once development and construction is finished, renewable 
energy projects are relatively simple investments. There 
are no fuel costs to manage, operating costs are relatively 
low, output is fixed by wind or solar conditions, and 
revenues are also fixed, assuming a fixed, long-term price 
contract or feed-in tariff. As simple investments, these 
projects remain attractive investments even when returns 
are low, and with the right structural changes they can 
remain attractive at lower returns still. 
Utilities and IPPs have used project finance – where a 
stand-alone project company is formed that owns only 
the renewable energy project – to increase returns to 
levels more in line with what their shareholders expect 
from utility investments. Project finance increases 
returns by allowing the owner to borrow more money 
directly against the asset, without otherwise affecting the 
company’s finances. By borrowing more, project owners 
get their cash back earlier and thus enhance their returns. 
However, project finance can be expensive to arrange 
and banks charge higher interest on loans to project 
companies, thus increasing the cost of finance. 
Policies can encourage the use of project finance despite 
its lower efficiency. For example, in the United States, tax 
credits used to incentivise renewable energy are often 
worth more with project finance, because they are realised 
earlier. Project finance can be used to transfer these 
credits to banks or other companies with immediate tax 
obligations to offset, thereby shortening the period over 
which tax credits are received by as much as several years. 
However, arranging the project finance and providing an 
incentive for the investor with the “tax appetite” can be 
costly and inefficient. As a result, the use of tax credits 
can end up costing the government more than other 
types of policies.9  
The financial crisis has made project finance less attractive. 
Longer-term loans are riskier for banks in general, and 
one response to the financial crisis has been to shorten 
the tenor of loans that they offer – that is, how long the 
loan lasts – in order to manage their own risks, and in 
anticipation of regulatory requirements under Basel 
III and Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV). With 
shorter-term loans, project owners need to set aside 
more cash each year to pay the debt principal. The result 
is that the average debt over the project life goes down, 
and higher tariffs are needed to make projects attractive 
to developers. If the market for longer-tenor debt were 
to dry up completely, the cost of renewable energy could 
increase by 16% or more.10  
Some utilities have responded by financing renewable 
energy on their balance sheets – that is, by borrowing 
against the entire company rather than just a specific 
project. Companies have lower debt costs than projects, 
since lenders have more assets to recover in case of 
default, and thus face lower risks. The lower debt cost 
would reduce the renewable energy costs by 6% for a 
well-financed utility. For many utilities, however, large 
renewable energy portfolios still offer lower returns than 
other investments, consume investment capital while 
producing little growth, and thus make the companies 
less attractive to investors. That is notwithstanding 
the fact that the very best renewable energy projects, 
including many wind projects in Texas and Midwestern US, 
have very good wind conditions that can make projects 
If the market for longer-tenor debt 
were to dry up completely, the cost 
of renewable energy could increase 
by 16% or more.
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Figure 2
New finance models could reduce renewable energy costs by up to 20%  
Source: Climate Policy Initiative modelling, based on interviews with developers and investors and Standard & Poor’s; company reports. 
competitive over their lifetime. An additional, emerging 
problem with utility financing in Europe is that these 
companies are seeing falling revenues and profits, and 
many can no longer support additional debt. 
The essential problem is that renewable energy 
investments have financial characteristics that are more 
akin to corporate bonds than the typical utility investment. 
A utility would make no money borrowing at a bond 
rate just to invest in another bond with the same return. 
Packaged appropriately, in structures that look like bonds 
rather than utility company shares, and then selling the 
assets directly to bond investors could significantly reduce 
the cost of financing renewable energy. 
Another issue is that many current renewable projects 
investments are relatively “illiquid”. That is, investors tie 
up their money in the investment and cannot easily sell 
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FINANCIAL STRUCTURES
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1. Typical Project Finance – Base Case
Most Wind Power is project financed with 12-20 
year bank debt at interest rates 2% or more higher 
than corporate bonds
2. Impacts of Financial Crisis
Some banks are reducing the time period over  
which they lend to reduce their own risk, limiting  
debt to 7 years raises lifetime energy cost 15%
3. Utility Corporate Finance
Utilities can reduce renewable financing costs by 
using corporate debt and equity, but this reduces 
project leverage and offers lower returns than 
other corporate investments
4. New Investment Model
Properly structured, a portfolio of renewable ener-
gy projects could attract corporate bond  type
investors for a large share of the investment lower-
ing debt and equality costs, increasing 
leverage and accessing large pools of capital
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the assets if their circumstances, or those of the market, 
change, or can only do so with substantial transaction 
costs or loss of value. Illiquidity imposes a significant 
cost on institutional investors, if it makes them unable to 
react to new investment opportunities that may arise in 
the market. They may have to retain extra investment in 
secure, very liquid, but low-return investments such as 
government treasury bonds. 
Appropriate structures that provide both direct access 
to the bond-like risk reward profiles of renewable energy 
projects and some liquidity are already beginning to 
emerge, including “YieldCos” (described in Box 2). These 
new investment vehicles are tailored to the investment 
needs of long-term, institutional investors, such as pension 
funds and insurance companies. They focus exclusively 
on owning and operating portfolios of renewable assets 
that are largely free of fuel, market, and technology risks, 
providing investors with steady, predictable revenues over 
15 to 20 years, while creating an opportunity to sell the 
investment should the need arise. Based on interviews 
with long-term investors and rating agencies, the analysis 
for the Commission suggests that such low-risk structures 
could attract equity investment at costs 2% per year 
lower than traditional utilities, and could support more 
debt on their balance sheets. Alternatively, institutional 
investors could buy the YieldCos without debt as 
direct replacements for corporate bonds, essentially 
earning corporate bond rates for the entire investment. 
Renewable energy investments are more capital-intensive 
than fossil fuel power generation, and so are highly 
sensitive to the cost of capital. Financial modelling of 
typical wind and solar projects in the US and Europe 
shows that renewable energy-specific business models 
could reduce the cost of renewable energy by up to 20%.11
Other approaches such as securitisation of loans 
to renewable energy and covered bonds rely on 
standardisation and pooling for diversification and 
aggregation. These can also be appealing to institutional 
investors, which require large transactions and low 
transaction fees, high credit ratings, sufficient transaction 
data to assess risk and return, liquidity, benchmarks, and 
a defined asset category in which to invest. Institutional 
investors are also primarily interested in providing long-
term debt investments that match their liabilities. 
Green bonds (described in Box 2) could be a promising 
vehicle for institutional investors if renewable energy 
projects can be standardised and securitised. The Climate 
Bonds Initiative and HSBC reported US$11 billion in 
green bonds were issued in 2013 – a marginal portion 
of the total global bond market, but one that is growing 
rapidly.12  Institutional investors are very comfortable with 
bond investments. If green bonds can be used to finance 
renewable energy projects in a manner that delivers 
liquidity and high credit ratings (e.g. through pooling, 
credit enhancement and securitisation) this may be a 
promising path for increased institutional investment in 
renewable energy.
Creating national infrastructure banks
Although the sophisticated financial systems of 
developed economies can cultivate innovative solutions 
to financing problems, they need an investment case 
to do so. The unfamiliarity and risks of new financial 
products can prevent their development, but, once the 
market is established, risks fall and financial actors join 
the market. In this context, national infrastructure banks 
can develop credible markets that will eventually bring 
in private capital.
For renewable energy and energy efficiency, there are a 
number of markets that a government infrastructure bank 
could help develop. These include:
• Creating appropriately designed YieldCos: Although 
YieldCos, as discussed above, are gradually entering 
the market, their design is not perfectly aligned 
with institutional investor needs. A government 
infrastructure bank could take on this role and 
develop the new, appropriately designed, asset class.
• Lending to small-scale distributed generation and 
energy efficiency projects: Infrastructure banks 
could extend loans to de-centralised, customer-
generated electricity and energy efficiency projects 
with marginal credit risks, creating business 
opportunities both for the private sector and low-
carbon investment. Examples of these programmes 
are discussed in Box 3.
• Financing infrastructure that needs scale for 
rollout: As an example, an infrastructure bank could 
lead investment in electric vehicle (EV) charging 
infrastructure, an investment that is difficult for 
individual actors to make due to scale up and timing 
issues, but one with significant public benefits. The 
timing issue refers to a “chicken and egg situation” 
where widespread EV adoption requires a charging 
infrastructure in place, but without EV users charging 
infrastructure will fail to generate revenues. 
The Climate Bonds Initiative and 
HSBC reported US$11 billion in 
green bonds were issued in 2013 
— a marginal portion of the total 
global bond market, but one that is 
growing rapidly.
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Current investor business models, accounting rules 
and investment restrictions established by financial 
supervisory bodies, may discourage institutional investors 
from investing in infrastructure and other “illiquid” asset 
classes. The motive of such rules is to ensure financial 
solvency of investors by not locking them into long-term 
investments that may be hard to exit from at short notice or 
at acceptable prices.13 
Despite their long time horizon, institutional investors 
tend to invest overwhelmingly in liquid assets, so that 
they can maintain diverse portfolios and manage risks 
in a changing investment landscape. Large-scale funds 
are better positioned to increase investment in green 
infrastructure and other illiquid assets, because they 
can develop specialised knowledge on the risks and 
returns to these assets, increasing their confidence in 
the investment and reducing the need for liquidity.14  For 
example, the largest of these funds, the Norwegian Bank 
for Investment Management, may be able to manage the 
risks of more investment in illiquid assets and emerging 
markets, consistent with its mission of investing for the 
benefit of future generations.15  However, investors overall 
continue to favour shorter-term investment. The OECD has 
identified several reasons for this:16 
1. Financial markets tend to reward short-term over 
longer-term investment. Although they are long-term 
investors in theory, institutional investors often face 
short-term performance pressures which can prevent 
them from investing in long-term assets.17  Investment 
holding periods are declining among institutional 
investors, and allocations to less liquid, long-term 
assets such as infrastructure and venture capital are 
generally very low. 
2. As part of the liberalisation of gas and electricity 
markets, “unbundling” regulations have been set up 
to prevent investors from owning a controlling stake 
in both transmission and generation. This applies 
to renewable energy as well, and the OECD notes 
that given the attractiveness of transmission and 
pipeline-type infrastructure assets, “unbundling” 
regulations “may unintentionally force investors to 
choose between majority ownership in transmission 
and generation/production”. Similarly, the use of tax 
incentives may discourage investment by institutions 
that are already tax-exempt (such as pension funds  
in many countries), and instead can create a new  
class of “tax investor”, the OECD notes, “whose 
purpose is to accelerate the use of, and improve the 
value of tax credits, but whose presence can crowd  
out institutions”.
3. “Capital adequacy” rules designed to increase banks’ 
levels of capital and reduce their exposure to long-
term debts can also discourage long-term investments, 
including green infrastructure investments. (Examples 
include Basel III for banks around the globe, and 
Solvency II for insurance companies in Europe.) 
In addition, the OECD notes, certain accounting 
rules that are meant to increase transparency and 
consistency in financial statements – such as fair value 
or mark-to-market accounting – can be hard to apply 
to illiquid investments with long holding periods.
There are policy initiatives underway to attempt to 
re-orient the financial sector toward longer-term, 
lower-carbon investments, including the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Inquiry on the Design 
of a Sustainable Financial System.18 A number of banks 
have made statements on the value to investors of taking 
a longer-term perspective or considering social and 
environmental risks. However, implementation of these 
principles has been sparse to date.
Box 1 
How business models and financial regulations create barriers to scaling up  
low-carbon infrastructure 
• Providing early-stage deployment support:  
An infrastructure bank could take on some early-stage 
risk to accelerate deployment of newly emerging 
technologies that drive infrastructure productivity. 
• Supporting local municipal governments and 
aggregating small-scale projects to attract cheaper 
capital: Securities backed by pools of diversified small-
scale clean energy loans can attain much greater cash 
flow certainty than individual projects, making them 
attractive to institutional investors. Building such 
projects portfolios have to acquire a certain scale, 
however, where a government infrastructure bank can 
provide initial support for example through first-debt 
loss guarantees.
Table 1 lists several examples of public green infrastructure 
banks in in OECD countries.19 These types of banks and 
other public finance institutions, the OECD notes, are 
currently being used to leverage private capital and support 
investment in low-carbon infrastructure, including from 
institutional investors.20  There are also green investment 
banks (GIBs) or similar institutions in developing and 
emerging economies, such as South Africa (Green Fund), 
Malaysia (Malaysian Green Technology Corporation), and 
United Arab Emirates (Masdar).21 
Green investment banks have been established at both the 
national and sub-national levels.22  Many have leveraged 
private capital, and engaged with institutional investors 
in a number of ways including: taking cornerstone stakes 
in funds or vehicles that attract pension and insurance 
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Financing costs are crucially important in keeping 
down the cost of infrastructure, given the high upfront 
investment. As discussed in Box 1, there are presently 
financial market barriers that restrict or raise the cost 
of finance to infrastructure.
A number of different financial instruments address this 
challenge, by attracting institutional investors. 
Infrastructure bonds are primarily used in the project 
finance of infrastructure assets. Through these bonds, 
institutional investors can gain direct access to long-
term, steady, low-risk investments. Bank deleveraging 
and Basel III capital restrictions have limited new 
investment from banks. Infrastructure bonds and other 
vehicles below here have the potential to fill the void by 
attracting institutional investment. 
Green bonds are a type of infrastructure bond that 
provides debt to a project or a portfolio of projects 
that are certified as being environmental or “green”. 
The green character is the key enhancement over 
infrastructure bonds. By being green, these bonds 
may be able to access investors who prefer green 
investments or have restrictions or limitations to non-
green investments when debt is scarce. By creating 
a distinct market and through competitive forces, 
green bonds could lower the cost of environmental 
infrastructure projects. Corporations and governments 
have also issued green bonds to back low-carbon 
projects, using their institutional creditworthiness to 
bring down financing costs for the projects. 
YieldCos, which own portfolios of low-risk, long-term 
projects are equity vehicles that can go a step further 
than infrastructure bonds by effectively bundling 
equity and debt together in one package. By bundling 
projects together, the project finance premium for 
single projects can be avoided. Moreover, for a portfolio 
of projects with risks comparable to corporate bonds, 
the result for investors can be a higher-yielding, bond-
like instrument that nevertheless reduces the overall 
financing cost for the projects in question.
Municipal bonds can serve the same purpose for 
renewable energy as YieldCos – that is, using high 
leverage for a project while keeping debt and equity 
costs down – if a municipal government is willing to bear 
the equity risk and role of investor itself.
Box 2
Green bonds, infrastructure bonds, Yield-
Cos and municipal bonds 
capital; providing debt financing; issuing green bonds; or 
designing products that have stable long-term cash flows 
which will be attractive to long-term institutional investors. 
Some green investment banks have a particular focus on 
financial sustainability and demonstrating that low-carbon 
investments can be profitable. The UK Green Investment 
Bank expects to earn taxpayers an average return of 8% per 
year, with every investment on track to make a profits.23 
At the national level, green investment banks can be 
effective tools to mobilise domestic private finance and 
investment in low-carbon infrastructure when existing 
institutions are not already fulfilling this role. Some Public 
Finance Institutions (PFIs), such as Germany’s KfW, already 
have an explicit mandate and authority to invest in green 
infrastructure – often with established guidelines on which 
technologies or markets to address. “Greening” existing 
PFIs, where there is the necessary institutional and political 
support, might be preferable to creating new institutions. 
Currently, these banks are a small portion of the financing 
landscape, but through their investments they may 
be able to kick-start liquidity in these assets, creating 
a virtuous circle whereby more investors are able to 
participate in financing low-carbon assets. As these begin 
to replace high-carbon assets, they shift the landscape 
of infrastructure investment needs. For example, energy 
efficiency investments bring down the need for renewal and 
expansion of the power generation, transport networks and 
building stocks.24  
Apart from their role in funding and directing national 
infrastructure banks, governments also invest in low-
carbon infrastructure themselves, both via direct 
investment and via companies that are fully or partially 
owned by the government. 
3.3 Development banks and  
low-carbon investment in middle-
income countries
Renewable energy can play a slightly different role in 
rapidly developing, middle-income countries. First, rapid 
growth creates a thirst for new energy sources to meet 
growing demand. Thus, competition for renewable energy 
comes from new plants that are yet to be built, rather than 
already existing facilities, as may be the case in developed 
markets. With good renewable resources, renewable 
energy could already be competitive, and in some cases, 
renewable energy might even have an advantage given 
the infrastructure that may be needed to support large-
scale, centralised coal-fired generation. Second, the 
potential role of renewable energy is especially important 
in boosting energy security and improving balance of 
payments compared with importing coal, oil or gas. Third, 
some developing markets have viewed the manufacture 
of renewable energy equipment as a potential national 
strategic objective.
To meet these goals, many middle-income countries 
have adopted policies and incentive schemes also used in 
developed markets, such as feed-in tariffs, power purchase 
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Table 1
Examples of public green infrastructure banks in the OECD
Source: Berlin et al., 2012; Booz&co, 2013; Clean Energy Finance Corporation, n.d.; Critchley, 2014; Export Development Canada, n.d.; 
Gutscher, 2014; Hawaii State Energy Office, n.d.; Kidney, 2014; Moore and Morrow, 2013; New York Green Bank, n.d.; Parliament of 
Canada, n.d.; UK Green Investment Bank, 2014; Wee, 2013.25
Bank Name & 
Location
Capitalisation
Source of 
Capitalisation
Year of 
creation
Target rate 
of return
Scope
Instruments 
used
Australia –  
Clean Energy 
Finance 
Corporation
AU$10 billion
Government 
budget 
appropriation
2013
Commercial-
level returns 
Renewable energy, 
energy efficiency 
Direct debt/equity 
investment and 
indirect (pooled) 
investment 
UK Green 
Investment Bank
GBP3.8 billion
Government 
appropriation 
2012
Sufficient to 
offset losses, 
and create 
profit 
Offshore wind, 
waste, non-
domestic energy 
efficiency, with 
goal of market 
transformation 
Direct debt and 
equity investment; 
indirect, fund-led 
investment 
Korea Export 
- Import Bank 
(Kexim) Green 
Bonds
US$500 million Bond issuance 2014
None 
provided
Low carbon and 
climate resilient 
growth, including 
clean energy, 
energy efficiency, 
emissions 
reduction, and 
waste filtering.
Direct debt 
investment
Canada – Ontario 
Financing 
Authority Green 
Bonds
<C$500 million, 
planned
Bond issuance
2014 
– 2015 
planned
None 
provided
Environmentally 
friendly 
infrastructure 
including transit 
Not specified
Canada Export 
Development 
Corp. Green 
Bonds 
C$300 million Bond issuance
2014 
– 2015 
planned 
Sufficient 
to generate 
“modest 
profit to 
finance 
growth”
EProjects “aimed at 
the preservation, 
protection or 
remediation of air, 
water or soil or 
the mitigation of 
climate change.”
Direct debt 
investment
USA – New York 
State Green Bank 
US$218.5 
million
Utility bill 
surcharge, 
auction 
proceeds. 
2013
Sufficient to 
offset losses 
Commercially 
proven clean 
energy and energy 
efficiency
Credit 
enhancements, 
joint or pooled 
debt investment, 
loan warehousing 
USA - Green 
Energy Market 
Securitization 
(GEMS)
US$100 million 
anticipated 
Bond issuance 
2014 
planned
Not a key 
concern
Distributed solar, 
energy efficiency 
On-bill financing, 
securitisation 
(proposed)
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The priority 
Increasing energy efficiency is a key part of developing 
better energy systems. Improving energy efficiency 
in buildings and energy-intensive industries accounts 
for US$5.3 trillion of the US$8.8 trillion of incremental 
investment in energy efficiency from 2015 to 2030, laid 
out under the low-carbon transition scenario in Figure 
1. Efficiency is particularly important for those countries 
whose growth is constrained by unmet energy demand. 
The challenge 
Energy efficiency poses specific financing challenges. 
Achieving investment at the scale needed will require new 
policy and financing vehicles.
While many energy efficiency investments generate 
substantial savings relative to the initial investment, 
few projects are large enough to attract the attention of 
financiers. Energy efficiency projects generally offer poor 
collateral, for example improvements to a building’s shell 
have little value if removed and resold. Credit risk is the 
principal driver of financing costs for most energy efficiency 
projects, and that risk – being uncollateralised – is 
substantial enough that interest rates for small commercial 
and residential consumers are relatively high. In developing 
countries, where credit-based lending is rare, energy 
efficiency financing is often not available for small-scale 
borrowers. Even lending to large industrial actors with 
collateral is restricted to five years or less. Moreover, it may 
depend on targeted lines of credit financed by international 
institutions, such as the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), both of which have prioritised 
funding for private-sector energy efficiency investment.
New business models are emerging to deliver financing
Despite these difficulties, private-sector interest in 
energy efficiency financing is growing, with new business 
models emerging that shift risks in helpful ways. Public 
programmes that add security to investments by tying them 
to utility bills, mortgages, or property tax assessments may 
lower rates from financiers. Sales of securities backed by 
energy efficiency loans have begun to emerge, potentially 
making energy efficiency lending more liquid and attracting 
cheaper capital.
Innovative policies are generating results
The HERO programme started in Riverside County, 
California demonstrates the potential benefits. With 
repayments secured on property tax bills (and therefore 
senior in obligation to mortgages), private lenders 
have provided more than US$200 million in capital for 
efficiency and distributed renewables in residential and 
commercial buildings. One capital provider has securitised 
and sold bonds backed by the loans to raise additional 
capital. Demand has been strong and over 100 California 
municipalities have now joined the programme.
The German development bank KfW runs a  
residential energy efficiency programme that provides 
increasing amounts of principal reduction for projects with 
higher energy savings, and buys down local banks’ interest 
rates to low (1%) levels. Almost 1% of German households 
participate annually – a considerably larger participation 
rate than most whole-home programmes of its  
kind achieve.26 
Through its Sustainable Energy Financing Facilities (SEFFs), 
EBRD has offered credit lines and technical assistance to 
support development of energy efficiency financing among 
banks in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Since 2006, the 
bank has provided over €2 billion in financing to local banks 
to establish new markets for lending for energy efficiency 
and small-scale renewable energy projects.27
In the developing world, risk-sharing programmes run by 
multilateral development banks have encouraged energy 
efficiency lending at more attractive terms. For example, 
under the China Utility-Based Energy Efficiency Finance 
Program (CHUEE), the IFC provided a loss reserve to 
participating banks, thereby inducing them to extend loan 
tenors and offer loans to smaller enterprises. Participating 
banks have lent over US$500 million under the programme, 
and as of 2010 the programme had not experienced a  
single loan default.28 
Most financial programmes, even those that offer 
substantial concessions, have struggled to motivate 
customers. The extent to which improved financing drives 
project uptake has not been well studied, and may vary 
substantially in different markets. That said, the approach 
clearly offers potential.
Box 3
Challenges and innovative policies for financing energy efficiency 
agreements, auctions and green certificate markets. A 
distinguishing feature of some middle-income countries 
which can alter the effectiveness of these types of policies 
is their greater cost of debt.
Low-cost debt can reduce the cost of renewable energy
Middle-income countries tend to grow faster than high-
income ones. Growth creates competing investment 
needs, particularly for infrastructure, and it can also 
lead to inflation. The result is usually higher interest 
rate environments than in slower-growing developed 
countries. Additionally, generally younger populations 
and less well-developed pension and insurance industries 
limit the pool of long-term, relatively low-cost investment 
available for infrastructure.
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Thus, in middle-income countries low-carbon energy may 
suffer in two ways. First, since low-carbon generation is 
often more capital-intensive than fossil fuel generation, 
higher interest rates and low debt availability have a 
greater impact. Second, since fossil fuel generation is often 
priced in dollars and has access to global markets, it can be 
financed on international rather than domestic markets. 
Yet for the developing country itself, renewable energy 
is often a direct substitute for the fossil fuel, replacing 
imported coal, gas or oil, and reducing foreign exchange 
requirements that go along with fossil fuel imports. 
For developing countries there are a number of financial 
mechanisms that can bridge the difference between the 
high cost of financing in local currency and the benefits 
that should be priced in hard currency.  
Countries such as China and Brazil effectively use 
subsidised, low-cost debt to finance renewable energy. 
National development banks, national sovereign wealth 
funds and investments made from national budgets or 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under administrative 
direction fund substantial percentages of the world’s  
low-carbon investment, overwhelmingly in their own 
domestic markets. 
The China Development Bank, for instance, is the largest 
development bank in the world and has supplied over 
US$80 billion to renewable energy projects.29  In China, 
as of June 2012, 87% of wind projects and 68% of 
solar projects were built and owned by SOEs and their 
subsidiaries.30  As such, they have access to capital at 
low, administered interest rates. In Brazil, the national 
development bank, Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), 
sets a separate long-term interest rate that it uses as a 
basis on which to make loans to infrastructure projects. 
Nearly every major power project in Brazil has had access 
to BNDES funding, with around US$50 billion committed 
so far into low-carbon energy.31  The result is that 
renewable energy projects in these countries have access 
to low-cost financing that reduces the cost disadvantage 
compared with fossil fuel alternatives. Recent auctions 
in Brazil, for instance, achieved average prices for energy 
from wind projects at the comparatively low price of 
US$58/MWh.32  
The accomplishment of state banks in funding low-carbon 
energy at tolerable debt rates is substantial. In China, 
it may be that the combination of China Development 
Bank debt, SOE equity funded by retained earnings, and 
secure power purchasing agreements in administered 
markets creates the functional equivalence of municipal 
finance, energy user finance or YieldCos in high-income 
country, market-based finance systems. However, it is 
important to note that there are active reform movements 
in China, Brazil and other middle-income countries 
with strong development banks that would liberalise 
the existing financial system, changing the supply of 
low-carbon debt financing. 
Middle-income countries such as India, Mexico, South 
Africa and Morocco use a variety of national niche and 
multilateral solutions to finance low-carbon projects, but 
are constrained by an absence of low-cost debt necessary 
for such capital-intensive investments. In this analysis, 
those countries are labelled as MIC2, in contrast to 
middle-income countries with access to low-cost  
debt through development banks, such as Brazil and  
China (MIC1). 
MIC2 countries often pay as much for renewable energy 
as the US and Europe, and sometimes much more, despite 
potential labour, land and construction cost advantages. 
Figure 3 shows how increased financing costs could 
impact a typical Indian solar project. Lower initial capital 
expenditures for this plant were almost 25% lower than 
a US counterpart. Less advanced equipment, lower solar 
radiation and dust were expected to decrease its output, 
but even then, costs were slightly lower than in the United 
States. However, financing costs due in large part to wider 
capital market factors in India, pushed lifetime cost per 
unit of energy well above the US counterpart.
More specifically, the difference is the cost and terms 
of debt. In India, our modelling of a range of projects 
shows that the cost and terms of debt alone can add 
24–32% to the cost of utility-scale wind and solar 
photovoltaic (PV) projects.34  
The high cost of debt creates other problems. Policy 
solutions such as stable long-term contracts or reliable 
feed-in tariffs can reduce the cost of renewable energy in 
other countries by allowing a larger share of a project to 
be financed with debt, which carries lower financing costs 
than equity. But in many rapidly developing countries, 
the cost of debt is so high that there are virtually no 
savings to be gained by growing the share of debt in 
a project. As a result, those same policy solutions are 
much less effective at bringing down renewable energy 
costs and driving deployment.35  More expensive debt 
can limit the availability of upfront equity capital, given 
uncertainty over the cost of refinancing the completed 
project. Developers may not be willing or able to 
refinance completed projects with debt. Discussions with 
stakeholders in India reveal that the difficulty in securing 
The China Development Bank, for 
instance, is the largest development 
bank in the world and has supplied 
over US$80 billion to renewable 
energy projects.
223BETTER GROWTH, BETTER CLIMATE : THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT
F
IN
A
N
C
E
Figure 3
Financing costs for solar power eliminate natural cost advantages in India
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Source: Climate Policy Initiative, 2012.33 
debt may already be causing developers to run out of 
equity to invest in the next set of projects.
High debt costs are not unique to renewable energy. 
Rather, they reflect the high interest rate environment, 
which itself reflects the higher inflation, large 
infrastructure needs, heavy government borrowing, 
and a less developed financial system typical of 
rapidly growing economies. 
Cheaper foreign debt is not an easy solution for middle-
income countries because of exchange rate risk
One option would seemingly be to use lower-cost debt 
from developed markets. The first question is, then, 
whether the loan should be denominated in, say, US 
dollars, or in the local currency. If it is denominated in US 
dollars, then the borrower must take the risk that the local 
currency falls and the debt becomes much more expensive.
The lender will likely refuse to make this loan because 
the default risk associated with unfavourable currency 
movements will be too high. Alternatively, the loan could 
be priced in local currency, but then the lenders need 
much higher interest rates to compensate them for the 
currency risk. 
As a result, most loans require currency hedges that 
convert one currency to another over the life of the 
loan. In fact, unless they have offsetting liabilities, most 
dollar investors require hedges for euro investments and 
vice versa. Hedges cover relative currency movement 
risk that results from differences in inflation, economic 
growth, government policy, and so forth. The cost of 
these hedges depend on market conditions, trade flows 
and relative country risks, but often they can take up all 
of the difference in interest rates between dollar-based 
loans and local currency loans. In fact, Figure 4 shows 
that as of January 2014 the cost of hedging for a number 
of developing countries was 20–80% higher than the 
In India, our modelling of a range 
of projects shows that the cost and 
terms of debt alone can add 
24-32% to the cost. 
Levelised cost of solar power, US indexed at 100
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Figure 4
The cost of hedging more than eliminates the advantage of lower foreign interest rates
Source: Adapted from CPI, 2014.36 
difference between base interest rates in each country. In 
other words, foreign debt that was fully hedged against 
currency risk would have been more expensive than local 
debt, meaning that foreign debt is not a viable option for 
renewable energy project in these economies.
One solution for MIC2 that does have promise for 
increasing scale is national or local debt subsidies, which 
can reduce the total cost of subsidising renewable energy. 
Analysis for this report shows that if debt were available 
at terms and interest rates similar to those found in 
developed countries, the cost of renewable energy would 
be as much as 22% lower.37  Debt subsidies can be used 
alongside feed-in tariffs or power purchase agreements, 
partially or wholly replacing the subsidy element 
within these mechanisms. Modelling conducted for the 
Commission shows that this switch could reduce the total 
cost to government and energy consumers of subsidising 
renewable energy, including the cost of the debt subsidy, 
by up to 30% for the same amount of renewable energy. 
Lowering debt costs can allow the government to support 
greater renewable energy deployment with scarce subsidy 
resources, compared to providing the same rate of subsidy 
through higher guaranteed revenues. 
A key challenge for incentivising renewable energy 
through concessional debt will be the administration of the 
debt and selection of projects. These arrangements must 
allow project developers to receive adequate incentives 
while ensuring that the value of the lower-cost debt 
flows through into lower energy prices. Project selection 
mechanisms must also target the most economic projects, 
to minimise inefficiencies through poor project selection 
including failed projects. 
Many countries already have institutions which can 
perform part of the task, such as renewable agencies, 
energy ministries, treasuries or development banks. But 
careful design will be needed to ensure efficient project 
selection and development in coordination with national 
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As discussed in Chapter 2: Cities, cities are likely to 
play a central role as drivers of low-carbon economies 
and low-carbon growth. Municipal financing is a 
common instrument to finance public transportation 
and efficient city infrastructure, and analysis in 
this chapter suggests it is also a useful vehicle for 
investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
But in many countries, cities have limited authority to 
make decisions on major infrastructure investments. 
They also have limited financial resources and may 
not be able to provide sufficient collateral to finance 
investments themselves. 
In order for cities to be able to deliver on the 
recommendations in this report, it will be necessary 
to resolve these issues of authority and financial 
resources. Further work is needed to better understand 
these challenges in each nation, and to develop 
financing vehicles that provide security for investors 
while helping low-carbon cities grow.
Box 4
The finance challenge for cities
energy policy. In some cases, multilateral development 
banks may be able to help build the necessary institutions. 
In other cases, existing institutions may serve as a conduit 
for multilateral financing. Once these arrangements are 
in place, projects that receive concessional debt in lieu of 
subsidies should remain just as attractive to developers, 
while costing 30% less in terms of subsidies from 
governments or higher tariffs from consumers.
Other creative financing solutions for middle-income 
countries need to be scaled up
Rapidly developing, middle-income countries are in 
the process of quickly expanding their energy supply 
systems, and niche solutions for MIC2 countries abound, 
but need scaling up. 
Examples of such creative niche solutions include private 
wind parks to supply off-grid power to high value firms 
in Mexico and India, which are willing to pay extra for 
a more secure electricity supply and can finance the 
project off their own balance sheets. Another is the case 
of large conglomerates which can access low-cost debt 
from commercial banks with which they have long-term 
relationships. A third is concessional financing from 
multilateral trust funds like the World Bank’s Clean 
Technology Fund for early vintage concentrated solar 
plants in India, South Africa and Morocco and geothermal 
plants in Indonesia. Still, these solutions are, at the 
moment, limited in scale and do not compare to levels of 
low-carbon investment financed in high-income countries 
and MIC1 nations.
3.4 The role of development  
finance institutions
Development finance institutions (DFIs) have a significant 
role to play in the expansion of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy in both MIC2 nations and in low-
income countries (LICs). These include global and regional 
multilateral banks such as the World Bank Group, national 
development banks with international portfolios, and 
bilateral development agencies. They can provide support 
through equity investments, loans (concessional and 
non-concessional), guarantees and insurance products, 
principally to MIC2 recipients.37  
DFIs can provide a layer of risk protection and  
capital cost reductions beyond what can be provided  
by host governments. Historically, international 
concessional financing has formed a substantial share  
of financing in low-income countries. Official  
development assistance in low-income countries  
averaged 54.9% of gross capital formation in 2012,39   
and those with lower GDPs had even larger shares of 
foreign assistance.
Concessional loans are known to be an effective tool to 
support governments in the development of large projects 
that might not garner private sector participation, such 
as large hydropower plants or binational/regional high 
voltage transmission lines to transport electricity from 
renewable sources. 
Equity and non-concessional loans can attract the private 
sector to invest equity and debt in utility-scale renewable 
power generation plants. The return on equity and the 
financing cost of the loans of DFIs are similar to private-
sector investors and so do not directly reduce financing 
costs. However, the participation of DFIs as co-lenders 
or equity partners is regarded as positive with respect to 
reducing regulatory and other risks, and so still attracts 
private investors.
Recent OECD analysis shows that both bilateral and 
multilateral external development finance has a positive 
and significant effect in mobilising private finance flows to 
developing countries, with a more pronounced effect in 
attracting domestic over international financial flows. These 
Projects that receive concessional 
debt in lieu of subsidies should 
remain just as attractive to 
developers, while costing 30% 
less in terms of subsidies from 
governments or higher tariffs  
from consumers.
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results are robust across different models and estimation 
approaches. Interestingly, the results suggest that the effect 
of multilateral public finance is greater on the decision over 
whether to invest at all, than on the volume of investment 
once the decision to invest is taken.40  
The same analysis shows that raising the ambition of 
domestic policies in developing countries to incentivise 
renewable energy investment, such as through feed-
in tariffs and renewable energy quotas, is vital to 
attracting private investment at scale. Evidence shows 
that external official development finance operates on 
at least two levels to support green investment: first, 
to directly attract private co-financing and investment 
for green infrastructure; and second, to work with MIC 
governments to support policy reform processes and 
build local capacity and conditions so as to make green 
investment viable in the longer term.41  Delivered  
through bilateral or multilateral development  
cooperation channels, external official development 
finance often has a catalytic role in shifting and scaling  
up green investment.
In addition to direct equity and debt investments 
in infrastructure projects, DFIs offer risk-bearing 
instruments for investors in MIC2 and low-income 
countries, such as insurance protection and guarantees. 
With additional improvements and innovation, these 
instruments, could help address finance needs for low-
carbon assets at larger scale. 
Some institutions offer political risk insurance that can 
partially cover the impact of policy change, provided 
that the change qualifies as an expropriatory breach of 
investor’s rights. For example, the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a World Bank Group agency 
established in 1988 to offer political risk insurance to 
investors in developing countries, can cover a tariff 
reduction for the equity and debt provider. Similarly, 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
provides policy risk coverage to US investors when the 
policy change causes a breach of the power purchase 
agreement (PPA) and constitutes an expropriation 
of investors’ rights (or regulatory taking) originating 
from the contract.42 
While these are useful steps forward, there are still 
significant gaps in the supply of instruments to address 
these risks. Existing instruments (such as those offered by 
MIGA and OPIC) have costly compliance requirements, 
which limit their application to large and well-resourced 
projects only. They may also not be fully visible under 
international official development assistance accounting 
rules, which measure assistance on a cash flow basis. 
Because these instruments are largely unaffordable for 
smaller projects and programmes covering widespread, 
small-scale installations,43  due to high costs as a result 
of complex negotiating and drafting processes, other 
dedicated programmes are needed to seek justice locally 
and keep investments solvent before compensation is paid. 
A number of factors have limited a more widespread 
adoption of partial risk guarantees, which have only been 
issued 23 times since their inception and eight times 
for renewable energy projects.44  The World Bank has 
in the past promoted the use of partial risk guarantees 
mainly for large and complex projects, such as large hydro 
investments and cross-border projects, and required 
an indemnity agreement from the host government. 
This has increased a market perception of product 
complexity, lengthy procedures and high transaction 
costs. Furthermore, partial risk guarantees directly cover 
only debt holders, while tariff reductions usually affect 
many other parties including equity owners, providers 
of operations and maintenance services. This last issue 
can be addressed by complementing the instrument 
with other insurance tools and guarantees, such as 
MIGA insurance, albeit at increased complexity and 
transaction costs.
MIGA aims to provide compensation within six to 14 
months following the date of loss.45 Historical evidence 
made available by the Agency46 shows that so far claims 
have been paid after two to three years from the event 
date, and no later than one year from the date of  
claim’s submission.
OPIC data based on 13 available observations, from a total 
of about 70 projects determined under total expropriation 
clause, show that claims are resolved on average 3.5 years 
after the event date and 1.5 years from the submission of 
the claim. Timing of the reimbursement process is uncertain 
and varies significantly from case to case. These delays and 
uncertainty have a large impact on the viability, and the 
perception of viability by investors, of these schemes.
Guarantees are another financial instrument offered 
to reduce and mitigate investment risks. They are 
mostly offered by the World Bank and have proven to 
be an effective tool to attract private investment to the 
energy sector. Guarantees are particularly well suited 
for use in MIC2 and low-income countries, as they are 
focused on reducing the risk associated with payments 
due from governments or state-owned enterprises to 
investors (equity or debt) under contractual or regulatory 
Delivered through bilateral or 
multilateral development  
cooperation channels, external 
official development finance has 
often a catalytic role in shifting and 
scaling up green investment.
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commitments. These payments can be of a diverse nature 
such as those due monthly under a power purchase 
agreement, payments due as compensation resulting from 
a change in law, or payments due from SOEs under loan 
agreements with commercial banks. The World Bank has 
approved 19 guarantees in the past three years for an 
aggregate amount of US$2.9 billion.47 These guarantees 
have enabled US$11 billion of investment, mostly in 
the energy sector, in highly challenging markets such as 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Senegal and Uganda.
3.5 Addressing the energy financing challenge 
of low-income countries
Across low-income countries (LIC), even those 
now exporting oil and other natural resources, the 
challenge of capital mobilisation for investment in 
energy assets, whether low or high-carbon, is still very 
severe. Infrastructure investments typically depend 
on government involvement in the form of partial 
ownership, subsidies or credit guarantees, or contracts 
with a government-owned utility. As in all countries, a 
stable regulatory system and enforceable, long-term 
power purchasing contracts is a major component of an 
investment case. However, lack of government credibility 
and/or financial capacity is a potential barrier for 
investment in infrastructure assets. 
Given the lack of long-term domestic or international 
private capital for these classes of investment, multilateral 
banks and development finance institutions, including 
the Global Environmental Facility, the Green Climate 
Fund, and the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Adaptation Fund, continue 
to play a central role in financing infrastructure in 
low-income countries. 
The extra up-front capital costs of low-carbon energy 
present a challenge to the multilateral banks, given 
many other demands on their balance sheet capacity. 
Fortunately, new initiatives, funding vehicles and 
programmes, special purpose funds and institutions with 
particular dedication to low-income countries energy 
provision are expanding. 
Examples include innovative distributed, off-grid 
energy solutions such as community-inclusive local area 
networks, anchored on an agricultural or mining producer 
with substantial base demand, or small-scale mechanisms 
such as prepayment cards as used in mobile telephones 
or securitised microfinance. Multilateral platforms such 
as the Green Climate Fund, Sustainable Energy for All, 
and the Climate Finance Innovation Lab assign leading 
emphasis to the particular demands of low-income 
countries, including funding adaptation and the design 
and implementation of specific equity funds, project 
development facilities and the private refinancing of 
multilateral banks’ energy development budgets. Finally, 
it is worth noting the growing significance of funding of 
energy infrastructure in low-income countries by Chinese 
development banks (see Box 5).
4. Financing energy  
system transformation
While the emerging strategies described in the previous 
section can reduce the cost of capital and increase the 
availability of finance for a low-carbon energy transition, 
these measures by themselves would not achieve the 
full investment necessary to reach an ambitious climate 
goal, often benchmarked at a 2°C rise in global average 
temperatures. The Commission therefore decided to 
explore just how much additional capital might be required 
to achieve this goal and what impact that those additional 
capital needs could have on global finance. 
The headline financial impact of the low-carbon transition 
is the incremental investment required. Incremental 
investment is important because it can describe how much 
of the available global investment capital would need to 
be “crowded out” and shifted to the low-carbon energy 
investments. If, for example, a doubling of investment into 
the power sector were required (relative to a “business 
as usual” scenario), it would be hard to reconcile this 
with the imperative to grow global energy supplies in an 
affordable way. But incremental investment tells only 
a part of the story. 
First of all, the mix of assets will change beyond just 
incremental investment, since there would be a reduction 
of investment in fossil fuel assets like coal mines, oil 
production facilities and coal-fired power stations. 
Furthermore, incremental investment does not adequately 
capture the effect that this shift in investment will have 
on other costs that then feed back into financial markets, 
for investment in an energy transition can create or 
destroy value in a number of ways, in so doing freeing 
up (or consuming) additional cash to the economy that 
could then be recycled into other investments in the 
future. Four adjustments must be made to incremental 
capital investments to understand the true impact on the 
economy and financial markets:
These guarantees have enabled 
US$11 billion of investment, 
mostly in the energy sector, in 
highly challenging markets such 
as Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Senegal and Uganda.
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• Operating expenses: Capital investment will replace 
some operating expenses freeing up cash for further 
investment. For example, wind turbine investment 
reduces the cost of transporting coal from mine to power 
station. The money saved in transportation would then 
be available for investment elsewhere in the economy. 
• Asset life: Both high- and low-carbon energy systems 
have a mix of long and short-term assets. In general, 
the average life of the assets of a low-carbon system 
is slightly longer, particularly when considering the 
short amortisation periods of some upstream fossil 
fuel assets. Longer-life low-carbon infrastructure 
may require more initial investment, but will delay 
future investment to replace capacity. For example, an 
investment made in 2025 with a 20-year life will still 
have half of its production remaining in 2035. 
• Risk and required return: Lower-risk assets require 
smaller incentives to meet a given return. Investors in a 
project could require double or more incentive – that is 
return - to invest in a riskier project. Reducing risks in the 
Infrastructure in developing and emerging countries 
will require a step-change in investment levels over the 
next decade, even before accounting for climate action. 
Estimates indicate that investment in developing and 
emerging markets, in order to sustain projected growth 
paths, will need to more than double from the current 
US$1 trillion a year invested in electricity supply, transport, 
telecoms and water.48  
At the moment, the majority of investment in infrastructure 
in developing and emerging markets is provided by the 
public sector. Given the budget constraints faced by these 
countries, and the projected needs, the private sector will 
need to participate more strongly in the future. Private-
sector money is not flowing to developing and emerging 
countries at the pace and scale required. Political risk, 
macroeconomic instability, lack of well-developed  
projects all contribute to the reluctance of the private 
sector to invest. 
A number of new public funds and banks are being created 
or strengthened in developing countries to respond to the 
new government demand. The latest two are the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia. India, China and South Africa) Bank. The 
AIIB was proposed last October by Chinese President Xi 
Jinping during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Summit in Bali. It is expected to be established within the 
year with an operating capital of US$50 billion to start with, 
and the perspective to grow quickly to US$100 billion. 
To date, China has invited Japan, South Korea and other 
countries to join. The BRICS Bank, an initiative of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa, was proposed at the 
BRICS summit in Delhi in 2012, and was formally launched 
at the BRICS Summit in July 2014. The bank would begin 
with a subscribed capital of US$50 billion, divided equally 
between its five partners, with an initial total of US$10 
billion in cash and US$40 billion in guarantees.49  
While the total subscribed capital of these institutions 
is not insignificant, it is still fairly limited in comparison 
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), at about US$200 billion, or the Asian 
Development Bank, at about US$160 billion.  
The real potential of these institutions derives from their 
shareholding, formed by key emerging and developing 
countries, and their focus on infrastructure. This puts 
these new institutions in a strong position to leverage 
and blend their finance with national development banks 
and funds, such as the China Development Bank or the 
Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), both able 
to mobilise substantial investments.
Some smaller regional development funds, such as the 
Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), are also 
increasingly influential. With one of the highest credit 
rating of debt issuers in Latin America (AA-), the CAF is 
now lending more than the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank together in the Latin 
American region. As developing and emerging countries’ 
domestic financial markets deepen and savings are 
increasingly recycled through their domestic banking 
system, these new banks and funds will be in a strong 
position to blend their finance with private sector funds. 
An important question is to what extent these institutions 
will recognise the opportunity to invest in infrastructure 
that lays the foundations for a more sustainable, low-
carbon future, particularly when investing in energy 
infrastructure. The nascent Green Climate Fund, which 
is meant to provide global climate change finance in the 
context of delivering on the commitment of mobilising 
US$100 billion a year by 2020 to support emerging and 
developing countries on adaptation and mitigation options, 
can play an important role in blending its finance with other 
infrastructure funds. While US$100 billion is a small part of 
the total financing needs for sustainable infrastructure, and 
can be raised in rich countries through current and future 
fiscal instruments, used wisely these funds can be a catalyst 
for further public and private funds. 
Using innovative financial instruments to address 
multiple issues including policy risk and affordability of 
infrastructure in poorer countries, will be key for these 
institutions to invest at scale in sustainable infrastructure. 
BRICS countries have explored how their new bank could 
support sustainable infrastructure, but the outcome will 
only be clear once the bank starts lending at scale.
Box 5
The emergence of new international financial institutions
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energy portfolio could free risk capital to invest in risky, 
value producing, ventures elsewhere in the economy. 
• Stranded assets: On the other side, a low-carbon 
transition can create “stranded” fossil fuel  
assets which lose value when they are no longer 
needed. Valuable assets can be used as security  
for future investments, so such a loss of asset value 
can take value directly out of the potential  
investment pool.
The next section analyses the required incremental 
investment in a low-carbon transition, with an initial 
estimate that is then adjusted according to the wider 
influencing factors described above.
4.1 Investment needs are large and well  
investigated, but will depend on policy  
ambition and choice 
The IEA uses a number of models and analyses to estimate 
future energy investment needs. Included in these 
estimates are scenarios that reflect current perspectives 
on “business-as-usual case” investment needs and 
scenarios with substantial carbon abatement, including 
the IEA’s 2°C scenario, or “2DS.” 
Both scenarios define the investment requirements 
for: power generation (fossil fuel and low-carbon 
power generation, plus transmission and distribution), 
building energy efficiency, industry (energy efficiency 
and other measures), and transportation (vehicles and 
mass transportation). They exclude the upstream energy 
investment requirements in oil, gas, and coal and non-
energy infrastructure investments (roads, railways, 
bridges, agriculture, etc.). 
The difference between these two scenarios is an  
estimate of the incremental investment required to  
achieve substantial carbon abatement. It is only an 
estimate, since there are multiple possible scenarios, 
with very different investment implications. Nonetheless, 
the IEA investment figures provide a credible starting 
point from which to evaluate the impact of a transition 
on financing and financial markets. Analyses that specify 
less ambitious climate goals, for example to stabilise 
atmospheric greenhouse gases at 500 or 550 parts 
per million, could reduce substantially the incremental 
costs incurred by low-carbon systems and associated 
value stranding. However, the analysis of what such less 
ambitious transitions would mean for the average  
cost of capital, how these costs were distributed, and  
what political reactions might be expected would be 
logically similar. 
The IEA estimates that about US$36 trillion of investment 
will be needed in 2015–2030 in the energy sector, as well 
as in energy end-use sectors such as buildings, industry 
and transport, regardless of climate goals. A 2°C scenario, 
the IEA estimates, could require about US$12 trillion 
of incremental investment over the same time period 
in comparison with a scenario with zero climate action, 
leading to up to 6°C of warming.50 This is mainly because 
additional investments to improve energy efficiency and 
for the deployment of low-carbon technologies are only 
partially offset by reduced investment in fossil fuel power 
generation and in electricity transmission and distribution. 
(Note that savings from compact cities and reduced 
investment in fossil fuel exploration and transport, 
included in Figure 1, were not considered here.)
During that time, however, the world economy will grow 
substantially, and investments will be made in a variety of 
forms of capital capital stock. Analysis for the Commission 
shows that roughly US$400 trillion of new investments 
will be made into fixed capital (that is, total global 
investment in the economy) over the same time period. 
This is based on World Bank data on the historic ratio of 
Fixed Capital Formation to GDP, and OECD projections of 
GDP growth.
In comparison, the above IEA estimates imply that the 
total investment needs for energy are 9% of fixed capital 
formation without taking any climate action, and 12% 
including the extra costs of low-carbon investments. While 
these are significant additional capital requirements, 
our assessment is that 3 percentage points additional 
investment in energy, as proportion of total investment, 
is modest relative to the overall scale of capital formation 
likely to occur over the next 15 years. The challenge 
will be to generate the required quantity of attractive 
investments, through technology improvements and 
supporting policy, and to direct available sources of capital 
into such investments.
Table 2 breaks down incremental cost for a 2°C scenario 
for high-, middle-, and low-income countries.
4.2 Lower-risk, low-carbon  
energy investments
Earlier we outlined how incremental investment needs 
to be adjusted for operating expenses, asset life, risk and 
stranded asset to assess the full financial impact of an 
energy transition. Figure 5 makes this adjustment for one 
of the key components of the transition, the transition in 
electricity to move to low-carbon energy to replace fossil 
fuel-fired generation. 
This analysis is based on a comparison of the IEA’s 
business-as-usual and 2°C (2DS) scenarios, as well  
as additional market and financial analysis undertaken  
by the Commission. As such, it represents just one 
example of how low-carbon investment needs would 
translate into an actual financial impact on the  
economy. Many different paths could be taken to a  
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Box 7 
Air pollution control in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region of China 
Table 2
Energy investment needs as a proportion of total fixed capital formation, under a 2°C scenario
low-carbon future, and the Commission believes that 
policy-makers will follow this type of analysis in  
evaluating policy paths for a low-carbon transition. 
Amortisation and operating expenses
As shown in Figure 5 (“Increased Low-Carbon  
Expense”), our analysis shows that US$2.8 trillion52 of  
additional capital will be used, or amortised, between 
2015 and 2035 for renewable energy, nuclear energy, 
carbon capture and sequestration and transmission under 
the IEA’s 2DS scenario compared to business as usual. 
Our analysis also indicates that by the end of 2035, an 
additional incremental US$4 trillion of low-carbon  
assets (not pictured) would have been invested and be  
on the books and available for continued production  
after 2035. Thus, although US$6.8 trillion of capital is  
invested, only US$2.8 trillion of this capital is amortised 
during this period. Amortisation is lower than total  
capital investment during this period because a 
mortisation is spread out over the entire lifetime of  
the asset. 
The incremental costs of operating the additional plants, 
including nuclear fuel, will consume an addition US$1 
trillion between 2015 and 2035. These estimates are 
based on the IEA investment paths, and on Commission 
modelling for upstream gas, oil and coal, based on 
commercial databases, including the Rystad oil and 
gas production economics database and a variety 
of industry and government data sources (see the 
discussion on stranded assets for further detail). Table 3 
shows an application of various return and amortisation 
assumptions to different types of investment, based on 
industry and company analysis.
Coal mining is less investment-intensive than low-carbon 
energy, but it requires substantial operating costs to mine 
the coal and transport it to the power station where it will 
be used. Coal-fired power stations themselves also have 
higher operating expenses than comparable renewable 
energy generators. Our analysis shows that reducing coal 
and gas consumption in power plants will avoid about 
US$1.7 trillion of capital investment from 2015-2035 
(and avoid a further US$2.8 trillion on the books in 2035). 
Meanwhile, operating expenses – excluding fuel use in 
power plants which is already accounted for in the fuel 
production expenses – will fall by US$5.5 trillion.
Thus, while the transition will consume US$1.1 trillion 
more capital during the period, total costs, after including 
amortisation and operating expenses, actually fall by 
US$3.5 trillion.
Financing costs
However, the story does not end there, for assets require 
investment returns — that is, they incur financing costs 
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Box 7 
Air pollution control in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region of China 
Figure 5
Increased investment in low-carbon technology is offset by avoided operating and  
financing costs
Source: Climate Policy Initiative analysis, using data from IEA, 2012; IEA, 2014; Platts, and Rystad.51 
— based on the entire value of the investment, not just 
the portion that is used (amortised) during a given period. 
The total amount of investment will be much larger for 
the low-carbon asset group, and therefore financing 
costs are higher as well. Nevertheless, the differences in 
returns required are not as large as the differences in total 
investment because the low-carbon assets are generally 
lower-risk than the high-carbon assets they replace. 
While fossil fuel generation technologies are well-
established, fossil fuel investment must still manage 
substantial risks across the supply chain, including 
exploration and transportation of the fuel. The riskiness 
of fossil fuels can be observed in their historically volatile 
prices. Fossil fuel power-generating assets are exposed 
to this risk, as fossil fuels have to be purchased as inputs. 
This is particularly true when the fossil fuel generator is 
participating in a competitive electricity market and is not 
guaranteed a fixed return for the power it sells. 
Renewable energy investments, by contrast, are not 
exposed to volatile inputs, and deliver electricity over the 
life of the investment at low operating costs (up to 90% 
of the total cost of a wind or solar plant is in the initial 
investment) and with a high degree of predictability. Thus, 
renewable energy sources can supply electricity at lower 
risk, if not at lower cost, than fossil fuel generators. 
Whether the inherent low risk of renewable energy 
translates to a low cost of capital depends on the policy 
and market structures in place. If renewable energy 
generators participate alongside fossil fuel generators in a 
competitive market, they will receive a market price based 
on fossil fuel costs — and will still be exposed to fossil fuel 
price risk. However, if renewable energy generators can 
sign long-term contracts to provide power to a credible 
off-taker, they are not exposed to fuel price risks. 
Operating expenses (excluding fuel for power plants)
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Table 3
Return requirements and amortisation periods for different categories of high- and  
low-carbon assets 
The lower risk of renewable energy sources could lead to 
lower overall financing costs as equity investors require 
a lower rate of return, and more of the total investment 
can be financed through debt. The lower financing costs 
reduce energy prices and free capital for savings and 
investment. From the investor side, relatively risk-tolerant 
capital is then freed to invest in new businesses elsewhere 
in the economy.
Once the incremental cost and relative risk of investments 
is considered, modelling for the Commission suggests 
that the transition will require US$600 billion of 
additional investment return to investors over the twenty 
year period.
Stranded assets
Stranded assets are the final piece. Owners of fossil fuel 
assets would find that the value of their assets might fall 
in a transition. Valuable assets and the cash flows that 
they generate are used to underpin future investments. 
Reducing the value of these assets removes investment 
potential from the economy. Unlike capital and operating 
expenses, declining asset value does not represent a cost, 
but a one-time hit to the financial system. Therefore, this 
investment loss to 2015 was discounted to reflect the 
impact on the system.53  For the power transition, asset 
stranding – or the decline in asset value which reflects 
potential reduced prices for ongoing production, as well 
Average investment 
life in years
(Amortisation)
Return on investment 
(weighted average  
cost of capital)
Coal mining – internationally traded coal, 
or domestic markets in countries with 
lower financing costs
Coal mining – domestic markets in 
countries with high financing costs
Renewable energy – countries with low 
interest rates
Renewable energy and fossil  
fuel generation – countries with high  
interest rates
Gas transport investment – 
global markets
Fossil fuel generation – countries with low 
interest rates
Carbon capture  
and storage
Gas upstream investment
Nuclear generation
Transmission
15
15
10
25
25
30
25
20
20
20
9%
12%
12%
6%
10%
6%
6%
10%
6%
10%
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The electricity transition is not the only one that involves 
a trade-off between higher capital expense, lower risk 
and lower operating costs. The same story plays out in an 
oil transition to higher electric vehicle penetration, fuel 
substitution, more mass transit and higher efficiency. 
In this case, the analysis again used a combination of the 
IEA 2DS and business-as-usual scenarios with modelling 
for the Commission. It was found that a combination of 
lower operating costs, savings from reduced oil production, 
refining, transport and fossil fuel powertrains, and 
lower price risk almost entirely offset the higher capital 
investment, compared with the business-as-usual scenario. 
In total, before considering stranded assets, the global 
transition would cost around US$750 billion cumulatively 
for 2015–2035.
Regarding asset stranding, oil supply and demand curve 
modelling and analysis were used to demonstrate the 
impact of different policies. The impact of the transition 
on consumers as well as producers and the government 
was explored. The impact that lower demand would have 
on benchmark, wholesale oil prices is far more important 
to producers as a group than lost production. But when 
prices fall, consumers benefit. The net cost or benefit to 
the economy is the net of costs or benefits to producers, 
consumers and government tax receipts. 
The result depends on the chosen policy. If customers lose 
value through reduced consumption or from being forced 
to switch transport due to costs – for instance through 
higher consumption taxes – the economy loses out because 
of consumers’ loss of value. However, if innovative new and 
lower-cost transport options – perhaps developed through 
innovation policy – attract consumers away from oil-based 
transport, the economy wins. Including all of the cost 
elements, a purely tax or cost-based policy would cost  
the economy US$2.5 trillion over 20 years while  
pure innovation would save US$3.5 trillion. In practical 
terms, a mix of policies will be needed as higher prices 
 are a major spur to innovation and tax receipts can be  
used to invest in innovation. Meanwhile, the more 
successful innovation is, the lower taxes will be needed 
 to reach a low-carbon trajectory.
Box 6
The financial consequences of another transition – reducing oil use in transport 
and the central role of policys
Source: Climate Policy Initiative, using data from IEA, 2012; IEA, 2014; Platts, and Rystad.54
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as delayed or curtailed production resulting from the 
transition – is estimated at approximately US$1.1 trillion. 
Coal mining investments comprise the majority of lost 
value, with gas production assets accounting for a smaller 
part of the impact. The impact on power plants is relatively 
small, as there are available policies to manage coal plant 
stranding risk. The US$1.1 trillion estimate is likely to 
significantly overstate the impact on financial markets as 
valuations currently seem likely to reflect some action 
towards reduced fossil fuel use, as discussed in Box 6.
Summing the above calculations, after accounting for the 
cost of finance and the one-time cost  of asset stranding, 
the analysis shows that the transition would have a net 
financial benefit of about US$1.8 trillion. However it 
should be noted that this is based on just one scenario, 
and that the IEA scenarios assume a significant increase 
in energy efficiency in the 2DS. The analysis has not 
attempted to value either the investment or operating 
costs of energy efficiency, except to note that much energy 
efficiency, if it can be achieved, has a net financial benefit, 
some, but not all, of which is reflected in the US$1.8 
trillion figure.
5. Addressing stranded asset risk and 
the cost to fossil fuel asset owners 
5.1 Stranded assets and the capacity finance 
growth and investment
While capital expenses, operating expenses and even 
financial expenses have easily visible, tangible impacts 
on the flows of money within an economy, the effect of 
the final element of our impact analysis – stranded assets 
– can seem less obvious. The term “stranded assets” 
comes from the regulatory and economic concept where 
a change to technology, regulation or markets can leave 
assets “stranded”, reducing their usefulness and reducing 
or even eliminating their economic value.55
When the value of an existing asset falls, there is no 
obvious immediate cash impact on the economy. However, 
there is still an important impact on the ability of an 
economy to finance its growth and investment needs. Take 
the example of a homeowner whose house value falls 50%. 
After the price drop, the owner may no longer be able to 
borrow against the house to finance home improvements 
or even buy additional properties, and in the worst case, 
may no longer be able to pay off the debt. For the energy 
industries, stranded assets related to the transition could 
be particularly important if the very companies that are 
expected to finance the transition, such as electric utilities, 
are the ones who no longer have the financial firepower to 
make new investments.
For the purposes of evaluating the impact of stranded 
assets on the financing of a transition, several concepts 
should be highlighted:
• Value rather than output: The financial impact of 
stranded assets is not about lost production, but lost 
value. For example, under our evaluation scenario, 
even oil producers whose output is unaffected by the 
transition could see the value of their oil production 
fall by up to 60% due to falling wholesale oil prices 
that result when demand declines.
• A loss in wealth, not an ongoing cost: Stranded assets 
are a one-time hit to expected or perceived wealth 
rather than an ongoing drain in expenses. It is this loss 
in wealth that could make it more difficult to finance 
the transition. The impact on the ability to finance 
the transition is thus roughly the same as a one-time, 
unexpected cash cost.
• Expectations matter: Since stranded assets affect 
markets through declines in expected wealth against 
which financing can be secured, expectations matter. 
If the market already expected the policy changes 
that would lead to a full transition, and further 
had included the impact of these changes in asset 
valuations, there would be no asset stranding impact 
on financial markets.
5.2 Economic modelling and scenario analysis 
to inform better policies 
The impact of a low-carbon transition on asset stranding 
will depend on the starting point, the end point, and 
the process and trajectory of getting there. Thus, 
current market expectations, the ultimate shape of the 
transformed economy, and the policy, technology and 
economic paths followed during the transition determine 
the stranded asset impact, for it is these three elements 
that will define the surprise or adjustment that investors 
will need to make.
Describing these three more fully, it is possible to guess, 
but never fully know, what market participants are 
thinking based on interviews, asset prices and analysis. 
The set of assets and industries that comprise a future 
low-carbon economy can be envisaged, but many versions 
of that economy are possible, and new possibilities will 
continue to develop over time as new technologies 
develop and unforeseen advances and costs reductions 
are made. As for policy change and the shape of the 
transition, the Commission sees the evaluation of potential 
policy paths, including their impact and consequences, 
as one of the critical responsibilities of policy-makers 
worldwide.
To begin this process of evaluation and quantification of 
stranded assets and their impact, two scenarios are used 
as starting points. The first scenario is based on business-
as-usual, where no additional climate relevant policy 
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action is taken. The second is based on the IEA’s following 
– broadly consistent – low-carbon scenarios; the 2°C 
scenario (2DS) from the Energy Technology Perspectives 
2012 modelling,56 the 450 ppm scenario from the World 
Energy Outlook 2013,57  and the 450 ppm scenario from 
the 2014 World Energy Investment Outlook.58 The term 
450 ppm refers to the level of greenhouse gases, in parts 
per million of carbon dioxide equivalent in the atmosphere, 
consistent with avoiding more dangerous climate change. 
Both of our scenarios are likely to overstate the impact of 
stranded assets: 
• The business-as-usual scenarios are likely to 
imply higher asset valuations than current market 
expectations, as investors assume at least some policy 
action to curb greenhouse gas emissions. For example, 
major oil companies such as Exxon and Shell typically 
use reasonably high carbon prices in their investment 
evaluation process.59 Furthermore, metrics that 
investors typically use to value companies, including 
price-to-earnings60 (forward PE) and five-year growth 
expectations, show that markets expect industries like 
integrated oil and gas companies and electric utilities 
to grow more slowly than the market in general.
• The scenarios based on IEA 2DS and 450 ppm reflect 
a feasible path to a low-carbon economy based on 
current technologies. However, as technology and 
the economy evolve, new, low-cost carbon-reducing 
opportunities are likely to emerge, while existing ones 
will become cheaper. By reacting and selecting the set 
with the lowest cost, even the path all the way to 2DS 
is likely to become less costly, with different sets of 
asset stranding. For example, the rapid decline in solar 
PV pricing has exceeded expectations from just two 
years ago.
Thus, the business-as-usual and 2°C/450 ppm scenarios 
are not used as definitive numbers. They are used as 
guides with the following aims: to help quantify the 
potential impact of stranded assets; understand how asset 
stranding costs could be distributed; and identify the 
potential impact of policy on stranding and implications 
for policy-makers. For example, the results would be 
quantitatively but not directionally different had we 
modelled scenarios more consistent with 2.5°C or 3°C 
of global warming (i.e. 550 ppm rather than 450 ppm 
stabilisation levels).
5.3 Governments bear the biggest risk of  
value loss due to an energy transition
Stranded assets are often viewed solely from the 
perspective of investors and investor-owned companies. 
It is these investors, after all, who may not be able to 
invest in new assets once they find their balance sheets 
weakened by declining asset values. 
However, when assessing the impact on the global 
economy, governments and even consumers have an 
important part to play. A government that could no 
longer rely on oil exports earnings might find it harder 
to borrow money or invest in infrastructure. Thus, when 
examining stranded assets, producers, both investor- and 
government-owned, are considered first, and then in the 
case of oil, the analysis is extended further to consumers. 
After all, falling prices may impact an oil producer, but 
depending on how these flow through to retail prices they 
could benefit a consumer. A consumer with more cash in 
their pocket could spend or invest the money that could 
then flow back into more investment. 
Beginning with producers, governments and government-
owned companies own well over half of global fossil fuel 
assets by output and reserves. Even for those assets 
produced by commercial enterprises and owned by 
investors, governments typically extract significant 
value through royalties or taxes. Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that governments, rather than investors, face 
the greatest risk of stranding, as shown in Figure 6.
These figures only include the value that governments 
receive from exports and the taxes and royalties they 
garner from commercial enterprises operating in their 
own country. These numbers do not include the profits 
that governments make on their own consumers, as this 
is, essentially, just another form of taxation that could be 
replaced with other taxes with the same economic effect. 
In fact, many countries choose not to collect all of this 
profit, instead subsidising their consumers (by comparison 
with the world price). While they face 70% of the risk as 
measured by the difference in value between a business-
as-usual scenario and a 2DS scenario, if the value that 
governments could make on their own consumers were to 
be included, the figure would be well above 80%. 
5.4 Stranding of coal: more carbon reduction 
for lower stranding risks
• Based on the stranded assets modelling conducted for 
the Commission, nearly 80% of the fossil fuel-related 
CO
2
 emissions reductions in low-carbon scenarios 
come from the reduction in coal production and use. 
Summing the above calculations, 
after accounting for the cost of 
finance and the one-time cost  of 
asset stranding, the analysis shows 
that the transition would have 
a net financial benefit of about 
US$1.8 trillion.
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Figure 6
Governments lose more than private investors if fossil fuel consumption is reduced
Source: Climate Policy Initiative modelling, based on data from Rystad and Platts.
This refers to the reduction in carbon emissions 
required to stay on a 2°C pathway. At the same  
time, coal only represents approximately 12% of  
the potential stranded asset cost. Therefore, if  
asset stranding is a major concern, then focusing  
on reducing coal use makes economic sense. 
Furthermore, approximately 70% of coal  
consumption is in the power sector. As outlined  
above, a low-carbon transition in the power 
generation sector could yield a net benefit to the 
global economy.
5.5 Coal-fired power plant risks compared 
with oil, gas or coal
Regarding the coal sector, coal-fired power plants may 
be stranded in addition to coal reserves. Here, asset 
stranding costs to meet the IEA low-carbon scenarios are 
comparatively even smaller, at just over US$32 billion.  
All of this risk is in the developed world, as the IEA  
low-carbon scenarios include a modest amount of  
growth in coal-fired power plants in developing countries. 
The risk for power plants is small for a number of reasons:
• Unlike coal, gas or oil there are no reserves to strand, 
only production assets.
• In the developed economies, recent air pollution 
legislation, such as the Large Combustion Plant 
Directive (LCPD) in Europe and the Mercury and 
Air Toxic Standards (MATS) in the US, has led to the 
retirement, or pending retirement, of coal-fired power 
plants. In these cases of retirement, the plant owners 
decided to close plants rather than invest in upgrades 
to reduce pollutants like SOx, NOx or particulates. 
This impact is shown in Figure 7.
• Some of the remaining plants in developed countries 
are old and without investing in life extension could 
be nearing retirement. It is assumed that all plants 
that have pollution control retire “early” at 60 years, 
while those that do not retire at 40 years. Based on 
the prevalent market prices for power, coal and other 
costs, it is calculated that the value that these plants 
forgo by not operating an additional 20 years, once 
life extension and maintenance costs are considered. 
In Europe, the additional value of these plants is 
particularly small, since we assume that the market 
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Five data sources influence the calculation of the 
potential value at risk in any given sector: price, 
quantity, production cost, ownership and taxes. Below 
is a description of how the data were sourced for the 
analysis: 
• Production cost, ownership and taxes are allocated 
based on commercially available data sources, such 
as the Rystad database of 66,000 global oil and gas 
fields and various other cost and ownership data 
sources. 
• For the price and quantity of coal, gas and oil 
production, supply and demand modelling was 
developed to forecast which production would be 
curtailed because it is too expensive to operate 
under different scenarios and how prices in 
commodity markets would react to falling demand 
under a transition.
 - These supply models are based on aggregations 
of cash costs and investment costs from the 
same data sources, adjusted to account for 
the impact of sunk costs, transport costs, 
investment returns and in the case of gas, the 
interrelationship between oil and gas supplies.
 - The oil demand model is based on International 
Monetary Fund forecasts for country-by-
country GDP growth, and historical multipliers 
for the relationship between GDP and oil 
Box 7
Evaluating stranded asset risk for fossil fuel assets 
consumption in the absence of price changes.  
How demand would change for any given future 
price expectations is then forecast, based  
on a number of studies of oil sensitivity to  
price changes.
 - Demand for coal oil, gas and power under the 
low-carbon scenarios is based directly on the IEA 
low-carbon scenarios.. 
 - By comparing these demand estimates against the 
supply curves generated by the supply models, 
market price and which production assets will be 
needed in a given year can be estimated.
With this in hand, price minus cost is the value achieved 
per unit of production which can then be multiplied by 
quantity or output to define yearly profit. This profit is 
split between royalties and taxes and corporate profits, 
and then assigned the specific assets to companies and 
countries. Annual profits from 2015 to 2035 are then 
discounted to estimate value for any given asset.  
A discount rate of 8% is used to represent the return  
in the general market that the re-invested revenues  
from these assets could support were they not to be 
stranded. Higher or lower discount rates affect the 
headline number, but do not materially alter the relative 
impact and insight that this analysis brings. Finally, asset 
values are compared by owner between the business-
as-usual and low-carbon scenarios to estimate the asset 
stranding impact on various players.
expects that carbon prices will return, over time, to 25 
euros per tonne. As a result, some US$28 billion of the 
US$32 billion of stranding risk occurs in the US.
• Some of the plants that remain will be converted to 
low load factor, more highly flexible plants, and not 
therefore written off entirely. There are significant 
limits to the ultimate flexibility that can be achieved, 
depending on market design. The modelling 
conducted suggests that some power plants may be 
able to maintain profitability in a renewable-heavy 
generation system by offering flexibility services in 
support of the renewable energy build-out.
While there need be no risk of stranding to existing assets 
in the developing world, building of additional, new coal-
fired plants will pose a dilemma. These additional power 
plants would either lead to stranding of existing assets, 
or the world would miss its low-carbon targets. In other 
words, the largest risk facing coal plant owners is that 
additional plants, once built, will reduce the value of their 
plant. Within the context of the IEA 450 ppm scenario, 
Figure 8 demonstrates the dilemma facing rapidly growing 
countries, particularly China and India. The figure shows 
coal-fired power plants that are under construction or 
planned, based on the Platts power plant database and 
the IEA. In India and China, the plants under construction 
alone, if completed, would push these countries past the 
targets outlined in the IEA 450 ppm scenario. (Russia 
includes 3 GW of early retirement.)
Beyond the stranded asset risk, this analysis highlights the 
urgent need to develop low-cost, low-carbon alternatives, 
including energy efficiency and renewables, to avoid the need 
to build more coal-fired power plant to support economic 
growth. CCS technology would also allow for more build-out 
of fossil fuel generation without stranding assets.
Here, asset stranding costs to meet 
the IEA low-carbon scenarios are 
comparatively even smaller, at just 
over US$32 billion
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Figure 7
Current pollution regulation, retirements and load factor reductions are enough to meet IEA 
low-carbon scenarios for coal-fired power plant
Source: Climate Policy Initiative analysis, using data from the European Commission (LCPD retirement projections), IEA, and Platts
5.6 How policy can turn oil industry stranded 
asset risk into a net economic benefit
Nearly three-quarters of stranding risk lies in the oil 
industry. The risk is high partly because oil reserves are 
relatively large and continue to grow. The most important 
reason, however, lies in the global supply curve for oil 
and the relative sensitivity of oil prices to demand. As 
descried in Box 6, we have modelled supply and demand 
for oil through 2035 as a function of the oil price. When 
oil demand falls, the most expensive new production is 
no longer needed and the remaining producers compete 
to sell oil into an oversupplied market. Prices are likely 
to fall as a result, notwithstanding the unusual structural 
characteristics of the global oil market. 
To assess the stranding risk, the producer price for oil 
that would be consistent with output at the IEA 450 ppm 
scenario levels was forecast. This was then compared 
with the forecast of oil demand and supply based on the 
analysis set out in Box 6. Additionally, the impact that 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) members could have was modelled. It was  
found that given recent changes to non-OPEC supply  
and at these levels of demand, OPEC would be unlikely  
to be able to maintain, or benefit from, higher oil prices  
as the lost profit from production they would need to  
remove from the market would exceed the benefits of the 
higher prices.
This modelling demonstrates an important dilemma in 
the oil transition. If demand falls to the 450 ppm level, oil 
prices are likely to fall. By 2035, the 450 ppm price for oil 
could be less than half of our forecast for the business-as-
usual scenario. This decline in price is the most important 
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Figure 8
Coal-fired power plant under construction and planned versus IEA 450 ppm scenario 
contributor to oil asset stranding risk. Indeed, our natural 
gas market modelling suggests that by 2030, low oil prices 
would also begin to suppress the price of liquefied natural 
gas and cause further risks there.
Yet, if prices were to stay low, and no other action was 
taken, demand would grow. The demand modelling suggests 
that prices would need to be almost 40% higher than the 
business-as-usual case to supress demand to the 450 ppm 
levels. With higher prices, over time consumers would buy 
more efficient cars or electric vehicles and move closer to 
work, logistics chains would shift to reduce transport costs, 
and prices would spark innovation in new energy saving.
The question for the transition is how to bridge the gap 
between producer prices and consumer prices consistent 
with the lower demand. Two solutions emerge:
• Impose energy taxes (or in the case of many countries, 
remove subsidies) to give consumers price signals 
equivalent to that of higher commodity prices, while 
the resulting decline in demand leads to lower prices 
for producers; or,
• Innovate to shift demand by creating low-cost or 
more attractive alternatives. Governments can 
induce innovation through several channels, including 
implementing financial incentives, imposing fuel 
economy standards, and sponsoring research.
For either of these solutions, the impact on the economy 
and investment extends beyond just the stranding loss 
faced by producers. With taxes, governments will benefit 
from tax receipts, while consumers will suffer from higher 
prices; although governments could, presumably, lower 
other taxes to compensate them for their higher costs.  
In the case of innovation, consumers will benefit  
from lower fuel prices, as even in the 450 ppm case  
oil demand continues at around 80% of today’s level.
When taxes are the primary mechanism for  
consumption reduction, the net stranding impact –  
broadly defined to include governments, producers  
and consumers – amounts to US$3 trillion of lost  
Source: Climate Policy Initiative analysis, using data from IEA, Platts
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Figure 9
Consumer prices required to suppress demand to 450 ppm targets versus  
implied producer prices 
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value.61 This figure accounts for all of the investment 
required to make the transition happen on the consumer 
side as well as the producer side, as the consumer 
response inherent in our demand curves effectively value 
the trade-off that a consumer would see, for instance, in 
moving a warehouse closer to consumers to reduce 
transportation costs.
Alternatively, if innovation could spark a transition without 
the need for consumer trade-offs, taxes would not be 
needed and the benefits of lower fuel expenses to 
consumers would outweigh the stranding of producer 
assets by US$7 trillion. Clearly, innovation is unlikely to be 
costless and some consumer trade-offs could be useful. 
This suggests that the eventual answer lies somewhere in 
between. A mix of tax incentives and investments in 
innovation will lead the net stranding costs to lie 
somewhere between these two extremes. 
5.7 Investors face risks, but it is policy action 
that matters
While governments bear the majority of risk, the threat of 
asset stranding is real and could have a significant impact 
on overall investment performance. As in Box 8, many 
financial investors may choose to ignore the dilemma by 
maintaining equal weight positions – that is investments 
that reflect the share of fossil fuel in the overall market – 
Source: Climate Policy Initiative analysis, using data from IEA, IMF and Rystad.
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Many institutional investors and sovereign wealth funds 
seek to maintain or grow their relative share of the 
global or regional economy. These investors diversify 
across the entire economy, owning shares of industries 
in correspondence to their weight in the market. They 
continually rebalance to maintain an equal weighted 
portfolio. For these investors, taking a position different 
from the benchmark constitutes a risk. Thus, owning 
less than the market share of the fossil fuel sectors 
constitutes a risk as much as having too much exposure.
If these investors are convinced that the market is 
underestimating the risk that policy will change, and 
therefore the oil and gas sector is overvalued, they 
might reduce their investments in the oil and gas sector, 
seeking to outperform the market based on this insight. 
If enough investors take this stance, the relative share 
prices of oil companies would fall and markets would 
rebalance. In this respect, current valuations reflect 
average market perceptions as to whether policies  
like taxation or innovation will be implemented, and 
how strongly. 
The risk to investors is that they have over- or 
underestimated the impact and timing of the potential 
new policies, technology changes, or public opinion. 
Many investors avoid this risk by maintaining equal 
weight positions and then rebalancing their portfolios 
each time relative valuations change. An investor 
pursuing such a strategy would maintain their market-
like performance. Only those investors who are 
overweight in sectors, especially those locked into 
illiquid, or difficult to sell, positions, would bear risk 
that policy change might accelerate. We note that 
many sovereign wealth funds in hydrocarbon-rich 
countries are already overly exposed to fossil fuels and 
derive new cash flows from their fossil fuel revenues; 
they would benefit from diversifying their investment 
portfolios away from hydrocarbons, and many are 
already doing so.
Box 8
Institutional investors manage  
their portfolios in ways that minimise 
stranding risk
in the fossil fuel industry and avoiding illiquid assets that 
could trap them as policy changes.
Yet others may choose to bet that the market is not 
pricing all of the risk of the sector into asset values, and 
thus maintain little or zero exposure to the sector. Others 
may view the risk as being overstated by the market and 
thus increase their exposure to the sector. At the end of 
the day, it is policy that will drive the transition, and it is 
investors’ views on policy development that will lead them 
to take a position on investing in the sector. Uncertainty 
around policy will lead to a wider range of investor 
views, which will, in turn, facilitate a divergence of views 
amongst corporate investors in actual projects. Where 
there is a divergence of views, there will be a greater risk 
that corporate investors may invest in assets that could 
eventually be stranded.
The short and simple lesson is that policy ambiguity not 
only increases the medium- to long-term risk of significant 
asset stranding. It also affects short-term economic 
performance by reducing investment activity, including the 
creation of associated jobs; and it also adversely affects 
medium-term economic performance by limiting the 
productivity benefits that better energy infrastructure 
could have generated. Sending clear policy signals – 
possibly including an effective carbon pricing or energy 
tax regime and investments in innovation together with 
appropriate sectoral policies – is the most direct way to 
limit stranded asset risk and at the same time, to reduce 
investor uncertainty.
6. Recommendations
Investment in low-carbon energy can both strengthen 
economic growth and cut carbon emissions. Mobilising 
capital presents a challenge, however, because a  
low-carbon transition requires new and sometimes 
unfamiliar assets and policies. Low-carbon policies will  
also impact the value of existing assets. 
The Commission makes recommendations to 
governments, financial regulators, and national and 
multilateral development banks along these two themes: 
how to stimulate low-carbon investment, and reduce the 
cost impact of stranded assets.
6.1 Stimulating investment in  
low-carbon assets
• Provide long-term policy signals possibly including 
carbon pricing, resource pricing and regulation. 
These will ensure that there is a robust business case 
to invest in a low-carbon economy. Further details 
of policies to reform asset pricing are provided in 
Chapter 5: Economics of Change.
• Develop financing arrangements, industry  
structures and market designs that reflect the 
infrastructure characteristics of many of the assets 
underpinning the low-carbon transition. These 
assets particularly include renewable energy and the 
electricity sector:
• Develop commercial investment vehicles that 
provide investors direct access to low-carbon 
infrastructure including renewable energy. This 
contrast with the present model of investing as 
shareholders in renewable energy developers 
including utilities. These alternative investment 
vehicles, including YieldCos, municipal finance, and 
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crowd-funding, may reduce the annual investment 
return requirement by 1-2% and in so doing reduce 
the cost of renewable energy by up to 20%.
• Explore expanding direct financing of low-
carbon infrastructure by regional, municipal and 
national governments, potentially using national 
infrastructure banks, infrastructure bonds, and 
green bonds to reduce capital costs. Such direct 
infrastructure finance also reduces renewable 
energy costs by as much as 20%.
• In middle-income countries facing high interest 
rate environments, replace all or a portion of 
support for low-carbon infrastructure, such 
as feed-in tariffs, with low-cost debt. This 
could reduce the total subsidy (including debt 
concession) by as much as 30% or more; reduce 
the cost of energy; and harness other benefits 
from renewable energy such as reducing foreign 
currency needs to buy imported fossil fuel.
• Develop or strengthen the capabilities of  
national development banks to perform this  
new role of providing low-cost debt to low-carbon 
infrastructure projects, while enhancing  
systems to ensure the efficiency of project 
selection and development. These banks may be 
an appropriate conduit for international financial 
flows into the industry. 
• For low-income countries, continue multilateral 
and bilateral development bank assistance as a 
major source of investment and aid for energy 
system and infrastructure development. Enhance 
development cooperation to support country-led 
domestic policy and regulatory reforms that can 
strengthen enabling conditions for investment in 
energy infrastructure. These institutions should 
review their policies to ensure that development 
is consistent with a low-carbon transition, 
including the phase out of high carbon projects. 
Where needed, development finance institutions 
should be strengthened or created to support 
low-carbon financing.
• In both developed and developing countries, 
consider restructuring the electricity industry, 
market design, and regulation in accordance with 
the financial and operating characteristics of  
low-carbon infrastructure, and in so doing lower 
the cost of capital for low-carbon energy.
6.2 Reducing the cost impact of stranded fossil 
fuel assets
• Develop transition arrangements that account for 
and minimise the impact of asset stranding:
• In all countries, focus on opportunities to reduce 
consumption of coal. Commission modelling 
suggests that coal represents an opportunity to 
achieve 80% of the emissions reductions under 
IEA’s low-carbon scenarios with only 12% of total 
stranded asset value.
• In high-income countries, avoid investment in 
coal-fired power plant, including new build and 
life extension. Retire existing plant at the end of 
their normal life or when major refurbishment 
would be required.
• One exception to the no new investment  
rule would be investment designed to increase 
the flexibility of coal-fired power plant in ways 
that would support renewable energy and  
enable reduced operating hours of coal-fired 
power plant (and emissions) while  
maintaining profitability.
• In emerging markets, slow down the construction 
and planning of new coal-fired power plant, 
as new-build plants could create a significant 
stranding risk to existing plants.
• To maintain economic growth in rapidly 
developing countries while slowing growth in 
coal-fired power plant, there is an urgent need 
to develop and scale alternative technologies, 
low-carbon manufacturing capabilities, energy 
efficiency and low-cost financing arrangements to 
create viable and cost effective replacements for 
coal as an energy source.
• In general, across all of the high-carbon 
investment sectors, the transition from the fossil 
fuel investment should be addressed by demand 
strategies. For example, oil use in transport should 
be gradually reduced through a combination of 
consumer taxes and innovation in alternatives and 
vehicle efficiency standards.
• With oil-producing country governments  
facing the greatest asset stranding risk, there  
will be a need to address and manage the 
budgetary consequences of reduced demand and 
the falling oil prices that would result. This should 
include more rapid phasing out of current fossil 
fuel subsidies.
• For net consuming countries, policies used 
to reduce demand will need to be developed 
carefully, but the benefits to net consuming 
countries of lower fossil fuel prices and energy 
savings could create room for policies to smooth 
the transition and avoid significant distortions 
associated with asset stranding.
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Chapter 7
INNOVATION
Main points
• Innovation is the fundamental engine of long-term growth, and is crucial to enabling economies to grow sustainably. 
Industrialised countries already enjoy the benefits of past innovations that have sharply increased resource 
efficiency. New and emerging technologies could allow them to go even further, while enabling developing countries 
to leapfrog to highly productive, low-carbon economies and improved living conditions.
• Materials science and digitisation hold particularly great potential for economic growth and climate change 
mitigation alike. Combined with business model innovations, technological advances in these fields are driving rapid 
progress in renewable energy and energy efficiency. They are also transforming multiple other sectors in both rich 
and poor countries, including personal transport, buildings, manufacturing, agriculture and consumer goods.  
• One example is a shift to “circular” business models, which dramatically reduce the material and energy-intensity 
of production systems through greater durability and reuse of key product components, and could add up to US$1 
trillion to the global economy by 2025.
• The potential for innovations to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy is enormous, but there are real 
barriers, including the market scale, sunk costs and entrenched incentives for incumbent high-carbon technologies. 
For example, in the construction sector, leading players have shown the potential to achieve radical efficiency gains, 
but those innovations have yet to be widely adopted.  
• Energy-sector public research and development (R&D) is less than half of what it was in the late 1970s, in real terms, 
even amid growing concern about air pollution, energy security and climate change. Knowledge generated by clean 
tech R&D in particular has spillover benefits comparable with those from robotics, IT and nanotechnologies, and new 
patents associated with clean-tech R&D are much likelier to be used by other fields than those associated with fossil 
fuel-based technologies. 
• Stronger incentives for low-carbon innovation – including much greater support for R&D, which has social returns 
estimated at 30-70% – could lead to large economic benefits while lowering the costs of climate risk management. 
Support for market creation is also vital, but needs to be carefully tailored to overcome specific market barriers, and 
to avoid subsidies that are excessive or inhibit competition.
• International collaboration, including financing, technical support and expanded use of patent pools, is essential to 
making low-carbon and climate-resilient technologies available to lower-income countries, and ensuring they have 
the capacity to adopt and adapt them.
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1. Introduction
Innovation is central to economic growth, as long-term 
trends in productivity and growth are largely determined 
by trends in innovation. The importance of innovation is 
a recurring theme throughout this report; it is essential 
to transforming global energy systems, agriculture and 
cities – every aspect of the economy. It also depends on 
and is shaped by factors discussed in other chapters, from 
investment strategies, to effective regulation of markets, 
to international climate policy. 
Innovation also makes it possible to continue growing our 
economies in a world of finite resources. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has projected that if current trends continue, as the world 
population grows from 7 billion in 2010 to more than 
9 billion in 2050, per capita consumption will more than 
triple, from roughly US$6,600 to US$19,700 per year, 
and global GDP will nearly quadruple, requiring 80% 
more energy.1  Achieving growth at anywhere near that 
scale, sustainably, will only be possible with radically new 
business models, products and means of production. 
The Green Revolution, which transformed agriculture in 
the 20th century, allowed humanity to grow more food 
than ever, by leveraging new technologies. Similarly, 
new technologies today, from smart meters to satellites, 
are helping societies use resources more productively. 
This chapter explores the role of innovation in building 
a strong, low-carbon economy. We begin by discussing 
two fundamental areas of innovation where rapid, 
transformative advances are being made – materials 
science and digitisation – and gauge their potential to 
accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy, based 
on trends that are already being observed. In doing so, 
we also demonstrate the importance of business model 
innovations that leverage technological possibilities to 
transform markets.
Next, we explore what needs to happen in order to 
accelerate innovation and its diffusion to a low-carbon 
economy. Finally, we explore some “game-changing” low-
carbon innovations that warrant targeted attention, given 
their potential to transform the economics of climate 
action. We conclude with a series of recommendations. 
We should note that innovation is also covered in 
other sections of this report, especially in Chapter 
3: Land Use, Chapter 4: Energy, and Chapter 5: The 
Economics of Change. 
2. Transformative innovation
Innovation continues to transform how we live, what 
we consume, and how we do business. Two innovation 
areas have large potential to drive systemic change, 
with particular significance for a low-carbon economy: 
materials science and digitisation. This section explores 
these two areas, along with the integral role of innovative 
business models. Other, often inter-related, advances 
in areas such as life sciences are also driving large-scale 
changes, but are not discussed here in detail.2  
Innovations in materials and digitisation are already 
making an impact across the global economy, increasing 
productivity, reshaping entire industries, and creating 
opportunities for leapfrogging, by skipping less efficient 
and more polluting stages of development. 
The impact of digitisation can be seen in “big data” – the 
large and complex data sets that are now available thanks 
to digital technology. Virginia Rometty, chief executive 
of IBM, has described it as “a vast new natural resource, 
which promises to be for the 21st century what steam 
power was for the 18th, electricity for the 19th and 
hydrocarbons for the 20th”.3  As more and more devices 
in our homes, businesses and public infrastructure are 
connected to data networks, they have the potential to 
dramatically increase efficiency, reducing consumption of 
energy and other resources. 
Materials breakthroughs are also transforming products 
all around us. New materials have created new possibilities 
in practically every sector, from pharmaceuticals to 
aerospace. Nanomaterials, formed by particles a billionth 
of a metre, or five orders of magnitude smaller than the 
width of a human hair, are being used in computer chips, 
medical implants, flat-panel displays and satellites. More 
broadly, biologists can now create entirely new life forms 
that can be designed for a certain application, such as 
biofuels with high energy density characteristics targeted 
for aviation.4 
Digitisation and materials science, in tandem with 
innovative business models, are driving economic growth, 
both through incremental improvements and dramatic 
disruption of existing industries. The question we seek 
to answer below is how these forces of innovation can 
support the transition to a low-carbon economy.  
2.1 The potential for a low-carbon transition
The potential for innovation in areas such as new materials 
and digitisation to accelerate and increase the efficiency 
of the transition to a low-carbon, resource-efficient and 
resilient economy is enormous. In fact, such innovation is 
already reducing climate risk. 
In the last 10 years, we have seen a number of materials-
related advancements that lower GHG emissions. New 
and improved materials have driven down the cost and 
improved the performance of wind and solar energy. In the 
US, more than 30% of new electricity generation capacity 
added in 2010–2013 involved solar and wind power, up 
from less than 2% in 2000–2003.5  Advances in materials 
have facilitated large improvements in the efficiency of 
lighting and appliances, including the rapid emergence of 
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Figure 1:
Cloud computing can lead to significant savings in energy and carbon
Note: PUE is the ratio of total amount of energy used by a computer data centre facility to the energy delivered to computing equipment. 
An ideal PUE is 1. Source: Adapted from Google Inc., 2011.11
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light-emitting diodes (LEDs). They have enabled a broad 
array of technologies that improve the energy efficiency of 
the building envelope,6  and they have enabled continual 
improvements in the fuel efficiency of vehicles.7 
Looking ahead, the potential remains large. New advances 
in materials will continue to drive improvements in 
renewable energy, and energy efficiency across the 
transport, buildings and industrial sectors.8  By 2020, it is 
estimated that the US corporate sector could save $120 
billion in annual costs, and reduce annual emissions by 
890 million tonnes of CO
2
e, by utilising renewable energy 
and energy efficiency technologies,9  most of which rely on 
improved materials. Advances in materials are also critical 
to improving energy storage, and carbon capture, use 
and storage. This will include incremental improvements 
in existing materials, as well as the application of more 
advanced materials, such as nanomaterials.
Adoption of digital technologies is gaining traction through 
a range of new business models that reduce capital- and 
energy intensity across the economy. It makes it possible 
to share assets, such as “cloud” storage and online servers, 
or dispense with them altogether by working remotely 
and digitising information. Even in mature manufacturing 
industries, traditional process controls are intersecting 
with system automation to transform factory efficiency. 
Ten years ago, energy was too cheap and data too 
expensive for this to be feasible. Today, the shift in relative 
prices is changing the picture.
Cloud computing is particularly promising, as research 
shows it can increase efficiency and reduce companies’ 
overhead costs, and energy usage and related emissions. 
For example, for an office with 50 people, Google 
estimates IT energy use at 175 kWh per person per  
year, compared with 2.2 kWh when using Gmail  
(see Figure 1).10  Cloud computing also reduces the  
need for in-house hardware and software expertise,  
which can be particularly helpful in poorer countries 
where such skills are less widely available. In that sense, 
information technology is effectively replacing capital in 
many cases. Thus, while there is considerable evidence 
to suggest that a low-carbon economy will be relatively 
capital-intensive, due to the capital costs of renewable 
power, efficient buildings, smart appliances and electric 
vehicles, digital technologies could significantly offset 
Caterpillar, the American machinery and engine 
manufacturer, has been in the remanufacturing 
business for almost 40 years. Its Cat Reman activities 
have improved and expanded over the years, and now 
employ 8,000 workers spread in 68 plants  
in 15 countries. 
Materials make up almost two-thirds of Caterpillar’s 
costs. Through Cat Reman, the company disassembles 
products (called “core”) at the end of their lives, 
cleans all the parts, and salvages all that is reusable. 
This allows the company to boost profit margins, 
make “same-as-new”-condition products available to 
customers at a fraction of the cost of new ones, and in 
the process, reduce waste and greenhouse  
gas emissions. 
In order to intercept products before they break, it is 
crucial to have consistent knowledge of the condition 
of the key components. Typically, this is monitored 
through a regular and simplified maintenance process 
between the dealer and the customer, but Caterpillar 
is now beginning to use digital technology to add 
a “Product Link” service to units in the field. This 
service provides customers with information about 
the condition of their equipment, through a satellite 
connection to a network of Caterpillar dealers.
The pricing structure for remanufactured products is 
different than for new products: an important part of 
the pricing is a core deposit, roughly equal to that of the 
unit itself. Increasing core recovery rates is a challenge 
for any manufacturer engaging in remanufacturing 
activity, so offering an economic incentive to return the 
component is a crucial part of the business model. 
An additional advantage of remanufacturing is its 
faster turnaround of products, allowing delivery of 
remanufactured products at a fraction of the time 
required for delivering a brand-new piece of equipment, 
an important feature in fast-growing economies.
Box 1:
Remanufacturing at Caterpillar14 
those ca ital costs. 
Digital technologies are also changing behaviours at the 
individual level, in ways that could dramatically reduce 
GHG emissions. Digital apps facilitate car- and ride-
sharing schemes, guide riders through public transit, and 
help motorists avoid congested roads and find parking 
more quickly; services such as shopping and banking 
have moved online, reducing the need to travel. In our 
homes, data-rich systems are increasingly able to control 
heating and lighting on a much more reliable basis. In 
some cases, these technologies have the potential to scale 
rapidly: China has already installed nearly 250 million 
smart meters.12  They can also create opportunities 
for lower-income countries to leapfrog higher-income 
For an office with 50 people, 
Google estimates IT energy 
use at 175 kWh per person 
per year, compared with 2.2 
kWh when using Gmail.
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countries – such as by using decentralised renewable 
energy sources and micro-grids to quickly and reliably 
electrify remote and hard-to-reach areas or provide 
backup for emergencies.
Below we look in more detail at examples of the impact 
of these and other key trends on both developed and 
developing countries. We also discuss how low-carbon 
technologies themselves are feeding back into, and 
accelerating, the underlying innovation trends.
2.2 Resource productivity, value chains and 
the ‘circular economy’
Supply chains typically move in one direction: material 
extraction, manufacture, use, and ultimately waste. The 
result of this linear model has been landfills full of useful 
products and components, representing wasted resources 
and lost potential revenues. This is a particular challenge 
for the construction industry, which produces 30–40% of 
global waste and typically has very low reuse and recycling 
rates, except for steel and copper in many countries.13  
Many companies are now looking to an alternative 
to the linear model, attempting to recycle, reuse and 
remanufacture wherever possible. Materials-related 
innovation is at the heart of the “circular economy”, and 
new materials technologies can facilitate the transition, 
with better conversion of used materials to new materials. 
Similarly, digital technology supports market creation, 
helping to match used goods with potential reuse or 
remanufacture markets. This can help substantially with 
monitoring the product “phase”, hence facilitating the 
reuse of product parts.
The practice of restoring used products for resale is 
expanding rapidly. The United States is the largest 
remanufacturer in the world, according to a recent US 
International Trade Commission (ITC) report. 15 The domestic 
remanufacturing industry grew by 15% between 2009 and 
2011 to at least $43.0 billion, supporting 180,000 full-
time US jobs. Even in the midst of a recession, every single 
remanufacturing sector sampled by the ITC reported some 
growth. The market has huge profit potential. 
Should economies successfully move to circular models, 
the Ellen MacArthur Foundation estimates that over US$1 
trillion a year could be generated for the global economy 
by 2025, with 100,000 new jobs created for the next five 
years, while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, capturing these benefits requires businesses to 
operate in new ways, with high cross-sector collaboration 
and alignment. A marked shift to a circular economic 
model would require new skills and systems in areas such 
as reverse logistics and service-based revenue models. 
It also requires regulatory change, from better labelling, 
to reduced consumption taxes on goods with refurbished 
components. Existing laws and regulations may stand 
in the way; for example, regulations on end-of-life of 
products and waste can prohibit higher-value reuse or 
remanufacture. The value-added tax (VAT) treatment can 
make a huge difference to the incentives for a circular 
economy. Effectively, without the right treatment, VAT can 
discriminate against reuse/remanufacturing, because it 
re-taxes goods at every stage of recycling of the product 
into the market.
Finally, it is crucial that recycling and remanufacturing 
efforts be underpinned by policies that ensure safe 
working practices and environmental protection, or else 
they can have substantial social costs. For example, the 
“ship-breaking” industry in Bangladesh, which employs 
over 100,000 people and is the source of 50% of the 
country’s steel, has been found to have severe impacts 
on the environment and people’s health, due to improper 
handling of toxic materials and poor working conditions.16
2.3 Making buildings and materials  
more sustainable
Buildings consume 32% of global energy and produce 
19% of energy-related GHG emissions,17  and the sector 
is expected to continue to grow substantially in the next 
few decades, fuelled by urbanisation in the developing 
world. For both economic and environmental reasons, it 
is important to maximise the efficiency with which energy 
and materials are used in construction, and the efficiency 
of new buildings once they are occupied.
Yet the industry is slow to change. In the words of Zhang 
Yue, chairman and CEO of Broad Group, a Chinese 
prefabricated construction company: “From city planning 
to infrastructure development and building construction, 
from resource consumption to energy use, the industry is 
lagging behind the time in which we live.”18  
This is due in part to the complexity of the building 
process. The energy intensity of a building depends on 
choices made by several different actors at different points 
in time, including architects, urban planners, constructors, 
owners and tenants. It is rife with misaligned incentives, as 
those who would benefit from savings are typically not the 
people making the choices. Finally, the common reliance 
in the sector on prescriptive standards and regulations, 
rather than performance or outcome-based ones, can slow 
innovation rather than encourage it.19  
Nonetheless , the buildings value chain has huge potential 
for improving energy efficiency, reducing GHG impacts 
and creating economic value through various levers, 
including new products that reduce building energy 
use, modular construction and pre-assembly, improved 
building materials, process efficiency in cement and steel, 
circular business models, and sustainable architectural 
design. Digitisation and use of new materials cut  
across the levers, helping to enable previously 
inconceivable improvements.
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New products with great promise include improved 
LED lighting, compressor-less air conditioners, high-
performance windows, advanced thermal insulation, 
and sophisticated sensors and controls, among others. 
These new technologies are often linked to advanced 
building management systems, which optimise building 
performance and reduce energy consumption. 
Modern technologies are also changing the building 
process. Modular construction and pre-assembly 
strategies could significantly reduce raw material use 
and lower construction time. The Broad Group in China, 
whose CEO is quoted above, recently built a 30-storey, 
earthquake-resistant hotel in only 15 days through 
modular construction – a process that typically takes two 
years – and it has managed in some cases to use 96% 
recycled steel.20  Pre-manufacturing the components 
in a factory allows builders to optimise resource use 
during construction, achieving efficiencies similar to a 
manufacturing facility.
Even wood construction is being transformed. Cross-
laminated timber (CLT) panels, made from inexpensive 
wood that is glued or pinned together in layers, can be 
engineered to be as strong as concrete, more energy-
efficient and even fire-resistant. In March 2014, the 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced a 
partnership to train architects, engineers and builders 
in the use of “advanced wood” building materials, and 
plans for a competition to design and build high-rise 
wood demonstration projects.21  Sustainability is a key 
motivation; advocates note that wood is a renewable 
resource, requires less energy to make than concrete 
and steel, and contributes to carbon capture. In the UK, 
the Alliance for Sustainable Building Products (ASBP) 
estimates that policies to encourage increased use of 
wood, hemp, straw, wool and other “biogenic” materials 
in all UK buildings could yield net emission reductions 
of 10 MtCO
2
 per year by 2020 and 22 MtCO
2
 per 
year by 2050; the sector’s total emissions in 2010 are 
estimated at 33 MtCO
2
e.22
Developing countries are also innovating. A joint project 
by the Rwanda Housing Authority and the Global Green 
Growth Institute, for example, looked at ways to develop 
new, locally produced construction materials and 
sustainable and affordable housing units. Researchers 
focused particularly on unburnt bricks made with locally 
available clay mixed with cement, sand and limestone. 
Early results from the assessment of 54 samples identified 
four optimal mixing ratios. When using a semi-automatic 
brick machine, the bricks made following each of those 
ratios were found to have more than twice the average 
compression strength of traditional Rwandan bricks; 
they could also be produced at a fraction of the cost and 
emissions of high-spec bricks.23 
Great potential, but real barriers as well
Without major improvements in energy efficiency and 
materials, building energy use may double or even triple 
by 2050 due to population growth, urbanisation and 
rising incomes – but if cost-effective best practices and 
technologies are widely adopted, energy use could instead 
stay constant or decline.24  Even modest improvements 
can make a real difference: a 10% increase in the efficiency 
of US buildings’ energy use, which now costs about $200 
billion, would not only save money, but also improve air 
quality and reduce GHG emissions by as much as taking 
about 30 million vehicles off the road.25 
However, adoption of these technologies is typically 
inhibited by upfront capital costs, coupled with the 
misaligned incentives discussed above. Innovations 
in business models are now helping to address the 
challenge. For example, through managed energy service 
agreements, independent providers will finance, own, 
operate and maintain efficiency upgrades. In return, 
property owners pay a fee based on their energy savings. 
This model is fast growing in popularity; the energy 
performance contracting market in China grew more than 
40-fold between 2003 and 2010, to US$4.25 billion.26 
New products could also disrupt the construction 
materials markets further up the chain. For instance, 
innovative cements have been developed that are 
low-carbon or even net-negative carbon.27  Whereas 
traditional cement leaves a carbon footprint of around 0.6 
tonnes of CO
2
 per tonne of cement produced, a number 
of companies are developing cements and concretes that 
have the potential to capture as much as 0.75 tonnes of 
CO
2
 per tonne of cement, locking it away indefinitely.28  
However, the cement and steel sectors are often slow 
to adopt substitutes developed with new technology, 
even if they are economically and environmentally 
superior. Both manufacturers and consumers are often 
risk-averse; existing plants are often highly utilised 
and largely a sunk cost, while consumers are bound by 
internal or government standards. Government testing 
and standards for new materials is crucial to allay fears of 
latent defects. Without swifter updating of government 
standards, deployment could easily be delayed for years 
to come. Nevertheless, many governments or large 
purchasers continue to implement prescriptive input-
The Broad Group in China 
built a 30-storey, earthquake-
resistant hotel in only 15 days 
through modular construction.
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based standards for construction materials rather than 
performance-based standards.29 
2.4 Bigger, stronger and ‘smarter’ wind power
The development of wind turbines illustrates how 
digital and new materials technologies can transform a 
single product. 
New materials are making wind turbines bigger, stronger 
and even quieter. The use of carbon fibre in turbine 
blades is allowing for larger and more efficient turbines, 
which achieve more power per land area used and dollar 
invested. Further efficiency gains could be achieved from 
new power electronics – for example, through silicon 
carbide.30  For offshore wind, new materials are being used 
so wind turbines survive in harsh marine environments.31
Digital technology is allowing for “smart wind” that can 
be more easily integrated into electric grids. In eastern 
Colorado, hundreds of wind turbines transmit their 
wind speed and electrical output to the National Center 
for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). There, that data is 
combined with data from weather stations, satellites and 
other wind farms in the state. NCAR uses software to 
make highly accurate forecasts that allow utilities to more 
easily and cheaply integrate the variable wind-generated 
electricity into the grid, by improving the prediction of 
wind speed and thus electricity generation.32
2.5 A virtuous cycle of low-carbon innovation
As demand for low-carbon technologies grows, and 
innovation aimed at those technologies increases, we are 
seeing a virtuous cycle in which innovation aimed at  
low-carbon technologies itself accelerates advances 
in other fields. A recent analysis of patent data across 
countries in the OECD35  has shown that new patents 
associated with clean-tech research and development 
(R&D) are much more likely to be used by other fields than 
are new patents associated with R&D in fossil fuel-based 
technologies. In fact, the knowledge generated by clean 
tech has spillover benefits to other fields comparable to 
the knowledge generated from R&D in robotics, IT  
and nanotechnologies. 
Another analysis, of global patenting rates across all 
energy technologies, shows that renewable energy 
patents (particularly solar and wind) have grown faster 
in recent years than patents in other areas (fossil and 
nuclear), despite there being no corresponding increase 
in total R&D funding.36 The evidence suggests this 
increase is driven by the rapid growth in markets for clean 
energy technologies, and the greater overall potential for 
innovation in such emerging technologies. These factors 
together lead to a greater rate of innovation achievement 
at any given level of R&D funding.
This demonstrates how deeply low-carbon innovation 
is embedded in the current wave of innovation, 
driving economic growth. Further, it strengthens 
the case for public support for low-carbon 
innovation, and weakens the case for public support 
towards fossil fuel-related technologies.
3. Directing innovation to support  
a low-carbon economy
Innovation is agnostic. No matter how much potential 
there is for innovation to advance the low-carbon 
transition, it will not necessarily do so – not on its own. The 
application of new technologies, and the innovations that 
they spawn, are driven by a number of factors, primarily 
market demand for goods and services benefitting from 
those innovations. 
Where the current wave of innovation has the strongest 
impact will be determined by two key factors: market 
demand and public policy. This section examines these two 
factors, with a focus on identifying and removing barriers 
to innovation. 
3.1 Identifying barriers to  
low-carbon innovation
As discussed in the economic policy and energy chapters, 
to ensure our markets work efficiently, it is crucial 
that prices reflect the true costs of carbon and other 
environmental damages. Economic research shows that 
if these costs are not accurately reflected, investment in 
low-carbon technologies is likely to be lower than what 
would benefit society most.37  Industry consultations 
by the Commission indicate a broad agreement that a 
strong carbon price or an equivalent policy that prices 
emissions would greatly accelerate the application of new 
technologies and new business models to low-carbon 
applications.38  We discuss this further below, but first we 
examine several other kinds of barriers that inhibit low-
carbon innovation.
Generally speaking, innovations enter the economy in a 
continual and iterative process encompassing “invention” 
(the creation and development of innovations) and 
“diffusion” (the adoption of new, innovative products and 
services across the economy, often replacing old ones).39   
Different obstacles and constraints arise at different 
points of the process. 
The knowledge generated by 
clean tech has spillover benefits 
to other fields comparable  
to R&D in robotics,  
IT and nanotechnologies.
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adapting their existing capital to new business models  
and processes. This process can be hindered by an array  
of market failures, most notably – but not only – the  
failure to accurately price environmental damages and 
other externalities.
Market failures can hinder the uptake of innovations 
in several ways. For example, the success of many 
technologies depends on their widespread adoption. 
So while everyone would benefit if they all moved to 
the new technology, nobody has an incentive to be 
the first to adopt an untested technology. So-called 
“dynamic increasing returns” emerge gradually,41  as early 
adopters are observed and copied by others, until the 
“learning-by-using” effect is substantial and adoption 
becomes widespread. This means that, absent some 
intervention, the adoption of such technologies would 
be slower than optimal. An example is smart meters, 
where both the effectiveness and cost of the technology 
depend on creating a large user base and leveraging 
learning-by-using effects. 
Related to this, achieving network economies can also 
be a challenge for new technologies that require new 
infrastructure and a critical mass of users. Government 
Figure 2:
Wind turbines can generate 100 times the power of 30 years ago
Source: Adapted from the European Wind Energy Association
The invention process is constrained by the fact that 
the value of innovations is often difficult to protect, 
and becomes, to an extent, widely accessible. While a 
technological solution, such as the formula for a new 
drug, can be patented, such patents can be difficult 
or prohibitively costly to exercise. And new business 
models can be copied with little payoff to the original 
inventor. At the same time, knowledge about, and 
the ability to replicate, a new technology or process 
can also be transferred as individuals move from 
one company to another. 
These spillover effects may be positive in terms of rapid 
diffusion of innovation, but they may also make businesses 
and financiers reluctant to invest, as the value of that 
innovation is difficult to protect. This market failure leads 
to lower-than-optimal levels of innovation.40  Intellectual 
property rights are an important tool to protect 
innovation and create incentives for investment, but 
they also suffer from inherent disadvantages. We turn to 
this later in this chapter. 
The diffusion of innovation, critical to reaping its economic 
benefits, involves companies and households purchasing 
new equipment, learning new ways of doing things, or 
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Innovation plays a critical role not only in climate  
change mitigation, but also in adaptation. While the 
focus of this report is on mitigation, it is worth noting 
just how central digital technologies are likely to be 
in tackling the physical impact of climate change. 
Digitisation and access to big data is already helping 
communities to better understand and prepare for the 
effects of climate change by accessing data relevant 
to climate-related risks such as rising sea levels and 
extreme weather events. Google, for example, is using 
its cloud computing storage and access to support 
institutions that are exploring climate change  
resilience through its LatLong project.33
Google donated 50 million hours of high-performance 
computing to use the Google Earth Engine geospatial 
analysis platform that brings together the world’s 
satellite imagery to help detect trends on the Earth’s 
surface. This includes an interactive time-lapse of 
the planet for 1984–2012. One billion megabytes of 
cloud storage will be made available to house satellite 
observations, digital elevation data, and climate/
weather model datasets. Researchers and agencies from 
developed and developing countries are able to join 
in this project by contributing and curating data, and 
developing ad-hoc applications. 
Box 2:
Innovation and climate  
change adaptation
Figure 3:
Mapping sea level rise to support adaptation
The Google Maps engine was used to highlight the vulnerabilities associated with rising sea levels, storm surges, and coastal inundations in 
the Republic of Vanuatu. The darker blue shows present-day inundation of the Efate lagoon during a high astronomical tide, and the lighter 
blue shows predicted inundation in 2090 due to sea level rise. Source: Google Inc., 2014.34
plays a key coordinating role as rule-setter. Just 
as governments help ensure the interoperability 
of electronics, requiring that different systems be 
compatible, they also need to set standards for new 
technologies and their associated infrastructure, such as 
electric vehicle (EV) charging and solar panel integration. 
EVs’ market success, for instance, depends on having 
a strong network of charging stations; without a large 
EV user base, however, there is little incentive to build 
charging stations. If multiple companies build incompatible 
networks to charge cars, this exacerbates the problem and 
further inhibits the growth of the network. Mandating that 
charging stations all follow the same technical standard 
will speed the rate of network growth. 
Another market failure relates to financing innovation. 
Information on new technologies is, by definition, 
scarce, and held primarily by the creator. This can lead 
to underinvestment in the adoption and diffusion of the 
new technologies, as investors may find it difficult to 
understand the new technology, and if they do finance it, 
they are likely to charge a premium. The added cost, in 
turn, will further reduce investment. 
Misaligned incentives can similarly inhibit profitable 
investment in new technologies. For example, building 
owners are often not the ones paying the electricity bills, 
so they have few incentives to invest in equipment or 
insulation to reduce costs for their tenants.  
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In the context of environmental issues, and in particular 
GHG emissions, these general barriers to innovation 
are exacerbated by the uncertainties and lack of 
understanding surrounding the future impact of climate 
change. Even if we were to introduce a strong carbon 
price, uncertainty about the nature and magnitude of 
damages, about future policy responses, and about the 
nature of the untested technologies, would make investors 
reluctant and financing more expensive.42  
Barriers to entry, such as regulations favouring incumbent 
industry, also inhibit new technologies. Government 
plays a key role in helping to reduce these barriers. 
Incumbency is powerful – the combination of capital 
invested (sunk costs), technology maturity, and outdated 
policy frameworks delay adoption of new technologies 
and business models. These barriers to entry appear to 
be entrenched in the global energy system, where new 
energy technologies can take over 20 years to achieve a 
1% penetration rate.43 
The discussion above makes it clear that, while pricing 
carbon and other externalities is crucial to unleashing 
the power of markets for a low-carbon economy, other 
measures also play a role in ensuring that investment in 
innovation flows to low-carbon technologies at the pace 
and scale that is optimal for the economy. The next section 
looks at potential solutions to these issues.
3.2 Fixing market failures to enable 
innovation and direct it to the  
low-carbon economy
Innovation and the incentives around it are best 
understood in the wider context of industrial policies. 
Thus, any measures to address and correct the market 
failures discussed above should be seen as critical 
components of overall policies for growth. The potential 
interventions fall into three broad categories, which we 
will discuss in this section:
1. Support for research and development (R&D), 
including publicly funded basic research and links 
between public research and the private sector,  
to ensure the research remains relevant to  
market demand; 
2. Building market demand for the new technologies 
through pricing mechanisms, regulatory standards or 
direct procurement; 
3. Ensuring strong and fair competition through  
anti-trust and intellectual property regimes that 
protect the value of innovation and shape the 
diffusion of innovation. 
Support for research and development
Historical analysis of innovation across several sectors 
indicates that commitments to support a specific type of 
innovation must be long-term in order to succeed. There is 
broad agreement that government has a role in supporting 
nascent technologies through R&D, as benefits often 
accrue to all of society, rather than just investors. This is 
particularly true for early-stage technologies, where they 
may have widespread applications. The economist William 
Nordhaus found that R&D can have a social return on 
investment of 30–70%, compared with private returns of 
just 6–15%.44
Figure 4:
Investment in energy R&D as a percentage of GDP and total R&D
ENERGY R&D AS % OF GDP
IN IEA MEMBER COUNTRIES
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Note: International Energy Agency (IEA) members mostly overlap with OECD countries. Sources: R&D figures from 
IEA, 2013.  GDP figures from the World Bank’s World DataBank (constant 2005 US$).
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Governments’ key role in R&D has been understood for 
decades, if not centuries. AT&T’s first solid transistor, 
though developed by the private sector, was the outcome 
of decades of public spending on preparatory research in 
the 1950s. Similarly, the development of the internet was 
based on US federal funding in the 1960s, with no real 
expectation of a commercial application. Much high-risk, 
high-reward R&D has come from governments, and has 
paid high dividends to society. The economist Marianna 
Mazzucato notes that 75% of breakthrough drugs are 
funded by the US National Institutes of Health, and 
most of the key components of the iPhone grew out of 
government-funded research.45 
Public support for R&D can take a number of forms, 
including direct vs. indirect methods, and grant- vs. 
investment-based. It can also take place at various 
points in the R&D process (from experimental research 
to large scale demonstration), and can involve public, 
private or other non-government actors, or consortia of 
different actors.
Direct, grant-based funding includes direct support 
for science, engineering, and other innovation-related 
education programmes. It includes direct financing 
of national labs, along with their R&D facilities and 
researchers. It also includes direct funding for individual 
R&D projects, as well as support for the creation of R&D 
networks across the public and private sector, and across 
academic researchers and commercial entities. In some 
cases, countries even provide direct grants as seed funding 
to start-ups. 
Additional, often lower-cost, options for indirect support 
include orchestrated international knowledge-sharing 
and outcome-based competitions. For example, the Grand 
Challenge for driverless vehicles46 and the Robotics 
Challenge,47 both sponsored by the US Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), have spurred big 
improvements in these nascent technologies. 
Finally, countries can utilise investment support 
mechanisms for R&D activities. These may include 
venture capital or other risk capital funds, either directly 
funded by the government, or directly guaranteed by 
the government. Such investment support may also be 
provided indirectly through tax incentives, which offer 
favourable tax treatment (e.g. deductions) to investments 
in R&D or early stage companies to encourage private 
investment in R&D.48
Still, even amid growing concern about air pollution, 
energy security and climate change, public funding for 
energy-sector R&D is lower than it was in previous eras. 
The US government invested $1.8 billion per year in 
energy R&D in 2007 (constant 2005$); in recent years 
this has risen to about $5 billion per year,49 including a 
major one-time investment in 2009 under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act. However, the current 
annual investment amount is still below the 1978 peak 
of $7.4 billion (constant 2005$).50 Over the same period, 
health R&D spending has more than tripled and defence 
R&D spending more than doubled.51 The picture is similar 
with the European Union. Energy R&D investments are 
down 32% while total R&D investment has risen 148% 
since 1980.52 Several factors have contributed to this 
decline, including low fossil-fuel prices since the 1970s 
oil crisis and liberalisation of the utility industry. State-
run utilities also used to run large R&D projects but have 
discontinued them in recent decades. 
Yet there appears to be plenty of promising R&D worth 
investing in. For example, the US’s flagship R&D support 
programme, ARPA-E, has been consistently over-
subscribed.53 In another example, a detailed assessment 
conducted by the UK’s Low Carbon Innovation 
Coordination Group (representing stakeholders across 
sectors) assessed the potential benefits to the economy of 
low-carbon innovation, and identified concrete, high-value 
opportunities for government R&D support of roughly 
£600 million per year, which is two to three times the 
amount now being invested.54 Finally, many developing 
countries, including relatively advanced middle-income 
countries, still do not have well-defined programmes for 
climate change-related innovation, and both their low-
carbon and overall innovation spend remains very low 
relative to innovation leaders at similar income levels.55 
South Korea and Japan offer a different perspective. 
With their gross domestic expenditure on R&D reaching 
over 4% and 3%, respectively, in 2012, they are two of 
the highest spenders on R&D in the OECD.57 Korea, in 
particular, has focused its R&D spending on relatively few 
large-scale programmes, joint with large firms (chaebols), 
which provide substantial co-investment (see Box 3).58  
Japan’s Science and Technology Agency (JST) also takes 
a strong and deliberate approach to R&D, focusing on a 
few, large-scale projects – peer-reviewed independently 
and carried out in partnership with different agencies 
and institutions, public and private. The impact of Japan’s 
innovation policy is well documented: its “Top Runner” 
programme has achieved particular success by requiring 
appliances to meet the best-in-class energy efficiency 
rate within a certain number of years, thereby raising the 
overall standard progressively over time. From 1997 to 
2005, the energy efficiency of computers rose by 99%, of 
air conditioners by 68%, and of televisions by 26%.
In addition to directly supporting R&D activities, the public 
sector plays a key role in promoting the development of 
underlying innovation capacity, especially through support 
to science, technology, engineering and other innovation-
related education and training programmes. Such support 
is particularly important in developing countries, where 
the lack of such capacity presents an enormous barrier 
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to the adoption and adaptation of new technologies and 
business models in the local market. International support 
can play a major role,65  as in the case of the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), 
which is discussed in depth in Chapter 3: Land Use.
Another important insight from economic research is that 
policies should be carefully balanced to avoid “crowding 
out” private investment or subsidising an innovation that 
can stand on its own. Government policies can support 
the scale-up of new technologies, but good policy design 
will plan for the end of government support. The goal is to 
catalyse a market transformation in which the emerging 
technology becomes self-sustaining. Support to specific 
technologies should not become a long-term burden on 
taxpayers. It should not continue for technologies that 
have failed to develop as hoped, nor should it provide 
advantage to incumbent technologies in a way that 
is inconsistent with public policy goals. Reduction of 
government support sometimes happens too slowly, and 
mature industries may continue to benefit from measures 
taken when they were still nascent.66  Continuing support 
for mature technologies then becomes a barrier to new 
technologies, obstructing the innovation cycle. 
Mechanisms to support the exchange of knowledge 
between the public and private sectors is also crucial, 
even at early stages of R&D, to help ensure that the 
innovation remains economically relevant. There is 
evidence of this from across sectors: from life sciences 
– where the complex interaction of universities, start-
ups, biotechnology companies, pharmaceutical firms, 
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) across OECD countries and China
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators Database, 2014/1.
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government and venture capitalists has often led to 
significant innovation and very rapid diffusion – to the 
agriculture sector, where R&D has been shown to be 
more successful when it is conducted in close contact 
with extension stations, ensuring the applicability of the 
solutions developed in the lab.67  One example is the Latin 
American Maize Project, a multi-country partnership that 
successfully balanced developing public goods in terms of 
research and ensuring commercially viability. 
Close interaction between the public and private sectors 
can also ensure that governments adapt regulations and 
standards to facilitate the spread of innovation while 
maintaining appropriate consumer protections. Two prime 
examples are Airbnb and Uber, pioneers of the “sharing 
economy” that have faced push-back from regulators and 
from market actors whose businesses they are disrupting 
(lodgings and taxi services). Legitimate issues do arise,68 
but if lawmakers and regulators don’t understand peer-to-
peer services and the value they add to the economy, they 
may cling to outdated rules that protect incumbents and 
stanch innovation.
Demand-driven innovation and public procurement
The role of demand in driving both invention and diffusion 
cannot be underestimated. Demand creates incentives 
for private-sector players to invest and provides a testing 
ground to improve innovative technologies, products 
and services. Strong demand is also crucial in starting the 
process of “learning-by-using” and “dynamic increasing 
returns” that derive from technologies being adopted 
by a critical mass of users. In the case of information and 
communication technologies, the interaction between 
technology providers and users generated a process of 
“co-invention” that was crucial to diffusing the benefits 
of the technologies more quickly and widely across the 
economy.69 As mentioned earlier in the chapter, this is 
an important issue for low-carbon innovations trying to 
compete against well-established technologies.
The most common tools for creating demand for low-
carbon innovations are those pricing mechanisms (e.g. a 
carbon price or fossil fuel tax) and regulatory standards 
(e.g. energy efficiency standards) used to encourage 
widespread deployment, and discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 5: The Economics of Change, and Chapter 4: 
Energy, respectively. In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
the particularly large gap in creating demand for “bottom-
of-the-pyramid” innovation relevant to meeting the 
needs of the world’s poorest populations.70 Here too, 
international support may be critical to supplementing 
national policies.71 In some cases, markets in lower 
 
Korea’s economic development over the last several 
decades was driven both by inputs such as labour and 
capital, and by the application of technologies that 
improved productivity. However, Korea’s high growth was 
fuelled in part by technologies applied to energy-intensive 
heavy industries such as steelmaking, shipbuilding and 
automobiles. Energy consumption has risen steadily, 
reaching 157.4 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 
total final consumption in 2010, up 6.5% from 2009 and 
up 23.8% from 2000.60  Korea meets 97% of this energy 
demand through imports and has become one of the 
world’s top energy importers.61  It is also among the top 
GHG emitters, more than doubling its energy-sector GHG 
emissions since 1990, to 576 Mt CO
2
e in 2010.62
Since the financial crisis in 1997-98, however, the Korean 
government has tried to shift its development towards a 
knowledge-based and innovation economy. The country 
has also made increasingly strong commitments to 
sustainability. In 2008, Korea launched the Low Carbon, 
Green Growth plan, following it with a voluntary pledge in 
2009 to reduce GHG emissions by 30% below business-
as-usual levels by 2020. In 2010, the Framework Act 
on Low Carbon, Green Growth made it a priority to 
pursue development that combines economic growth 
with environment protection, backed by a “green” fiscal 
stimulus plan of as much as 3% of GDP, with substantial 
Box 3:
Innovation and climate change adaptation59
incentives for green industries. The framework also 
provided a vehicle for mid- to long-term strategies for 
emissions reductions, including a foundation for carbon 
emissions trading. In 2012, Korea became the first country 
in Asia to approve national carbon markets legislation.
As part of these efforts, Korea has developed a 
Green Technology R&D plan focused on R&D and 
commercialisation of green technologies in five broad 
areas: i) forecasting technologies in climate change, 
ii) higher efficiency technology, iii) low-carbon energy 
sources, iv) post-production technologies, and v) pollution-
free industries. In addition, a renewables portfolio standard 
was introduced in 2012, with an initial quota of 2% rising to 
10% by 2022, with planned investments of US$8.2 billion in 
offshore wind to grow generation capacity from 0.4 GW in 
2012 to 2.5 GW by 2019.63  
In 2013 the government unveiled the Korean Creative 
Economy initiative as the next engine of economic growth 
and job creation, based on “the convergence of science 
and technology with industry, the fusion of culture with 
industry, and the blossoming of creativity”.64  The initiative 
can be seen as a way of harvesting the benefits of both the 
investment in green growth and the fast digitisation of the 
service sector to expand beyond previous manufacturing-
oriented development strategies.
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income countries can become leading markets globally, 
as with disaster early warning systems. Increasingly, 
developing countries are as important as developed 
countries in the innovation process, and the low-carbon 
transition is not going to be a one-way flow of technologies 
from North to South.
Demand for innovative goods and services can also be 
increased through more systemic approaches, such as 
creating innovative industrial clusters to spur innovation 
and new technology deployment. A high-profile example 
of such a cluster is Silicon Valley, which a 2009 McKinsey 
& Company analysis identified as the highest-performance 
cluster in the world in terms of growth and number of 
patents granted by companies and sectors.
As shown in Figure 6, McKinsey classified innovation 
clusters into four categories, based on their growth 
momentum and diversity: “hot springs” are small, fast-
growing hubs; “dynamic oceans”, such as Silicon Valley, 
are large and vibrant ecosystems with continuous 
creation and destruction of new businesses; “silent lakes” 
are older, slower-growing hubs with a narrow range of 
well-established businesses; “shrinking pools” have little 
diversity or growth.
New clusters are emerging all over the world, often close 
to large consumer markets that can generate large-scale 
demand for new products and services. Take the new 
economic corridor that is being planned between Mumbai 
and Bangalore in India, with the support of the British 
government. The corridor aims to raise US$50 billion in 
investment, generate up to 12% of the country’s GDP 
along the 1,000 km corridor, and create 2.5 million jobs. It 
is well placed to capitalise on the creativity and innovation 
of Mumbai and Bangalore and on relatively cheap 
manufacturing capacity, while having access to one of the 
largest consumer markets in the world to test and deploy 
innovative technologies.73 
Public procurement has also played a fundamental role 
in this context, across a number of sectors. Innovation 
in semi-conductors in the US, for example, was driven 
by the prospect of large military procurement contracts. 
Similarly, the first ever electronic computer was purchased 
by the US military, and the development of the IBM 
650 – which became the first commercially successful 
computer in the 1950s – was only possible thanks to 
the upfront commitment to purchase 50 machines 
by the US government.74 In the past few decades, 
the US and a number of European countries have 
Figure 6:
Mapping innovation clusters
Source: McKinsey & Company and World Economic Forum, 2009, adapted with permission from Juan Alcacer.72
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successfully introduced demand-led innovation research 
programmes whereby small businesses are invited to 
propose innovation projects that meet pre-identified 
public procurement needs.75  In the realm of low-carbon 
innovation, a number of countries have also used large-
scale demonstration projects to spur initial demand and 
foster the creation of network economies.76 
Lessons from history show unequivocally that fostering 
strong market demand plays an important role in 
overcoming constraints to the invention and diffusion 
processes. The creation of innovation clusters, and 
the leveraging of public procurement and large-scale 
demonstration projects, have also shown to be effective 
means of fostering demand in more focused ways to 
spur the broader innovation eco-system, enable user-
feedback and co-invention, and overcome the inertia 
of network economies.
Intellectual property rights and innovation  
support programmes
History shows that intellectual property rights have 
enabled innovation revolutions through the centuries. 
James Watt, inventor of the steam engine, led his first 
financier, John Roebuck, to bankruptcy by failing to 
develop a workable engine, but managed to secure 
further funding by Matthew Boulton after committing 
to extending his patent though an Act of Parliament. 
Thomas Edison, a century later, managed to make his 
light bulb a viable commercial product only thanks to 
George Westinghouse’s foresight to purchase Nikola 
Tesla’s patent for alternating current. As it turned out, 
Westinghouse had to purchase many more patents to put 
in place a workable system for street lighting, and he ran 
out of money in the process. He raised further finance by 
using the patents he had acquired as collateral.77 
Intellectual property rights are not the only means of 
protecting and encouraging innovation. Companies 
generally employ a number of other means of protecting 
and leveraging their innovations. These include strong 
internal processes for confidentiality, non-disclosure 
agreements, and non-compete contractual clauses; 
in some cases, such trade secrets can provide legal 
protection.79  Companies also protect their innovations 
through non-legal means: by creating a rewarding 
environment for their innovation-related staff, by 
building market advantage as quickly as possible, and by 
continually innovating to remain ahead of the competition.
Nevertheless, intellectual property rights provide 
commercial incentives to invest in risky technologies, 
often for markets that are yet to be formed. They allow 
transactions, transfer and sharing of technologies to 
happen in a legally controlled manner. They allow for 
choice on how to manage and charge for technologies, 
as the decision to secure intellectual property rights 
on a technology is independent of how it will be used. 
Intellectual property rights do not imply a “closed 
innovation” model, and are often key to the willingness 
and ability of firms to engage in more networked “open 
innovation” models.80  
Over the next decades we will need to see billions of 
dollars invested in innovation and diffusion of new 
technologies, much of it coming from private investors. 
Some investors will need to take on substantial risks, 
as some of the technologies and business models are 
untested. Some of them will fail, while others will succeed 
at producing financial rewards. These rewards will need 
to be substantial in order to attract investment capital, 
and can only be generated if a clear and strong intellectual 
property rights regime is in place.81  
Intellectual property rights can also present barriers to 
the diffusion of environmental technologies, however, 
along three fundamental issues:
• Cost: proprietary products cost more than  
generic ones;
• Access: owners of intellectual property can choose to 
license a techn≠ology only to certain manufacturers 
and countries;
• Capacity: countries with weaker institutions are 
often unable to deal with the legal complexity of 
patent licensing and cannot finance the complex and 
long process of negotiations related to intellectual 
property rights.
A famous example that illustrates the difficulties faced by 
developing countries relates to the Montreal Protocol.82  
Once the Protocol entered into force, ozone-depleting 
substances (ODS) were phased out, with industries 
having to adopt ODS-free technologies. Indian and 
Korean agrochemical companies tried to access ODS-
free technologies, but the manufacturer DuPont refused 
to enter into a commercial licensing agreement, citing 
concerns about illegal appropriation of the technology by 
potential national and international competitors.83  
This example illustrates a fundamental issue with 
intellectual property rights. As indicated earlier in 
this chapter, public- and private-sector investment in 
innovation (particularly basic research) is often motivated 
by industrial policy and international competitiveness 
considerations. In practice, many countries choose to 
drive domestic market deployment of new technologies, 
and support them through intellectual property rights, 
clustering and tax incentives, in hopes of gaining an 
international competitive advantage. For example, 
Denmark deployed wind energy throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, gaining an advantage when other countries 
looked to deploy wind in the 2000s. A similar pattern 
has been seen historically with high-speed rail, whereby 
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France, then Japan, and then China deployed national rail 
systems, in the process creating leading global businesses 
in the sector. 
This is a desirable process, as it allows for innovation 
and, eventually, growth. Intellectual property rights are 
central to it. At the same time, the comparative advantage 
created for a country or company, once protected by those 
rights, increases costs and complicates access to the new 
technologies for everyone else.
Access to technologies by poorer countries has been 
a hotly debated issue. These countries need to adopt 
low-carbon technologies in order to meet agreed targets 
for emission reductions, or indeed to transform their 
economies into sustainable, resilient low-carbon ones. 
The concern is whether they will be able to access 
those technologies at fair and affordable prices. While 
eliminating intellectual property rights cannot be the 
optimal solution, as it destroys incentives for investment, 
there is a need for mechanisms to accelerate the sharing 
of technologies with lower-income countries, and to 
ensure that countries have the capacity to adopt and 
adapt those technologies. 
In fact, for most technologies, patents are not filed  
in poorer countries, as the size of the potential market 
and the complexity of procedures often discourages 
companies. In such cases, inventions can be used  
freely in the countries. The issue of transfer and capacity 
still persists, but patents do not create additional  
barriers. Many companies also offer differentiated prices 
to poorer countries, on the condition of non-leakage  
in richer countries. But when market sizes are large  
or leakage risks are perceived as higher, patents are  
put in place, and constitute barriers for  
technology diffusion. 
A number of potential solutions to this issue have been 
discussed, both in the literature and in negotiating 
forums, including for low-carbon technologies.84  One 
important solution that is being put forward is the creation 
of patent pools: consortia created by owners of similar 
technologies to pull together, and sometimes cross-
license, common or complementary technologies. These 
are then made available at standard prices, licensed to any 
third party, with no right of exclusion by the members of 
the consortium. The advantage of a pool is that it ensures 
access to environmental technologies, avoids the cost and 
difficulties of entering into legal agreements with multiple 
patent owners, and doesn’t discriminate, as it guarantees 
access to all. (For an example, see Box 5.)
Even with patent pools in place, the cost of licensing will 
remain an issue. This could be addressed by setting up 
such a mechanism in conjunction with funding support 
by the Global Environmental Facility or the new Green 
Climate Fund to cover the cost of licensing. Both of these 
institutions include support for technology transfer within 
their mandate. 
Other potential, and complementary, solutions include  
the establishment of a platform for “nationally appropriate 
innovation actions” (NAIAs) where countries take  
action on specific innovation agendas that have 
implications for emissions, and these are recognised  
as actions that “count” towards an overall target on 
emission reductions in the context of an international 
agreement. Such NAIAs could also be used to recognise 
contribution of countries that decide to share intellectual 
property rights they hold and make them accessible for 
free to other countries.85   
The US-China Clean Energy Research Center provides 
an example of bilateral collaboration on technology 
with a strong focus on mitigating intellectual property 
concerns.86  It was established in 2009 as part of several 
US-China clean energy agreements signed by President 
Hu and President Obama, and it includes representatives 
from universities, government research laboratories, 
and private companies from both countries. It focuses on 
three key areas: buildings energy efficiency, advanced coal 
technology and clean vehicles. One of the more innovative 
aspects of this collaboration has been the development 
of a Technology Management Plan, which has helped 
mitigate some of the intellectual property concerns of the 
participants.87 In July 2014, the US and China announced 
another raft of agreements to tackle climate change, 
including demonstration projects on carbon capture, use 
and storage (CCUS) and smart grids.88 
In addition to bilateral collaborations, multilateral 
initiatives such as the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM)89  
and the Major Economies Forum on Energy and  
Climate (MEF)90  provide platforms for sharing best 
practice and exploring multilateral cooperation around 
clean energy with tailored arrangements for intellectual 
property protection. 
Some principles on intellectual property rights emerge 
from this review:
• Support a strong intellectual property rights regime 
for developing and diffusing new low-carbon 
technologies, without prejudice on how these will be 
Denmark deployed wind 
energy throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, gaining an 
advantage when others looked 
to deploy wind in the 2000s.
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used and shared.
• Identify effective, inclusive international forums 
for addressing intellectual property rights issues, 
and make it a priority to resolve disagreements that 
are impeding the diffusion of innovations. Given 
these issues’ implications for trade, the World Trade 
Organization may be the most appropriate venue for 
many of these debates. For low-carbon technologies 
in particular, the technology transfer institutions 
within the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are also crucial, but 
they need to be streamlined and simplified to be more 
effective and ensure transparency and accountability.
• Support the development of patent pools for low-
carbon technologies, with support from existing 
institutions to enable poorer countries to access them.
3.3 The success of innovation policy in driving 
down costs 
The section above lays out a substantial agenda for 
government intervention. But there is significant debate 
about the role of policy in supporting the deployment 
of innovation, fuelled largely by fears of governments 
“picking winners” as acts of political favouritism. There 
also remain significant differences in the means employed 
by different countries to encourage innovation. 
Governments have a plethora of policies from which 
to choose to assist with deployment and scale-up of 
new technologies and business models. Some require 
government money; for example, tax breaks for businesses 
producing renewable energy or direct consumer rebates 
for the purchase of new technologies have supported 
significant market growth in solar, wind and certain 
building technologies and appliances, in both the EU 
and the US. Other deployment policies don’t require 
government money, but instead mandate that a market 
embrace new entrants via renewable portfolio targets, 
performance codes and technology standards. These 
regulatory measures have had impact in Japan, Korea, 
China and the US, among others. 
There is no single “right answer” for which policy 
instrument to use, although the above sections 
provide a number of insights into the types of policies 
governments should consider as they determine the 
best approach for their particular context.92  Overall, 
harnessing innovation to drive down costs and improve 
performance requires a range of policy interventions in 
order to address multiple market failures, to cultivate the 
broad innovation ecosystem, and to support innovation 
at different points in the process (e.g. across invention 
and diffusion). Moreover, effectively implementing 
such a range of policy interventions requires a coherent 
innovation strategy and priorities, and stable funding.93  
The case of US government support for solar energy 
(see Box 6) illustrates the success of comprehensive 
low-carbon innovation policies in radically improving 
cost and performance. 
At the same time, policies that monitor and evaluate 
results, set cost and performance targets, and dynamically 
respond to cost changes over time, have proven to be 
particularly effective. This is true of policies across the 
innovation process. In terms of R&D support, the US, 
Korea, Japan and other leading countries have deployed 
Intellectual property rights are legally enforceable 
rights over inventions and other “creations of the 
mind”. The most important such rights for low-carbon 
technologies are likely to be patents, which allow 
the patent owner to stop the use of an innovation by 
others. They do not automatically allow the use of the 
patented technology by the patent owner, because 
the new invention may incorporate inventions already 
patented by others, for which permission to use must 
be sought. This is an important point. A patent also 
requires publication of the invention so that others 
may build upon the ideas it contains. Other intellectual 
property rights include copyrights, trademarks and 
design rights. With the exception of copyright, however, 
these are granted rights (i.e. they have to be examined 
and approved by a granting body), and they apply only 
to the country in which they have been granted.  
Most patents are applied for only in substantial markets 
where they will be manufactured, sold or used. Most 
companies do not file patents in Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). Other than trademarks, which can 
last indefinitely, intellectual property rights have a 
limited life, which is generally 20 years in the case 
of patents. Statistically, radical new technologies 
take about 12 years after first patenting to reach 
the marketplace. Evolutionary technologies, which 
are usually less dominant, may reach the market 
in five years. In sectors with complex technologies 
and products, there are often many inventions (and 
therefore intellectual property rights), owned by 
different parties, which are used in the final product. 
Examples include mobile phones, computers and 
medical technologies such as magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI). This situation is known as a  
patent thicket. 
Where patents covering some elements of a product 
are owned by others, agreements to grant each 
other rights to use the other’s inventions are called 
cross licences. Where standards are set, particularly 
where interoperability is important (such as mobile 
phones and TVs), patent pools may be created where 
patent owners make their inventions available, at 
predetermined prices for both putting them in and 
gaining access to the entire pool.
Box 4:
What are intellectual property rights?78 
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clear and increasing cost/performance targets to 
encourage significant advances and benchmark overall 
progress.94  In terms of supporting demand, ratcheting-up 
performance codes and standards has driven successive 
waves of innovation, while ensuring that the worst 
performers exit the market. This is often referred to as 
the “California effect”, after the state that has been a 
frontrunner of tighter environmental regulation, spurred 
by the need to remain competitive in export markets 
that already had similar stricter regulation.95  Recent 
research on the “California effect” indicates that it can 
have important spillovers: a global study on automobile 
standards found that when developing countries export 
automobiles and related components to countries with 
more stringent automobile emission standards, they are 
likelier to raise their own domestic standards.96 
Finally, the lessons from recent experience in the rapid 
reduction in cost of clean technologies (the technology 
“cost curves”) are important to take into account when 
modelling the future cost of new technologies in the 
context of economic planning. Often models used by 
policy-makers for economic planning purposes assume 
technology as a constant, or at best treat innovation as an 
Figure 7:
Solar photovoltaic production cost: 1974-2008
Source: US Department of Energy, 2013; O’Connor et al, 2010.98
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GreenXchange was a virtual exchange of technology 
patents related to sustainability, created in Davos in 
2010 by Nike, Best Buy and Creative Commons. The 
purpose of the exchange was to foster innovation in 
non-competing industries. The rules were that members 
would control the degree to which their intellectual 
property was made available and the fees for sharing 
that property, and could exclude competitors. Patent 
holders would then be able to retain the rights they 
believed were critical to maintaining their competitive 
edge, while non-competitors could access technologies 
simply and efficiently. Three years into its launch, more 
than 400 technologies had been made available through 
the platform, including Nike’s environmentally preferred 
rubber. Although the GreenXchange website is not 
active anymore, Nike says the company has “gained 
significant insights from this collaboration which 
continue to inform our strategy to bring sustainability 
innovations to scale”.91 
Box 5:
GreenXchange: a patent pool for 
‘green’ technologies
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economy-wide process, as opposed to a sector-specific 
process that is itself determined by new markets, policies 
and incentives. This is dangerous: inadequate modelling 
will underestimate the importance of innovation (and 
innovation support policies), bias assumptions on the likely 
costs of a low-carbon transition and, ultimately, lead to 
wrong policy choices.99 
4. Potential game-changers
Both  broad-based innovation policies and targeted 
interventions are important to driving the development 
of new technologies. In previous sections, we looked 
at the potential impact of broad-based innovations in 
the areas of materials science and digitisation, and at 
the business model innovations integral to creating this 
impact. We also looked at related low-carbon innovation 
areas benefitting from these broader innovations, such 
as resource productivity and the circular economy; cities 
and sustainable buildings; and renewable energy. We 
showed the importance of broad-based policies to support 
innovation, and also showed how targeted support (see 
the US solar energy case study) has been critical to 
advances in low-carbon innovation.
Targeted interventions are most essential for technologies 
that reduce market externalities, like avoiding dangerous 
levels of climate change. Such interventions are also 
essential to overcoming path dependency and the inertia 
of incumbency that may lead to under-investment in 
low-carbon technologies.100  Targeted investment in such 
technologies can have a transformational impact, and 
lead to large returns in the future.101  History shows that 
new technologies can take several decades to generate 
new products, often to meet needs and mitigate risks that 
are themselves difficult to predict. Hence, government 
support for early investment in potentially transformative 
technologies is crucial to manage risk in the future. 
Below we have chosen to highlight three examples of 
technologies that have the potential to be transformative 
in terms of reducing emissions, with substantial additional 
benefits: energy storage; carbon capture, use and 
storage, and advanced bioenergy. We also highlight the 
example of Tesla Motors, where a number of different 
technological innovations (including energy storage) were 
combined with business model innovation, leveraging an 
open-innovation approach, to create a potentially game-
changing product. 
This does not mean to be a comprehensive list. Our aim 
is to highlight examples of innovations that have the 
potential to transform products and business models in 
the future, and to show the potential role of government in 
enabling such advances. 
4.1 Cutting-edge energy storage
Energy storage technology has advanced considerably in 
recent years as a result of increased R&D, a renewed focus 
on grid resiliency and reliability, increased interest in  
low-carbon transport options, and improved information 
and communications technology. 
Several energy storage technologies are under 
development, including thermal storage and batteries 
with various electro-chemistries and configurations. 
Early investment in potentially 
transformative technologies 
can help manage risk in the 
future.
Today, photovoltaic (PV) solar modules in the US cost 
about 1% of what they did 35 years ago. This impressive 
learning rate has been achieved with the support of 
multiple government interventions, including:
• Support through the US Department of Energy’s 
national laboratories to pioneer scientific 
discovery and new innovations that can break 
through the limits of current solar technologies.
• Financial policies to leverage private sector 
investment. This includes up to $4 billion 
in loan guarantees to overcome financial 
barriers to commercial-scale deployment and 
a 30% investment tax credit for residential and 
commercial solar systems.
• Support for projects that help solar manufacturers 
make improvements in a broad range of 
manufacturing processes across the supply chain.
• Targeted initiatives, such as the SunShot Initiative, 
to support research in existing solar technologies 
with the aim of reducing the costs to a nationwide 
average of $0.06 per kWh by 2020.
• Policies to alleviate workforce development 
barriers within the solar industry. This involves 
training programmes and sharing of best practices. 
Support for training programmes is provided at 
nearly 400 community colleges around the US, 
including programmes to provide skills to veterans; 
around 13,000 veterans now work in the  
US solar industry. 
Box 6:
US government support for  
solar energy97 
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Technology options with the same storage capacity 
may differ in other important specifications – such 
as round-trip efficiency, discharge time and cycle 
life – and so it is expected that multiple technologies 
will co-exist in the energy storage market and be used 
for different applications.102 
Energy storage could provide value to many different 
economic actors. Homes and businesses could use 
energy storage to save money on energy bills, by storing 
electricity when prices are low and consuming it when 
prices are high. Those without grid access can use 
energy storage coupled with distributed solar power 
to meet their energy needs, and increasingly, this may 
become a competitive option for on-grid customers 
as well.103 Utilities can save money, and reduce their 
carbon footprint, by using storage for ancillary services, 
such as frequency and voltage regulation, and operating 
reserves. Currently, grid operators often rely on peaking 
natural gas plants or part-load plants to provide these 
services. These plants have fast ramp rates but are 
inefficient and as a result are more expensive than 
conventional baseload plants.104 
Energy storage can also have a substantial indirect 
impact on carbon emissions by facilitating the integration 
of renewable energy sources such as wind and solar PV.  
In the long term, energy storage allows for high 
penetration of renewables (i.e. 80% or more), which is 
infeasible with today’s electric grid. It can accomplish  
this by smoothing the intermittency of renewable  
sources over both short and long time scales.  
Storage can smooth output and avoid voltage spikes 
over short time intervals, such as when a cloud 
temporarily reduces output from a solar array. It can 
also shift intermittent generation profiles to better 
match demand; for example, wind energy generation 
that is strongest at night could be stored for use 
during higher demand periods during the day. In 
this respect, energy storage is likely to function as a 
critical element in a suite of technological solutions, 
including smarter grid infrastructure and integrated 
demand-side management.105 
Government decisions will have a critical role in 
determining the future of energy storage, particularly 
because storage does not fit neatly into the traditional 
utility business model. Policies should be designed 
to ensure that renewable energy and storage 
systems receive proper value for the benefits they 
provide while also paying their fair share of fixed grid 
infrastructure costs. At the grid scale, governments 
can play a major role in accelerating the deployment 
of energy storage by allowing storage to participate 
in well-designed electricity markets. Since 2011, the 
US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has taken 
major steps towards this goal, through two orders 
that enable energy storage technologies to compete 
in the frequency regulation and ancillary services 
markets.106  At the same time, government support for 
research, development and deployment can facilitate 
technological advances and cost reductions. The UK’s 
Department for Energy and Climate Change recently 
conducted competitions to award demonstration funding 
to new storage technologies.107   As there are many 
technologies in the energy storage space, government 
Tesla launched its stock in June 2010 on the NASDAQ 
Stock Market and saw its price increase by 40% in the 
first day of trading, valuing the company at US$2 billion 
and raising over US$226 million. It wams the first initial 
public offering by an American automaker since Ford’s 
debut in 1956. By 2013, Tesla’s market capitalisation 
had grown to US$26 billion, even though the company 
was selling only 25,000 cars per year. For comparison, 
in the same year General Motors sold 9.7 million cars, 
with a market cap of US$54 billion. Clearly Tesla has 
managed to capture people’s imagination about the 
future of the automobile – and raised substantial capital 
in the process. 
The Tesla Motors story – from the outsourced 
manufacturing of the Roadster, the first fully electric 
sports car, to in-house production of the Model S, a fully 
electric luxury sedan – is a success story about open 
innovation. The idea of open (vs. closed) innovation is 
based on three fundamental observations: good ideas 
are difficult to protect and hence are quickly shared; 
innovation increasingly happens through partnerships 
and networks of firms and public institutes, rather than 
within an individual company; and it is very hard to hire 
and retain highly skilled workers. 
Key  partnerships across the car value chain were 
instrumental to Tesla’s success. This includes supplier 
alliances, R&D alliances and Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) alliances with other automobile 
manufacturers. Lotus Cars and Panasonic were partners 
on supplies, crucially including batteries, while Toyota 
and Daimler were partners on other components 
of the cars. A partnership with Sotira (France) was 
crucial in the development of the carbon fibre body. 
Many of these alliances were based on equity, creating 
joint incentives for partners. These partnerships also 
allowed Tesla to leverage a broad accumulation of 
technology advances that had themselves benefited 
from government support. Recently, in line with 
its open innovation approach, Tesla released all its 
electric vehicle patents to the public, arguing that all 
car companies would “benefit from a common, rapidly-
evolving technology platform.”108
Box 7:
Tesla Motors: Innovative  
business models to advance low-
carbon technologies
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policy should always be applied in a way that promotes 
competition between them. 
Tesla  managed to apply substantial innovation through 
the value chain, even in a mature and saturated market. It 
picked a very specific niche, foreseeing potential growth, 
and was able to effectively fix initial quality glitches. 
Through its open innovation partnerships, it benefited 
from substantial existing automobile and battery supply-
chain experience, and developed internal expertise on 
the electric drive-train. Thus, while “cooking with the 
same ingredients” as other manufacturers, it managed 
to create a substantially innovative product. Tesla also 
leveraged public support for market demand (by selling 
US$130 million in zero-emission vehicle credits in 2013) 
and secured public lending to set up production  
facilities (a $465 million loan from the US Department  
of Energy in 2010, which it paid off nine years early  
in 2013). 
Finally, the company’s business model is to sell the car 
through factory-owned direct points of sale – similar 
to Apple’s stores – and it is working to remove market 
barriers by fighting regulations that would require 
franchised dealership to sell the cars. The latter 
is an important aspect of Tesla’s success, showing 
the importance of business model innovation, and 
the potential barriers to such innovation posed by 
incumbent models and government regulations 
Figure 8:
Tesla’s innovative business model
 TESLA MOTORS IS CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO IN MANY INDUSTRIES AND CREATING HUGE
WEALTH IN THE PROCESS
Sources: Tesla motors website, scdigest.com, autonews.com.
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that support such incumbency. 
4.2 Carbon capture, use and storage 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
Fifth Assessment Report indicates that technologies to 
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere will likely 
be crucial to keep global warming under 2°C.109  While 
the IPCC sees potential for extensive use of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS), on its own and combined with 
bioenergy, there could also be other, more profitable 
applications of carbon capture technologies at various 
scales in the future, should they receive the right support 
over the coming years. 
Carbon capture technologies have substantial room for 
improvement. For example, capture technologies for 
fossil-based power plants carry a heavy economic penalty 
by reducing their efficiency. A certain efficiency penalty 
is unavoidable, but there is wide scope for reducing it. 
Additionally, new research by a number of companies and 
universities suggests that carbon dioxide or methane can 
be economically captured from other, less concentrated 
sources, such as landfills, water treatment sites or even 
from the air, although the cost of this option is still very 
high.110  At the same time, very long-term and secure 
carbon storage has yet to be proven, and further R&D 
and demonstration of storage methods remains critical, 
including in the areas of measuring, monitoring and 
verification, and mitigation and remediation of leakage.111 
Finally, the government has a critical role in creating a 
sound regulatory regime that ensures protection against 
potential storage-related accidents, and as a result, 
facilitates deployment by mitigating public opposition and 
reduces the risks for investors. 
As discussed in Chapter 4: Energy, however, the biggest 
challenge for CCS is that capturing and storing CO
2
 is not 
inherently profitable (except in the context of a carbon 
price). Thus, any way to profitably use the captured CO
2
 
would make CCS more economically viable. Some existing 
operations already use captured CO
2
 for enhanced 
oil recovery profitably. While  other technologies are 
still early-stage and typically high-risk, there are some 
emerging possibilities: a number of companies and 
research institutes are demonstrating that CO
2
 can be 
converted to carbon-negative plastics, carbonates and 
other minerals.112  Methods to make biofuels by feeding 
concentrated CO
2
 to algae are also being developed.113  
Apart from enhanced oil recovery (EOR), no application 
has yet been able to simultaneously capture CO
2
 at a 
significant scale, avoid re-emitting the CO
2
 or using 
additional fossil energy, and significantly reduce the 
net cost of CCS, but further research may change this. 
Research in CO
2 
use is now being funded by the EU’s 
main climate innovation initiative, Climate-KIC, which has 
identified it as a priority research area.114  All applications, 
including EOR, face the challenge that the mass of CO
2
 
that must be captured to significantly reduce climate risk 
exceeds the conceivable demand for most products made 
from it. Even so, commercial CO
2
 use can greatly improve 
the economics of CCS demonstration projects and initial 
large-scale deployment.
For CO
2
 use to become widespread, incentives and 
funding must be put in place. Governments wishing 
to explore this technology could fund R&D, support 
demonstration projects, and design policy programmes, 
such as carbon markets and subsidies, to allow for 
CO
2
 use solutions. Such policy tools could ease the 
transition to commercialisation. A carbon price or 
feed-in-tariff equivalent of US$50 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide would greatly accelerate the deployment 
of these technologies.115
4.3 Advanced bioenergy 
Breakthroughs in materials science are leading to new 
types of bioenergy that could conceivably replace a 
large proportion of fuels. The widespread use and/or 
displacement of food crops for biofuels in some countries, 
driven by poorly designed policies, has led many to oppose 
bioenergy as a threat to food security. However, there 
are many ways to scale-up bioenergy production without 
decreasing food security. 
Second-generation biofuels convert biomass to fuel, using 
dedicated energy crops such as miscanthus (a species 
of fast-growing perennial grasses), food waste or by-
products of agricultural production, such as corn stover or 
sugarcane bagasse. In 2013–14 there has been significant 
progress in commercialisation of second-generation 
technologies, as several players have built out commercial-
scale plants. One projection forecasts second-generation 
ethanol capacity in the US to rise from 12 million gallons 
per year in 2013 to 140 million gallons in 2016.116  Other 
forecasts are more cautious, given difficulties in creating 
the new supply chains in feedstock and getting the 
conversion process to scale efficiently.
Third-generation biofuels are typically made from 
microalgae, grown with waste carbon dioxide, generating 
minimal pressure on land and water resources. They 
are ideal for regions with substantial sunshine, non-
arable land, and sources of carbon dioxide. While 
third-generation biofuels have not yet been deployed 
at commercial scale (and there are considerable scaling 
challenges), many pilot projects are operating successfully 
and attracting significant interest from biotech, genomics 
and software engineering communities. Development of 
third-generation biofuels will require further R&D, as well 
as incentives for investors to build the first commercial 
scale plants.
Fast-growing trees and grasses can also be developed 
as a feedstock for bioenergy. While these clearly should 
not displace crops or forests, there is potential for fast-
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growing biomass to be developed on non-arable land and 
in harsh environments. Trees and grasses could be bred 
either for efficient carbon sequestration purposes or 
potentially as a source of biomass for energy, potentially as 
feedstock for power generation.
Advanced bioenergy, of different types, is an accessible 
opportunity for most countries, including regions with 
deserts or degraded land and a lot of sunlight. It could 
generate many economic benefits, including improved 
energy security, as fuels are produced domestically rather 
than imported. Waste, in the form of food waste or carbon 
pollution, can be converted into a profitable product. 
Urban pollution can be reduced, as combustion emissions 
from fuels or power plants could be reduced, as  
bioenergy burns cleaner. In some sectors, such as 
chemicals, biomass offers perhaps the only way to 
reach zero net emissions. It also creates an option to 
reduce atmospheric concentrations of carbon, if coupled 
with CCS solutions. As noted above, the IPCC’s Fifth 
Assessment Report envisions widespread use of  
bioenergy combined with CCS to help keep global 
warming under 2°C.117
Advanced bioenergy can also work in tandem with other 
game-changers. It can be an output of CO
2 
use, as algae-
based bioenergy systems take carbon as an input. It can 
also be a means to store energy, as bioenergy can be 
stockpiled in the same way as fossil fuels. 
As with CCS, government has a role not only in providing 
R&D and demand incentives, but also in ensuring a 
sound regulatory environment that addresses public 
concerns related to, the impact on food security, the 
threat to natural forests and biodiversity, and the safety of 
genetically modified crops, among others.
5. Recommendations
In order to accelerate the pace of change to create a  
new climate economy, the Commission recommends  
that governments:
• Create market pull for new technologies: To meet 
climate and economic growth objectives in the 
necessary time frame, every economy must put policy 
measures in place that help spur demand for clean 
technologies. 
• Carbon pricing is the first critical instrument in using 
the power of markets to create such demand, and in 
the context of innovation it has two key advantages: it 
is technology-neutral (letting the market decide), and 
it sets credible long-term expectations. 
• Alongside a carbon price, the Commission 
recommends that by 2015–2020 (depending on 
income level) all countries adopt performance-based, 
technology-neutral codes and standards that are 
continually ratcheted up over time. This is especially 
important in sectors where economic benefits are 
ample and price signals less likely to be effective (such 
as energy efficiency in buildings, appliances  
and vehicles). 
• Finally, the Commission recommends that all 
countries and international institutions assess their 
public procurement processes and insert guidelines 
so that minimising energy use and carbon emissions 
become procurement criteria for all publicly procured 
goods and services by 2015-2020 (depending on 
income level). Public procurement has proven to be a 
large and credible market for technology developers, 
accelerating innovation, and supporting user-based 
refinements.
• Governments of major economies should at least 
triple their public energy-related R&D by the  
mid-2020s, to take it well over US$100 billion a year 
(exceeding 0.1% of their GDP), and target it towards 
game-changing technologies. 
R&D annual spending for new energy-related technologies 
in the major economies should be at least tripled by the 
mid-2020s to take it to its late-1970s levels, over 0.1% 
of their projected GDP in 2020, across public research, 
development and demonstration. In a rapidly changing 
sector in which more than US$6 trillion changes hands 
every year,118 it is essential to invest at least US$100 
billion per year to pioneer improved technologies.  
 
This would include a phase-out of support from more 
mature, “dirty” technologies, which neither offer large 
economic spillovers, nor suffer from market failures that 
inhibit demand. Other countries should also increase 
their support for climate-related innovation, with a focus 
appropriate to their local context. 
The energy sector is undergoing a transformation that 
has the potential to dramatically improve global human 
welfare. While solar and wind technologies are at, or 
approaching, cost-competitiveness, a number of others 
could get to that stage with additional, early-stage 
support. Coordinated programmes and roadmaps for 
game-changing technologies such as, among others, 
energy storage, carbon capture, use and storage, and 
advanced bioenergy will be of great importance. For 
more mature technologies, such as wind and solar, more 
R&D could be focused on driving continued technical 
improvements based on technology-neutral cost and 
performance targets.  
• Encourage new business models by removing poor 
regulations and other barriers to entry.
The Commission recommends that countries work with 
the private sector to identify and remove regulatory and 
other barriers to the adoption of new business models 
and technologies. Of particular relevance are regulations 
that inhibit the shared use of capital-intensive goods, 
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such as cars, and regulations that deter entry into highly 
networked systems, such as the power distribution 
markets. Other examples include overly prescriptive 
input standards in building regulations, various electricity 
network standards favouring incumbent supply 
technologies, and the regulatory and tax treatment of 
reuse, remanufacturing and asset sharing. In addition, this 
should include separate, more favourable tax treatment 
for high-risk investment, where lack of access to financing 
is recognised as a major barrier to the development and 
scale-up of new technologies. 
• Establish a robust system of intellectual property 
protection and sharing, while supporting poorer 
countries in accessing, adapting and adopting low-
carbon technologies.
Developed and developing countries should recognise 
the need for clear and simple intellectual property rights 
to incentivise public and private investment in low-
carbon innovation, but also acknowledge the need for 
mechanisms that expand access to these innovations. 
Governments and companies should promote the 
creation of patent pools for low-carbon technologies, 
and seek additional mechanisms for IP sharing. Financial 
and technical support to access these pools, and to drive 
innovation appropriate to the needs of lower-income 
economies, should be provided to poorer countries by 
bilateral and multilateral institutions such as the Green 
Climate Fund and the Global Environmental Facility. 
Such support should focus not only on direct technology 
transfer, but also on building the broader innovation 
capacity and local institutions required to adapt, adopt 
and further develop such technologies. “Nationally 
Appropriate Innovation Actions” could also be used to 
encourage and recognise countries that develop and 
share key low-carbon technologies in the context of an 
international agreement. 
• Use realistic assumptions on cost trajectories for 
new technologies when making economic policy  
and public service and infrastructure  
investment decisions.
Getting policy right will require understanding how 
the process of learning about new technologies will 
reduce their cost. Few ministries of finance around 
the world do this well because it is difficult to predict 
future technological change. But the default assumption 
that technology costs will remain constant is clearly 
incorrect. As we saw in the chapter, industries at early 
stages of development are typically on steep learning 
curves, yielding dramatic cost reductions. This has 
been seen across industries, from semiconductors to 
genetic mapping to smartphones. At a 10% performance 
improvement per year, a shift from two years’ backward-
looking to two years’ forward-looking cost comparisons 
can reprioritise investment decisions. By systematically 
modelling and incorporating learning curves for new 
technologies, ministries of finance across the world can 
better decide how to allocate scarce resources. 
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Chapter 8
INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION
Main points
• International trade and supply-chain integration have played a key role in driving down the costs of low-carbon 
technologies. International trade in environmental goods and services totals nearly US$1 trillion per year, or around 
5% of all trade. Trade in low-carbon and energy-efficient technologies alone is expected to reach US$2.2 trillion in 
2020, a tripling of current levels.
• A new international legal agreement on climate change is essential to enable the large-scale transition to a low-
carbon pathway needed to have a good chance of keeping global warming under 2°C. A strong agreement could act 
as a powerful macroeconomic policy instrument, sending clear signals to businesses and investors about the direction 
of the global economy. This should include a long-term goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to near-zero or 
below in the second half of the century. 
• It is important that a new international agreement is equitable. This means developed countries will have to make 
deep long-term cuts in their emissions, and mobilise finance, capacity-building assistance and technology to support 
developing-country efforts. Larger developing countries will have to make serious commitments to reducing their 
emissions trajectories. 
• Globally, financial flows to low-carbon and climate-resilient investment totalled around US$359 billion in 2012, 
much of it to renewable energy projects. Only about a quarter (US$84 billion) of these flows were international, of 
which an estimated US$39–62 billion (46–73%) were directed at developing countries, mostly from public sources in 
developed countries.  
• Around a third of climate financing comes from development finance institutions, including multilateral development 
banks, national development banks, and bilateral and regional financial institutions. These have considerable 
potential to scale up low-carbon and climate-resilient financing, both directly and by leveraging private capital.
• Some 14% of World Trade Organization trade disputes concern renewable energy technologies, as competition has 
increased for market share. Faster dispute resolution processes are needed, and the environmental elements of 
international trade agreements should be strengthened. 
• There is potentially significant scope for business-led initiatives to reduce emissions in some internationally traded 
sectors dominated by relatively small numbers of firms, such as commodities deriving from forest areas.
• The rules and norms of the international economic system need to be aligned more closely with the transition to a 
low-carbon, climate-resilient global economy. Corporate reporting on climate risk and mitigation strategies should 
now be integrated with financial reports and standardised. Investors with around half of total institutional assets 
(US$45 billion) under management now subscribe to responsible investing principles, and climate risk management 
now needs to become part of investors’ fiduciary duty.
• Economic growth and climate risk are intertwined; the institutions and forums charged with fostering economic 
cooperation – such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, and the G20 – should reflect climate risk assessment and reduction in their national 
economic surveillance processes and assessments. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalisation has been a major driver of both high- and 
low-carbon growth over the last 25 years. World trade 
more than tripled in that period, reaching US$18 trillion 
in 2012.1 This has provided an important boost to 
developing and emerging economies as well as developed 
ones, but, as discussed in Chapter 1: Strategic Context, it 
has also led to a significant shift in production to countries 
with weaker pollution controls and predominantly coal-
based energy systems. Thus, the trade boom has likely 
increased global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.2  
Yet trade has also played a major role in accelerating the 
diffusion of low-carbon technologies such as solar and 
wind power, and light-emitting diodes (LEDs). The ability 
to produce components in low-cost countries, combined 
with expanding global markets, has led to a dramatic 
reduction in the cost of those technologies, enabling 
broader deployment. 
The low-carbon economy is now a global phenomenon. 
International trade in environmental goods and services 
totals nearly US$1 trillion per year, or around 5% of 
all trade.3 Trade in low-carbon and energy-efficient 
technologies alone is expected to reach US$2.2 trillion 
in 2020, a tripling of current levels.4 Two-fifths of that 
market are expected to be in emerging and developing 
economies,5  and the companies supplying these markets 
come from all over the world. 
Most of this new activity has been driven by national 
and sub-national policies. This new global economy has 
largely been driven by national policy-making, as individual 
countries have introduced incentives for low-carbon 
energy supply and energy efficiency and other climate-
related policies. Outside the European Union, whose 
single market policies cover 27 countries together, there 
has been little attempt to harmonise national policies. 
In some cases, such as vehicle fuel efficiency standards, 
independent policy-making has led to a convergence 
of policy between countries; in others, such as carbon 
pricing, coordination has proved more elusive.6  
But there is considerable potential for international 
cooperation to expand and enhance it. This chapter 
focuses on five areas in particular: 
• A new international legal agreement to provide a 
foundation of multilateral rules and principles to 
underpin national climate action. 
• International climate finance, including both public- 
and private-sector investments in mitigation  
and adaptation. 
• Trade agreements to lower tariffs on environmental 
goods and services, enable faster resolution of trade 
disputes, and raise standards for low-carbon goods. 
• Voluntary collaborations among businesses, 
governments and other actors in the global economy 
to help catalyse action in specific sectors and fields. 
• Changes to the international rules and norms which 
influence the economic behaviour of businesses, 
financial institutions and governments. 
This review is by no means comprehensive; it focuses on 
areas where international cooperation has the potential to 
make a significant impact on the prospects for low-carbon 
and climate-resilient growth. It cross-refers to other 
chapters of this report which also discuss cooperative 
actions of various kinds, particularly Chapter 3: Land Use, 
Chapter 5: Economics of Change, Chapter 6: Finance, and 
Chapter 7: Innovation.
2. A new international  
climate agreement
Most of the recommendations presented in this report can 
be implemented by individual countries – or by the cities, 
states, regions and businesses within them. Much of what 
needs to be done to achieve better growth and a better 
climate is in these actors’ economic self-interest even if 
comparable action is not occurring elsewhere. 
Still, an international agreement on climate change is vital, 
for several reasons. 
First, the more action is taken globally, the easier it is to 
win political support for action at home. Climate change 
mitigation requires collective action; greenhouse gas 
molecules have the same effect wherever their origin, 
and no single country (or small group of countries) can 
slow the processes of warming alone. Thus, it is easy to 
resist climate action by asking, “What difference can our 
contribution make if other countries are not acting?”  
The greater the collective effort, the easier it is for  
political and business decision-makers to justify the  
effort and costs required for actions at home.  
(This is discussed further in Chapter 5: Economics  
of Change.) 
Second, the wider the international field of low-carbon 
policies, the less likely they are to affect business 
competitiveness. When firms face different climate 
policies in different jurisdictions, there is always a risk that 
those facing more stringent regulations or higher carbon 
prices might lose market share, or even seek to move to 
areas with weaker policies. 
Third, an international agreement is needed to strengthen 
the climate finance flows, technology transfer and 
capacity-building that developing countries need to 
implement low-carbon strategies and adapt to climate 
change. Even where measures are economically beneficial, 
they are often not affordable, particularly when their 
upfront costs exceed those of equivalent but higher-
carbon investments. 
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Fourth, as the report has argued, actions and policies 
with net economic benefits are unlikely to be sufficient to 
keep the average global temperature increase under 2°C. 
Other measures will be required whose sole or primary 
purpose is to combat climate change, such as deployment 
of carbon capture and storage (CCS) or early retirement of 
coal power plants. These will be much more feasible in the 
context of a global agreement to tackle climate change. 
A new legal agreement is thus essential to drive the 
investment and innovation in low-carbon, climate-
resilient growth at a sufficient scale to reduce the risk of 
dangerous climate change. Such an agreement is currently 
being negotiated under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as a successor, 
or supplement, to the Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997.7 
That agreement had been the subject of considerable 
controversy. The United States refused to ratify it because 
it did not require binding emission reduction commitments 
from major developing economies. The US withdrawal, in 
turn, discouraged stronger action by those countries. The 
emission reduction targets for the first Kyoto commitment 
period, which amounted to just a 5.2% reduction by 2012 
from 1990 levels, were also clearly inadequate to the 
growing scale of the climate problem.8 The commitments 
have also proven difficult to enforce, as became evident 
when Canada, which was not on track to meet its target, 
withdrew in late 2011 and thus avoided any penalties.9 
Negotiations to achieve a new international agreement 
have not been easy. Hopes that a new legally binding 
agreement might be secured at the UN Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen in 2009 were not fulfilled. 
The conference ended with only partial agreement, and 
amid considerable acrimony.10 The following year, in 
Cancun, Mexico, a UN agreement was reached, under 
which countries made pledges to reduce their emissions 
trajectories and to provide financial support to developing 
countries, but it was not legally binding.11  
This experience has led some commentators, businesses 
and others to question whether a global legal agreement 
is either possible or necessary. Some have argued that, 
since the vast majority of global emissions come from a 
relatively small group of countries, it might be better to 
shift international efforts away from the often tortuous 
negotiations of the UN, where all countries have to agree, 
to smaller forums of the major emitting countries, such  
as the G20.12 
But this analysis underestimates both the importance 
of a global agreement and the viability of the UNFCCC 
negotiations. Even if only a few countries are major 
GHG emitters, the impacts of climate change affect all 
– particularly some of the smallest and least developed 
countries, including small island states whose very survival 
is threatened by sea-level rise.13 An agreement reached 
without these countries at the table would be neither 
fair nor legitimate. At the 2011 UN Climate Change 
Conference in Durban, South Africa, countries laid the 
groundwork for negotiating a new legal agreement to 
come into effect in 2020.14 The agreement is expected 
to be finalised and approved at the UN Climate Change 
Conference in Paris in December 2015. 
An international agreement cannot force countries to 
tackle climate change. They will act of their own volition, 
through domestic political and policy processes. This is 
recognised in the ongoing negotiations, which have agreed 
that each country should submit its “intended nationally 
determined contributions”.15  What an agreement can 
provide is the global framework that facilitates stronger 
action by all countries simultaneously. Only strong and 
simultaneous action will make it possible to keep global 
warming under 2°C. 
Countries need to feel confident that all are doing their 
fair share, so it is important that the new agreement be 
equitable. Climate change embodies a form of injustice: 
it has been overwhelmingly caused by the historical 
emissions of the now developed countries,16 but its 
impacts will hit some of the poorest, lowest-emitting 
countries the hardest. A majority of the accumulated 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere today were emitted 
by the developed economies. Yet developing countries’ 
emissions now exceed those of high-income countries, 
driven primarily by fast-growing upper-middle-income 
economies, and their share is increasing.17 Slowing 
emissions in developing countries is thus essential to 
avoiding dangerous climate change. The question is how 
to do this fairly, as these countries still have significant 
populations living in poverty, and they rightfully wish  
to continue developing their economies. Most also  
have much lower per capita emissions than  
developed countries.18
For these reasons the perceived fairness of an 
international agreement matters. In practice, what this 
means is that, while both developing and developed 
countries will have to take serious action, developed 
countries will have to make earlier and deeper absolute 
cuts to their own emissions, on a path to near-complete 
decarbonisation of their economies by mid-century. They 
will need to provide strong examples of how good policy 
can drive economic growth and climate risk reduction 
together; develop and disseminate new technologies; 
share know-how, including through collaborative 
ventures; strengthen funding sources and financial 
institutions to bring down the cost of capital; and provide 
climate finance to developing countries for adaptation, 
mitigation and capacity-building. 
By providing a core framework of multilateral rules, an 
international legal agreement on climate change would 
represent a strong form of global governance. But an 
even more important goal is economic. The ultimate 
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purpose of an international agreement should be to drive 
investment into low-carbon and climate-resilient growth 
and development. 
One of the key observations of this report, as argued 
in particular in Chapter 5: Economics of Change, is the 
importance of expectations in determining the level and 
direction of investment and consumption. Uncertainty 
weakens both. Yet it is uncertainty which currently 
characterises low-carbon policy in many countries. 
Businesses and investors frequently have little confidence 
that government targets will be met or policies sustained. 
Weak and inconsistent policies send mixed signals 
about governments’ own commitments, creating “policy 
risk” which raises the cost of capital. The result is lower 
investment overall, and the now-familiar strategy of 
investors hedging their bets between high- and low-
carbon assets. 
An international agreement cannot in itself give 
confidence in the policies of specific countries – that 
comes from the credibility of domestic action. But 
it could send a powerful overall signal on the future 
direction of the global economy. A strong agreement in 
which all countries commit to a low-carbon future could 
significantly change business and investor expectations 
about the relative returns on low- and high-carbon 
investments. It would indicate to the suppliers of low-
carbon goods and services that their markets are going to 
grow, not just in individual countries, but throughout the 
world. The stronger the agreement’s legal form, and the 
longer-term its commitments, the greater the confidence 
generated that low-carbon policies are likely to endure, 
and not be reversed. 
For these reasons a strong international agreement has 
the potential to act as a powerful macroeconomic policy 
instrument, sending clear signals to businesses and 
investors about the future low-carbon direction of the 
global economy. 
The 2015 agreement looks likely to combine a set of 
common rules and norms, internationally agreed, with 
“intended nationally determined contributions” submitted 
by each participating country. These contributions will be 
decided through domestic political and economic policy-
making processes, which has the important advantage of 
grounding the agreement in national realities. But it also 
carries the evident risk that the contributions will not add 
up to a collective effort sufficient to put the world on track 
to meet the agreed 2°C goal. There has therefore been 
discussion of potential processes to compare intended 
contributions with one another and against the 2°C goal, 
to encourage further effort.19  
What are not likely are negotiations which seek to divide 
up a global GHG budget among the different countries. 
But if it is recognised, as this report shows, that prosperity 
and a low-carbon future can go together, climate 
negotiations should not be a competition for the right 
to emit as much as possible. Some countries, especially 
those with ample fossil fuel resources, will unquestionably 
find it challenging to make the low-carbon transition. But 
the incentives should not be to maximise each country’s 
“carbon allowance”. Instead, the aim of the new agreement 
should be to help all countries seize the opportunity to 
improve their growth prospects and living standards  
while reducing their dependence on emissions- 
generating activities. 
It is not the Commission’s place to recommend the 
detailed components of a new agreement. From an 
economic standpoint, however, there are several features 
which would greatly enhance its ability to send a clear 
signal to businesses, investors and governments on the 
future low-carbon character of the global economy.
First, it is important that the agreement establish a clear 
long-term direction. A good way to do this is to include 
a long-term goal. Countries have agreed to the goal 
of keeping global warming below 2°C, but while this is 
valuable, it is unclear what it means for actual emissions. 
One idea which has gained some attention recently is that 
the long-term goal should be to phase out net greenhouse 
gas emissions altogether.20  (“Net” emissions allows  
for the fact that increasing the stock of forests  
and other natural “sinks” and using effective carbon 
capture technologies could compensate for some  
level of emissions, and even potentially generate  
“negative emissions”.) 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
shows that for a two-thirds or better chance of holding 
warming to 2°C, GHG emissions will need to fall to near-
zero or below in the second half of the century.21 A world 
of no net emissions (sometimes described as “carbon 
neutrality”) sounds radical today, but within 40–50 years, 
technological innovation is very likely to make it achievable 
– even likelier if governments adopt the goal and 
incentivise its achievement.22 One only needs to compare 
today’s technologies with those of the 1960s and 70s to 
appreciate this. Adoption of a long-term goal of this kind 
within an international agreement would send a powerful 
economic signal about the direction of the future  
global economy. 
Second, the agreement should aim to establish a 
predictable and synchronised process of national 
policy-making. Under a five-year cycle of international 
negotiations, for example, countries would set targets for 
5–10 years ahead (in 2015 this would be for 2020–2025), 
with an indicative, revisable target for a further five years. 
A specific requirement that emissions targets must be 
progressively tightened would be particularly helpful. 
The degree of tightening would need to be determined by 
each country on its five-year cycle, but the principle would 
ensure clarity of direction. A combination of firm five-year 
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commitments, plus indicative 10-year targets aiming  
for the long-term goal, would provide appropriate time  
frames for action and planning across sectors  
and governments. 
For major economies, the agreement might go further, 
obliging or encouraging governments to publish long-term 
economic development and growth strategies outlining 
how they plan to move in a long-term low-carbon and 
climate-resilient direction. Such strategies – and the 
underlying political and policy-making processes – would 
greatly help businesses, investors and the wider public to 
understand and debate the possibilities, benefits and costs 
of the low-carbon transition. Guidance for such strategies 
could include encouragement of carbon pricing (including 
the removal of fossil fuel subsidies), along with strategies 
to shift towards low-carbon energy and low-carbon 
policies in transport, urban development, agriculture, 
forests and other sectors.
Third, an agreement should strengthen countries’ 
incentives and capacities to adapt to climate change 
and to reduce their vulnerability. In particular, it could 
encourage all parties to develop and implement national 
adaptation plans. These should incorporate action by 
sub-national governments and municipalities, and set out 
the requirements on businesses and others to understand 
and take action to address climate risks. It should 
incentivise regional collaboration to support adaptation 
planning, given shared exposure to some climate risks 
and the benefits of pooling resources for climate change 
research and information systems. Adaptation plans 
will benefit from including a diverse set of government 
agencies, alongside business, academia and civil society, 
and can provide a vehicle for international financial and 
technological support. 
Fourth, it is important that an agreement establishes 
common accounting and reporting rules on the 
commitments countries make, and their progress 
towards achieving them. International confidence in 
the agreement, and in the national actions which follow 
it, will be undermined if there is doubt about whether 
claimed emissions reductions are accurate or credible. 
Transparency and clear verification processes are 
therefore vital. 
Last, a new international agreement should provide a 
framework for increased financial flows into low-carbon 
and climate-resilient investment and development.  
This should include the obligations of the richest 
countries to provide support to developing countries, 
and mechanisms designed to facilitate increased flows of 
private-sector finance. It should also include provisions 
to enhance the development and dissemination of low-
carbon technologies, and those which can improve  
climate resilience. These are discussed further in the 
following section. 
An international agreement will contain many other 
provisions; this is by no means a comprehensive 
description. But an agreement which included these 
elements would provide a major boost to international 
economic confidence.
3. Increasing climate finance
In 2012, global investment to support GHG emission 
reductions, low-carbon development, and climate change 
adaptation was about US$359 billion.23 Three-quarters 
of these financial flows involved renewable energy 
projects (particularly solar and wind power), with most 
of the remainder directed at energy efficiency, transport, 
agriculture and adaptation activities. Just under half of 
total investments (US$177 billion) occurred in developed 
countries (members of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development), particularly in the EU 
and US; just over half (US$182 billion) were in developing 
countries (non-OECD), particularly in China. Total 
investment in 2011–12 was around the same  
as in 2010–11. 
Around a quarter (US$84 billion) of these financial 
flows in 2012 were international; the rest were in the 
investor’s own country. An estimated US$39–62 billion 
(46–73%) of international climate finance flows went to 
non-OECD countries from sources in OECD countries. 
Most of this “North–South” financing (US$35–49 billion, 
or 80–90%) came from public sources. These included 
official development assistance (ODA) provided directly 
by governments, and funding through multilateral 
development banks, UN agencies, bilateral finance 
institutions and national development banks.24  
Development finance institutions (DFIs) play an 
increasingly important role in climate finance. These 
include not only the multilateral development banks (the 
World Bank and regional development banks), but a range 
of national development banks, and bilateral and regional 
financial institutions. Altogether, they committed around 
a third (US$121 billion) of all domestic and international 
climate finance in 2012.25 The ability of DFIs to raise 
funds of their own on the capital markets gives them 
additional resources beyond their public capital base. They 
are able to blend low-cost project debt with market-rate 
loans (and occasionally also equity and grants), and co-
finance projects with the private sector. This makes them 
particularly suited to investments that may involve some 
additional risk or unfamiliarity to private investors. 
Most national development banks are focused on 
domestic lending, but increasingly the larger ones, such 
as the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and the 
China Development Bank (both considerably bigger than 
the World Bank), are also financing projects outside their 
home countries. At the same time, new multilateral banks 
are being established, such as the Asian Infrastructure 
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Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank 
set up by the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa).26  
The growth of development institution financing presents 
considerable opportunities to increase global investment 
in low-carbon and climate-resilient infrastructure and 
related projects. Over recent years the “traditional” 
multilateral development banks have all considerably 
increased their commitment to climate finance, even 
adopting quantitative targets for their lending portfolios. 
Some, including the World Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and the European 
Investment Bank, have also pledged to limit or cease 
funding for most coal-fired power generation projects.27  
But there are now many more players in this field. If 
commitments of these kinds were adopted across the 
wider group of development finance institutions, a 
considerable increase in global funding could be mobilised. 
A major target for this must be financing for developing 
countries. At the Copenhagen conference in 2009, 
developed countries made two climate finance pledges: 
to provide US$30 billion in “Fast-start Finance” in 
2010–2012,28  and to mobilise US$100 billion per year 
in public and private finance by 2020. In 2013 they 
reported that the first goal had been achieved, with US$35 
billion in public climate finance having been provided in 
2010–12.29 Some concerns have been raised over how 
much of this was “new and additional” funding, as agreed 
in Copenhagen: most of it came under ODA, and therefore 
from sums which many developing countries felt they 
were due to receive anyway.30 But in terms of climate-
specific funding, it represented a significant increase on 
prior levels.31 The issue now under discussion therefore 
is how developed countries will meet the second pledge. 
There is still no consensus on what precisely it means  
to “mobilise” US$100 billion, how much should come  
from public sources, and how different forms of finance  
should be counted.32  
Given that private-sector investment accounts for over 
60% of current global climate finance (in 2011–12, 
around US$224 billion), but under 20% of North–South 
flows,33 it is widely accepted that a key priority should be 
to encourage greater private-sector investment in low-
income countries. As discussed in Chapter 6: Finance, the 
problem in general is not lack of global capital; rather it is 
a lack of low-carbon and climate-resilient development 
projects which can provide the required risk-adjusted 
returns to investors. In many countries this is partly due 
to a shortage of viable projects in the pipeline, partly due 
to lack of investor confidence in regulatory frameworks 
and policies, and other related risks.34 For national 
governments, and the multilateral development banks 
and international agencies working with them, improving 
investment conditions while maintaining national 
determination of policy is therefore often the priority. 
A number of countries are now establishing national 
financing strategies of various kinds to coordinate  
their low-carbon and climate-resilient development 
financing needs.35  
At the same time, there have been several efforts in recent 
years to use public finance and policy instruments to 
mitigate the risks faced by private investors, in order to 
leverage greater private flows. Such instruments include 
partial risk, “first loss” and export credit guarantees, policy 
risk insurance and various kinds of pooled funds.36 The 
World Bank Group and other multilateral banks have 
pioneered these, but only a few types of instruments 
have yet been used to any great extent, and institutional 
investors in particular have not yet been attracted at scale 
into the low-carbon and climate-resilient project field.37  
Developing instruments and funds which can attract larger 
flows from these sources needs to be a priority. 
The more traditional forms of direct grant funding and 
concessional lending also remain vital. This is particularly 
true for adaptation projects in low-income countries, 
where commercial returns from investments (making 
them suitable for lending) may not be available. Adaptation 
expenditure, in areas such as water, land use and resource 
management, coastal and infrastructure protection, and 
disaster risk management, accounted for a little under 
half of all direct government climate finance to developing 
countries in 2012.38 As this report has argued, the 
distinction between adaptation and wider development 
expenditure is increasingly difficult to define, and many 
investments can meet both low-carbon and resilient 
development objectives. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
current funding levels represent only a fraction of total 
adaptation investment requirements. 
There is also considerable scope for direct public 
finance of low-carbon development projects and other 
mitigation activities. Increasing attention is being paid 
to various options for “performance-related” funding, 
in which finance is tied to specific emissions reduction 
outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 3: Land Use, the 
Commission recommends that funding to prevent 
tropical deforestation and forest degradation is increased 
to at least US$5 billion per year from 2015 to 2030, 
increasingly linked to performance. In some countries, 
the additional or incremental costs of renewable energy 
policies such as feed-in tariffs are also now being 
supported by international climate finance.39 There are 
considerable opportunities to develop and expand such 
schemes further. 
Public financial flows are also needed for capacity-
building, technological cooperation (see Box 1) and various 
kind of policy support for developing countries pursuing 
low-carbon and climate-resilient development strategies. 
Public finance is likely to flow through a range of bilateral 
and multilateral channels, but significant capitalisation of 
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the Green Climate Fund established under the auspices of 
the UNFCCC will be an important signal of confidence in a 
new international agreement.40  
There is no doubt that increasing the flows of public 
finance from developed countries in the current economic 
conditions will be challenging. It is therefore important to 
identify new sources of public revenue which can expand 
the existing funding base. In 2010 the High-Level Advisory 
Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) established by 
the UN Secretary-General identified a series of potential 
sources of new and additional public finance which could 
together meet the US$100 billion per year goal. These 
included revenues from carbon taxes and emissions 
trading schemes and from reductions on fossil fuel 
subsidies, new taxes on the emissions of the aviation and 
maritime sectors, and an increase in the capital base of the 
multilateral development banks.41 A financial transactions 
tax was also discussed, but was regarded as too difficult to 
implement without a global agreement. 
In addition, the AGF’s report noted the potential for 
increasing revenues under the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). Established under the Kyoto Protocol, 
the CDM allows buyers in developed countries to offset 
their emissions by purchasing emission reduction credits 
from projects in developing countries. Since 2004, the 
CDM has registered more than 7,000 projects in 89 
countries and is estimated to have leveraged around 
US$315 billion in capital investment in mitigation and 
sustainable development projects.42 But (as also with 
funds from auctioning emissions trading permits) the 
revenues from CDM depend on tight emissions  
reduction targets and a strong carbon price. The demand 
for offsets declined dramatically in 2013 as the European 
carbon price fell.43 Still, there is continued interest 
in market-based approaches, and as part of ongoing 
UNFCCC negotiations, a new market-based mechanism  
is being discussed.44  
None of these new funding sources will be easy to achieve. 
But there is a strong case to revisit them as part of the 
process by which developed countries identify a pathway 
to achieve the US$100 billion goal by 2020. This should 
also include a clear and agreed set of accounting methods 
Box 1:
Accelerating the diffusion of low-carbon and climate-resilient technologies 
Access to new technologies is an important requirement 
for developing countries seeking to pursue low-carbon 
and climate-resilient development. A Chatham House 
analysis suggests that recent diffusion rates of relevant 
technologies need to be at least doubled if the 2°C goal 
is to remain within reach.46 As discussed in Chapter 7: 
Innovation, several mechanisms are being pioneered that 
could enhance technology transfer by making climate-
related patents available free or at low cost. These include 
voluntary patent pools, open source innovation and open 
licensing arrangements. 
For example, an Eco-Patent Commons launched in 
2008 by IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes, Sony and the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
has already collected 100 environment-related patents 
pledged by companies to be made available for free use 
by all.47 In June 2014 Tesla Motors Inc. announced that it 
would open the company’s patents for electric cars freely 
to others. CEO Elon Musk argued that this would speed 
the adoption of electric cars without damaging Tesla’s 
competitive position, in which its main competitors are 
gas and diesel-fuelled vehicles.48  
Experience in other areas, such as medicines for 
infectious diseases, shows that multilateral financing 
to cover licensing fees or to buy out patents on key 
technologies of public interest can be useful if they are 
well designed. One example in the climate field might 
be new crop varieties that are more resilient to climate 
change impacts, for which the intellectual property rights 
may constitute a significant part of the costs. But they 
may not be as relevant for clean energy technologies 
and their components, many of which are variations on 
what is already available in the market. In many cases 
developers have not applied for patent protection for 
these technologies in developing countries, as there is little 
commercial benefit from doing so; there are therefore 
often no patent-related restrictions on their use.49 Less 
than 1% of the world’s principal climate mitigation-related 
technologies have been registered as patents in Africa.50 
More generally, there is strong evidence that a key factor 
in enabling greater clean energy technology transfer 
is having local capacity to successfully adopt the new 
technologies.51  Strengthening technical and scientific 
capacities in developing countries is therefore a critical 
step toward enhanced technology transfer. 
One option might be to establish a platform for public–
private collaboration on innovation in access to distributed 
energy. Governments and others could collaborate to 
establish a network of regional institutions which would 
undertake publicly funded research and development in 
off-grid electricity, household thermal energy, and micro-
grid applications. It could also support the incubation 
of new enterprises to apply the new technologies and 
develop new business models for distributed energy 
access.52  Such a network could build on the strengths 
of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) model for key agricultural applications, 
discussed further in Chapter 3: Land Use.53 
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for climate finance adopted by all donors and recipients.45  
It is important that these flows, and their additionality 
over existing funds, are transparent and verifiable. 
4. Trade agreements
The international trade in low-carbon goods and services 
increasingly reflects the globalisation of supply chains, 
with companies optimising manufacturing costs by taking 
advantage of the comparative advantage of different 
locations for producing different inputs or services (see 
Box 2). This growing interdependence has stimulated 
a widespread move to reduce import tariffs on such 
products, in order to boost trade and lower costs. 
However, it has also led to some bitter disputes between 
major trading partners.
Although import tariffs on environmental goods are not 
especially high in many countries relative to those of other 
product groups, they can rise to 35% in some countries. 
As the global trade in such goods increases, there would 
be clear benefit to low-carbon growth if they could be 
reduced. In 2011 leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) countries committed to cut tariffs  
on a list of more than 50 environmental goods, including 
wind turbines and solar panels, to 5% or less by 2015.55 
And in early 2014, 14 countries accounting for 86% of 
global trade in such goods (including the US, China, the  
EU, Japan and the Republic of Korea) announced plans  
to eliminate tariffs on them altogether through the  
World Trade Organization (WTO).56 These are  
promising intentions. 
Yet at the same time, many of the same countries have 
become embroiled in serious trade disputes over specific 
low-carbon products in which there is particularly fierce 
competition for market share. It is estimated that 14% 
of WTO disputes since 2010 have related to renewable 
energy, at least in part.57 They are of two principal types. 
First, separate disputes between the EU and China and 
the US and China over the price of Chinese solar panels 
(and in the US case wind power equipment as well) 
have centred on claims that Chinese manufacturers 
were effectively subsidising production and therefore 
“dumping” cheap goods onto export markets in 
contravention of WTO rules. These, it was claimed, 
were unfairly undercutting domestically produced 
products. The Chinese government vigorously denied the 
allegations. Both the EU and US reacted by imposed “anti-
dumping” duties against these goods, leading China to 
place comparable duties on EU and US exports. Although 
the EU and China reached an agreement in 2013 (placing 
a minimum price and a maximum volume on Chinese solar 
panel imports to the EU), disagreement over compliance 
remains, and China has made a counter-claim against EU 
solar-grade polysilicon. The US and China remain  
in dispute.58  
A striking example of the growing trade in low-carbon 
goods and services is the solar photovoltaic sector, 
for which the various components can be produced in 
multiple countries. The US and China traded more than 
US$6.5 billion worth of solar photovoltaic products 
and services in 2011. According to a study by the Pew 
Charitable Trusts, finished solar modules account for 
95% of the solar products exported by China to the 
US, in addition to US$151 million of solar cells. These 
products reflect China’s relative strengths in mass 
assembly and high-volume manufacturing. 
The US competitive advantage is in producing high-
value inputs (such as polysilicon wafers used in 
photovoltaic cells) and the capital equipment and 
systems for solar factories. Firms based in the US 
exported more than US$3.7 billion worth of solar 
photovoltaic goods and services to China, while 
Chinese companies exported US$2.8 billion worth of 
products to the US. The globalisation and increasing 
integration of these supply chains has helped to drive 
down the costs of renewable energy production, 
allowing the different components to be produced 
wherever costs are lowest. 
Box 2:
Global value chains and clean energy 
trade: the case of solar power54  
Second, a number of trade cases have arisen over 
subsidies for renewable energy supply such as feed-
in tariffs. These include disputes between the EU and 
Canada, and between India and the US. The principal 
issue at stake has been the use of “local content” rules, 
under which renewable energy subsidies are only 
available to suppliers using locally sourced equipment. 
These rules are usually designed to support local industry 
and employment, but to overseas manufacturers they 
frequently look like protectionist measures designed to 
keep imports out.59 In a ruling on the EU–Canada case, 
the WTO declared that local content rules were indeed 
discriminatory and had to be rescinded. But the feed-in 
tariffs themselves were not held to be in violation of anti-
subsidy rules, since there was no “unregulated” price of 
energy against which they could be compared.60 A more 
general declaration of the compatibility of renewable 
energy subsidies with WTO rules would now be of 
considerable assistance. 
These disputes reflect the increasing importance of 
markets for renewable energy products as low-carbon 
policy spreads throughout the world, and in some respects 
they are inevitable as domestic producers compete with 
those overseas. But they are damaging to the growth of 
low-carbon policy, raising prices for renewable energy 
just as it becomes competitive with fossil fuels. It is 
notable that the installers of solar panels in the US have 
not supported the countervailing duties against Chinese 
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imports, arguing that higher prices are slowing down 
the growth of solar power in the US, with a larger overall 
impact on jobs – as well as emissions – than in domestic 
solar manufacturing.61 The increasing interdependence 
and complexity of global value chains means that trade 
restrictions may even backfire, with domestic producers 
facing higher costs for imported components.62  
It would clearly be beneficial to all sides if these disputes 
were avoided if possible, and resolved more quickly when 
they occur. One option would be to change WTO rules to 
prohibit in these cases the use of “trade remedies” such 
as anti-dumping and countervailing duties, which tend to 
lengthen disputes, and to establish a more rapid dispute 
resolution procedure.63 Another would be to use bilateral 
and regional trade agreements between smaller groups of 
countries to do this. 
Regional trade agreements in fact offer wider potential in 
this field. As negotiations under the WTO have stalled in 
recent years, such “plurilateral” agreements have become 
more common: there are now over 350 in force between 
various groups of countries.64 Most now incorporate an 
environmental chapter, but this in itself determines very 
little: it depends whether the provisions of the agreement 
strengthen or weaken environmental protection across 
the signatory countries.65 But there are clear opportunities 
in trade agreements currently being negotiated – such as 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
between the US and Europe, the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) in the Asia-Pacific region, and the EU–China 
Investment Agreement – to strengthen measures which 
can support low-carbon growth. 
Such measures include common energy efficiency 
standards for appliances and industrial equipment; 
common technology standards for low-carbon systems, 
such as electric cars and their associated charging 
infrastructure; liberalisation of public procurement rules 
in low-carbon sectors; strengthening the rules governing 
investment in natural resources such as forests and 
energy; and liberalisation of trade in services in major 
sectors such as construction and urban planning. In the 
context of the development of more connected and 
compact cities, as proposed in this report, the latter 
offers considerable potential. Traditionally largely closed 
to international trade, these sectors now have major 
opportunities for innovation, such as modular construction 
techniques and use of information technologies in 
energy and transport, which could help accelerate the 
development of lower-carbon production methods and 
urban design. 
5. Voluntary cooperative 
initiatives
A growing number of international cooperative initiatives 
have been established in recent years to support and 
enhance the impact of climate action by national and 
local governments, businesses and civil society. Most 
of these initiatives focus on specific sectors and fields 
such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, transport, 
avoided deforestation, agriculture, short-lived climate 
pollutants66 and finance. Some are collaborations between 
governments; some are collaborations in specific business 
sectors; most are “multi-stakeholder” in form, bringing 
together governments, the private sector, civil society and 
others.67 They have different functions. Some are aimed at 
disseminating best practice and providing technical advice 
and support to public authorities and businesses wanting 
to take action in specific areas; others are coalitions of 
such actors wanting to take more ambitious action than 
their peers. Box 3 provides some examples. 
These voluntary initiatives should not be seen as 
substitutes for formal multilateral agreements between 
governments, or national regulatory processes. 
Their purpose is generally to support governments in 
implementing nationally determined climate goals and 
policies. Some may even offer the potential to achieve 
additional impact through the independent decisions of 
important actors such as cities and major businesses.
The voluntary nature of these initiatives is both a strength 
and a weakness. As “coalitions of the willing”, their impact 
is inevitably limited by the number and scale of the 
participants they can attract. But because they do not 
need universal participation, they have considerable scope 
for ambition and innovation. They can have particular 
value in fostering learning. Integrating economic goals 
with climate risk management is not easy; governments, 
businesses, city authorities and others are all working out 
how to do it as they go along. In this context, voluntary 
cooperative initiatives can play a useful role in exchanging 
best practices and supporting mutual “learning by doing”. 
Nevertheless, the diverse (and in some cases overlapping) 
nature of these initiatives, and in some cases their 
relatively recent creation, makes it difficult to assess their 
impact in any systematic way.69 For many, an important 
next step will be to develop quantifiable commitments 
subjected to standardised and verifiable methods of 
measurement and reporting. This will help ensure both 
clarity of impact and public accountability. Building on the 
UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit in September 
2014,70 and using protocols developed by international 
research institutes, welcome moves are now under 
way in many of these initiatives to move towards such 
commitments and methods.71 
One of the most interesting developments in this field 
has been the establishment of business-led initiatives in 
certain sectors of the global economy where products are 
internationally traded and it is therefore almost impossible 
to achieve strong national regulation of emissions. If 
complying with such regulations is perceived as costly by 
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International cooperative initiatives which aim to 
reduce climate risk while promoting economic and 
business growth come in a variety of forms. Recent 
surveys have suggested that, depending on what is 
included within the scope, there are around 100 such 
initiatives.68 The following list provides a flavour of the 
kinds of initiatives which now exist.
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership 
(reeep). A non-profit organisation focused on 
supporting clean energy business models in developing 
and emerging economies. The Partnership has 400 
official member organisations, including businesses, 
NGOs, industry associations, financial institutions 
and other civil society entities, as well as 45 national 
governments. To date, reeep has funded more than 180 
clean energy projects in 58 countries.  
See: http://www.reeep.org.
en.lighten. A joint initiative of United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), OSRAM and Philips 
Lighting, with the support of the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), en.lighten aims to eliminate inefficient 
lighting by 2030. The initiative estimates that 
achievement of the goal could cut carbon emissions 
by 500 million tonnes of CO
2
 annually in 2030, and cut 
electricity bills globally by more than US$100 billion. 
See: http://www.enlighten-initiative.org.
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV). 
A partnership of 72 governments, international 
organisations and industry. It aims to reduce air 
pollution through the introduction of cleaner fuels and 
vehicle standards. See: http://www.unep.org/transport/
new/pcfv.
R20 – Regions of Climate Action. A group of more than 
500 sub-national regions that work to promote and 
implement major GHG emission reduction and other 
environmental projects. R20 aims to address barriers 
Box 3:
International cooperative initiatives
that prohibit sub-national governments from developing 
low-carbon and climate resilient economic development 
projects. See: http://www.regions20.org.
Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Address Short-Lived 
Climate Pollutants (CCAC). A coalition of around 40 
countries and 60 non-state partners aiming to address 
short-lived pollutants such as black carbon, methane and 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are responsible for a 
substantial proportion of current global warming. CCAC’s 
aims are to raise awareness, enhance national action by 
overcoming barriers, promote best practices, and improve 
scientific research. See: http://www.unep.org/ccac.
C40 Climate Cities Leadership Group. A global network of 
more than 60 large cities committed to sustainable urban 
development and GHG emission reduction, providing 
best practices, advice and support. Together C40 cities 
represent more than 20% of world GDP, and have taken 
over 8,000 actions to mitigate and/or adapt to climate 
change since the network’s founding in 2005.  
See: http://www.c40.org.
REDD+ Partnership. An intergovernmental partnership of 
75 countries to improve the effectiveness of measures to 
tackle deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries, including the transparency and coordination 
of REDD+ initiatives and financial instruments. The 
Partnership facilitates knowledge transfer, capacity 
enhancement, mitigation actions, and technology 
development and transfer.  
See: http://www.reddpluspartnership.org.
Low Emissions Development Strategies Global 
Partnership (LEDS-GP). Launched in early 2011, the 
partnership brings together more than 120 governmental 
and international institutions, aiming to strengthen 
support for low-emissions development in regions and to 
foster capacity-building.  
See: http://en.openei.org/wiki/LEDSGP/home.
the companies that would be regulated, they will almost 
certainly put up resistance; and since the benefits of such 
emissions reductions are global, not local (unlike, for 
example, air or water pollution standards), governments 
may find them hard to justify. Yet if businesses in such 
sectors cooperate to regulate themselves on a global 
basis, they can, at least in principle, overcome the 
competitiveness problem. 
The Consumer Goods Forum (CGF), an association of 
around 400 manufacturers, retailers, service providers 
and other stakeholders across 70 countries, has 
established a number of initiatives to reduce GHG 
emissions from the consumer goods sector on this basis.72  
One is the Global Protocol on Packaging Sustainability 
(GPPS). Launched in 2011, it provides a means for 
consumer goods firms to assess the sustainability of their 
packaging practices throughout their supply chains.73  
A second initiative is the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 
(TFA 2020).74 As described in Chapter 3: Land Use, TFA 
2020 is a partnership of businesses, governments and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) committed 
to reducing the deforestation in Southeast Asia, Latin 
America and Africa which is driven by production of four 
major global commodities: palm oil, soy, beef, and paper 
and pulp. It includes many of the major global companies 
that trade these products, manufacture consumer goods 
and foodstuffs containing them, and sell them  
in supermarkets. 
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The participating companies undertake to remove 
products deriving from deforested areas from their supply 
chains by 2015–2020. TFA 2020 works with national and 
state governments to introduce appropriate regulatory 
and enforcement policies and support for local producers.  
A group of banks brought together by the Banking 
Environment Initiative have also committed to work with 
companies and their supply chains to develop appropriate 
financing solutions for sustainably produced commodities.75 
In the case of palm oil, companies participating in the 
initiative have 15% of the total consumer market by 
volume, and well over 50% of the global trade in the 
commodity. Analysis suggests that such significant 
participation rates might be sufficient to tip the entire 
global market towards sustainable palm oil, since it is 
highly inefficient to separate out differently sourced kinds 
of bulk-traded commodities.76  
It is too early to say whether this will happen. But the 
potential to transform the environmental and climate 
impact of these major agricultural and forest commodities 
is clearly significant. Between them, the four commodities 
targeted by TFA 2020 are estimated to be responsible 
for around 40% of global deforestation. So if by 2020, the 
Alliance’s target of ending deforestation throughout the 
supply chains for these products could be achieved, that 
would represent a reduction of up to 6% of total global 
GHG emissions.77  
Why would companies collaborate in this way? There are 
a number of reasons. Fierce campaigning by NGOs such 
as Greenpeace has provided a powerful motivation.78 For 
companies with well-known brands, adverse publicity 
for their role in causing deforestation provides a strong 
market incentive to adopt more sustainable policies. Many 
companies increasingly acknowledge a social and ethical 
responsibility to reduce their environmental impact. Many 
have also found that the costs of doing so have not been 
very large relative to the companies’ size and profitability. 
Indeed, high environmental standards demanded by 
retailers and consumers tend to support the market 
position of large multinational companies, requiring local 
firms in regional markets to meet the same standards 
despite otherwise lower costs.
There is clearly potential for business-led initiatives of 
these kinds in other sectors where products are globally 
traded and national regulation is therefore particularly 
difficult or unlikely. (The desirability of common carbon 
regulation is also discussed in Chapter 5: Economics of 
Change, with the possibility of border tariffs to adjust for 
differential carbon regulation.) Examples of such sectors, 
with high emissions and relatively small numbers of large 
companies, include oil and gas, iron and steel, and cement. 
Such cooperation need not be confined to individual 
sectors. Although in recent years many businesses have 
begun to identify and invest in measures to improve their 
energy efficiency, there is still huge scope for further 
energy and resource productivity improvement in industry 
throughout the world.79 There is clearly the potential 
for a new initiative in this field to take up this challenge, 
led by existing business organisations such as the World 
Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 
The WBCSD’s Action2020 initiative, which has developed 
roadmaps for a variety of key fields of business action on 
sustainable development, provides a valuable template.80 
6. Changing the rules and norms of 
the global economy 
Cooperative initiatives provide valuable ways to make 
progress in specific sectors and fields of activity, but they 
are not enough. To achieve a broad, long-term transition 
to low-carbon growth and development, a deeper 
shift is needed. All major economic actors – national 
governments, sub-national and city authorities, companies 
and financial institutions in both the private and public 
sector – will need to integrate climate risk management 
into their core economic and business strategies. 
Each can act individually, but many more will do so if it is 
demanded by the “rules of the game” under which they 
operate. In a global economy, these rules are increasingly 
determined at an international level. 
Business reporting provides an important example. In 
recent years, more than 4,000 global companies have 
been reporting their greenhouse gas emissions at the 
behest of their major investors. CDP (formerly the Carbon 
Disclosure Project) operates on behalf of more than 
750 institutional investors, publishing annual reports 
on corporate emissions using data collected under a 
standardised methodology, the Greenhouse Gas Protocol. 
By publicly scoring companies’ performance, CDP aims to 
strengthen their emissions reductions programmes.81 
But these reports are not part of these businesses’ 
mainstream financial reports, and are not treated in the 
same way by the companies or by their shareholders. The 
same is true of the reports that many companies produce 
today on their wider environmental and social impacts, 
which have no common reporting framework and which 
vary widely in scope and depth. Financial reports – which 
are legally required – are standardised around the key 
indicators that measure business performance. They 
allow shareholders to benchmark individual companies 
against one another and to assess the financial risks they 
face. Climate risk – the extent to which business assets, 
activities and future profits are made vulnerable by 
climate change and climate change policy – now needs to 
be understood as a significant additional risk factor facing 
most major businesses. It therefore needs to form part of 
their standard reporting processes, giving managements 
and shareholders the information and analysis required 
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to address it properly. The same is true of companies’ 
exposure to natural disasters.82 There is therefore a strong 
case for business reporting on each of these wider issues – 
GHG emissions, climate risk, and environmental and social 
impacts – to be integrated with financial reports  
and standardised.83 
That is beginning to happen. The Carbon Standards 
Disclosure Board, a consortium of business, investor and 
environmental organisations, has published a Climate 
Change Reporting Framework which enables businesses 
to report on their climate impacts in a systematic way 
linked to information about their financial performance.84  
At the same time the concept of “integrated reporting” has 
gained momentum under the auspices of a global business 
and investor partnership, the International Integrated 
Reporting Committee. Results from the partnership’s 
pilot study suggest that integrated reporting leads to 
higher-quality data collection and provides management 
with a better understanding of how the business creates 
value over time.85 This is consistent with the results 
achieved by existing forms of social and environmental 
reporting. Companies required to report on these issues 
consistently perform better in areas such as energy and 
water consumption and waste (which, in turn, almost 
always leads to lower costs) than those not facing 
mandatory reporting.86 This should not be surprising. 
The rules under which companies operate affect their 
behaviour. Integrating the reporting of climate and other 
environmental and social risks into financial reports will 
almost certainly motivate company boards to pay closer 
attention to these issues and to give higher priority to 
their management.
There are two routes through which integrated reporting 
could become the new internationally agreed norm. 
One is through investor demand. As they have already 
done with emissions reporting, major shareholders 
could require companies to report financial and non-
financial information together, with climate risk a 
standard feature. A second route is through national 
stock exchanges. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange has 
already pioneered this, introducing listing rules in 2010 
which include the requirement to publish an integrated 
report.87 The Brazilian Stock Exchange has announced 
that it will encourage businesses to produce an integrated 
report on a “report or explain” basis.88 There is clearly 
significant scope for other stock exchanges to follow 
suit. Cooperation between stock exchanges in different 
countries and global investors would enable momentum 
to be accelerated towards mandatory and standardised 
integrated reporting. 
Moreover, if investors require stronger climate risk 
management and reporting of the companies they own, 
they also need to apply it to themselves. As discussed in 
Chapter 6: Finance, investors’ asset portfolios are subject 
to climate risk in different forms – both the risks resulting 
from climate change itself, and the risks of devaluation 
or “stranding” arising from changes in climate policy 
and fossil fuel prices. In the last few years a number of 
investors have begun to recognise this and conduct more 
systematic and integrated assessments of their portfolios. 
A few have also examined how far they are, and should be, 
investing in lower-carbon sectors.89  
But though sector leaders can set precedents for change, 
individual investors do not determine the behaviour of the 
sector as a whole. That arises from the rules and norms 
which apply to all. The UN Principles for Responsible 
Investment, which seek to drive greater consideration of 
economic, social and governance factors in investment 
decision-making and ownership practices, have provided 
some impetus for this. Signatories now include 1,200 
investors with US$45 trillion in assets, around half 
the global institutional total.90 Smaller associations of 
institutional investors are also seeking to drive change.91  
But this could be considerably accelerated through 
collaboration among stock exchanges and financial 
regulators in major economies. By requiring investors 
to conduct climate (and wider environmental) risk 
assessments of their portfolios as part of their recognised 
fiduciary duty, stock exchanges and financial regulators 
could drive significant behaviour change throughout the 
global economy.92  
A comparable shift in rules and norms is needed in 
government accounting systems. As discussed in 
Chapter 5: Economics of Change, some governments 
and international institutions are now experimenting 
with forms of measurement of national economic activity 
which more strongly reflect environmental conditions. 
These include adjustments to GDP to account for the 
depreciation of natural capital, the introduction of “natural 
capital accounts”, and the establishment of alternative 
indicator sets of national progress.93 Again, it will be at 
the international level that such practices will become 
established as the global norm. The adoption by the 
UN Statistical Committee of a “central framework” for 
a System of Environmental-Economic Accounting is a 
start, but there is considerable way to go before such 
measurements become a routine part of governments’ 
mainstream economic performance measurement.94  
International institutions can play a particularly helpful 
role here. Over the last few years a number of major 
international economic organisations have begun to 
integrate climate and environmental risk management 
into their core economic analyses, policy advice and 
operations. These include the OECD, the World Bank, 
the major regional multilateral development banks, and 
UN agencies such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO). Most would acknowledge that more 
integration is still needed to cover all areas of their work, 
with sufficient priority given to climate risk among other 
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growth challenges. The multilateral development banks 
in particular are under some pressure to reconcile the 
demands they face to finance high-carbon infrastructure 
with their own analysis of the benefits, both national 
and global, of lower-carbon pathways. Attention is also 
now focusing on how finance provided by export credit 
agencies can be shifted to support efforts to tackle  
climate change.95  
In other cases there is potential to do much more. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, has 
acknowledged that climate change is a long-term risk to 
growth in its overall analysis of the global economy, and 
has contributed valuable research and policy advice on 
key aspects of fiscal policy, including fossil fuel subsidy 
reform.96 But climate risk is not a routine element in 
its country advice or its influential economic analyses, 
such as the annual World Economic Outlook. There is 
now considerable scope for the IMF, along with other 
major international organisations concerned with the 
management of the global economy, such as the OECD 
and the multilateral development banks, to reflect climate 
risk assessment and reduction in their national economic 
surveillance processes and assessments. 
It is particularly noticeable how small a role climate risk 
has played in many of the major international and regional 
forums where countries gather to discuss international 
economic cooperation and coordination.97 The G20 group 
of nations, for example, has developed a strong interest in 
long-term and infrastructure investment as a key driver of 
growth. Yet it has not integrated this either with concern 
about climate risks to investment or the potential for low-
carbon infrastructure. At some of its high-level meetings 
the G20 has acknowledged the potential for “green 
growth” strategies to combine economic development 
with climate risk reduction, and in 2009 agreed to the 
phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.98 But 
its attention has been sporadic at best, and on some 
occasions it has deliberately sought to avoid discussing 
climate issues. This is no longer a tenable position. 
Economic growth and climate risk are intertwined; 
institutions and forums charged with fostering economic 
cooperation – particularly those involving the countries 
with the highest emissions and emissions growth – should 
be engaging deeply with the challenges discussed in  
this report. 
7. Recommendations
In light of this analysis, the Global Commission 
recommends that:
• All countries should seek to achieve an equitable, 
ambitious and durable international legal agreement 
on climate change at the UN conference in Paris in 
2015, with a view to sending a clear policy signal to 
businesses and investors about the future low-carbon 
direction of the global economy. Such an agreement 
should include a long-term goal to reduce annual GHG 
emissions to near zero or below, should establish a 
coordinated five-yearly policy-making cycle with a 
clear downward trajectory underpinned by long-term 
economic strategies, and should support developing 
countries to move towards lower-carbon and climate-
resilient development paths.
• Developed countries should increase financial 
support for developing countries’ efforts to tackle 
climate change, drawing up a clear pathway to meet 
the goal to mobilise US$100 billion per year in public 
and private finance by 2020, and exploring new 
and innovative sources of revenue. Multilateral and 
national development banks, including the new banks 
created by emerging economies, should increase 
their lending for low-carbon and climate-resilient 
infrastructure, both in direct lending and to leverage 
much greater flows of private investment. 
• Governments should negotiate the elimination, 
where possible, of import tariffs on low-carbon 
goods and services, and agree more rapid resolution 
processes for trade disputes in low-carbon sectors. 
They should strengthen the environment-related 
elements of Regional Trade Agreements. 
• Major international businesses in globally traded 
sectors with high emissions, such as food and forest 
commodities, HFCs, oil and gas, steel and cement, 
should seek to establish and strengthen cooperative 
initiatives to reduce their GHG emissions. 
• Institutional investors and stock exchanges should 
establish a timetable to move towards mandatory 
integrated corporate reporting of financial and non-
financial performance and risks on a standardised 
model. They should require institutional and other 
major investors to undertake mandatory climate risk 
assessments. 
• All global economic institutions and forums should 
integrate climate risk into their economic growth 
and development strategies and discussions. The 
G20 should make climate risk assessment and 
reduction a standing agenda item in its meetings. 
Major international organisations concerned with the 
management of the global economy, such as the IMF, 
the OECD and the multilateral development banks, 
should reflect climate risk assessment and reduction 
in their surveillance processes and policy assessments 
as relevant to their mandates.
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PART III: GLOBAL ACTION PLAN
Introduction
Each chapter of this report sets out detailed 
recommendations for governments and other 
decision-makers. The Commission highlights here 10 
transformative areas for action which can deliver both 
significant economic benefits and reduce the risk of 
dangerous climate change. These actions offer the 
prospect of better economic growth that yields multiple 
benefits, including more energy, water and food security; 
improved rural livelihoods; better protection of the natural 
world; less traffic congestion; improved air quality and 
public health; as well as lower greenhouse gas emissions 
and more climate-resilient growth. A key insight of the 
New Climate Economy study is that these actions make 
good economic sense, even before their climate benefits 
are considered. Countries can gain a net benefit from 
implementing the proposed actions, when these full 
advantages are considered. Implementing these actions 
can achieve at least half of the cuts in global greenhouse 
gas emissions required by 2030 to stay on a 2°C pathway, 
and potentially up to 90%, if they are implemented in the 
right way. Taken together, the proposed actions would 
send a strong, clear signal that the world economy is 
poised to follow a low-carbon direction. They would 
reduce uncertainty for investors, businesses, farmers and 
consumers, and so reduce the transitional costs of change. 
The more countries, cities and businesses that move in 
this direction, the easier it is for everyone to join in. But 
the right policy signals and actions are needed urgently. If 
this does not happen now, there is a serious risk that we 
will lock in a growth path with significant risks of climate 
change and weak economic performance. Delaying action 
will also increase the costs of changing course later on.
The world can only achieve such ambitious, deliberate 
change with leadership and collaboration. It requires 
the engagement of economic decision-makers at every 
level. Countries have different abilities to realise the 
opportunities highlighted here. Developed countries 
must show real leadership: both politically, demonstrated 
through their own domestic ambition, and by supporting 
the development and dissemination of low-carbon 
technologies and know-how, providing finance, and 
strengthening the financial institutions needed to bring 
down the cost of low-carbon investments. Developing 
countries will require financial, institutional and 
technological support. For their part, developing countries 
already account for two-thirds of global greenhouse 
gas emissions, largely as a result of emissions growth in 
rapidly industrialising, middle-income economies. Global 
emissions reductions on the scale required will therefore 
only be possible if all countries participate in delivering 
these actions.
By implementing the recommendations in this Global 
Action Plan, the world’s economic decision-makers have 
a remarkable opportunity to set the world on the path to 
better growth and a better climate. The Commission urges 
them to seize it. 
The Commission’s 10 recommendations are divided  
into two main classes of policy action. Recommendations 
1 to 6 define the necessary conditions for better, 
low-carbon, climate-resilient investment and growth; 
recommendations 7 to 10 focus on the potential for 
sectoral change which drives future growth and lower 
climate risk, specifically in urban, land use and  
energy systems. 
The Commission recommends that national, sub-national 
and city governments, businesses, investors, financial 
institutions and civil society organisations:
1. Accelerate a low-carbon transformation 
by integrating climate action and risk into 
strategic economic decision-making. 
The risk of severe climate change threatens long-term 
economic growth and business performance. Tackling 
climate change, meanwhile, presents significant 
opportunities to strengthen growth and create new 
market opportunities. Business leaders have started to 
monitor, report on and actively manage the climate (and 
other environmental) impacts of their activities, under 
increasing scrutiny by civil society. Companies, cities and 
countries are strengthening their approaches to climate 
resilience and adaptation. Many long-term investors 
recognise that accounting for and addressing material 
environmental, social and governance factors is part of 
their fiduciary duty. At the same time, there is a growing 
risk that investments in fossil fuel assets may be “stranded” 
(prematurely scrapped or devalued) as countries move to 
a low-carbon growth model. 
Decision-makers must integrate climate and other 
environmental impacts into their core economic, 
development and investment strategies. Taking a long-
term approach, integrating these factors into investment 
and business decision-making, can reduce investor risk 
without harming performance. 
To implement and support this recommendation:   
• All governments, major businesses, investors, 
development, commercial and investment banks, 
international organisations and leading cities should 
work to integrate climate risks and opportunities into 
their economic and business strategies.
• Climate and other environmental risks should be 
integrated into core decision-making tools and 
practices, such as economic and business models, 
policy and project assessment methods, performance 
indicators, discounting approaches used to estimate 
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the present value of longer-run costs and benefits,  
risk metrics and models, resilience tests, and  
reporting requirements.
• Businesses, working through associations such 
as the World Business Council on Sustainable 
Development and with government regulators, should 
adopt and implement a standardised Integrated 
Reporting Framework for financial and non-financial 
performance that includes the assessment of climate 
risk and risk reduction strategies. Investors and stock 
exchanges should require companies to disclose  
this information. 
• Investors, working together with government 
financial regulators, should develop an approach to 
report transparently on the carbon exposure of their 
assets, and the potential risk of stranded fossil fuel 
assets. Banks should deepen their assessment of 
environmental and carbon risk in transactions.
• The G20 should make climate risk assessment and 
reduction a standing agenda item in its meetings. 
Major international organisations concerned with 
the management of the global economy, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, and the 
multilateral development banks, should reflect climate 
risk assessment and reduction in their surveillance 
processes and policy assessments as relevant to  
their mandates.
2. Create the confidence needed for 
global investment and climate action by 
entering into a strong, lasting and equitable 
international climate agreement.
The Commission’s analysis shows that the national actions 
and investments that drive economic growth can also 
reduce climate risks. But these actions and investments 
will not be sufficient to put economies worldwide on a 
pathway to avoid dangerous climate change. International 
cooperation is essential to reduce the global cost of 
climate action; provide sufficient finance and technological 
cooperation to support developing country action; send 
a strong and predictable signal for investment; open 
opportunities for trade; and ensure a level playing field to 
reduce competitiveness impacts. An international climate 
agreement is also essential to provide the confidence 
and trust needed for robust domestic policy action. The 
Commission urges leaders to achieve a strong, lasting and 
equitable agreement under the United Nations in 2015.  
To implement this recommendation: 
• All governments should set clear, ambitious medium-
term (e.g. 2025) national greenhouse gas emission 
targets or actions which reflect their common but 
differentiated responsibilities as part of the global 
agreement. They should agree a global goal which 
would achieve annual greenhouse gas emissions of 
near zero or below in the second half of the century. 
The agreement should include a mechanism for 
regular strengthening of national commitments 
(e.g. on five-yearly cycles); financial and technical 
support for developing country action, and strong 
commitments to take adaptation action. It should 
also provide as much transparency as possible to 
build confidence. The principles of equity and a just 
transition should underpin the agreement, reflecting 
the current and changing circumstances of countries.
• Developed countries should commit to a clear 
pathway for meeting the Copenhagen commitment 
to mobilise US$100 billion annually by 2020 in 
public and private finance, combined with greater 
transparency of financial commitments and identifying 
new sources of finance (see Recommendation 5). 
• Businesses, cities, states, national governments, 
international institutions and civil society 
organisations should complement an international 
agreement by strengthening (and where appropriate, 
creating) cooperative initiatives to drive growth  
and climate risk management in key sectors, including 
major commodities and energy-intensive  
industries, and to achieve the phase-out of 
hydrofluorocarbons (HCFs).
3. Phase out subsidies for fossil fuels and 
agricultural inputs and incentives for  
urban sprawl.
Globally, subsidies and tax breaks to fossil fuel exploration, 
production and consumption amount to around 
US$600 billion each year, while support to agricultural 
input use in advanced and some emerging economies 
totals about US$80 billion per year. Phasing out these 
subsidies can enhance economic efficiency; free up 
scarce government resources to provide better targeted 
support to low-income households and affected workers; 
build agricultural resilience; and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Perverse subsidies which support urban sprawl, 
either explicitly or implicitly, also persist in many countries, 
for example through under-pricing of the conversion of 
land, and of the costs of public services and infrastructure 
provision. These subsidies can be costly to taxpayers. To 
implement this recommendation:
• National governments should develop comprehensive 
plans for phasing out fossil fuel and agricultural 
input subsidies. These should include enhanced 
transparency and communication and targeted 
support to poor households and affected workers. 
Governments should explore innovative approaches 
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with multilateral and national development banks on 
how to finance the upfront costs of reducing 
• the impact on low-income households, and enhancing 
service delivery as or before the subsidies are  
phased out. 
• Export credit agencies should agree to restrict 
preferential terms for new coal power stations to 
supercritical or more efficient technologies, and then 
to a timetable for phasing out these preferential 
terms, initially for middle-income countries, and then 
for low-income countries (See Recommendation 5).
• Regions, cities and urban development ministries 
should phase out incentives for urban sprawl. 
Multilateral and national development banks should 
work with countries to redirect infrastructure 
spending away from projects that enable urban 
sprawl and towards more connected, compact and 
coordinated urban development.
4. Introduce strong, predictable carbon prices 
as part of good fiscal reform. 
Carbon prices are an essential element in the growth 
and climate policy mix. About 40 countries and over 20 
sub-national jurisdictions now apply or have scheduled 
to apply carbon pricing through a carbon tax or 
emissions trading scheme (ETS). A further 26 countries 
or jurisdictions are considering carbon pricing. The 
Commission finds no evidence that implementing 
carbon pricing slows growth. The effective use of 
the significant fiscal revenues generated – including 
to reduce other taxes – can instead boost growth 
and employment, even in the short term, and be 
used to address distributional concerns. Even a low 
initial carbon price, if accompanied by transparent 
mechanisms to increase it over time, can send a strong 
signal, incentivising producers and consumers to shift 
behaviour and to invest in assets, technologies and 
systems that foster low-carbon growth. 
A broader policy approach is needed to complement 
carbon prices, in order to address other market failures 
and overcome the inertia embedded in the current, high 
carbon economy, and to strengthen investor confidence. 
This broader policy mix includes market-based resource 
pricing; better regulations and performance standards; 
improved information provision; targeted research 
and development; public procurement policies; and 
measures that can reduce government-induced regulatory 
uncertainty. This uncertainty is the enemy of low-carbon 
jobs, investment and growth.  
To implement this recommendation:
• National governments should introduce a strong, 
predictable and rising carbon price as part of fiscal 
reform strategies, prioritising the use of resulting 
revenues to offset impacts on low-income households 
and finance reductions in other distortionary taxes. 
• Major companies worldwide should apply a “shadow” 
carbon price to their investment decisions and 
support governments in putting in place well-
designed, stable regimes for carbon pricing. 
• Efficient regulations, standards and other approaches 
should be used to complement pricing; these can also 
help to put an “implicit” price on carbon for countries 
where a low level of carbon pricing is politically 
difficult, preferably with flexibility built in to facilitate 
the introduction of explicit pricing later.
• National governments should seek to reduce policy 
risk and uncertainty by enacting domestic climate 
legislation, modifying their national plans and 
developing the institutional arrangements needed 
to meet their commitments under an international 
climate agreement (see Recommendation 2).
5. Substantially reduce the capital cost of low-
carbon infrastructure investment.
It is estimated that around US$90 trillion will need to be 
invested globally in infrastructure between now and 2030 
to deliver economic growth and prosperity. Analysis for 
this report suggests that a low-carbon growth path can be 
achieved with only slightly higher investments. The lower 
operating costs of clean energy choices may partially 
or fully offset the cost of any additional investments in 
the energy sector. New and existing finance tools and 
approaches are needed to ensure there is sufficient 
access to finance for the up-front investments in low-
carbon and climate-resilient cities, transport, land-use 
and energy. Given the capital intensity of many low-
carbon technologies, reducing the costs of capital could 
significantly boost investment in these solutions.
To implement this recommendation:
• Donors, multilateral and national development banks 
should review all lending and investment policies and 
practices, and phase out financing of high-carbon 
projects and strategies in urban, land use and energy 
systems, except where there is a clear development 
rationale without viable alternatives. 
• Governments and multilateral and national 
development banks should help provide new and 
existing financing institutions with the right skills 
and capacity to provide finance for low-carbon and 
climate-resilient infrastructure, and to leverage 
private finance towards this goal. This would 
include finance for distributed off-grid and mini-grid 
renewable energy solutions, as a contribution to 
achieving universal access to modern energy services.
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• In rapidly developing countries facing high interest rate 
environments, governments should shift their support 
models for low-carbon infrastructure more towards low-
cost debt, and away from price subsidies such as feed-in 
tariffs. This could reduce the total subsidy required, 
bring down the cost of energy over time, and in some 
cases, may reduce the need to buy imported fuel.
• Governments, working with investor groups, should 
help develop well-regulated asset classes, industry 
structures and finance models for renewable and 
other low-carbon energy investment which match 
the needs of institutional investors, and identify and 
remove barriers that may hamper these investments. 
6. Scale up innovation in key low-carbon and 
climate-resilient technologies and remove 
barriers to entrepreneurship and creativity.
Innovation is a fundamental engine of long-term growth 
in a world with environmental constraints. Advances 
in material sciences and digitalisation, in combination 
with new business models, are already driving a low-
carbon industrial transformation. Digital technologies 
have shifted services on-line, enabled end-users to 
actively manage their energy demand, and driven the 
rapid development of car- and other asset-sharing 
schemes. Together with new materials, they have the 
potential to enhance resource productivity in energy-
intensive sectors such as construction and transport, 
to drive the development of new industries, such as 
advanced manufacturing and renewables, and to enable 
the development of a more “circular” economy in which 
materials are recycled and reused. Strong market signals, 
together with smart government interventions, will be 
needed to unleash the power of innovation to accelerate 
the transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy 
and make it cheaper. 
To implement this recommendation:
• Governments of the major economies should at least 
triple their energy-related research and development 
expenditure by the mid-2020s, with the aim of 
exceeding 0.1% of GDP; in addition, all countries 
should develop coordinated programmes to support 
the development, demonstration and deployment 
of potentially game-changing technologies, such as 
energy storage and carbon capture, use and storage.
• Governments should strengthen the market pull for 
new low-carbon technologies, in particular through 
carbon pricing, performance-based (technology-
neutral) codes and standards, and public  
procurement policies. 
• Governments should work individually and together 
to reduce barriers to the entry and scaling of new 
business models, particularly around “circular 
economy” and asset-sharing mechanisms, and trade in 
low-carbon and climate-resilient technologies.
• Donors, working with international agencies such as 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR), the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization and national research institutes in 
emerging and developing countries, should double 
investment in agriculture and agroforestry R&D, with 
the aim of boosting agricultural productivity, climate-
resilient crop development and carbon sequestration.
• Learning from the CGIAR experience, governments 
should collaborate to establish an international 
network of energy access “incubators” in developing 
countries. These should enhance public and private 
R&D in off-grid electricity, household thermal energy, 
and micro- and mini-grid applications. They should 
also boost business model development for new 
distributed energy technologies. 
7. Make connected and compact cities the 
preferred form of urban development.
More connected, compact and coordinated urban 
development based on mass public transport would raise 
infrastructure productivity, reduce the costs of providing 
public services, and could lower urban infrastructure 
spend by over US$3 trillion from 2015-2030. When 
managed well, connected and compact cities are not only 
more productive, they are also more competitive, socially 
inclusive, resilient, safer, cleaner, and generate lower 
greenhouse gas emissions. Urban sprawl, on the other 
hand, has significant economic, social and environmental 
costs, estimated for example to cost the equivalent of 
US$400 billion each year in the United States alone. 
Regeneration and densification of inner urban areas can 
help to rejuvenate sprawling cities by making them more 
attractive for people and investment. 
To implement this recommendation:
• Finance and urban planning ministries, national 
development banks, and city mayors should commit 
to a connected, compact and coordinated urban 
development model, centred on mass transport and 
resource-efficient service delivery.
• City authorities, working with national and sub-
national governments, should identify ways to 
increase locally generated revenues to finance and 
incentivise smarter, more compact and resilient urban 
development – for example, through greater use of 
congestion charging, parking fees, land development 
taxes and land value capture mechanisms. 
• Governments, multilateral and national development 
banks should work with major cities and private 
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banks to strengthen the creditworthiness of cities. 
They should work together to set up a global city 
creditworthiness facility.
• Networks of cities, such as the C40 Cities Climate 
Leadership Group and ICLEI (Local Governments 
for Sustainability), working with international 
organisations and the private sector, should create 
a Global Urban Productivity Initiative aimed at 
significantly increasing the economic and resource 
productivity of the world’s cities. The initiative could 
start by developing, quantifying and disseminating 
best practices in boosting urban productivity, 
and support countries’ efforts to put sustainable 
urbanisation at the heart of their economic 
development strategies.
8. Halt the deforestation of natural forests  
by 2030.
Forests are a vital natural resource. They support the 
livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people who live 
in or next to them or work in forest-related sectors. As 
well as timber and other forest products, they provide 
watershed protection, flood management, landslide 
prevention, climate mitigation, recreation, eco-tourism, 
and other economically valuable services. Between 2000 
and 2010, the world lost on average 13 million hectares 
(gross) of forest each year to deforestation, as a result of 
the clearing of forests and subsequent conversion of land 
to other uses, most commonly agriculture. Some estimates 
suggest that conserved and sustainably managed forests 
can generate US$6,000 or more in aggregate value per 
hectare per year through the provision of a wide array of 
goods and services. 
To implement this recommendation:  
• Developed countries should scale up payments for 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD+) to at least US$5 billion per 
year, focused increasingly on payments for verified 
emission reductions. 
• Forest-rich countries should take steps to correct the 
governance and market failures undermining natural 
forest capital, including actions to improve land use 
planning, secure tenure, strengthen enforcement of 
forest laws, and increase transparency concerning the 
condition and management of forests. 
• Companies and trade associations in the forestry 
and agricultural commodities sectors (including palm 
oil, soy, beef, and pulp and paper) should commit to 
eliminating deforestation from their supply chains by 
2020, for instance through collaborative initiatives 
such as the Consumer Goods Forum and its Tropical 
Forest Alliance 2020 and in cooperation with banks 
willing to incorporate environmental criteria into their 
trade financing instruments. 
9. Restore at least 500 million hectares of lost 
or degraded forests and agricultural land  
by 2030.
About one quarter of the world’s agricultural lands are 
presently degraded. Lost or degraded forest landscapes 
account for about two billion additional hectares. 
Restoring these will enhance the natural capital that 
countries, companies and citizens depend upon for 
economic growth and human well-being. Restoring 
degraded agricultural land and lost or degraded forest is 
important for food security, biodiversity, rural livelihoods, 
watershed protection, and climate mitigation and 
adaptation. Restoring agricultural land can also reduce 
pressures on forested lands. 
To implement this recommendation:
• National governments, working together with 
farmers, development banks, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and the private sector, should 
commit to and start the restoration of at least 150 
million hectares of degraded agricultural land, to 
bring this back into full productive use – for example, 
through agroforestry measures. This target could 
be scaled up over time, based on learning from 
experience. It is estimated that such action could 
generate additional farm incomes of US$36 billion, 
feed up to 200 million people and store about 1 billion 
tonnes of CO
2
e per year by 2030. 
• Governments, with the support of the international 
community, should commit to and start the 
restoration of at least 350 million hectares of lost 
or degraded forest landscapes through natural 
regeneration or assisted restoration by 2030. This 
could generate an estimated US$170 billion per year 
in benefits from ecosystem services, and sequester 
1-3 billion tonnes of CO
2
e per year.
10. Accelerate the shift away from polluting 
coal-fired power generation. 
Coal remains the energy source for over 40% of the 
global electricity supply. The widespread use of coal partly 
reflects the use of subsidies which lower or hide the 
costs of fossil fuel use. Coal is often the most lightly taxed 
fuel, despite being the most polluting. Globally, pollution 
from burning coal is a contributor to the estimated 3.7 
million premature deaths each year from outdoor air 
pollution, and coal production also causes ill health, 
injuries and deaths. There is increasing risk of coal sector 
assets becoming “stranded” as climate and other policies 
make them less profitable. In the absence of clear policy 
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signals, however, this risk is often beyond the investment 
horizon of capital providers. There are already signs that 
investments in a low-carbon energy system are rising, with 
renewables increasingly cost-competitive in a number 
of countries and regions, and increasing recognition of 
the costs savings and energy security benefits of energy 
efficiency improvements. But behavioural and institutional 
barriers often limit their uptake, so further policy action 
and assistance is needed to ensure more rapid deployment 
of low-carbon solutions.
To implement this recommendation:
• Governments should reverse the “burden of proof” 
for building new coal-fired power plants, building 
them only if alternatives are not economically feasible, 
bearing in mind the full range of financial, social and 
environmental costs associated with coal power. 
• All countries should aim for a global phase-out of 
unabated fossil fuel power generation by 2050. 
High-income countries should commit now to end the 
building of new unabated coal-fired power generation 
and accelerate early retirement of existing unabated 
capacity, while middle-income countries should aim to 
limit new construction now and halt new  
builds by 2025. 
• Governments and multilateral and national 
development banks should adopt an integrated 
framework for energy decisions, ensuring a public 
and transparent consideration of all the costs and 
benefits of different energy sources, including 
demand management options, based on consideration 
of supply costs, energy security impacts, health costs 
of air pollution, other environmental damage, risks 
related to climate change and technology  
learning curves.
• Governments worldwide should steer energy sector 
investments towards renewable energy sources, 
energy efficiency improvements and other low-carbon 
alternatives. Energy efficiency should be prioritised, 
given the cost savings and energy security  
benefits it provides. 
• Governments should provide assistance to support 
workers, low-income households and communities in 
coal-dependent regions and carbon-intensive sectors 
that may be adversely affected by these policies, 
to ensure a just transition with appropriate social 
protection measures, using where relevant some of 
the revenues from carbon taxes and subsidy reform 
for this purpose.
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